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ABSTRACT 
A Child’s Call: Braiding Narratives in the Face of Racial Violence 
by  
Corinne Bancroft 
 
“Hey, Mr. Cunningham,” Scout Finch calls to the single familiar face in a crowd of 
white men as she stands at the door of a jail that wrongly incarcerates a Black man for a 
crime that she does not understand.  This famous scene from Harper Lee’s To Kill A 
Mockingbird (1960) where an eight-year-old stops a lynch mob is both object and emblem of 
my dissertation project.  “A Child’s Call: Braiding Narratives in the Face of Racial Violence” 
draws on critical race theory and cognitive approaches to literature to show how 
contemporary American writers focus on child characters as instruments for narrating 
violence and violation, and how these children’s voices call adult characters and actual 
readers toward a heightened sense of social responsibility.  While Scout’s pleasantries move 
the adult characters toward an everyday responsibility of caregiving, other such child 
protagonists face insurmountable barriers: in Toni Morrison’s The Bluest Eye (1970), all 
adults fail to hear the cry of ten-year-old Pecola Breedlove, and many, such as the white 
storekeeper fail to “see” her.  Despite their differing political analyses and aesthetic projects, 
both Lee and Morrison trust a child with the task of reimagining the world and realigning our 
ethical responsibilities.   
The figure of the child leads me through two genres that constitute community 
through narration: the United States’ variation on the bildungsroman, the coming of age 
novel, and an emerging genre I term the “braided narrative”— novels in which multiple 
 vii 
narrators tell distinct, often incommensurate, stories that form a complicated constellation in 
the same storyworld.  When Morrison pairs Claudia and Pecola with The Bluest Eye’s other 
narrators, she begins to forge this new genre that diverges from the style of Mockingbird’s 
single narrative voice.  Like Morrison, Louise Erdrich, Ana Castillo, Nicole Krauss, and 
many others take up this strategy of casting child-narrators among a chorus of raconteurs 
who narrate different, conflicting stories.  “A Child’s Call” proposes a developmental 
relationship between the coming of age novel and the braided narrative for the reading of 
American literature.  My project proposes a feminist and anti-racist progression of ethical 
positions staged in these two genres; the relationship between the reader and the protagonist 
develops from one of identification, to one of maternal care, and finally, to one of empathy 
that both acknowledges and requires difference. 
viii 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
  
“Hey, Mr. Cunningham,” Scout Finch calls to the single familiar face in a crowd of 
white men that she doesn’t know is a lynch mob as she stands at the door of a jail that 
incarcerates a Black man for a crime that he did not commit and that she does not understand 
(174). The eight-year-old’s call cuts through the masculine tension and attendant posturing.  
Her ignorance of the power distributions between the races pauses potential racist violence.  
Instead, her naïvely civil address activates the adult’s relational responsibilities born of 
everyday proximity despite her unwitting evocation of the economic relationship between the 
Cunninghams and the Finches.  The child’s words implore the grown-up to respond to those 
fragile social attachments that are too easily trumped by macro-historical hierarchies of race, 
class, and gender.  This moment of cross-generational recognition proposes relationships that 
call us towards a responsibility that is simultaneously necessitated and made possible by 
difference—both that unassailable distance between the other with whom we have chosen to 
be most intimate and the phenotypical distinctions that have petrified into the historical 
antagonisms that underwrite exploitation and genocide.  In this famous scene from Harper 
Lee’s To Kill a Mockingbird (1960), the child’s call moves the adult towards an everyday 
responsibility of caregiving that forecloses that night’s violence.  I begin with Scout, a child-
narrator whose barefoot charm channels her nineteenth-century predecessor, Huck Finn, 
because her late-night pleasantries are perhaps the most famous.  But other such child 
protagonists face insurmountable barriers: in Toni Morrison’s The Bluest Eye (1970), all 
adults fail to hear the cry of ten-year-old Pecola Breedlove, and many, such as the white 
storekeeper fail to “see” her.  Like Jean Toomer’s “Portrait in Georgia,” Morrison’s novel 
exposes the uneven power relations, racial, gendered and classed, that render Pecola invisible 
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but that make white girls like Scout legible.  Morrison describes the storekeeper’s “total 
absence of human recognition” almost as a perceptual error: “[s]omewhere between retina 
and object, between vision and view, his eyes draw back, hesitate, and hover.  At some fixed 
point in time and space he senses that he need not waste the effort of a glance” (48).  The 
calculus of the color line compounded by class and gender has been so inscribed in 
America’s imaginary that it not only controls the very perception of other people, but also 
programs potential responses to their words.  
Despite their differing political analyses and aesthetic projects, both Lee and 
Morrison trust a child with the task of reimagining the world and realigning our ethical 
responsibilities.  Both authors foreground a potential attachment between child and adult that 
balances the vulnerability of the young with the adult’s capacity to care.  Age is the only 
difference that time requires all creatures to traverse, and relating across this difference 
developmentally begins with bonding rather than fear.  If Scout’s call to Mr. Cunningham 
can stand for Mockingbird’s appeal to American readers to overcome prejudice, can the 
narrative voice of children like The Bluest Eye’s Claudia and Pecola call readers toward more 
responsive relationships? The lives of those like Tom Robinson, who was shot by police, and 
Pecola Breedlove, whose mind shatters while her body survives violation, mark the stakes of 
these questions.  “A Child’s Call” shows how contemporary American writers focus on child 
characters as instruments for narrating violence and violation, and how these characters’ 
voices call adult characters and actual readers toward a heightened sense of social 
responsibility.  
While the majority of the project focuses on the affective, cognitive, and ethical 
affordances of the child-narrator, the figure of the child has lead me to recognize a new type 
 3 
of novel: the braided narrative— distinct stories told by different narrators that twine together 
to form a single novel.  When Morrison pairs Claudia and Pecola’s first-person sections with 
The Bluest Eye’s omniscient narration, she begins to forge this new genre that diverges from 
the style of Mockingbird’s single narrative voice.  The braided narrative fosters a sense of 
community, but does not take the nation as the horizon. Often, the braided narrative 
emphasizes connections among characters bound in everyday interactions even though those 
characters may not be members of the same imagined community; nor are we asked to 
identify with a single character.  Because the narrative perspectives of the braided narratives 
are necessarily multiple, they train readers to hold several—often incommensurate— 
subjectivities in our mind simultaneously.  The formal attention to different experiences that 
are often engendered by historical antagonisms eschews the abstractions that usually 
facilitate national affiliation. In this way, the braided narrative places an ethical burden on the 
reader: to engage a multiplicity of narrative perspectives, sometimes on the same event, and 
to understand the interdependencies that constitute community.   
“A Child’s Call” focuses on literature written by women authors in the United States 
after 1960—primarily, Harper Lee’s To Kill A Mockingbird (1960), Toni Morrison’s The 
Bluest Eye (1970), Louise Erdrich’s The Round House (2012) and The Plague of Doves 
(2008), and Nicole Krauss’s The History of Love (2005).  I chose these novels not only 
because they were written by some of the most luminary authors of our time (both in terms of 
the aesthetic and political accolades they have won and the innovative new techniques they 
have developed), but also because they all deal with questions about racial violence that are 
as urgent today as they were in 1960.  Mockingbird, The Bluest Eye, and The Round House 
all raise the issue of rape, a form of gendered violence used to subjugate classes and races.  
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This particular form of violence depends on the intersection of gender and race and has been 
used historically not only to subjugate women but also to perpetuate racial hierarchies and 
hatreds.  Kimberlé Crenshaw, a key voice in the field of Critical Race Theory, used sexual 
violence as a key site to explain her foundational theory of “intersectionality.”  Crenshaw 
proposes “intersectionality as a way of framing the various interactions of race and gender in 
the context of violence against women of color” (1296).  Crenshaw’s theory makes clear the 
social mechanisms that allow for conviction of Tom Robinson for a crime he didn’t commit 
in Mockingbird and facilitate the violence against women of color in The Bluest Eye and The 
Round House.  While The Plague of Doves and The History of Love do not engage explicitly 
with sexual violence, they do ask how we can reimagine social relations in a world shadowed 
by collective trauma such as the genocidal conquest that formed the United States and the 
Holocaust in Europe.  Lee, Morrison, Erdrich, and Krauss turn to the voice of the child to 
invite readers to set aside preconceived notions of social structures and realign attachments.    
Much of “A Child’s Call” focuses on To Kill a Mockingbird, The Bluest Eye, and The 
Round House as emblematic of many novels with child-narrators.  The narrative strategies 
that Lee, Morrison, and Erdrich develop in these important novels demonstrate the affective, 
cognitive, and ethical affordances of the child-narrator because these three novels all do to 
readers what Scout did to the lynch mob.  By featuring child-narrators, these three novels 
refocus our attention on intimate, familial attachments moving us away from learned forms 
of power relations and implore us to rethink historical antagonisms.  This is easily measured 
by these novels’ educational popularity.  As political scholar Peter Augustine Lawler says, 
“To Kill a Mockingbird comes close to exhausting what we have of an edifying common 
culture.  Virtually all students come to college having read the book and/or seen the film, and 
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it’s impossible to find a second book of any consequence about which that can be said” 
(263).  Because Mockingbird plays such an important role in our shared imaginary, it is 
important to understand the work that it does.  Likewise, high school and college syllabi 
often feature The Bluest Eye and if the National Book Award winning novel, The Round 
House is not yet a classroom staple, it soon will be.  All three novels are transcendent in 
some sense—they have taken on a greater role in the American imaginary than the texts 
themselves.   
Moreover, all three authors envisioned a greater social purpose for their respective 
novels than simply entertaining readers or becoming canonical cornerstones.  Harper Lee 
wrote, in defense of her novel being banned, “[s]urely it is plain to the simplest intelligence 
that ‘To Kill A Mockingbird’ spells out in words of seldom more than two syllables a code of 
honor and conduct, Christian in its ethic, that is the heritage of all Southerners” (22).1  
Through her novel, Lee hoped to impart an ethical code particular to her religion and region.  
While Morrison’s understanding of the power systems differs from Lee’s, an ethical 
imperative also motivates her writing.  Unlike Lee, who posits a specific code, Morrison asks 
                                                
1 Lee wrote this in a letter to the editor of Richmond News-Leader on January 15th 1966.  The 
newspaper had been hosting a debate about the banning of the novel in the Hanover County 
public schools.  In another act of archaic chivalry, the newspaper wrote “In most 
controversies, the lady is expected to have the last word.  In this particular discussion, it 
seems especially fitting that the last word should come from the lady who wrote “To Kill A 
Mockingbird.”  With Miss Lee’s letter, we call a halt, at least temporarily, to the publication 
of letters commenting on the book-banning in Hanover County” (22).  Harper Lee’s To Kill A 
Mockingbird Harold Bloom.   
 6 
readers to face a suffering too often ignored and see the intricate systems that cause it.  
Morrison explained that she wrote The Bluest Eye because the literary archive lacked such a 
book: 
I wanted to show how painful this constructed horrible racism was on the 
most vulnerable people in the society, girls, black girls, poor girls.  And that it 
really and truly could hurt you.  So that’s what I was looking for, and no one, I 
thought, had written that book, so since I really wanted to read it, I thought I 
should write it.2   
Morrison wrote her first book to reveal something about how society works and to invite 
readers to join her in that understanding.  Erdrich takes this project further in The Round 
House; she doesn’t just want readers to understand something they might be ignorant of, she 
wants them to advocate for change.  In an interview she explained, the novel “should be 
about the complexity of this [the law], but if I go around say on a book tour and say ‘I’ve just 
written a book about jurisdictional issues!’ [Audience laughs.] Exactly.  You need a thirteen-
year-old boy.  You need a thirteen-year-old boy!”3  The exigency behind The Round House, 
like Mockingbird and The Bluest Eye, comes from a sense of ethics.  While Lee wanted to 
communicate the sense of pride she felt about her religion and region, and Morrison wanted 
to show the violent effects of racism, Erdrich wanted to expose the injustice and violence 
caused by the U.S.’s relationship with tribal governments.  In Erdrich’s interview, she names 
a fundamental tool for achieving this complicated purpose—a child-narrator.    
                                                
2 Toni Morrison made this comment in an interview on “The Colbert Report” 11/19/2014.  
3 Louise Erdrich shared this insight in an interview with Samson Occom Professor of Native 
American Studies Bruce Duthu at Dartmouth.   
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 Child-narrators, as the term implies, are a particular type of character narrator that are 
children during a significant part of the novel’s story and narrate from that perspective of 
innocence and naivety.  Structural narratologists distinguish between the story time (the 
chronological time of the narrated events) and discourse tome (the timing of the telling).  To 
be a child-narrator, the narrator must be a child at the time of the recounted events (at the 
level of story), but not necessarily at the time of the recounting (at the level of discourse).  
While many child-narrators start out as children and grow into adults, like Pip in Great 
Expectations, Jane in Jane Eyre, and the heroes of many other bildungsromane, the 
characters I focus on here are children for the majority of the novel’s story.  In Mockingbird, 
for instance, Scout grows from six to almost nine while her brother matures from ten to 
thirteen.  The child-narrators in The Bluest Eye are nine, ten, and eleven, and Joe Coutts is 
the thirteen-year-old boy Erdrich needed for her story.  These writers position their characters 
on the brink of puberty, and many novels include a scene either where the character 
witnesses or experiences the changes we associate with that time of life.  Morrison begins 
The Bluest Eye with Pecola’s first menstruation; Lee includes a similar menstruation scene in 
Go Set A Watchman, the rumored first draft of Mockingbird; and, Erdrich balances the 
seriousness of The Round House with Joe and his friends’ sexual giddiness.  More 
importantly, these writers outline the potential for an intellectual maturation of their 
character-narrators as well.  In the first chapter of The Round House, for instance, Joe 
exchanges a look with his father that he describes as “odd, as if between two grown men, and 
I had not been ready” (7).  While the maturing narrator recognizes the difference in his 
father’s gaze, his sentences still reflect the innocence of a child; Joe writes, “I had actually 
just turned thirteen.  Two weeks ago, I’d been twelve” (3).  Scout observes a similarly 
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sudden change in Jem when he turns twelve, “[o]vernight it seemed, Jem had acquired an 
alien set of values and was trying to impose them on me: several times he went so far as to 
tell me what to do” (131).  The growth in both Jem and Joe comes with a deep sense of moral 
responsibility.  Just as the boys feel responsible for the world they are increasingly coming to 
understand, Morrison’s Claudia connects her own actions to her friend’s tragedy: “[w]e 
thought, at the time, that it was because Pecola was having her father’s baby that the 
marigolds did not grow” (6).  The coming of age in all these novels marks the transition from 
childhood to adolescence—a loss of innocence that does not quite lead to adulthood, but does 
lead to a loss of childhood.   
Although I call them child-narrators, Scout Finch, Claudia MacTeer, and Joe Coutts 
are only children at the level of the story and not discourse.  All three narrate their novels at 
what Joe calls “a removal of time,” a time in the future after the narrated events have taken 
place (142).  This narrative complexity is common among child-narrators—Scout, Claudia, 
Joe, like Marcel Proust’s unnamed narrator all recount their childhood experiences from a 
point in the future, not always, but often as ambiguous as the waking dreams where Proust 
starts his novel.  Scout begins Mockingbird at a point after Jem had broken his arm and after 
it had healed, at a time “[w]hen enough years had gone by to enable us to look back on them, 
we sometimes discussed the events leading to his accident” (3).  Likewise, Claudia opens The 
Bluest Eye by naming the events that close the novel and explaining that “[i]t was a long time 
before my sister and I admitted to ourselves that no green was going to grow from our seeds.  
Once we knew, our guilt was relived only by fights and mutual accusations about who was to 
blame” (5).  Although Joe does not have a sibling to debate the events leading up to the 
climax of his novel, he also begins The Round House with a metaphoric allusion to its close: 
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“[s]mall trees had attacked my parents’ house at the foundation” (1).  In all three novels, this 
narrative gesture introduces a fractal melody, so that upon re-reading, as Kenneth Burke 
writes in “Psychology and Form,” “[i]n the opening lines we hear the promise of the close, 
and thus feel the emotional curve even more keenly than at first reading” (26).  
The complexity of narrating “at a removal of time” also sets up a narrative voice that 
is not quite unreliable.  On the one hand, Scout, Joe, and Claudia narrate from a child’s 
mindset that doesn’t understand the wrongs they name.  The poignancy of this innocence 
resonates in the questions they ask: “what’s rape?” eight-year-old Scout asks Atticus (153); 
“[w]hy did she smell like gas?” thirteen-year-old Joe asks his aunt after she confirms that his 
mother had been raped (15).  On the other hand, narrating, as they do at a time after the 
narrated events have taken place, these characters actually do know the horrible answers to 
these questions, but they often narrate as if they don’t.  They are, at once, unreliable because 
they “tell[] us less than he or she knows,” as James Phelan describes a type of unreliability, 
and honest to their experience (52).  This technique of narrating “at a removal of time” 
allows these child-narrators to sometimes craft scenes where readers fill in what a child 
cannot know and at other times explain to us what we have refused to see.   
Although Mockingbird, The Bluest Eye, and The Round House share this common 
narrative strategy, it may seem unbalanced to pair them.  As of now, Mockingbird is the 
widest read and most popularly embraced.  Morrison and Erdrich, on the other hand, are 
more accomplished writers.  They have each won important literary awards and are 
frequently taken up in the academy.  While Mockingbird is hard to escape in grade school, 
one should not graduate the university without reading Morrison or Erdrich.  Further, 
Morrison and Erdrich’s analysis of race relations are sharper and more incisive than Lee’s 
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attempt. (In addition to their own insights, Morrison and Erdrich inform their novels with 
their perspectives as members of particular aggrieved communities and their works are more 
recent than Lee’s.)  That The Bluest Eye and The Round House are not yet as widely popular 
as Mockingbird is a symptom of the lingering racism in our society.   
Each of these three novels, narrated by a child, faces the violence born of a historical 
hatred that has shaped the United States’ national psyche. In To Kill A Mockingbird, “[i]t was 
Jem’s turn to cry” when the Maycomb County jury convicted Tom Robinson of rape despite 
Atticus’s unimpeachable defense; Jem’s “angry tears” turn to a moral outrage that demands 
an explanation from his father (242).  How could an American court, which Jem had just 
heard his father praise as our nation’s “great levelers,” convict a man so clearly innocent, 
physically incapable, in fact, of a crime meriting the death penalty (233)?  Atticus’s 
explanation of what he understood all along as an “inevitable verdict” conflates the jury with 
a lynch mob (253).  His association stems not from the similarity of masculine ritual between 
courtroom proceedings and Klan meetings,4 nor from the similarity of spectacle between 
Mockingbird’s trial and restoration era lynchings, but rather, because of the collective illogic 
of the jury.  Atticus explains to Jem and Scout, “[t]hose are twelve reasonable men in 
everyday life, Tom’s jury, but you saw something come between them and reason.  You saw 
                                                
4 In Go Set A Watchman, the grown-up Scout witnesses her father attend a citizen’s council 
meeting, the Klan’s daytime cousin, from the same vantage point in the “Colored balcony” 
where she would view his famous defense Mockingbird.  Because that scene explicitly 
references the Mockingbird trial, we can infer that Lee’s artifice connected the two 
proceedings.  Importantly, however, in Go Set A Watchman, Lee lets Atticus win Tom an 
acquittal (109).     
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the same thing that night in front of the jail” (251).  That “thing” which neither Atticus nor 
Lee can name is the national neurosis of white supremacy and the accompanying fantasy 
where the cry rape requires the Pavlovian response of murder.  It is the insane post-bellum 
fear of miscegenation, ironic in the wake of plantation rape that incites white mobs to 
brutality and murder.  As Crenshaw avers, “[t]he well-developed fear of Black sexuality 
served primarily to increase white tolerance for racial terrorism as a prophylactic measure to 
keep Blacks under control” (1272).   To Kill A Mockingbird confronts this tradition of racist 
violence by connecting the courtroom ritual to the public spectacle of a lynching, 
acknowledging that the drunken violence of midnight terrorism can and has become 
inscribed in the whiteness that frames the letter of the law.   
The Bluest Eye, on the other hand, examines the personal, psychological effects of 
living in a society structured by such violence.  By paring Claudia, the first child-narrator, 
with omniscient sections that give substance and insight into the other characters, Morrison 
reveals the social factors that push characters towards violence.  She asks readers to condemn 
the actual (in contrast to the false allegation in Mockingbird), incestual rape that stands as the 
novel’s central crime, but not without facing what made the father fail.  By braiding together 
different narrative voices, Morrison forces her readers to care for Cholly, too, even as we 
condemn him for his crime.  Further, Morrison forecloses a trial that plays such an important 
role in Mockingbird, a decision that begins where Mockingbird ends: a U.S. court is not a site 
of justice for Black people.5  While Lee leaves progress in the hands of Atticus’s progeny 
                                                
5 Morrison does not include a trial in Beloved (1987) either; a choice that is even more 
glaring given that she based her novel on the historical Margaret Garner who did have a 
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(“[i]f you had been on that jury, son, and eleven other boys like you, Tom would be a free 
man”), Morrison demonstrates how the mental structures that make possible bad laws and 
decisions, like Mockingbird’s verdict, also make it easy for violence to find its way onto the 
backs of society’s most innocent and vulnerable members (251).    
Mockingbird and The Bluest Eye pair easily, bookending as they do the decade known 
for social change and shifting social awareness in the United States.  While Lee and 
Morrison’s texts explicitly raise issues of rape and incest, the subtext of both novels 
addresses the 1954 Brown v Board of Education, which some connected, in a Freudian leap, 
to miscegenation, a fear Lee summarizes in Go Set a Watchman (2015): “because you go to 
school with one Negro, or go to school with them in droves, you’ll want to marry one” (270).  
In the racial rubric of Mockingbird, Mayella’s desire for a Black man causes the central 
conflict that instigates Atticus’s case.  As both literary scholar Anne Anlin Cheng and 
cultural historian Robin Bernstein notice, The Bluest Eye dialogues with the doll tests that 
were central to the testimony of the lawyers who argued Brown.  Through these experiments, 
psychologists Kenneth and Mamie Clark found that both white and Black children prefer 
white dolls and had thus adopted the bias at the core of segregation.  As I’ll discuss in greater 
detail in “Chapter Three: ‘Hey, Mr. Cunningham,’” Morrison has Claudia detail the painful 
transition from the self-preserving “pristine sadism” she felt for white dolls to the “fraudulent 
love” adults and older girls expect her to feel (23).  The reservation crime mystery of The 
Round House, published half a century later, might seem distant from the racial politics that 
Mockingbird and The Bluest Eye debate, but Erdrich’s novel actually takes up the same 
                                                                                                                                                  
trial—famous because of the legal ambiguity of trying her as a ‘person’ for the crime of 
murder or as ‘property’ under the Fugitive Slave Law.   
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issues of rape and race using the similar strategy of child-narration, but Erdrich targets a 
different set of laws.  Like Lee, she questions the “inevitable verdict” of the court system, but 
like Morrison she refuses a court scene in fierce indictment of the lack of justice of the 
United States legal system.    
What is it about these novels that make them classroom favorites?  These fictional 
child-narrators ask us to consider serious issues, like rape and racial violence that we would 
be reluctant to discuss with their real-life counterparts.  What is it about these novels that 
earned such acclaim, even though they raise some of the United States’ most pernicious 
problems?  For me, the strength of all three novels is as tied up in the emotional work they do 
as it is in the political analyses they offer.  The word’s morphology suggests movement 
outward, and when people want to describe the emotional power of an aesthetic object, we do 
often reach for particular verbs of movement—arrest, touch, and move.  Pieces of art arrest 
us when they make us stop in our tracks and consider them deeply.  Those arresting aesthetic 
objects prevent us from moving forward with our own lives until we process them.  Slightly 
differently, we say a scene is touching when it seems to reach out of the work that contains it 
and affects us.  While these descriptions of art often go hand in hand, the idea of a touching 
moment implies that although it does influence us, we can keep going.  Finally, we often say 
that emotionally powerful books are moving.  When we describe a novel as moving, we 
usually imagine an actual shift from one emotional state to another—this novel moved me to 
tears.  Like the verb to arrest, it imagines the emotional life of a reader as moving forward on 
a track where we, the readers, get to determine our own emotions.   While these three terms 
are often used interchangeably, they actually mean different, and in the case of to arrest and 
to move, opposite things. An arresting novel stops the independent movement forward; a 
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touching novel intervenes in the movement, or at least makes an impression on it, and a 
moving novel redirects it.  Unlike the verbs ‘to arrest’ and ‘to touch,’ the third term, ‘to 
move,’ has currency in the sphere of social change.  While we might also use the verb to 
arrest at a rally with the same denotation of preventing movement, it has a different 
connotation there than it does in the realm of art.  To move on the other hand means the same 
thing in a social movement as it might in a book club.  It suggests that people thought and felt 
one way before they were moved and changed course afterward.  It doesn’t imply social 
change, but it suggests actual motion in that direction.     
While Mockingbird, The Bluest Eye, and The Round House do each of these actions 
for some readers, I associate one predominately with each novel.  To Kill A Mockingbird 
arrests readers the way Scout arrested the lynch mob. 6  Scout pauses, but does not foreclose, 
the racist violence the lynch mob wanted to inflict on Tom Robinson.  Instead, in the 
narrative arc of the novel, this scene merely postpones a violent death, which, in unfortunate 
prophecy, comes through the state apparatus currently responsible for the death of so many 
Black men.  Mockingbird stops to consider racist violence, but then moves forward in terms 
of both plot and emotion to Boo Radley.  In other words, Mockingbird does not create social 
change.  It does hold open the possibility that that change is possible—when Jem grows up— 
but it doesn’t get us there.  Further, Morrison famously wrote about The Bluest Eye that 
“many readers remain touched but not moved” (211).  Readers pity Pecola, but they don’t 
necessarily do something.  We better understand structural racism and the way that violence 
finds its way to the weakest and most vulnerable in society, but as Morrison’s self-critique 
                                                
6 When conferring the Presidential Medal of Freedom to Lee in 2007, George Bush said “To 
Kill a Mockingbird still touches and inspires every reader”.  
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comments readers might not feel complicit in that system.  The Round House, on the other 
hand, moves readers, not only to tears, as the other two novels may do as well, but also 
towards political change.  In 2012, when Erdrich wrote, published, and won the National 
Book award for the novel, white men could rape Native women on tribal lands and walk free.  
Because tribal jurisdiction does not extend to sexual crimes, many men, like the novel’s 
antagonist, prey on Native women, knowing that because of this legal loophole their crimes 
won’t be punished.  In 2013, Congress renewed the Violence Against Women Act with a 
provision that extends tribal jurisdiction, an improvement that responds to the central 
polemic of Erdrich’s novel, and provides, what she calls in a New York Times opinion piece, 
published the day the house took up the act, “a slim margin of hope for justice.”  The Round 
House moves people towards social change.   
Despite Morrison’s disappointment in her first novel, The Bluest Eye is one of the 
earliest novels to help form the braided narrative.  Although Morrison asks her readers to 
condemn the crime she narrates, by switching narrative voices and concentrating on different 
characters’ stories, she forces readers to critically engage with the assailant as well as the 
victim.  While she doesn’t repeat the neat triadic pattern of The Bluest Eye (Dick and Jane 
excerpt, Claudia’s voice, omniscient narration) in her subsequent novels, the weaving 
together of distinct voices has become characteristic of her style.  In terms of polyvocality, 
Erdrich belongs on the shelf next to Morrison.7  At the time of its publication, as many critics 
                                                
7 In her influential essay on the “frustration of narrativity” in Erdrich’s early novels, 
Rainwater writes, 
Love Medicine defies the reader’s effort to locate a conventional plot—a 
temporal sequence of characters’ actions traceable along a ‘constant curve’ 
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pointed out, The Round House was one of Erdrich’s only novels to have a single narrator tell 
a story in chronological order from beginning to end.8  Even considering the stories and 
dreams Joe reports hearing and the complication that he narrates at “a removal of time,” The 
Round House is one of Erdrich’s simplest novels.  While Bakhtin identified the polyvocality 
inherent to the genre of the novel itself, “A Child’s Call” traces how contemporary authors 
like Morrison and Erdrich help to forge a new genre by formally plaiting together different 
narrative threads.   
 “A Child’s Call” proposes a developmental relationship between the coming of age 
novel and the braided narrative for the reading of contemporary American literature.  The 
shift in the figure of the child that I trace in the project proposes a feminist and anti-racist 
progression between these two distinct genres; the ethical position of the reader develops 
from identification, to maternal care, to an empathy that both acknowledges and requires 
                                                                                                                                                  
with a teleological aim (the notion of plot as consisting of beginning, conflict, 
rising action, resolution, ending).  Erdrich’s novels conspicuously lack plot in 
this traditional sense of the term (171). 
Rainwater is not alone in recognizing Erdrich’s distinctive narrative style.  Hertha D. Sweet 
Wong says that Erdrich’s “multiple narrators confound conventional western expectations of 
an autonomous protagonist, a dominant narrative voice, and a consistently chronological 
linear narrative” (88).  Kathleen M. Sands avers of Love Medicine “[t]here is no single 
version of this story, no single tone, no consistent narrative style, no predictable pattern of 
development because there is no single narrator who knows all the events and secrets” (37-
38).   
8 Since then LaRose (2016) and Future Home of the Living God (2017) had single narrators.   
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difference. The bildungsroman is particularly apt, as its theorization suggests, for those who 
are themselves coming of age.  In the coming of age novel, the affective function of a youth 
growing into adulthood is built on identification.  Readers ignorant (or resistant) to the 
complexities of race formation in the U.S. can learn along with the young characters; and, 
reading through the eyes of a child facilitates the embrace of an innocence and idealism that 
is difficult for fictional and non-fictional adults.  The canon of U.S. literature, as indicated by 
National Book Awards, high-school and college syllabi, and qualifying exam lists, shows a 
preference for this genre especially when considering texts by writers of color.  In this 
archive of canonical bildungsromane, protagonists marked by race cannot come of age in 
U.S. society.  The young men in mid-century novels, such as Darcy McNickle’s The 
Surrounded (1936), Richard Wright’s Native Son (1940), Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man 
(1947), and Américo Paredes George Washington Gomez (1990, composed in the 1940s), are 
killed, go underground, or are forced to sell-out.  These young men cannot find a productive 
role in American society while maintaining the politics of their racial identity.  After To Kill 
A Mockingbird in 1960 and especially after The Bluest Eye in 1970,9 a sub-genre of child-
narrators takes center stage; Rudolfo Anaya’s Bless Me, Ultima (1972), Joy Kogawa’s 
Obasan (1971), The House on Mango Street (1984), Sherman Alexie’s The Absolutely True 
Diary of a Part-Time Indian (2007) and Louise Erdrich’s The Round House (2012) feature a 
protagonist only as a child.10  This coed cohort not only indicates an increased inclusion of 
                                                
9 A variant that pairs a young white child with an adult black man has been a favorite in the 
American imaginary since Huckleberry Finn (1885) and Intruder in the Dust (1948).   
10 “A Child’s Call” focuses on works of fiction; I have bookmarked the parallel tradition of 
memoirs and autobiographies such as Anne Moody’s Coming of Age In Mississippi (1968), 
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female protagonists, but also, these child-narrators call adult readers towards an ethos of 
maternal care,11 evoking our potential to provide the sort of care implicit in Donald 
Winnicott’s concept of “holding.”  The bildungsroman is perhaps the most popular and 
politically powerful genre that deals with racism and sexual violation because, although those 
violences were created by adults, we have, as yet, been unable to grow out of them.  
The braided narrative, on the other hand, is what Virginia Woolf might call a genre 
“for grown-up people” because the structure itself requires and engenders more maturity in 
its readers.  The braided narrative is not yet as critically acclaimed or widely taught as the 
bildungsroman, so I hope my this project will focus critical attention on this genre for its 
ethical and aesthetic significance in American literature. Many contemporary American 
braided narratives, such as Nicole Krauss’ History of Love (2005) and Louise Erdrich’s 
Plague of Doves (2008), which I discuss in the final chapter, include child-narrators among 
their multiple raconteurs, and these young people evoke similar feelings as their counterparts 
in the bildungsroman.  However, the structure of the braided narrative creates a constellation 
of interrelated stories that places more emphasis on community relationships than on the 
processes of individuation (as is the case in the bildungsroman).  The ability to see and 
                                                                                                                                                  
Maya Angelou’s I Know Why The Caged Bird Sings (1969), Maxine Hong Kingston’s 
Woman Warrior (1974) for a future complementary project.   
11 I use maternal not to foreclose the potential for fathers or others to care for the young but 
rather to acknowledge the historical and evolutionary tendency for mothers to take on this 
responsibility.  As Nancy Chadorow argues, “the contemporary reproduction of mothering 
occurs through social structurally induced psychological processes,” and the resulting 
gendered psychology of caregiving is important to my project (7).   
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empathize with experiences across identity lines has been associated with subordinated 
groups who have disproportionally been responsible for society’s emotional labor. W.E.B. 
DuBois’ theory of the double consciousness relies on African Americans’ ability to see 
through the veil, and, as sociologist and psychoanalyst Nancy Chodorow explains, western 
society raises girls “with a basis for ‘empathy’ built into their primary definition of self in 
ways that boys do not” (167).  The content of braided narratives exposes this problematic 
history of uneven responsibilities forged through exploited relationships while the formal 
structure both imagines more egalitarian ways of communal responsibility and positions 
readers to participate in this necessary care.  In the braided narrative, readers cannot rely on 
identificatory impulses only; rather, we must imagine a community that requires 
responsibility and dependence.    
In the first chapter, I detail the theoretical perspectives that frame “A Child’s Call.”  I 
begin with Critical Race Studies because, as I hope this prelude has shown, the authors 
discussed in the project engage the uneven social landscape of the United States.  While the 
sociological and legal insights provide an essential context for the work Morrison, Erdrich 
and others accomplish, fiction affords an engagement with the personal, the particular, the 
emotional that can be overlooked in those other disciplines.  For that reason, I follow my 
discussion of Critical Race Studies with a consideration of the interpersonal field in which 
the ethical can emerge.  For me, ethics is an important category that we use to apprehend the 
invisible, but visceral magnetism between people that both entwine us in relational fields and 
push us to develop systems of “ought” for how we might behave in these attachments.  Like 
Emmanuel Levinas, I use ethical to describe that ontological tension that both pre-exists and 
shapes human relationships.  Instead of turning to Western philosophy, which has historically 
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been blind to the epistemological traditions of the authors I discuss and has tended to ignore 
the experiences of women and mothers, I braid post-Freud psychoanalytic work on the 
“matrixial,” and “intersubjectivity” together with the intellectual tradition of “radical 
mothering” and “mothering ourselves” established by lesbian feminists of color in the 1980s.  
While this may seem an odd combination, especially given the justified critiques of exclusion 
and narrow mindedness that scholars of color have mounted against psychoanalysis and 
white feminism, there is actually an important harmony among the theorists I discuss.  By 
engaging them in a single archive, I hope to avoid the pitfalls of racialized silos of 
knowledge, and trace an intellectual tradition that is well-equipped to help us face our 
contemporary socio-political challenges.        
The second chapter “Where is your mother?” is named for the chilling question that 
sets in motion Louise Erdrich’s 2012 novel The Round House.  Here, I pair attachment theory 
with intersectional feminism to consider the ways in which Erdrich, Lee, and Morrison lay 
groundwork for social change by creating a productive tension in the narrative space of a 
missing mother.   While Erdrich’s child-narrator is too young to understand the sexual 
violence that readers may already suspect, the thirteen-year-old does articulate the important 
role his mother plays in setting the rhythm that organizes his life.  Lee and Morrison also 
foreground a mother’s absence in a novel that engages serious social issues. In Mockingbird, 
Scout does not remember her late mother, and in The Bluest Eye, Morrison juxtaposes the 
harsh care of Claudia’s mother with the neglect of Pecola’s, whose maternal energies have 
been outsourced to the white child she’s paid to raise.  Imagery of attachment and maternal 
(in)attention function as proscenium walls framing the political questions that the novels 
stage. While the novels neither represent directly nor enact radical maternal relationships, 
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they do open a possibility for a sort of maternal care that leads towards transformation.  I 
argue that by foregrounding the absent or absented mother, Erdrich, Lee, and Morrison 
engage traditional expectations of maternal care in order to shift readers toward what queer 
Black feminist Alexis Pauline Gumbs calls “the radical potential” of mothering.  
The third chapter “Hey, Mr. Cunningham” turns to the cognitive work of child-
narrators.  The famous jailhouse scene in Mockingbird works because readers have access to 
a social script that Scout does not know.  Likewise, Morrison and Erdrich rely on their 
readers filling in the awful knowledge of rape their child-narrators’ innocence prevents them 
from knowing.  This chapter puts recent work on cognitive approaches to literature in 
conversation with the understanding that interpretive strategies for reading fiction bear some 
relationship to interpreting the world.  As we volunteer contextual knowledge that we want 
the child not to know, we rely on their narration not only for a report of the novel’s events, 
but also for suggestions on how to interpret them.  The asymmetrical relationship that 
emerges between a reader and a child-narrator facilitates a reworking of these interpretive 
strategies often in productive ways.  By mixing the reader’s cultural knowledge with the 
child’s directions, authors can make important shifts in how we read the world; Lee’s 
intervenes in the cultural narrative of lynching, Morrison exposes the power-structures that 
perpetuate violence, and Erdrich’s advocates on behalf of Native women.  
While the second and third chapters discussed the affective and cognitive affordances 
of the child-narrators, the fourth chapter “The Ethics of Killing Birds” critically engages the 
ethical assumptions that emerge in Mockingbird, The Bluest Eye, and The Round House.  
Atticus’s adage that provides the title for Mockingbird serves as a guiding motif for this 
section.  Extending Judith Butler’s question about what makes for a grievable life, I ask how 
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do these novels render certain lives killable?  In other words, why can we shoot all the 
bluejay’s we want, when it’s a sin to kill a mockingbird?  In Mockingbird, Lee renders the 
murder of Tom Robinson as inevitable as the verdict; shot seventeen times, he stands in eerie 
prophecy of the many contemporary victims of police violence.  Morrison’s Cholly dies in 
the same state institution as Lee’s character, but The Bluest Eye dedicates thirty-one pages to 
Cholly’s childhood to make readers attend to the factors that led to his violence and death.  In 
The Round House, Erdrich both acknowledges the epidemic of missing and murdered 
Indigenous women and flips the script to frame the deranged white man as necessary.  While 
Erdrich’s novel does not advocate murder, she does introduce an important interpretive lens 
that may help us see the need to prevent racist, misogynist violence.      
The final chapter, “‘There is no unraveling the rope’: The Ethics of Braided 
Narratives” introduces the formal features and ethical affordances of this emerging genre.  
Many contemporary novels feature multiple narrators who tell distinct, sometimes 
incommensurate, stories. While this narrative strategy is often viewed as a relic of the short 
story cycle tradition or a postmodern trend, I argue that this technique actually constitutes a 
new subtype of the novel that I call the braided narrative. In braided narratives, novelists plait 
together different narrative threads, distinct in terms of both narrator and story, to grapple 
with both the poignant fissure that fractures the most intimate attachments between 
individuals and the chasm that historical violences carve between social groups. This chapter 
focuses on Nicole Krauss’s The History of Love (2005) and Louise Erdrich’s The Plague of 
Doves (2008) to detail the way the braided narrative’s formal features facilitate ethical work 
that requires the recognition of different, often opposing, experiences. By pairing narrative 
theory with cognitive approaches to literature, especially the psychoanalytic concept of 
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intersubjectivity, I highlight the ethical possibilities of this new genre. Recognizing the 
nuances of the braided narrative not only allows us, as critics, to see similarities between 
novels usually read separately, such as Erdrich’s and Krauss’s, but also draws our attention to 
the way this narrative technique can train us, as readers, in a particular form of ethics—one 
that requires us to hold different, sometimes conflicting, perspectives in our minds 
simultaneously.  
What is it about child-narrators that allow them to address such challenging social 
issues and earn such popularity and acclaim?  How do these child-narrators seem to touch us 
even as they raise such fraught social problems?  How does the narrative strategy of a child’s 
voice move readers to see our shared world differently?  What difference does it make to 
twine the voices of children together with other, distinct narrators in the braided narrative?  
“A Child’s Call” traces how the child-narrators motivate affective responses that lay the 
foundation for ethical interventions.  Reorienting the reading of contemporary American 
literature around the figure of a child and the braided narrative may help us imagine our way 
through some of our gravest social problems.  While the violence of our society results from 
a history of subjugation and hate, there is, as Erdrich says of the legal victory associated with 
The Round House, “a slim margin of hope for justice.”  Perhaps, the perspective of the child, 
paired with the critical harmony of multiple voices in the braided narratives, can help readers 
learn to read the world differently.  As Claudia says at the beginning of Morrison’s first 
novel, “[T]here s really nothing more to say—except why.  But since why is difficult to 
handle, one must take refuge in how” (6).     
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CHAPTER ONE: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
 
 “Incident” 
Once riding in old Baltimore,  
    Heart-filled, head-filled with glee,  
I saw a Baltimorean  
    Keep looking straight at me. 
Now I was eight and very small,  
    And he was no whit bigger,  
And so I smiled, but he poked out  
    His tongue, and called me, “Ni-----.” 
I saw the whole of Baltimore  
    From May until December:  
Of all the things that happened there  
    That’s all that I remember. 
— Countee Cullen (1925) 
 Incidents like the one narrated in Countee Cullen’s poem mark much literature and 
life in twentieth-century United States.  The hostile enjambment of racist hate interrupts the 
gleeful, innocent nursery rhyme of childhood.  The Baltimorean child’s slur, heavy with the 
un-absolved history that he might not know, colors both the speaker and his memories of that 
old city.  Cullen is not alone in turning to his childhood to communicate the harm caused by 
social structures: sociologist-visionary W.E.B. DuBois, novelist-philosopher Toni Morrison, 
and poet-activist-theorist Audre Lorde, offer similar encounters in their various genres to 
help readers understand and resist the mechanisms of racial antagonisms.  Beginning with 
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these four childhood scenes will help trace the theoretical background of “A Child’s Call.”  
First, the engine oil of white supremacy is the gaze—the look of white people simultaneously 
enacts race, recall the repetition of “look, a Negro!” in Franz Fanon’s Black Skin White 
Masks (1967), and renders the resulting power structure seemingly outside the looker.  As 
many scholars have explained, race has been constructed in the United States through laws, 
social mores, and fiction, but it is both perpetuated through and rendered invisible through 
perverted modes of vision.   Second, while the gazing white people might be ignorant of the 
force and history of their own hateful stares, the people who become the target of those 
glares understand the mechanics of society’s racial rubric almost immediately.  The “gift” of 
seeing the invisible structure that renders the racial hierarchy of the U.S. in full color 
manifests instantly for the children in these opening interactions.  As is most clear in 
Morrison’s scene, it is more difficult for adults, especially those who profit from these power 
structures, to see this uneven logic that organizes our society.  Third, and most important, it is 
not only in childhood that this “revelation first bursts upon one” as DuBois says, but also it is 
from the perspective of a child that these theorists, and many others, choose to share that 
knowledge (1).  “A Child’s Call” questions not only why the verbal emerges as an important 
sphere to address a problem that clings to the visual, but also, why the voice of the child 
proves an effective narrative strategy for addressing issues of race in the United States.   
 First, at the beginning of the twentieth-century, W.E.B. DuBois tells a story from his 
own childhood to introduce his theory of the double consciousness. DuBois recalls, 
In a wee wooden schoolhouse, something put it into the boys’ and girls’ heads 
to buy gorgeous visiting-cards—ten cents a package—and exchange.  The 
exchange was merry, till one girl, a tall newcomer, refused my card, — 
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refused it peremptorily, with a glance.  Then it dawned upon me with a certain 
suddenness that I was different from the others; or like, mayhap, in heart and 
life and longing, but shut out from their world by a vast veil. (2) 
DuBois’s school-hood classmate communicates racist contempt with a glance.  Young 
Dubois understands in an instant the full breadth of knowledge communicated in this gaze, a 
hatred and hierarchy seemingly imperceptible to those who look.  The meanness and 
meaning of this refusal strikes DuBois with the reality of “the problem of the Twentieth 
Century… the problem of the color-line,” a problem he will spend his life explaining and 
solving (v).  His adult self explains, “the Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and 
gifted with second-sight in this American world, — a world which yields him to true self-
consciousness, but only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other world” (2).  
Metaphors of vision pervade DuBois’s explanation of the double consciousness.  While the 
white glance communicates racism, it cannot see through the veil, a one-way mirror that 
affords those within the ability and curse to see double.  In DuBois’s analysis, Black folk can 
see simultaneously the society that constructs blackness and the world inside the veil.  He 
writes, “[i]t is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at 
one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that 
looks on in amused contempt and pity” (2). DuBois situates his lived experience as “bone of 
the bone and flesh of the flesh of them that live within the Veil” as a central component of 
his sociological and philosophical intervention in The Souls of Black Folk.  
 Second, in her first novel The Bluest Eye (1970), Toni Morrison imagines an 
interracial encounter from the 1940s.  As mentioned in the introduction, eleven-year-old 
Pecola visits a shop to buy candy:   
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The gray head of Mr. Yacobowski looms up over the counter.  He 
urges his eyes out of his thoughts to encounter her.  Blue eyes.  Blear-
drooped.  Slowly, like Indian summer moving imperceptibly toward fall, he 
looks toward her.  Somewhere between retina and object, between vision and 
view, his eyes drew back, hesitate, and hover.  At some point in time and 
space he senses that he need not waste the effort of a glance.  He does not see 
her, because for him there is nothing to see.  How can a fifty-two-year-old 
white immigrant store-keeper with the taste of potatoes and beer in his mouth, 
his mind honed on the doe-eyed Virgin Mary, his sensibilities blunted by a 
permanent awareness of loss, see a little black girl?  Nothing in his life even 
suggested that the feat was possible, not to say desirable or necessary. 
“Yeah?” 
She looks up at him and sees the vacuum where curiosity ought to 
lodge.  And something more.  The total absence of human recognition—the 
glazed separateness.  She does not know what keeps his glance suspended.  
Perhaps because he is grown, or a man, and she a little girl.  But she has seen 
interest, disgust, even anger in grown male eyes.  Yet this vacuum is not new 
to her.  It has an edge; somewhere in the bottom lid is the distaste.  She has 
seen it lurking in the eyes of all white people.  So.  The distaste must be for 
her, her blackness.  All things in her are flux and anticipation.  But her 
blackness is static and dread.  And it is the blackness that accounts for, that 
creates, the vacuum edged with distaste in white eyes.  (italics in original 48-
49) 
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Morrison understands racism as “a profound neurosis” that presents first as a perversion of 
perception.12  The white adult’s droopy eyes cannot focus on the Black child’s form.  The 
failure of recognition occurs not in the cognitive processes of pious Mr. Yacobowski’s mind 
but in that indeterminate “time and space” before her image reaches his retinas.13  He cannot 
respond to the “flux and anticipation” that animate the eleven-year-old with the implicit 
invitation for human engagement because his eyes themselves “d[aw] back, hesitate, and 
hover.”  The blue eyes of the store-keeper, the blue eyes of the Mary Jane candies Pecola 
buys, the blue eyes of baby dolls, the blue eyes of little white girls, and the bluest eyes of 
Pecola’s deepest wish become both the location of and figure for the neurosis of white 
supremacy.  By describing racism as a perversion of perception, Morrison not only traces the 
                                                
12 While racism is also many other things—a cultural logic, a political system, a power 
dynamic—I find Morrison’s formulation as a psychological disorder compelling because it 
captures how white supremacy is illogical even as it structures and informs the history of 
Western rational thought.  Like a virus that mutates and evolves to continue infecting host 
organisms, white supremacy adapts to outlast the various political institutions, like slavery, 
that helped to forge it and shifts to survive the movements that sought to destroy it.  Like the 
complexes psychoanalysis uses to describe the development of familial relations, racism can 
play a large role in explaining uneven and deeply entrenched societal relationships.  Further, 
framing white supremacy as an ailment helps explain how we can still be carriers—think 
white privilege—even as we try to recover from it.   
13 Morrison’s allusion to his immigrant history and acquaintance with loss demonstrates an 
incisive analysis of the complexities of assimilation politics WWII era United States when 
she sets her novel.   
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wily way white supremacy structures a skewed set of standards situating itself as epitome, 
but also how this happens seemingly outside of the mind or before cognition of white people 
and others who adopt this mode of sight.  In dwelling on the image of the eye through the 
figurative language of literature, Morrison upends the paradoxical complicity of language in 
white supremacy—although marked racial differences function in part because they seem 
apparent in the visual register, their significance is rendered through language and can only 
exist because of the symbolic order.  Morrison’s decision to address this problem of sight in a 
novel, one of the least visual modes of expression, highlights the power of language and 
harnesses it to resist and expose what it once simultaneously made possible, papered over, 
and ignored.  Further, in The Bluest Eye, the figure of the child and child-narrators become 
the means to make visible the damaging way that language and sight intersect to construct 
race in the United States.  
 Finally, in the 1980s Audre Lorde wrote, “I don’t like to talk about hate.  I don’t like 
to remember the cancellation and hatred, heavy as my wished-for death, seen in the eyes of 
so many white people from the time I could see” (147). Like Pecola who finds “the absence 
of human recognition” in the droopy eyes of the shopkeeper, Lorde has been able to see her 
own destruction in the eyes of white people as long as she could see (49).  In order to explain 
the hatred that she does not want to talk about, Lorde shares a childhood memory.  As she 
and her mother board a subway train in New York City, 
My mother spots an almost seat, pushes my little snowsuited body down.  On 
one side of me a man reading a paper.  On the other, a woman in a fur hat 
staring down at me.  Her mouth twitches as she stares and then her gaze drops 
down, pulling mine with it.  Her leather-gloved hand plucks at the line where 
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my new blue snowpants and her sleek fur coat meet.  She jerks her coat closer 
to her.  I look.  I do not see whatever terrible thing she is seeing on the seat 
between us – probably a roach.  But she has communicated her horror to me.  
It must be something very bad from the way she’s looking, so I pull my 
snowsuit closer to me away from it, too.  When I look up the woman is still 
staring at me, her nose holes and eyes huge.  And suddenly I realize there is 
nothing crawling up the seat between us; it is me she doesn’t want her coat to 
touch.  The fur brushes past my face as she stands with a shudder and holds on 
to a strap in the speeding train.  (147-8)   
Without a word, this white-woman, dressed in dead animals, communicates hate clearly to 
the small child that Lorde once was.  The white woman’s gestures communicate more than 
words can. “Her mouth twitches”; her fingers “pluck”; her hand “jerks”; her nostrils flare and 
her eyes widen; she “shudders.”  The small child, protected from snow, but not from white 
loathing, registers the adjectives and animals associated with these actions: “terrible,” 
“roach,” “horror,” “very bad.”  But this child, so small her mother still can fit her in an 
“almost seat,” already understands that she is the object of this repulsion, the recipient of this 
disgust: “it is me she doesn’t want her coat to touch.”  This white woman executes her hatred 
with a glance, a weighty stare that not only lowers young Lorde’s eyes, a gesture associated 
with shame, but stays with her into adulthood, shaping her understanding of race and affect.   
 These four opening scenes foreshadow the work of the novels discussed in this 
project. They set the stage with the joyous potential of childhood: like the “heart-filled, head-
filled with glee” of Cullen’s speaker, DuBois’s describes his playground exchange as 
“merry,” and Morrison fills Pecola with “flux and anticipation” (2,2,49).  Cullen and Lorde 
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underscore the youthful innocence with their style: Cullen writes in simple metered rhyme 
and Lorde uses sentence fragments to frame the other passengers.  All four writers emphasize 
the smallness of the child, a gesture that alludes both to their vulnerability and their potential 
to reflect society in miniature.  Cullen describes himself as “very small” and the other child 
as “no whit bigger” (5,6).  In her passage, Morrison refers to Pecola as “a little black girl” 
and “a little girl” instead of by her name, and Lorde opens her anecdote with her “little 
snowsuited body” (48, 147). DuBois’s description “wee wooden schoolhouse” recalls the 
words and playthings of small children (2).  The repeated emphasis on the small size of these 
children highlights their fragility and issues an invitation for protection and care that do not 
occur within the scene.  Instead, these four short incidents communicate what it feels like to 
be the target of racism: for Cullen, the eight-year-old’s slur blocks all his other memories.  
For the other three, looks alone accomplish the antagonism: “a glance” shuts DuBois out 
from “their world,” Pecola experiences a “static and dread” in the vacuous stare of the 
shopkeeper and recognizes the “disgust” she has seen “lurking in the eyes of all white 
people,” and young Lorde sees her own “cancellation” in the gaze of “so many white people” 
(2, 49, 147).  These writers juxtapose the youthful vulnerability with the macro-historical 
brutality of racist hate.      
Importantly, the glaring white people don’t seem conscious of their own cruelty—
with the exception of “Incident,” these scenes render white supremacy a function of vision 
not of cognition, and even that Baltimorean child cannot have fully understood his hate.  Part 
of the poignancy of “Incident” stems from the fact that the Cullen’s bigoted child cannot 
fully know the violent history that informs his vulgarity.  Like the pointing child in Black 
Skin, White Masks, the eight-year-old echoes and perpetuates the adult antagonisms.  
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DuBois’s classmate dismisses his visiting-card without a thought, a mechanical rather than a 
considered response.  Likewise, Morrison frames Mr. Yacobowski’s failure to recognize 
Pecola as a problem of perception; the choice not to see the child occurs outside his mind, 
“[s]omewhere between retina and object, between vision and view” (49).  Finally, the furred 
white lady in Lorde’s subway car reacts to the child with the same knee-jerk disgust she 
would a roach.  The slur, the rejection, the vacuum or recognition, and the horror are 
performances that racialize and damage their targets, but, in at least three of the four scenes, 
these performances have stagnated into habits of sight.  I make this observation not to excuse 
these white people of their cruelty, but rather to underscore a pernicious attribute of white 
supremacy: it can perpetuate itself, as DuBois says, “peremptorily, with a glance,” but 
seemingly without a thought (2).   
While all of these incidents illustrate instances of individual prejudice and take place 
before the civil rights movement, the analyses mounted by these authors hold true through 
the era of “color-blindness” that dominated discourse after the 1950s and 60s.  The 
seemingly progressive strategy of not seeing color has the same effect of outsourcing 
responsibility for and understanding of the racial hierarchy that still informs life in the United 
States.  In place of the unmasked contempt of the woman on the subway, the vacant glances 
of unseeing people like Mr. Yacobowski populate a color-blind society.  Sociologist Eduardo 
Bonilla-Silva explains,  
[C]olor-blind racism serves today as the ideological armor for a covert and 
institutionalized system in the post-Civil Rights era.  And the beauty of this 
new ideology is that it aids in the maintenance of white privilege without 
fanfare, without naming those who it subjects and those who it rewards. (3-4) 
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Color-blind racism still depends on the politics of sight, but instead of seeing perversely, this 
ideology professes not to see color at all.   
 Covert color-blind racism damages as much as much as overt, prejudiced stares 
because both perpetuate and hide the mechanics of white supremacy, ignoring while 
participating in the history through which racial hierarchies were constructed and maintained.  
In the late 80s and early 90s, scholars in sociology and legal studies began to trace the way 
race in the United States has been historically and socially constructed.  In 1986, sociologists 
Michael Omi and Howard Winant made the crucial, and today standard, proposal that race is 
not a stagnant, essential attribute of biology or ancestry, but rather a contextually determined 
system of concepts.  Omi and Winant “use the term racial formation to refer to the process 
by which social, economic and political forces determine the content and importance of racial 
categories, and by which they are in turn shaped by racial meanings” (61).  Consider, for 
example, a study conducted by the Pew Research Center on “How the Census Race 
Categories Have Changed Over Time.”  The study assigns a color to each of the “races” 
recorded by the 2010 census: White (blue), Black, African-American, or Negro (pink), Some 
Other Race (gray), American Indian or Alaska Native (yellow), Asian (green), Hawaiian/ 
Pacific Islander (brown), and Hispanic (orange).  The interactive website allows viewers to 
select a decade to see how the census accounted for these races historically.  While the Pew 
study uses contemporary understandings of race and ethnicity to organize their study, the 
census only began using the term “race” in 1880 when social Darwinism and eugenics 
projects gained in influence.14  For the majority of the nineteenth century, the census stuck 
                                                
14 The United States Census Bureau publishes their questionnaires online at 
https://www.census.gov/history/www/through_the_decades/index_of_questions/2010.html.    
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with the language of the visual register and asked about a person’s “color.”  From 1790, 
when the U.S. began taking a census, until 1820, the division was less coded—instead of 
“color” it counted “other free persons” and “slaves.”  The only category that has consistent 
across the centuries is “White,” and we will see how the privileges associated with that race 
have been carefully maintained at the expense of “other persons.” 
We can grasp Omi and Winant’s concept of the fluidity of racial formation by tracing 
the red category, which the Pew study identifies as “Black, African American, or Negro” 
from 1790 when the nation first began taking a census.  From 1790 until 1850, the census 
had two different red categories: “slaves” or “free colored persons,” introducing “colored,” as 
we have seen in 1820.15 In 1850, the census began to distinguish “Black” and “Mulatto” 
people, dividing the categories of both free and enslaved people accordingly.  The 1870 
census reflected the abolition of slavery by eliminating the category of “slave,” but by 1890, 
perhaps a repercussion of the failure of reconstruction, the census added “Quadroon” and 
“Octoroon.” 1900 witnessed a consolidation of all these categories into “Black (Negro or of 
Negro descent).”  While the 1910 and 1920 returned to the “Black”/ “Mulatto” division, after 
1930, the category solidified again as “Negro” or “Black or Negro” until the present.  The 
history of chattel slavery helps us to understand how crucial shifting from one category such 
as “slave” to “Black” can be.  The proliferation of racial categories in at the end of the 
reconstruction era through the additional categories of “Quadroon” and “Octoroon,” which 
indicate one quarter and one eighth “Black” heritage respectively, reveals an effort to 
                                                
15 In 1820 the census began distinguishing between “free-colored males and females” to 
reflect the gendered distinction the census had for whites at that time.  The census stopped 
including gender in the racial category after 1850.   
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reaffirm a racial hierarchy—to construct race.  The past half-century has also witnessed a 
marked increase in racial categories, which reflects contemporary efforts at racialization.  
Although the census allows Asian Americans to distinguish among seven categories, 
Hawaiian/ Pacific Islanders to choose among four, and Latinos to choose among four, the 
Pew study assigns each of these broad categories one color.  Notably, while the Pew study 
assigns Latinos the single color orange, the census recognizes that many Latino people 
identify as white.16  That the census needs to ask a second question to determine whether 
those White people are of “Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish” suggests a contemporary effort to 
construct race.    
 While the census illustrates the historical malleability of racial categories, a multitude 
of other factors, especially the law, contribute to racial construction.  Philosopher Charles 
Mills’s theory of “Racial Contract” offers a broad explanation of this phenomenon.  Drawing 
on enlightenment-era ideas of a “social contract,” Mills proposes that our modern world 
actually functions through a “Racial Contract,” noting that “the social contract tradition that 
has been central to Western political theory, is not a contract between everybody (‘we the 
people’), but between just the people who count, the people who really are people (‘we the 
white people’)” (3).  The United States Constitution, to which Mills alludes, acts as a Racial 
Contract not only because only white men drafted and signed it, but also because it explicitly 
                                                
16 In granting U.S. citizenship to former Mexican citizens, The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo 
1848, effectively recognized these people as White.  History shows that White settlers often 
did not treat the Mexican American landowners as such, but they were counted as White in 
the census.  According to the Pew study, the census introduced “Mexican” in 1930, but 
abandoned the category until 1970.    
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excludes “exclude[s] Indians not taxed, [and] three fifths of all other Persons” from counting 
as people in this new nation (Article 1 Section 2).  This exclusion made possible the founding 
of a “free” nation on stolen land through the labor of enslaved people.  Mills asserts “the 
general purpose of the [Racial] Contract is always the differential privileging of whites as a 
group with respect to nonwhites as a group, the exploitation of their bodies, land, and 
resources, and the denial of equal socioeconomic opportunities to them” (11).  Mills tense 
affirms that despite increased inclusion of nonwhite people in the nation’s democratic 
process (such as the abolition of slavery, the extension of citizenship, etc.) the domination at 
the core of the contract continues.  Importantly, Mills joins DuBois, Morrison, and Lorde in 
identifying the essential role of perverted perception plays in maintaining racial hierarchies; 
he writes the Racial Contract “requires a certain schedule of structured blindness and 
opacities in order to establish and maintain the white polity” (19).  In order for the “Racial 
Contract” to work, white people “ha[ve] to learn to see the world wrongly, but with the 
assurance that this set of mistaken perceptions will be validated by white epistemic authority 
whether religious, or secular” (18).    
Ian F. Haney López contributes to the project of Critical Race Theory to expose the 
way U.S. law has played a central role in constructing race in his book White by Law: The 
Legal Construction of Race (1996).  Haney López isolates citizenship as a key crucible for 
the formation of whiteness because, from 1790 when Congress first passed a naturalization 
law until 1952, whiteness was a prerequisite for citizenship.  While the fourteenth 
amendment did extend citizenship to Black people and reiterate birth-right citizenship, 
immigrants still had to claim to be white in order to naturalize.  Haney López focuses on the 
landmark cases of Ozawa v. United States (1922) where the court denied a Japanese 
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American man citizenship because “numerous scientific authorities” classified him as a 
member of the “yellow race” and United States v. Thind (1923) where the court refused an 
Indian man citizenship despite his membership in the “Caucasian” race (85, 90).  As Haney 
López charts the court’s shift from “science” to the “understanding of the common man” to 
define whiteness, he identifies a consistent investment in that identity, despite—or because 
of—its elusiveness, both in terms of who gets to claim it and how it is defined (90).  In 1993, 
legal scholar Cheryl Harris made the compelling argument that the investment in whiteness is 
actually a property interest.  Harris outlines the history that “attempted the legal conversion 
of Blacks into objects of property” and that barred Native Americans from possessing their 
own lands (1721).  These two seemingly separate regimes of domination conspired to 
construct whiteness as “the characteristic, the attribute, the property of free human beings” 
and “solely through being white that property could be acquired and secured under law. Only 
whites possessed whiteness, a highly valued and exclusive form of property” (1721, 1724).  
Even as civil rights legislation, such as Brown v. Board of Education (1954) worked toward 
formal equality, Harris asserts, it also rendered the uneven patterns of wealth and privilege 
that developed from whiteness as property into a neutral status quo.  Her discussion of 
affirmative action cases such as Regents of the University of California v Bakke (1978) shows 
how the modern iteration of “whiteness as property” is the expectation of the privileges of 
whiteness and the false belief that those benefits are neutral and natural.17 George Lipsitz 
                                                
17 Harris explains, “[t]reating whiteness as the basis for a valid claim to special constitutional 
protection is a further legitimation of whiteness as identity, status, and property. Treating 
white identity as no different from any other group identity when, at its core, whiteness is 
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builds on Harris’s project in The Possessive Investment of Whiteness (1998) by detailing the 
way policies such as urban renewal and practices such as the Federal Housing 
Administration’s white preference in awarding home loans build wealth and opportunities for 
white people at the expense of communities of color, even after the 1960s era celebrated for 
progress.  Lipsitz frames some white people’s inability to see this sociological and economic 
reality as a problem of sight: “[t]he gap between white perception and minority experience 
can have explosive consequences” (20).      
This discussion of the construction of race as a strategy of subjugation does not intend 
to evacuate racial categories of their historic, cultural significance as modes of self-
identification and collective attachment.  Communities that would be racialized in the context 
of the United States always already had distinct cultures, governmental systems, and 
religions that would continue despite the state’s efforts to block them out.  For instance, 
historian Cedric Robinson points to “four centuries or more” of resistance to slavery to 
describe the “specifically African character” of what he will come to call the “Black Radical 
Tradition” (5).  Robinson writes,  
Resistances were formed through the meanings that Africans brought to the 
New World as their cultural possession; meanings sufficiently distinct from 
the foundations of Western ideas to be remarked upon over and over by the 
European witness of their manifestations; meanings enduring and powerful 
enough to survive slavery to become the basis of an opposition to it.  With 
                                                                                                                                                  
based on racial subordination ratifies existing white privilege by making it the referential 
base line. (1775) 
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Western society as a condition, that tradition almost naturally assumed a 
theoretical aspect as well.  (5) 
The Black Radical Tradition both perpetuates an African legacy and is shaped by its 
resistance to Western projects of dominance.  Even as plantation slavery attempted to destroy 
African customs and to prevent kinship structures in both the immediate and extended 
family, enslaved people maintained their heritage through new forms of art such as the 
Sorrow Songs and the oral tradition and developed systems of attachment that affirm 
connections to non-relatives as well as relatives.  Race not only allows for domination in this 
particular context but also signifies and contains cultural values and practices.   
 The incredible importance of the diverse epistemologies and traditions that inhabit, 
sometimes uncomfortably, constructed racial categories can be clarified by turning to the 
context of Indigenous Peoples.  Linguists estimate that at contact (1492), over three hundred 
distinct Indigenous languages, belonging to fifty different language families (striking when 
compared to the three in Western Europe), were spoken in what is today claimed by the U.S. 
and Canada (Mithun).  Each of these languages represents at least one, but often more, 
nation, distinct in culture, political system, religion, etc.  Many tribes have maintained their 
history and traditions and function as sovereign nations, albeit with some restrains, within the 
borders of the settler states.  At the same time, the colonial practices of the U.S. and Canada, 
even while making treaties with individual nations, sought to subsume all under the category 
“Indian.”  Facing similar projects of conquest—genocide, land theft, boarding schools, and 
assimilation policies—forced a shared history and identity for Indigenous peoples that exists 
along side their unique tribal affiliations.    
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Louise Erdrich teaches her readers about the complicated interplay between an 
imposed category and the shared experiences that constitute culture through the child-
narrator of The Round House (2012).  Joe Coutts explains,       
You can’t tell if a person is Indian from a set of fingerprints.  You 
can’t tell from a name.  You can’t even tell from a local police report.  You 
can’t tell from a picture.  From a mug shot.  From a phone number.  From the 
government’s point of view, the only way you can tell an Indian is an Indian is 
to look at that person’s history.  There must be ancestors from way back who 
signed some document or were recorded as Indians by the U.S. government, 
someone identified as a member of a tribe.  And then after that you have to 
look at that person’s blood quantum, how much Indian blood they’ve got that 
belongs to one tribe.  In most cases, the government will call the person an 
Indian if their blood is one quarter—it usually has to be from one tribe.  But 
that tribe has also got to be federally recognized.  In other words, being an 
Indian is in some ways a tangle of red tape.   
 On the other hand, Indians know other Indians without the need for a 
federal pedigree, and this knowledge—like love, sex, or having or not having 
a baby—has nothing to do with government.  (29-30) 
This passage, like much of Erdrich’s prose, is informed by a careful attention to history.  The 
first few sentences reject the traditional, stereotypical clues of identification such as 
fingerprints, physical appearance, and names, but at the same time Joe’s examples of 
fingerprints, police reports, and mug shots belie an institution that still clings to the visual 
register to profile Native people.  The remainder of the paragraph renders a complicated legal 
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history, some of which Eric Cheyfitz outlines in the first part of The Columbia Guide to 
American Indian Literatures of the United States Since 1945 (2006), through the vocabulary 
of a thirteen-year-old.  Joe mentions to the 19th century fetish “blood quantum,” which 
Cheyfitz explains alongside the Dawes Allotment Act, which parceled and privatized land 
belonging to many tribes, a policy that cost these tribes nearly two thirds of their land.18  As 
Joe explains, the government still requires Dawes Rolls or other historical documentation to 
prove that someone is Indian or to deny them that identity.  Lack of federal recognition can 
have damaging consequences; for instance, in Mashpee Tribe v New Seabury Court (1979), 
Federal Court refused the Mashpee’s efforts to reclaim their land because they could not 
                                                
18 The Allotment Act caused such dramatic losses for a few reasons.  First, the U.S. 
government allotted certain individuals 160-acre parcels of land.  While this seems like a lot 
of space, the number of allotments received did not nearly cover the amount of land 
previously belonging to the tribe; the federal government claimed the “surplus land.”  
Second, if the government found the recipient of the Allotment “incompetent,” the 
government could sell the land or appoint a white steward of the land, who could control it 
and ultimately sell it.  Finally, unaware of the importance of property in the capitalist system 
many people chose to sell their Allotment land.  Cheyfitz cites John Collier, the 
commissioner of Indian Affairs who states that through these policies,  “the total of Indian 
landholdings has been cut from 138,000,000 acres in 1887 to 48,000,000 acres in 1934” 
(Cheyfitz cited from Cohen 216).  Not all tribes were allotted.   
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prove tribal status.19  While the hefty first paragraph of this passage speaks to the laborious 
efforts of the U.S. government to construct race, the second brief paragraph affirms a 
different, more self-determined understanding of what it means to be Indian.  While Erdrich 
does not detail the specific content of this “knowledge,” perhaps because it wouldn’t make 
sense or doesn’t belong to those who don’t already have it, she does imply that it has to do 
with attachment and interpersonal connection.       
This detour into Critical Race Theory does not stray as far from the opening incidents 
as it may seem—rather Cullen, DuBois, Morrison, and Lorde know that racism is both 
constructed and interpersonal.  Each writer gestures to this socio-political landscape by 
situating their scene at the sites where racial equality has been legally and socially contested.  
Cullen and Lorde locate their interracial encounters on streetcar and subway train 
respectively, evoking Plessy v Ferguson (1896), which upheld segregation policies.  
Although Cullen and Lorde’s take place before Brown v Board of Education (1954) 
overturned Plessy, the fact that the cruelty they describe occurred in integrated spaces 
suggests that that formal equality is only part of the solution.  DuBois’s memory, which takes 
place in the institution at stake in Brown, also foreshadows the limits of integration.  
Morrison’s story alludes to the lunch counter sit-ins even though her racist shopkeeper serves 
her young protagonist.  By locating their scenes at sites that these authors know or foresee 
will be sites of contestation, they not only acknowledge the power of the law in creating 
change, but also mark its limitations.  These scholars use the voice and figure of a child to 
                                                
19 Cheryl Harris and Ian Haney Lopez both refer to this case as a key example of how racial 
constriction facilitates the accumulation of white wealth.  In 2007, the Mashpee Wampanoag 
Tribe gained federal recognition.     
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invite readers into their political analyses and to move readers to want to participate in the 
change they herald.  DuBois’s childhood anecdote stands as a way of introducing not only his 
theory of the double consciousness, but also his sociological investigation into the macro 
processes that kept African Americans subjugated after the Civil War.  Lorde places her 
memory among several others in an essay that interrogates the way large social structures 
infect individual emotional relationships.  Morrison turns to fiction to make personal the 
large-scale institutional problem of racism.  As we saw in the introduction, she couches her 
motivation for writing the The Bluest Eye in structural terms: “I wanted to show how painful 
this constructed horrible racism was on the most vulnerable people in the society, girls, black 
girls, poor girls.  And that it really and truly could hurt you.”20   
That DuBois, Lorde, and Morrison turn to narrative as a way of drawing readers into 
their political analyses suggests that there is something about that mode that cannot be 
accomplished as well if at all in another type of writing.  An important aspect that sets 
narrative apart, I argue, is the attention to the particular, the personal, and the emotional.  
While all three authors understand and communicate insights about the power systems that 
structure society, they all know that beginning with an individual child, even if that child 
already represents the adult writer, will engage readers in ways macro analyses will not.  For 
me, the increased attention and engagement invited by the particular person is best described 
as ethical—other people, a stranger, a friend, a relative, call to us, making an appeal that 
precedes our awareness of them.  Levinas uses the particularity of the human face to explain 
this ethical attraction; he writes, “[t]he facing position, opposition par excellence, can be only 
a moral summons” and later, “the face opens the primordial discourse whose first word is 
                                                
20 Toni Morrison made this comment in an interview on “The Colbert Report” 11/19/2014.  
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obligation” (196, 201).  The face of another person, which is both like our face and 
necessarily different, not only marks others as incommensurately distinct, but also burdens 
that difference with a “summons,” “obligation” or responsibility.  Unlike Levinas who finds 
the ethical pull between people dark and painful,21 I believe particular personalities and 
situations inflect ethical relationships with different and diverse valances.  For instance, we 
have all felt the imploring gaze of people asking for help on the street, and although they 
usually make their request in explicit sharpie on a cardboard sign, we can still feel their 
summons without reading it.  Although the demand is different, my students report feeling a 
similar pull from me; when I look at them too intensely during class, they sometimes ask, 
“are you calling on me?” This sort of summons, albeit in a different register, resonates almost 
inescapably in the call of a child.  The incidents that opened this chapter are painful in part 
because the white characters not only refuse, but don’t even register the preexisting 
obligation carried in children’s potential to be seen.      
Importantly, there are two different dimensions occurring simultaneously in all these 
scenarios, and both are usually glossed as ethical.  First, there is the relational pull between 
people, the call, the appeal, the summons.  Second, there is an associated “ought,” the content 
of the obligation the called to person should do, which is not necessarily the same as the 
content of the call itself.  For instance, some might say that we ought not give money to 
people on the street who are likely to use it to buy drugs; that my student should not answer 
                                                
21 For Levinas, the ethical force that binds humans is dark and painful; he explains, “[t]he 
epiphany of the face brings forth the possibility of gauging the infinity of the temptation to 
murder, not only as a temptation to total destruction, but also as the purely ethical 
impossibility of the temptation and attempt” (199).         
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in class if she hasn’t done the reading, and that the four Native men in The Plague of Doves 
ought not help the crying child because, if they do, the white settlers “will hang us for sure” 
(63).  The anecdotes that open this chapter also function in both registers—DuBois’s 
classmate fails to see his relational pull and she does not accept his card as she ought.  
Cullen’s Baltimorean, on the other hand, feels some sort of call from the poem’s speaker that 
attracts his gaze throughout the first few lines, but he responds to that invitation negatively 
by demeaning the speaker.  Martha Nussbaum, in her close attention to Henry James, adopts 
a similar distinction.  Expanding on James’ claim in his introduction to Princess 
Casamassima (1908) that complete feeling embraces “power to be finely aware and richly 
responsible,” Nussbaum calls the first ethical dimension, awareness or perception: “[i]t is 
seeing a complex, concrete reality in a highly lucid and richly responsive way; it is taking in 
what is there, with imagination and feeling” (152).  For Nussbaum we do not necessarily feel 
the pull of another by default (the fur-coated lady on Lorde’s subway car certainly did not), 
but rather we must train ourselves to be more attentive and aware, capacities the narrative 
arts especially enhance.  Nussbaum, like James, pairs perception with responsibility, which 
she describes as “a highly context-specific and nuanced and responsive” action (152).  The 
responsible response, for Nussbaum, “could not be captured in a description that fell short of 
the artistic (154).  For Nussbaum both the ability to imagine another’s experience, which is 
central to perception and attention, and the capacity for responsibility can be uniquely 
fostered by novels.   
Like Nussbaum and others, I turn to narrative as an unparalleled mode that can help 
people to first feel and then consider the ethical tension associated with particular human 
attachments.  As Nussbaum puts it “certain truths about human life can only be fittingly and 
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accurately stated in the language and forms characteristic of the narrative artist” (5).  What 
the face does for Levinas’ theory, narrative does for Adam Zachary Newton.  Newton 
explains in Narrative Ethics (1995), “narrative situations create an immediacy and force, 
…[a] call, and response that bind narrator and listener, author and character, or reader and 
text” (13).  Just as Levinas asserts that our ethical responsibility to another precedes our 
recognition of them,22 Newton explains, “[l]ike persons, texts present and expose themselves; 
the claim they make on me does not begin with dedicating myself to them, but rather 
precedes my discovery of the claim” (22).  In affirmation of Nussbaum’s observation, this 
argument about claims that preexist recognition and discovery is clearer perhaps in narrative 
than it is in philosophical texts.  In The History of Love, the first narrator Leo cries out with 
an appeal to be seen: “[A]ll I want is not to die on a day when I went unseen” (4).  This plea 
precedes the reader’s discovery of it in the sense that Krauss published his words on that 
page regardless of whether any individual reader chooses to open the novel or not.  Even in 
narrative situations that don’t request recognition as explicitly as Leo does, a similar call 
echoes insofar as all novels are invitations to be read.  In narrative and novels, the appeal 
transcends the plea of particular characters—instead writers create a series of plot 
                                                
22 In Otherwise Than Being Or Beyond Essence, Levinas writes, “[t]he neighbor concerns me 
before all assumption, all commitment consented to or refused.  I am bound to him, him who 
is, however, the first one of the scene, not signaled, unparalleled; I am bound to him before 
any liaison is contracted.  He orders me before being recognized.  Here there is a relation of 
kinship outside of all biology, ‘against all logic.’  It is not because the neighbor would be 
recognized as belonging to the same genus as me that he concerns me.  He is precisely other.  
The community with him beings in my obligation to him.  The neighbor is a brother” (87).   
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circumstances, discourse tensions, and story instabilities; they develop relationships among 
characters, between reader and characters, and between the reader and the story world in an 
effort to share a feeling and then a sense of responsibility that cannot be engendered in any 
other way.23  
The intersection of interpersonal ethics and large-scale socio-political critique is the 
key site where the texts discussed in this project do their work.  Racial formation in the 
United States is always already an ethical project in that it has systematically created 
structures that refuse the summons of others—recall that the 1790 census distinguished 
“White” people from “other free persons” and “slaves.”  As we have seen, the beneficiaries 
                                                
23 Walter Benjamin offers another example of a call that precedes recognition or even 
existence when he writes, “[b]y giving names, parents dedicate their children to God; the 
names they give do not correspond—in a metaphysical rather than etymological sense—to 
any knowledge, for they name newborn children” (69).  In place of knowledge, the names 
that we call our children carry with them inflections of expectations and obligations.  In The 
History of Love, for instance, Alma’s parents name her “after every girl” in the book-within-
a-book also called The History of Love (35).  Although her parents do not know that the 
protagonist in the fiction-within-a-fiction was based on Leo’s child-hood sweetheart, Alma 
feels reality of the love captured in the prose as a summons.  After reading Leo’s novel, 
Alma writes, “the more I thought about it, the more I thought that she also must have been 
someone.  Because how could [the author] have written so much about love without being in 
love himself.  With someone in particular” (108).  Alma treats this discovery as a call; almost 
as soon as Alma decides her namesake could have been real she decides “to look for her” 
(109).    
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of this racial order have developed strategies for outsourcing responsibility for this system to 
the ocular—either by accomplishing it with a glance or by claiming blindness to it.  The 
particular scenes of interpersonal, interracial encounters reaffirm the ethical nature of socio-
political power structures. I began with excerpts from sociology and philosophy to show that 
the strategy of turning to a particular child’s voice is not limited to fiction.  The remainder of 
the project concentrates on narrative fiction and novels in particular because, like Nussbaum, 
I feel that this mode is most apt to describe responsible responses.  Before turning in the 
remaining chapters to the major texts of “A Child’s Call,” I will dwell on a patchwork of 
theories from post-Freudian psychoanalysis and the intellectual tradition started by 1980s 
feminists like Audre Lorde.  
WHERE DO ETHICS COME FROM?   
Deep in the past during a spectacular cruel raid upon an isolate Ojibwe village 
mistaken for hostile during the scare over the starving Sioux, a dog bearing 
upon its back a frame-board tikinaagan enclosing a child in moss, velvet, 
embroideries of beads, was frightened into the vast carcass of the word west 
of the Ottertail river.  A cavalry soldier, spurred to human response by the 
sight of the dog, the strapped-on child, both vanishing into the distance, 
followed and did not return. 
— Louise Erdrich “Father’s Milk” 
“The radical potential of the word ‘mother’ comes after the ‘m.’  It is the 
space that ‘other’ takes in our mouths when we say it.  We are something 
else.” 
— Alexis Pauline Gumbs  
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In Louise Erdrich’s short story “Father’s Milk,” which opens Antelope Wife (1998) 
and Antelope Woman (2016), the sight of a baby and a dog move a cavalry soldier to defect 
from the genocidal army.  In her later novel The Plague of Doves (2008), an infant’s cry calls 
a murderer to stop his bloody rampage, and in The Round House (2012) the safety of a 
toddler releases the testimony that identifies and condemns the rapist.  Erdrich’s description 
of the pull between potential caregiver and desperate child captures the ethical situation 
central to this project— a tension between people that bears a sense responsibility even if it is 
undefined.24 This section uses this opening scene from “Father’s Milk” as well as another 
instance of adoption in Tracks to introduce some key terms that will provide a foundation to 
“A Child’s Call.”  The moment that precipitates the soldier’s turn from violence 
demonstrates feminist psychoanalyst Bracha Ettiger’s theory of the “matrixial,” a sphere of 
interpersonal interconnection and links that provides a supplementary model of subject 
formation to traditional phallus-oriented theories.  The cavalryman’s care of the adopted 
infant demonstrates a form of what Alexis Pauline Gumbs, in the tradition of Audre Lorde, 
describes as “radical mothering.”  In the 1980s, Lorde proposed “mothering ourselves” as a 
model for positive interpersonal relationships, a mutual affirmation that many of the novels 
discussed represent in the friendship of their characters and foster among their readers.  
Understanding how novels might influence their readers can best be imagined through 
Jessica Benjamin’s theory of “intersubjectivity,” which builds Donald Winnicott’s concept of 
                                                
24 Levinas understands an ethical appeal in this sense.  He describes this relation as “an 
unexceptionable responsibility, preceding every free consent, every pact, every contract” 
(Otherwise Than Being Or Beyond Essence 88). 
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“potential space.”  Both psychoanalytic concepts harmonize with Lorde’s proposition and 
together create a theoretical foundation for the project.  
THE MATRIXIAL      
If we move past the first paragraph of “Father’s Milk,” we see that the soldier began 
his turn before seeing the child.  As he pulled his bayonet out of the crumpled body of the 
infant’s grandmother, he cannot avoid the eyes of the dying woman: “[h]is gaze was drawn 
into hers and sank into the dark unaccompanied moment before his birth.  There was a word 
she uttered in her language.  A groan of heat and blood.  He saw his mother, yanked the 
bayonet out with a huge cry, and began to run” (299).  In a paradoxical description of the 
ethical bind between people, Erdrich describes the cavalryman as entering the eyes of his 
victim where he encounters his own isolation in the embryonic space of his mother’s womb.  
The ability of the elder to connect with the soldier even in the moment of her murder pushes 
him to the time before his birth.  While the semantic content of the dying woman’s Ojibwe 
appeal is lost on him, the force of her word is not.  In violent parallel to his own birth, he 
emerges from his union with the grandmother’s gaze, separates his sword from her abdomen, 
and sees his own mother’s face before running away from battle.  “That was when he saw the 
dog,” Erdrich continues, and the invitation of the orphaned infant gives shape and purpose to 
an action already begun.  Erdrich’s account of the ethical appeal sounded in the child’s cry 
affirms that the claim of the other is an inverse and imperfect echo of one’s own earliest 
dependency.   
This epigraph illustrates the “matrixial” ethics that cause the solider to turn from the 
massacre and rescue the child, and, as the title implies, nurse her from his own breast.  
Feminist painter and psychoanalyst Bracha Ettinger has resurrected the Latin etymology of 
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“matrix” to propose a model of subjectivity based on our shared experiences in the womb.  
To put a complicated theory simply, Ettinger proposes the “matrixial” as a “supplementary 
possibility” to the phallus-oriented model of development and object-relations that has 
dominated psychoanalysis (47).  Just as the dying woman’s gaze recalls for the solider a pre-
birth memory, Ettinger’s theory of “[t]he matrixial is modeled on a certain conception of 
feminine/prebirth psychic intimate sharing, where the womb is conceived of as a shared 
psychic borderspace” (140).  Ettiger posits the psychic connection between a fetus and its 
mother as a model for potential human relatedness not as a prerequisite or determining 
experience.  In Erdrich’s prose, the soldier encounters his own pre-natal memory inside the 
gaze of the dying woman.  Later, the woman herself confesses in another character’s dream 
that she “stared him back in time, to when he was defenseless, before his birth” (262).  
Knowledge of prenatal vulnerability facilitates the fleeting, but powerful connection between 
adults.   
For Ettiger, the “matrixial” is a framework for understanding the way that human 
subjectivity is built on connections and linkages with others rather than separation from 
them.  Ettiger explains, 
I have termed this layer the matrixial stratum of subjectivization, proposing a 
matrixial subjectivity-as-encounter as a beyond-the-phallus feminine field 
related (in both men and women) to plural, partial, and shared unconscious, 
trauma, phantasy, and desire having imaginary and symbolic impact (and not 
only an ex-sistence in the Real). (64) 
While Ettiger is careful to articulate the relationship between the “matrixial” and previous 
psychoanalytic accounts of subject development, her theory offers both genders the 
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possibility of shared psychic experience—of interconnection and understanding, albeit partial 
and plural.  In “Father’s Milk,” the death trauma of the dying woman imperfectly recalls the 
birth trauma of her murderer.  Our experiences of partial connectedness in the womb make it 
possible for us to conceive of psychic relatedness as adults as well.  Ettiger continues, 
I have suggested that if—alongside traces of objects—we conceive of traces 
of links and relations, from the angle of a co-emerging I and non-I prior to the 
I versus others, then there arises a different kind of passageway proper to 
these links (which are then not taken for objects), attributable to particular 
processes of transformation.  (64)  
In place of the other-as-object theory present in some schools psychoanalysis, Ettiger makes 
the feminist gesture of proposing traces of links, echoes of attachment, that begin as the 
uneven relationship between a mother and an unborn child, but can extend into a matrix of 
interconnection of the “I” with “Other unknown non-I(s)” (87).  The soldier’s impossible 
intrauterine memory and his mother’s face frame the moment of the murder, the ethical claim 
the woman speaks in her own language and precede his desertion from the colonizing army 
and his care for the escaping infant.   
 Following Ettiger, I use “matrixial” in this project to describe the tension, the sense of 
connection between people, the potential for sharing and linking.  Mr. Cunningham’s 
awareness of the “matrixial” makes him suppress his patriarchal urge to “protect” the 
“wronged” white woman, and instead interact with the child.  Ettiger affirms, “the matrix has 
ethical implications.  In the phallus, we confront the impossibility of sharing trauma and 
phantasy, whereas in the matrix, to a certain extent, there is an impossibility of not sharing 
them” (89).  In small echo of the way a fetus shares her mother’s trauma, adults can become 
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aware of field of linkages among people and share part of each other’s pain.   The cavalry 
soldier adopts the grief of his victim, and, in the years to come, etches her word into his arm 
with a knife, pays her family his life savings in reparations, and kills himself on their floor.  
While these subsequent actions take the form of Christian, capitalist guilt, the reason he felt 
remorse at all is because his victim’s gaze activated his awareness of the “matrixial.”  Before 
he got trapped in her eyes, he was killing almost gleefully, but sharing a part of her trauma 
changed the course of his life. 
RADICAL MOTHERING 
While the bind between the grandmother and the soldier gets forged in the matrix, the 
immediate behavior, the “ought,” that results from the grandmother’s final stare can be 
described as maternal in the most radical sense.  The soldier turns from the masculine field of 
massacre, defects from the male army, fails the “White Father” as the stereotypical speech 
called the president, and follows the infant into the wilderness, a space feminized in much of 
Western literature.  The child herself shows the soldier that he can nurse, an actual possibility 
as Erdrich asserts in an interview included at the end of the book.25 When the child takes the 
man’s nipple in her mouth, an act that comes to “fill[] him with a foolish tender joy,” she 
illustrates the second epigraph to this section where activist-scholar Alexis Pauline Gumbs 
asserts “[t]he radical potential of the word ‘mother’ comes after the ‘m’” (8).  From the 
perspective of the cavalryman, the “others” who he was ordered to massacre have become a 
single “other” whom he will raise with care.  The child who holds him in her mouth, who 
teaches his body how to lactate becomes the “link” in Ettiger’s language that will redefine 
                                                
25 Erdrich comments “[t]here are several documented cases of male lactation….  I think it’s a 
great idea.  It would solve about half the problems in the world” (12). 
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who he is.  As his enduring guilt shows, however, he will not forget his “link” to the 
grandmother. 
In 2016, Gumbs and her co-editors, China Martens and Mai’a Williams published 
Revolutionary Mothering: Love on the Front Lines (2016),26 an anthology that they 
envisioned in the spirit of Cherríe Moraga and Gloria Anzaldúa’s This Bridge Called My 
Back (1981).  In her contribution to that anthology, Gumbs charts a radical sort of mothering 
that I try to embrace in this project:    
We are looking at mothering as an investment in the future that requires a 
person to change the status quo of their own lives, of their community and of 
the society as a whole again and again and again in the practice of affirming 
growing, unpredictable people who deserve a world that is better than what 
we can even imagine. (115)   
For Gumbs, mothering is not about reproducing a little people in our image or perpetuating 
societal norms, but rather about changing ourselves and our world to affirm “growing, 
unpredictable people” (115).  I think Gumbs uses this phrase to both include those children 
our society currently targets with violence (such as those with racialized, queer, female, and 
differently abled bodies) and to account for future identifications that we cannot yet imagine.    
The cavalryman does not care for the child to continue his family line—his desertion from 
the army cut him off from all his other relatives.  He does not rescue her because she has any 
trace of him inside her.  Instead, baby’s need reshapes his entire life—shifts his entire status 
                                                
26 and, like its “foremother,” this collection of creative, philosophical, and activist writings 
resists and thinks beyond the white-supremacist agenda that still shapes society.   
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quo.  He can no longer serve in an army that commits genocide and instead raises poultry to 
make a home for her.    
 While “A Child’s Call” uses the “matrixial” to denote the ethical field that arises 
between people, I use Gumb’s sense of “radical mothering” to describe one of the  “oughts” 
that that tension might carry.  While I understand “radical mothering” as a positive thing, I 
am not proposing it as a moral code or an ultimate good.  Instead, I posit that “radical 
mothering” as a concept best informs the responsibility most at stake in the novels this 
project engages.  For instance, the soldier demonstrates “radical mothering” when he rescues 
and nurses the child, but his act is still an act of kidnapping that has damaging consequences 
both for the girl and her birth mother, who also survives the massacre.   
Gumbs concept of “radical mothering” does not function within the framework of 
“reproductive futurism” that Lee Edelman critiques.  Edelman, like Robin Bernstein, 
recognizes the political currency of the figure of the child.  Bernstein puts it best in the 
questions that initiate her book Racial Innocence: Performing American Childhood from 
Slavery to Civil Rights (2011); she asks “[w]hy is abstracted childhood so flexible that it can 
simultaneously bolster arguments for and against interracial marriage?  How did childhood 
acquire so much affective weight that the exhortation to ‘protect the children’ seems to add 
persuasive power to almost any argument?” (2).  Edelman contends that the figure of the 
child stands as representative image of a conservative, repetitive future; he writes, “[t]hat 
figural Child alone embodies the citizen as ideal, entitled to claim full rights to its future 
share in the nation’s good, though always at the cost of limiting the rights “real” citizens are 
allowed” (11).  While the idea of children as future citizens does play an important role in the 
formation and maintenance of nations, Edelman errors in his assumption that the “image of 
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the Child” can be contained in a single “coercive universalization” (11).  Instead, we should 
join Bernstein in acknowledging that while “abstracted childhood” can serve as a wild card 
for any political cause, particular children—real or imagined—do specific symbolic work.  
Little Eva, Stowe’s fictional child that Bernstein discusses, played such an important role in 
U.S. history not because she stood as the universal ideal for all children, or heralded a future 
citizen (since she died at the end of the novel, she couldn’t bear more citizens, and if she had 
survived, she couldn’t vote), but because she stood as a particular, angelic child.  While I do 
identify common traits of child-narrators, this project, too focuses on particular children who, 
like the child-protagonists in the incidents that open this chapter, work because of their 
specificity. Part of the power of the child-narrators I discuss, is that they tap the proclivity to 
care that Edelman and Bernstein recognize, but marshal it for very specific reasons.    
MOTHERING OURSELVES 
In the 1980s, Audre Lorde, an inspiring figure for both Gumbs and me, proposed a 
radical type of mothering as a model of interpersonal relations.  In writing about the specific 
anger that Black women might feel because of the hatred that structures our society, 27 Lorde 
proclaims that “[w]e can learn to mother ourselves” (172).  Lorde’s formulation not only 
calls for the “recognition and acceptance that we have come to expect only from our 
                                                
27 Lorde explains “Every Black woman in America has survived several lifetimes of hatred, 
where even in the candy store cases of our childhood, little brown nigggerbaby candies 
testified against us.  We survived the wind-driven spittle on our child’s shoe and pink flesh 
color bandaids, attempted rapes on rooftops, and the prodding fingers of the super’s boy, 
seeing our girlfriends blown to bits in Sunday School, and we absorbed that loathing as a 
natural state” (156). 
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mommas” but also the affirmation of other Black women (159).  In a context of violence and 
prejudice, maternal care can create one of the only spaces where Lorde locates the self-
affirming love that makes life worth surviving.28  Her theory seeks to extend this care from 
the figure of the mother to relationships among Black women.  Instead of participating in the 
reproduction of society’s power structures or converting hatred into resentment of other 
Black women, Lorde implores her readers to create, to birth, to care for something new.  
Claudia and her sister Frieda model a juvenile sort of “mothering ourselves” in The Bluest 
Eye.  At the end of the novel, Claudia comments, “[n]obody paid us any attention, so we paid 
very good attention to ourselves” (191).  The girls give each other the affirmation and interest 
that they cannot find from adults, a sort of care that might have changed Pecola’s trajectory.  
Learning to “mother ourselves” is necessarily creative; Lorde explains “it means we must 
establish authority over our own definition, provide an attentive concern and expectation of 
growth which is the beginning of that acceptance we came to expect only from our mothers” 
(173).  For Lorde and her adherents who edited Revolutionary Mothering, mothering requires 
both self-transformation and nurturance of others.  Lorde explains, “[m]othering ourselves 
means learning to love what we have given birth to by giving definition to” (173).   Lorde’s 
theory requires intervention in the symbolic order as her imperatives “to establish authority” 
and “to define” imply, but also, and more important, she calls for an affective shift in the way 
                                                
28 Although, like Morrison, she takes seriously the way infanticide relates to maternal care.  
Lorde explains her commitment to caring for her daughter in such a hateful world: 
“[k]nowing I did not slit their throats at birth tear out the tiny beating heart with my own 
despairing teeth the way some sisters did in the slave ships chained to corpses and therefore I 
was committed to this very moment” (158). 
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women face each other.  The changing of definitions is made possible by self-acceptance and 
attention and care of others.  “Mothering each other,” then, is a shift in the organization of 
human attachments.   
Other feminists also chart the ways in which mothering contains within it a radical 
potential that manifests as empathy and facilitates different moral processes.  In her revision 
of psychoanalytic development, psychoanalyst and scholar Nancy Chodorow proposes that 
“[g]irls emerge from [the pre-oedipal] period with a basis for ‘empathy’ built into their 
primary definition of self in a way that boys do not” (167).  While boys in this conception of 
Western society are raised to overcome their primary attachment to their mother and 
eventually take the role of the father, girls, because of the identification with their mothers, 
“come to define and experience themselves as continuous with others” (169).  Carol 
Gilligan’s studies of psychological development build on this distinction to propose that men 
and women have different processes of moral reasoning.  Gilligan explains, “[i]n their 
portrayal of relationships, women replace the bias of men toward separation with a 
representation of the interdependence of self and other, both in love and in work.  By 
changing the lens of developmental observation from individual achievement to relationships 
of care, women depict ongoing attachment as the path that leads to maturity” (170).  In their 
realism, the novels discussed in “A Child’s Call” reflect this constructed gendered difference.  
Neither Joe Coutts in The Round House nor Jem Finch in Mockingbird believes that he 
caused the wrongs at the core of those novels although they both take responsibility for them.  
In The Bluest Eye, on the other hand, Claudia believes “it was my fault” that the marigolds 
did not grow and that Pecola lost her baby (5).  While all the children engage ethically with 
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the events of the novels, the boys do see themselves as more individuated and the girls as 
more interconnected.      
Like these feminists, I am committed to the feminine phrasing of mothering even 
though anyone can practice the activity because there is a power and a knowledge in the 
particular even if —and often because— that particular is born form histories of inequity and 
centuries of social evil.29  The sexual violence that The Round House and The Bluest Eye 
address and resist has and continues to follow precisely these gendered lines as they intersect 
with race.  If the problem stems from patriarchal systems of power, the solution might be 
born from a particular and resistant knowledge of maternal care.  As Gumbs points out in the 
second epigraph, the word “mother” itself holds the “other” within it, naming our potential to 
recognize and care for someone who is different than us.  The second wave white feminists 
also make strong arguments for the gendered term.  We should call it “mothering” and not 
“parenting” because as Nancy Chodorow explains in her universalizing way, “[w]omen 
mother.  In our society, as in most societies, women not only bear children.  They also take 
primary responsibility for infant care, spend more time with infants and children than do 
men, and sustain primary emotional ties with infants” (3).  Philosopher Sara Ruddick also 
insists on the feminine because we haven’t “transcended” this gender hierarchy: “[s]ince the 
maternal and the womanly are politically and conceptually connected, a man who engages in 
mothering to some extent takes on the female condition and risks identification with the 
                                                
29 DuBois’s theory of the double consciousness is another example of this.  Even as he 
describes the pain of “ever feel[ing] his two-ness” that “dogged strength alone keeps it from 
being torn asunder” DuBois calls the double-consciousness as being “gifted with second-
sight in this American world” (2).      
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feminine….  What is so terrible—or so wonderful—about that?” (45). Ruddick further points 
out that “father” is not the masculine corollary to “mother”—in Western society, fathering 
has historically had more to do with naming progeny into a social and symbolic order and 
establishing authority and law than mothering as Hortense Spillers’ critique indicates.  Like 
Ruddick, I am afraid to skip ahead to the gender-neutral term parent, because that may efface 
the radical potential that centuries of mothering—even in, and because of, the violent context 
of a patriarchal society—bears.       
In addition to, and perhaps more importantly than, acknowledging a historical 
division of labor, using the gendered term allows an important philosophical metaphor for 
human relationships—birth.  Lorde takes this very seriously.  In “Poetry is not a Luxury,” she 
asserts, “through poetry we give name to those ideas which are—until the poem—nameless 
and formless, about to be birthed, but already felt” (36).  Even though Lorde uses the verb “to 
name,” I don’t think she’s thinking of it in the sense of Walter Benjamin (“in the name, the 
mental being of man communicates itself to God” (65))30 or of Lacan of naming things into 
the symbolic order.  Instead, I think she’s proposing that giving life to a feeling, that like a 
child inside a womb, is felt and real before its inception into the world, before its naming.  
For Lorde, there is a plane of existence beneath language and names that is made up of felt 
experience.  She continues, “[t]hat distillation of experience from which true poetry springs 
                                                
30 Benjamin’s theory of language “presuppose[es] language as an ultimate reality, perceptible 
only in its manifestation, inexplicable and mystical” (67).  The Fall, however, caused “the 
enslavement of language in prattle” such that “[i]n the language of men, [things] are 
overnamed” (72,73).  The art of translation has to do with reaching towards the “ultimate 
clarity of the word of God” (74).   
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births thought as dream births concept, as feeling births idea, as knowledge births (precedes) 
understanding” (36). The activity of separating the various aspects of felt experience and 
putting them into words makes poetry possible.  Lorde’s repetition of births affirms that 
forming thoughts, concepts and ideas begins inside a person, dreaming mind, and felt 
experience in the same way that people begin inside women’s wombs.  By putting these 
internal processes into language and poetry, they can be shared.  The very need for this 
language, the sharing of different experiences is also made possible by birth—what was once 
inside, part of and the same, birthing makes separate, outside and different.   
Lorde and Ruddick challenge us to see birth as prerequisite, in the sense that we are 
all born even if we cannot all give birth, and model for human attachment because it stages 
connection and separation.  Like Lorde who moves away from what “the white fathers told 
us,” Ruddick critiques Western philosophy’s embarrassed avoidance of birth as a central 
experience for thinking through human connection (36).  Beginning with Aristotle and Plato, 
Ruddick chastises the tradition of philosophy formed in the male image, “‘[t]hrown’ into the 
world, they turn their back on the dependencies that formed them” (192).  Philosophy’s 
emphasis on “I” rejects attachment.  Instead, like Lorde, Ruddick sees a rich potential in 
examining birth as the actual and figurative way people are brought into the world.  Ruddick 
argues “[i]t is necessary for feminist philosophers to tell the story of birth again, reconnecting 
the work of mothering to the female labor in which it begins” (197).  For Ruddick 
reexamining birth as a philosophical metaphor might change the way we think about human 
interconnection.  Ruddick dwells on this in length:        
Regarded in the light of hope rather than suspicion, the entangling of self and 
other in birth—physical union in metaphysical separateness—is a crystallizing 
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symbol not of self-loss but of a kind of self-structuring.  The birthing woman 
is actively herself and her activity is a giving to, a creating of another who 
could not live without her.  Her creation fails unless the infant takes up the 
singular life, breathing, crying, kicking, sucking her or his own way into the 
world.  Giver and recipient are engaged in a mutual, active, interdependent 
creation.  The particular connectedness of the birthing couple is momentary.  
A pregnant woman’s body begins to hint at a separateness to come; a nursing 
infant and mother hint at a union past.  Only birth itself, singular and 
unrepeatable, expresses the metaphysical paradox of singularity and bodily 
conjunction. (210)   
The activity of birth encapsulates much of the philosophical angst that humans might 
experience—we were once physically a part of another and through birth (el parto) we 
become separate, a divide that cannot be undone.  We are at once fiercely dependent on other 
people and completely independent and disconnected from them.  This separation is a 
creative act that eventually requires and allows for language.  Because we are no longer 
physically connected, we must use words and sound to communicate across the separation.   
INTERSUBJECTIVITY  
 Donald Winnicott, a mid-century British pediatrician and psychoanalyst, developed 
some important models for how people negotiate this separation through his observations of 
infants’ transition from complete dependency on their mother to relative independence. Many 
psychoanalysts correlate this transition with infants’ discovery that they do not have 
omnipotent control over their mothers. Winnicott noticed that many infants develop an 
attachment to a “transitional object,” a blanket, doll, or teddy bear, that make this discovery 
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of separation easier (2). Both parents and the infant endow the object with a greater 
importance than its everyday value, a shared fiction that allows the child to be alone for 
longer periods of time. Winnicott distinguishes the “potential space” where the “transitional 
phenomenon” occurs from both “the inner world” of intrapsychic representations of the 
infant and “actual, or external reality” that we share (54–55). The potential space exists 
neither in fantasy (mental representations) nor reality (actual world), but somewhere in 
between. For me, the important point is not the transitional object itself, but the idea that both 
parents and child are willing to pretend in an effort to live with the reality of their separation. 
They create a shared fiction to make living in the world both bearable and pleasurable. 
Winnicott postulated that this “transitional phenomena” develops into “cultural experience” 
demonstrated through the proclivity of human societies to create and share imaginative art in 
a wide variety of forms (133).  In this sense, his ideas harmonize with Lorde who, as we have 
seen, understands poetry as a vital means of translating feelings into thoughts that can be 
shared.  
 Ettiger, like Lorde, sees the realm of the aesthetic as an important, and ethical, means 
for people to share experience, especially trauma.  Ettiger builds on Dori Laub and Shoshana 
Felman’s understanding of collective trauma, such as the Holocaust, in terms of an “event 
without witnesses,” to propose that the matrixial allows us to be with even if we weren’t 
present.  Ettiger writes, 
The matrixial gaze conducts imprints from ‘events without witnesses’ and 
passes them on to witnesses who were not there, who I term wit(h)nesses 
with-out events.  The artist in the matrixial dimension is a wit(h)ness with-out 
event in compassionate wit(h)nessing.  The viewer, and this partially includes 
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the artist in his or her unconscious viewer position, is the wit(h)ness with-out 
par excellence.  The viewer will embrace traces of the event while 
transforming them, and will continue to weave metamorphic borderlinks to 
others, present and archaic, cognized and uncognized, future and past.  The 
viewer is challenged by the artwork to join a specific matrixial borderspace, to 
join an alliance, an anonymous intimacy. (150-151) 
As we have seen, the matrixial makes possible the sharing of trauma, even if that sharing is 
incomplete and partial.  According to Ettiger, people can witness events without witnesses by 
registering and recognizing the imprints of that trauma.  Artists can capture traces of the 
imprints of this trauma and share them with viewers (while Ettiger focuses on painting, I 
attempt to extend her argument to writing as well).  Embracing the trauma held in an 
aesthetic object transforms the viewer, activating our awareness of the matrixial borderspace, 
pushing us toward interconnection.      
 Contemporary psychoanalysts have built on Winnicott’s concept of the “potential 
space” to theorize “intersubjectivity,” the final essential term of “A Child’s Call.”  In her 
essay “Recognition and Destruction,” feminist psychoanalyst Jessica Benjamin explains 
intersubjectivity as a developmentally attained capacity that comes about through the infant’s 
realization that her mother is a separate subject, a recognition that occurs in the “potential 
space.” Benjamin’s conception of intersubjectivity supplements Ettiger’s “matrixial” in an 
important way.  Unlike the “matrixial,” a field of connection always present whether one is 
aware of it or not, for Benjamin “intersubjectivity,” is achieved in fleeting moments of 
recognition.  Benjamin asserts a relationship between intersubjectivity and intrapsychic 
experience, which she explains as “the psychic internalization and representation of 
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interactions between self and objects” (28). Benjamin argues that “[a]ll experience is 
elaborated intrapsychically”; we create mental ideas for what we experience and who we 
encounter (40).  Other subjects break through the mental representations that we have 
constructed for them creating moments of intersubjective recognition. 31  Benjamin asserts 
that a tension between the two is central to human experience; “[i]t is the loss of balance 
between the intrapsychic and the intersubjective, between fantasy and reality, that is the 
problem” (40). While understanding the outside world requires intrapsychic creativity, those 
fantasies become dangerous and painful when they preclude recognition of the other as a 
subject.  Importantly, intersubjectivity depends on a difference between subjectivities. This 
recognition of difference makes possible the recognition of the self. Benjamin asserts 
“[i]ntersubjective theory postulates that the other must be recognized as another subject in 
order for the self to fully experience his or her subjectivity in the other’s presence” (30). In 
order to have subjectivity at all, one must have intersubjectivity—there must be two subjects 
for any sense of self.  
In Tracks (1988), Erdrich offers a physical paradigm for how we might imagine 
intersubjective recognition as a model for holding emotional suffering.  In Erdrich’s art, the 
                                                
31 Benjamin uses a toddler as her primary example.  The toddler may have an intrapsychic 
fantasy of omnipotence, that she can control her mother.  When the mother fails to conform 
to her child’s vision, the toddler may rail against her mother.  Benjamin writes, “in the 
mental act of negating or obliterating the object, which may be expressed in the real effort to 
attack the other, we find out whether the real other survives.  If she survives without 
retaliating or withdrawing under attack, then we know her to exist outside ourselves, not just 
as our mental product” (39).  This is an intersubjective encounter.   
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intersubjective union of mental experiences is embodied and simultaneously dependent on 
and symbolized by sound.  In his penultimate chapter, Nanapush finds four-year-old Lulu, 
Fleur’s child and his adopted grandchild, frozen at his door.  Lulu had worn her patent leather 
shoes to run through the North Dakota snow to get help for her mother.  After wrapping her 
in flannels, Nanapush takes Lulu’s icy feet under his arms.  Nanapush tells readers and the 
adult Lulu to whom he narrates, “I hunched over in shock at their ice-hardness.  Then I 
absorbed the cold into myself” (166).  Nanapush cradles the child in Erdrich’s version of 
what Winnicott called “holding” referring to the care that manages the physiological and 
emotional needs of a baby.  For Winnicott holding makes possible “the continuity of being” 
which is necessary to the infant’s survival and helps the child to develop an individual self 
(595).  As Nanapush holds Lulu, he looks into her face; he narrates to her older self, “you 
were suspended, eyes open, looking into mine.  Once I had you I did not dare break the string 
between us and kept on moving my lips, holding you motionless with talking” (167).  
Nanapush cares for Lulu with the warm touch of his body and the connection between their 
eyes.  The transmission of temperature through physical touch models the intersubjective 
meeting of minds—even though brains are physically separate we can, to some extent, reflect 
the mental experience of another through touch, eye contact, and facial expressions.  
In Erdrich’s prose, intersubjectivity depends on sound.  As Lulu regains sensation, 
she writhes with pain, but Nanapush “know[s] certain cure songs” to ameliorate her suffering 
(167).  Here, Erdrich offers a version of infant psychologist Daniel Stern’s concept of 
“affective attunement,” which he defines as “the performance of behaviors that express the 
quality of feeling of a shared affect state without imitating the exact behavioral expression of 
the inner state” (142).   All of Stern’s examples involve pre-verbal music making between 
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parent and child.  The very sound of Nanapush’s voice, not the sense of his words, envelops 
Lulu in an aural embrace that sustains her as much as the heat of his body.  Sound transcends 
the discrete boundaries of bodies, but does not require their violation.  Intersubjectivity, as 
Erdrich paints it, does not imply the elimination of individual selves, but rather depends on 
those differences. As Nanapush attunes himself to help hold Lulu’s agony, he says, “[f]or the 
first time in my life, it was my duty as well as pleasure to hold forth all night and long into 
the next morning” (167).  Nanapush’s penchant for storytelling, paired with the warmth of 
his body, rescues Lulu from frostbite.  Nanapush saves Lulu, making possible her continued 
existence, and her pain calls him to be his best self.   
Erdrich uses both the content of the scene and Nanapush’s rhetorical style itself to 
model intersubjectivity.  Nanapush narrates each of his chapters to Lulu, who was once the 
child he rescued from frostbite.  As Carl Gutiérrez-Jones notes, “Nanapush’s stories thus 
have an overt rhetorical setting; he seeks a reuniting of family, and given this goal, his telling 
is at once an explanation of Fleur’s actions and a call for forgiveness” (106).  While his songs 
saved the child, he hopes his words can mend the relationship between Fleur and her now-
grown daughter.  Each of Nanapush’s chapters, told in the style of an oral story, creates an 
intersubjective field between himself and Lulu; his purpose in encouraging Lulu to forgive 
her mother both implies resistance on Lulu’s part but also a bond with her adopted 
grandfather.  Just as the sound of his voice lulls the child, the rhythm of his storytelling lures 
readers into the emotional arc of his scenes. When we first learn Nanapush’s purpose for 
narrating, he says,  
I guided the last buffalo hunt.  I saw the last bear shot.  I trapped the last 
beaver with a pelt of more than two years’ growth.  I spoke aloud the words of the 
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government treaty, and refused to sign the settlement papers that would take away our 
woods and lake.  I axed the last birch that was older than I, and I saved the last 
Pillager.     
Fleur, the one you will not call mother. (Erdrich 2)   
Nanapush repeats the pattern of first person, active, declarative statements several times, 
building momentum with the length and complexity of the sentence.  Then he changes pace 
with a name and a single appositive phrase that stands as its own paragraph shifting both the 
grammatical rhythm and emotional valence.  As readers, we hear Nanapush’s words inside 
our head, taking his position as we bring his story alive with our imagination.32  At the same 
time, whenever he uses the second person intended for Lulu, we feel ourselves addressed.  
The very rhetorical situation of Nanapush’s chapters positions us in the intersubjective space 
between the tribal patriarch and his granddaughter.    
Erdrich proposes intersubjective holding as a potential paradigm for bearing 
seemingly intolerable suffering.  Psychoanalyst Robert Stolorow argues similarly that trauma 
is not only constituted by emotional agony, but also by the absence of another subject, a 
family member, friend, or analyst, who can provide a “relational home” for that pain (10).  
Erdrich, in true Pillager fashion, sees Stolorow and raises the stakes.  For Erdrich, this sort of 
care not only requires that the other subject has experienced a previous pain that makes 
empathy possible, but also that the other subject is different than the one in pain.  Nanapush 
can only absorb Lulu’s cold because he is not cold, although he has been before.  His words 
                                                
32 In Reading in the Brain; The New Science of How We Read (2010), Stanislas Dehaene 
presents evidence that readers do pronounce words in our mind, even if we are not aware of 
it, to decode written speech.   
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can only reduce her pain because his songs are different than her cries; Stern makes clear that 
attunement requires a difference.  Second person, Nanapush’s chosen voice, also requires 
two.  For Erdrich, feeling another’s pain is not enough to ameliorate suffering—we must also 
maintain our difference as we shape ourselves to hold it.   
The exchange between Nanapush and Lulu demonstrates that “intersubjectivity” can 
be represented between characters even as it is activated by the text’s prose.  The following 
chapters seek to bring these theories alive through close analysis of the central texts of “A 
Child’s Call.”  Like Erdrich, Harper Lee, Toni Morrison, and Nicole Krause not only 
represent child characters that activate other characters’ “matrixial” awareness, but also use a 
series of strategies to push readers also to become more aware of our interconnection with 
“Other unknown non-I(s)” (87).  In some cases, these authors underscore the absence of 
traditional maternal figures in order to invite readers to join them in imagining “radical 
mothering.”  As the artists craft fleeting scenes where characters, in moments of 
“intersubjective recognition,” learn to “mother [them]selves,” readers become closer to 
imagining a world based on interconnection rather than individuation.  The final chapter 
proposes the braided narrative as the key form for intersubjectivity, because the distinct 
narrative strands invite readers inside the intrapsychic experience of multiple characters 
while simultaneously requiring some negotiation of the connection and conflict between 
them.    
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CHAPTER TWO: “WHERE IS YOUR MOTHER?” 
Mom would have returned by now to start dinner.  Women don’t realize how 
much store men set on the regularity of their habits.  We absorb their comings 
and goings into our bodies, their rhythms into our bones.  Our pulse is set to 
theirs, and as always on a weekend afternoon we were waiting for my mother 
to start us ticking away on the evening. 
And so, you see, her absence stopped time. 
— Joe Coutts in The Round House  
Where is your mother?  The father’s question sets in motion Louise Erdrich’s 2012 
novel The Round House.  Joe, the child-narrator, is too young to understand the sexual 
violence that readers may already suspect his mother has just survived.  The just-turned-
thirteen-year-old, however, always already understands the important way mothering shapes 
his life.  Even as Joe describes how male bodies absorb feminine “comings and goings” 
creating a bone-stable rhythm and regular pulse, Erdrich opens the novel with the ominous 
absence of his particular mother and a suspenseful search that quickly escalates to a (heart-
)racing rush to the hospital.  Although Joe is thirteen, his sentences recall the earlier relation 
of mother and infant, when a baby’s whole world seems to depend on its mother’s “comings 
and goings,” when that presence and absence has not yet settled into an everyday ticking, 
when the rhythm of her voice and rocking of her body create calm and facilitate sleep.  
Erdrich’s references to felt and biological processes suggest that the social construction of 
mothering is embedded in and made possible by the attachment between mothers and those 
for whom they care.  Female author and mother Erdrich emphasizes the relationality essential 
to this claim about maternal care by voicing the observation through her male character 
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narrator, Joe Coutts.  How is mothering implicated in the transformative power of a child’s 
call that this project traces?  In what ways does the mother’s time-stopping absence both 
shape the narrative structure of the novel, set its affective tone, and facilitate the kind of 
attachments that make social change possible? 
This scene holds the seeds to preliminary answers to these questions.  Joe’s 
adolescent thoughts about his mother’s whereabouts stand in the discourse for where she is in 
the story33: Geraldine is either still at ceremonial place that gives the novel its name facing a 
crazed rapist or already escaping the attempted murder.  In the story space of a missing 
mother, Erdrich situates the social crisis she seeks to ameliorate. This true-to-life act of 
violence both functions as the novel’s central conflict in terms of plot and as the trauma that 
prevents Geraldine from providing the sort of maternal care Joe needs to deal emotionally 
with acknowledging the crime.  In this first moment of Geraldine’s absence, Erdrich also 
signals one of the rhetorical ways she will draw readers into the story.  Bazil asks his son 
“Where is your mother?” a question Erdrich renders, as she does with dialogue throughout 
the novel, without quotation marks (3).  As this is the first line of dialogue in the book, 
readers might momentarily or subconsciously, feel addressed by this unquoted second 
                                                
33 Structural narratology distinguishes between a narrative’s discourse (the ‘how’ of the 
telling) and its story (the ‘what’ of the told).  James Phelan uses this sort of language to 
explain the distinction.  In the glossary of Living to Tell About It, he defines discourse as 
“[t]he set of devices for telling a story…. In structuralist narratology, discourse is regarded as 
the “how” of narrative, distinct from the ‘what’—character, event and setting” (215).  His 
glossary offers a complementary definition of story: “[t]he what of narrative…. The events in 
chronological order constitute the story abstracted from the discourse” (218).   
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person, even though we know the father speaks to his son.  The question simultaneously 
positions readers in Joe’s situation and invites us to think of our own mothers.  On the same 
page, Joe shares the passage I included in the epigraph: “[a]nd so, you see, her absence 
stopped time” (3).  This time, the second person does address the reader.  In the space of the 
page, Erdrich uses a single pronoun to both place us in the position of her narrator and situate 
us, outside of him, as his audience.    
Further, Erdrich’s opening overflows with imperfect recursive renderings of care.  
Erdrich’s scenes represent potential care between characters, and like Russian dolls, solicit 
readers’ investment in those scenes.  But unlike Russian dolls, identical except for scale, the 
care Erdrich evokes on these various levels is not perfectly parallel.  Even as Bazil asks his 
son to wonder where his mother is, Erdrich arouses her readers’ care for Joe, channeling the 
potential interest we might feel for any protagonist and the potential responsibility we might 
feel for any child to this particular character.  Bazil and Joe’s worry for Geraldine, who we 
have not yet met, gets matched, albeit in a different register, by our concern for them.  
Bazil’s question strikes me as an inversion of the famous public service announcement “It’s 
ten p.m.  Do you know where your children are?”  As the characters become anxious about 
the mother’s Sunday afternoon whereabouts we might remember the nightly reminder to 
worry about our children.  Even Joe’s sentences themselves echo with a double significance.  
The face value of Joe’s claim that “[w]omen don’t realize how much store men set on the 
regularity of their habits” (3) insists that only men are aware of this importance.  If this 
assertion came through Erdrich’s own voice, unadulterated by her character narrator, we 
might assume it means the opposite of what it states—that men’s lives depend on maternal 
care, and they ought, like Joe, to recognize it.                
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Erdrich is not alone in structuring a novel set on social change around a mother’s 
absence; Harper Lee’s To Kill A Mockingbird (1960) and Toni Morrison’s The Bluest Eye 
(1970) remove and trouble this figure in different ways.  Early in Mockingbird, Scout 
cavalierly explains, “[o]ur mother died when I was two, so I never felt her absence….  I did 
not miss her, but I think Jem did” (6).  The film emphasizes Mrs. Finch’s absence more than 
the novel by introducing her death through a bedtime dialogue between Scout and Jem. 
Although the children talk to each other sleepily, the camera focuses on Gregory Peck sitting 
on the porch swing outside their window.  Atticus’s furrowed brow looks reflectively down 
as he hears his son remind his daughter that they loved his wife.   
 
Figure 2: To Kill A Mockingbird 1962: 15:30 
Although her death does not cast a big shadow over the plot of the novel, her absence does 
create a space for Atticus to become the political hero and beloved father.  In the film, only a 
camera pan separates this explanation of the deceased mother from Judge Taylor’s request 
that Atticus take Tom Robinson’s case.  While Atticus begins this scene overhearing his 
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children in the intimacy of their room, much of the film gains its power from the children 
overhearing Atticus in adult conversations or at court. The unobtrusive pan creates a 
narrative link between the death of the mother and the obligation of the father.  In both the 
novel and the film, the maternal care that Mrs. Finch would have otherwise provided gets 
divided between Atticus and Calpurnia, a reflection of societal division of labor, which 
Morrison takes up in The Bluest Eye (1970).   
In The Bluest Eye, Toni Morrison juxtaposes the harsh care Claudia’s mother 
provides with the neglect of Pecola’s, whose maternal energies have been outsourced to the 
white child who she’s paid to raise.  Morrison bookends novel’s story with Claudia’s 
physical illness and Pecola’s mental break.  Claudia, already assuming the invisibility society 
thrusts upon her, does not understand the way her mother expresses her care, but does come 
to associate autumn with “somebody with hands who does not want me to die” (12).  Later, 
Claudia witnesses Pecola’s mother turn from her own child whose legs have been burnt by a 
dropped cobbler to comfort the “pink-and-yellow girl” for whom she’s hired to care (109).  
In the absolute absence of maternal care and after surviving paternal abuse, Pecola creates a 
sad fantasy where she has the bluest eyes that finally make her feel worthy of love. 
In this chapter, I discuss the ways The Round House, To Kill a Mockingbird, and The 
Bluest Eye lay groundwork for social change by creating a productive tension in the narrative 
space of a missing mother.  While the novels neither represent directly nor enact radical 
maternal relationships, they do open a possibility for a sort of maternal care that leads 
towards social transformation.  I argue that by foregrounding the absent or absented mother, 
Erdrich, Lee, and Morrison engage traditional understandings and expectations of maternal 
care in order to activate what Alexis Pauline Gumbs calls “the radical potential” of 
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mothering.  Imagery of attachment and maternal attention function as proscenium walls 
framing the social issues that the novels stage.  All three writers link a readerly attachment to 
their child-narrator with an investment in social change.  In order to make this argument, I 
propose a theory for how we might account for the way writers evoke particular emotions in 
novels.  Authors can create a series of similarly structured (what happens: character, timing 
events, etc.) and styled (how they are written: the pace, the dialogue, the prose, etc.) facilitate 
a certain response in readers.  As these scenes recur over the course of the novel, authors can 
slowly shape readers’ feelings.  After clarifying what I mean by mothering, I begin with The 
Round House because Erdrich’s novel demonstrates this formal shaping of feeling most 
clearly.  Over the first thirty pages of The Round House, Erdrich crafts three different scenes 
where questions of what happened to Joe’s mother come up between him and an adult figure, 
and she uses the responses of the adults to position readers in a particular stance towards Joe 
that she models through Cappy in the fourth chapter.  While Erdrich foregrounds potential 
maternal care, Lee abandons explicit discussions of the mother and, instead, frames 
important scenes with imagery of attachment to rewrite the racist social script.  In To Kill a 
Mockingbird, Lee restages the mad-dog scene both at the jailhouse and in the courtroom to 
help Scout and readers see how we should feel about Atticus’s bravery in the face of rabies 
and racism.  I conclude with The Bluest Eye because the pattern Morrison creates to facilitate 
readers’ feelings is the most complicated—she repeats similar scenes of increasingly failed 
maternal care using different narrative styles, forging the genre of the braided narrative.  In 
each of that novel’s four seasons, Morrison begins with Claudia MacTeer’s naive narration 
that touches on her mother and then switches to omniscient explanations of Pecola’s life, 
juxtaposing Claudia’s care with Pecola, and other characters’, abuse and neglect.     
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Although I begin with literary representations of mothers who birthed their children, 
my understanding of the term is not biologically determined (although as we’ll see the 
biology does afford us some important insights).  Instead, like Alexis Pauline Gumbs, I see 
“the word ‘mother’ less as a gendered identity and more as a possible action, a technology of 
transformation” (23).  As we saw in the previous chapter, Gumbs explains radical mothering 
as  
an investment in the future that requires a person to change the status quo of 
their own lives, of their community and of the society as a whole again and 
again and again in the practice of affirming growing, unpredictable people 
who deserve a world that is better than what we can even imagine. (115)   
In Gumbs’ analysis “mothering” requires self-transformation, social change, and openness to 
the wild possibility of the “unpredictable person” that is the child.  Revolutionary 
Mothering’s definition and celebration of mothering is radical in the context of strategic, 
persistent efforts by the U.S. government to deny motherhood to non-white women by 
separating mothers from their children (under slavery34 and its legacies and Indian Boarding 
                                                
34 As Gumbs reminds us, the United States was founded on an institution of slavery that “has 
so fundamentally ripped the work of mothering from the bodies of Black mothers, forcing 
them to do the labor of mothering for white and Black children while fully denying them any 
of the authority of motherhood by killing and selling away and raping and mutilating their 
biological children and their chosen kin” (120). 
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Schools35) or sterilizing potential mothers.36  Current laws that allow the deportation of 
mothers of citizen children37 and policies that hinder LGBTQ families from adopting 
continue this practice.  The violence against women staged in The Round House and the 
exploitation of Black women’s labor illustrated in The Bluest Eye also attest to this trend of 
preventing women of color from mothering.  When Kimberlé Crenshaw defines 
“intersectionality,” the way systems of domination, such as racism and patriarchy, and even 
organized efforts to resist them, can overlap in damaging ways for those in both categories, 
she refers to similar policies that trap women of color in abusive situations.  In this socio-
historical context, mothering is a radical sort of care that demands social transformation.   
I follow the editors of Revolutionary Mothering in distinguishing between 
“motherHOOD,” the stagnant social category and “motherING,” the potential transformative 
activity.  Building on Hortense Spillers,38 Gumbs explains “motherHOOD is a status granted 
                                                
35 Psychologist Maria Yellow Horse Brave Heart explains how Indian Boarding Schools not 
only emotionally and physically damaged children but also left them “ill-prepared for raising 
their own children in a traditional American Indian context” (64).    
36 In Revolutionary Mothering, Esteli Juarez explains “hundreds of thousands of Native and 
Puerto Rican women were sterilized, many of them without knowledge or consent or with the 
belief that the process was reversible” (161).   
37 While Trump’s separation policies do this overtly, Obama’s workplace raids had a similar 
effect.   
38 In “Mama’s Baby Papa’s Maybe: An American Grammar Book” (1987), Spillers 
interrogates the way African-American families have been named into the symbolic order 
and social discourse of the United States.  She concludes “This different cultural text actually 
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by patriarchy to white middle-class women, those women whose rights to their children are 
never questioned, regardless of who does the labor (the how) of keeping them alive” (22).  
“MotherHOOD” is not a far leap from “the cult of true womanhood” that played an 
important role in racial construction in the tradition of lynching.39  Even more broadly, 
“motherHOOD” reflects the category of “personhood,” which has also been used Western 
societies to distinguish between those who have rights and those who do not or cannot 
because they are not full persons under the law.  In contrast to these exclusive identity 
categories, “MotherING is … a possible action, the name for that nurturing work, that 
survival dance, worked by enslaved women who were forced to breastfeed the children of the 
status mothers while having no control over whether their birth or chosen children were sold 
away” (Gumbs 22).  The behavior of mothering, as Gumbs points out, might not have much 
overlap with the social status of “motherHOOD,” but instead is often practiced even when 
society strives to prevent one from being a mother.        
                                                                                                                                                  
reconfigures, in historically ordained discourse, certain representational potentialities for 
African-Americans: 1) motherhood as female blood-rite is outraged, is denied, at the very 
same time that it becomes the founding term of a human and social enactment; 2) a dual 
fatherhood is set in motion, comprised of the African father’s banished name and body and 
the captor father’s mocking presence.  In this play of paradox, only the female stands in the 
flesh, both mother and mother-dispossessed.  This problematizing of gender places her, in my 
view, out of the traditional symbolics of female gender, and it is our task to make a place for 
this different social subject.  In doing so, we are less interested in joining the ranks of 
gendered femaleness than gaining the insurgent ground as female social subject” (80).  
39 Barbara Welter explained this 19th century concept in an article in the American Quarterly.   
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My emphasis on mothering seeks to highlight the force of attachment as an affective 
field that functions underneath and parallel to the symbolic order associated with the father 
and the law.  As Lacan writes “[i]t is in the name of the father that we must recognize the 
basis of the symbolic function which, since the dawn of historical time, has identified his 
person with the figure of the law” (66).  If we begin, as Audre Lorde does, on the level of 
emotion and recognize with her that birthing precedes defining, then we might be able to see 
the affective forces at play in the understanding of mothering as distinct from, but not 
mutually exclusive to, fathering.  Atticus Finch is an excellent figure to work through this 
distinction because, as many have pointed out, he functions in Mockingbird as both law and 
father, representing the social order even as he seeks to shift the norms.40 While we recognize 
his great courtroom speeches and moral imperatives that unite his roles as legal and 
patriarchal hero, we might also remember the frequent scenes where Scout takes comfort in 
Atticus’s lap.  This sort of physical care resonates in a different register than the paternal 
leadership.  Scout and her father’s embrace models a central position of attachment in 
primates and humans.  British psychologist and psychoanalyst John Bowlby first proposed 
attachment as a theory of motivation (distinct from Freud’s theory of drives) in the middle of 
the twentieth century.  He writes,  
In most species, there is more than one kind of behavior shown by young that 
results in young and mother staying close to one another.  For example, a 
young’s vocal calls attract mother to it, and its locomotory movements take it 
                                                
40 For more on Atticus and the law of the father see Austin Sarat and Umphrey Martha 
Merrill’s “TEMPORAL HORIZONS: On the Possibilities of Law and Fatherhood in To Kill 
a Mockingbird.” 
 80 
to her.  Since both kinds of behavior, and others as well, have the same 
consequence, namely proximity, it is useful to have a general term to cover 
them all; and for this purpose ‘attachment behavior’ is used. (182) 
Bowlby points out that the primary goal of attachment behavior is proximity—physical and 
emotional comfort—not food.  Much of Mockingbird involves Scout and Jem demonstrating 
basic attachment behavior—they track Atticus’s movements.  Scout and Jem greet their 
father at the end of the road when he comes home to work; they follow him when he leaves 
the house at odd hours, and they observe him in court.  Although Bowlby consistently uses 
the term “mother,” he makes it clear that one’s primary attachment figure can be anyone who 
reciprocates with caregiving behavior and does not have to be the infant’s birth mother.   
Neuroscience has shown that our very brain structures facilitate and encourage this 
sort of attachment.  Children seek their attachment figures because they enjoy “proximity to 
him or her and may want to be held or cuddled” (Bowlby 307).  Although Scout values her 
father’s legal leadership, she also appreciates the physical and emotional comfort he 
provides.  Young of many different species have behavioral systems that encourage them to 
attach to a figure that might care for them, which has clear survival benefits.  Neuroscientist 
Jaak Panksepp has found that most animals have brain structures that facilitate this type of 
attachment behavior. Separating most mammal and bird babies from their mothers activates 
what Panksepp calls the PANIC/GREIF system and results in crying, the lighting up of 
certain brain regions, and the increased release of uncomfortable chemicals such as cortisol.  
These adverse effects can elicit a CARE response in others, which can calm the activity of 
the PANIC system.  Comforting touch, even across species, among other things, can elicit 
secretion of opiods and oxytocin, happy brain chemicals, Panksepp associates with CARE.   
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It’s not just that Mockingbird illustrates basic attachment—many novels seeking to 
portray realistic relationships between children and their parents must evoke similar 
imagery—but more important, Lee uses attachment behavior to set up and frame the scenes 
that deal with Tom Robinson’s case, explicitly connecting this sort of care with the social 
issue the novel addresses.  Scout, Jem, and Dill find themselves outside of the county jail, 
poised to stop the lynch mob, because they followed Atticus there.  When the three children 
first see Atticus underneath his light at the jail, Jem explains that Scout shouldn’t run to him, 
“he might not like it.  He’s alright, let’s go home.  I just wanted to see where he was” (171).  
Just like the primates and humans Bowlby writes about, the young Finches follow their 
father, but unlike Bowlby’s hypothesis that young animals attach out of an instinct for 
protection, these children want to protect their father, and in so doing protect themselves, 
highlighting the recursive nature of the potential care activated in these novels.  When Jem 
senses the danger of the mob, he refuses to leave his father’s side.  Likewise, in the film 
version, both Scout and Jem go with Atticus to Helen Robinson’s house.  This not only 
allows Jem to have the face-to-face exchange with another boy of about his age, but it is also 
the second time we see the story’s villain: Mr. Ewell.  When Atticus gets back in the car, Jem 
puts his hand on his father’s shoulder again reversing the protective care usually associated 
with attachment.  In the film, we witness Jem accompany his father to Helen Robinson’s 
house to tell her that her husband has been shot by police.  In the novel, Jem also gets to go, 
but we hear it third hand, as told to Scout by Dill.  Both the visual of Jem in the front seat 
watching his father and Scout’s narrative account of the event keep the audience in the 
position of the child as Atticus deals with the adult issue of murder.  Because the children 
care about their father, and not initially Tom or Helen Robinson, Lee can raise important 
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political issues without being sentimental.  Finally, the friends witness the famous trial 
because they want to keep an eye on what their father is up to. Such important scenes of the 
novel are not only filtered through the narrative voice of a child, but also framed by that 
child’s relationship to her father—not as the law but as her primary attachment figure.    
While Lee neither represents nor enacts the sort of radical mothering contemporary 
feminists outline, reading her scenes in light of those theories allows us to see how her 
narrative structure and style, coupled with this consistent attachment imagery, creates a 
productive tension between the affective force of maternal care and the paternal power of the 
law.  The moral lessons of Mockingbird are made possible by a felt physiological connection 
between father and child.  In the film, when Atticus shares his classic line about walking in 
someone else’s shoes with Scout, Robert Mulligan positions them side by side on the porch 
swing.  Importantly, this is not a close-up, but a medium shot; this tunes viewers into the 
interpersonal interactions of the characters and the emotions behind them.  At the same time, 
the medium distance keeps the background in view; Atticus and his daughter are outside of 
the house, looking out on society, which underscores the social topic of their conversation.  
They are not inside, in the domestic sphere. 
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Figure 2:  To Kill A Mockingbird 1962: 40:00 
While this shot might triangulate viewers into the position of the missing mother (whose 
absence we learned about on that very swing), it also invites us to see the faces of both father 
and daughter.  Just as the medium distance of the shot allows viewers to consider the 
relationship between the two characters and the context, Atticus’s comforting embrace allows 
Scout to ponder his words without dealing with the weight of his gaze.  This is reciprocal—
the fact that Scout looks away from him gives him time to find the appropriate response.   
The face is central to both Bowlby’s theories of attachment and cognitive psychologic 
theories of empathy.  Bowlby explains how certain embraces facilitate this facial 
engagement: 
Not only are babies biased to behave in special ways towards humans but 
mother also are biased to behave in special ways towards babies.  By bringing 
her baby into a face-to-face orientation to herself a mother gives him 
opportunity to look at her. (272) 
 84 
Cognitive scientist Jonathan Cole argues, “empathy itself is supported by, and requires, the 
embodied expression and communication of emotion that the face provides” (271).  The 
looking that holding babies facilitates trains them to read emotions written on the faces of 
others.  In the novel, Scout often sits in Atticus’s lap and lets us know, in important scenes, 
when she’s looking someone in the face. Lee underscores empathy in both the content and 
imagery of her scenes.  That viewers can see Atticus and Scout’s faces while we cannot 
imbricates the readers in the empathic work.  We hold both their faces, both their emotions, 
in our mind while we watch them, just as we imagine the facing scenes in the literature. As 
George Butte explains in Suture and Narrative: Deep Intersubjectivity in Fiction and Film 
(2016), the facing scene would have to be captured in profile or through a suture shot which 
involves the back of the shoulder or the back of the head.   
 In addition to framing many central scenes with imagery of attachment, Lee 
emphasizes the relationality central to Atticus’s ethical decision-making process.  In the 
novel, Atticus’s decision to defend Tom Robinson because of his attachment to and 
relationship with his children takes “the different voice” Gilligan attributes to women.  Like 
the women and girls Gilligan interviewed Atticus frames his decision in terms of his 
relationship to others in addition to his adherence to his moral principles.  In fact, Atticus 
asserts the motivating force of his children above and beyond the Christian teachings.  When 
his brother cites the bible “Let this cup pass from you, eh?”, Atticus does not respond with 
Jesus’s words “not as I will, but as thou wilt”  (100, Mathew 26:39).  Instead, he asks the 
rhetorical question: “[d]o you think I could face my children otherwise?” (100).  Atticus does 
couch his reasoning in the law of the father where authority stems from moral judgment; as 
he earlier explains to Scout, if he didn’t take the case “I couldn’t even tell you or Jem not to 
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do something again” (86).  The way Lee structures these scenes, however, emphasizes the 
relational aspect of Atticus’s decision.  He not only explains that he made his choice for his 
children, but also makes sure Scout knows that he did so for them.  In addition to telling 
Scout directly, he makes sure she overhears his conversation with his brother.  At the end of 
that chapter, Scout writes “it was not until many years later that I realized he wanted me to 
hear every word he said” (101).  This scene, like Erdrich’s opening above, offers a recursive 
rendering of care.  Atticus vocalizes his concern for his children while Scout demonstrates 
her investment in him by eavesdropping and her final recognition that he intended her to hear 
echoes and deepens the original care.  If mothering is about transforming oneself and the 
world for one’s children, then Atticus’s actions as Lee depicts them here resonate as maternal 
care.  The way Lee frames the scene as a performance staged to facilitate Scout’s moral 
development further emphasizes the relational aspect of Atticus’s choice.  In the absence of 
Mrs. Finch, Lee can let Atticus serve both as paternal authority and maternal attachment 
figure.   
THE ROUND HOUSE 
“As a Cheyenne proverb goes, a nation is not conquered until the hearts of its 
women are on the ground”  
— Louise Erdrich in The New York Times 
Either before the novel opens, or off-page during the first scene, the narrator’s mother 
Geraldine survives an unspeakable crime.  Unspeakable in the double sense of trauma theory 
where certain aggressions violate “the human cognitive capacity to perceive and to 
assimilate,” but at the same time must be spoken and heard (Dori Laub 85).  Unspeakable in 
the legal sense because, as Erdrich explains in detail, the U.S. justice system denies 
 86 
Geraldine a trial where she can testify against her attacker, a fictive testament to an actual 
legal failure.  And unspeakable in the narrative sense because thirteen-year-old Joe does not 
understand and therefore cannot narrate the violence.  Geraldine herself refuses to speak until 
half way through the novel because her attacker threatened the life of another mother and her 
baby if Geraldine “say[s] one word even one word up in heaven after you are dead” (162).  
After ascertaining the safety of the child, Geraldine gives a powerful testimony, precisely in 
the center of the novel that confirms much of what Joe has already figured out.  Erdrich’s 
decision to disclose the violence this way makes some important shifts in how we think about 
witnessing trauma.  Traditional understandings of trauma conceptualize it as a painful event 
that occurs before one’s consciousness can conceptualize or prepare for it.  Cathy Caruth, in 
the Freudian tradition, explains trauma as an event that “is experienced too soon, too 
unexpectedly, to be fully known and is therefore not available to consciousness until it 
imposes itself again, repeatedly, in the nightmares and repetitive actions” (4).  Although this 
is certainly true for Geraldine’s experience of the event, it is not true for the reader’s 
experience of reading about it.  While Geraldine could have been prepared (and should not 
have to be), Erdrich organizes the first half of the novel into a series of gradual realizations 
about what happened.  So, when Geraldine eventually does narrate the crime, the reader and 
Joe have already determined what the series of events must have been.  In this way, Erdrich 
makes the trauma Geraldine’s alone, and not Joe’s or the readers.  This affirms certain 
vicissitudes about human experience: we cannot feel another’s pain; certain bodies are more 
vulnerable to sexual violence than others. Even if he were more mature, Joe cannot fully 
understand what it’s like for women to face sexual violence and non-Native readers cannot 
fully know what it’s like to face the prejudice and hatred Joe explains to us.   
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In her slow disclosure of the violence Geraldine survived, Erdrich positions the reader 
as a flexible third in careful relation to Joe and his interlocutors.  Over the course of the first 
few chapters, Joe pieces together what has happened to his mother through a series of 
conversations with adult figures who give him the words necessary to name what has 
happened, even if he cannot understand it.  In the first chapter Joe reflects, “[v]iolently raped, 
I thought.  I knew those words fit together.  Probably from some court case I’d read in my 
father’s books or from a newspaper article or the cherished paperback thrillers my uncle, 
Whitey, kept on his handmade bookshelf” (15).  As Joe fits these words together in his mind, 
readers use Erdrich’s words to fit together the crime her novel addresses.  Even as we 
experience the novel through the eyes of our young narrator, we also stand apart from him 
because we have a more mature understanding of what those words mean.  In addition to the 
concern readers might feel for the survivor of sexual violence, Erdrich adds worry for the 
child who has to learn not only that such things are possible in this world, but they have 
happened to his mother.  While Erdrich invites readers to identify with Joe, she also invites 
us to stand as adults outside of him by crafting a series of scenes with adult characters who 
have the potential to care for Joe.     
Joe comes to an understanding of what his mother survived through a series of 
stylistically and structurally similar dialogues where other characters serve as what Philip 
Fisher calls “registers.”   Fisher explains that, in some cases where writers want readers to 
feel a specific emotion, “an author often sets between us and a report a figure we can call the 
‘register,’ whose response models our response” (145). Fisher proposes as his key example 
Rousseau’s discussion of a man watch an animal eat a baby outside his prison cell as the 
child’s mother cries helplessly.  In this stereotypical, contrived example the incarcerated man 
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serves as what Fisher calls the “register” because “he registers for us the ‘correct’ response” 
(145).  In each of these scenes, Joe learns something important about what has happened to 
his mother through a conversation with an adult, who has the potential to offer maternal care.  
The word “rape” enters the novel’s discourse on the breath of a pregnant woman who Joe sits 
across from in the hospital waiting room; through a poignant conversation with his Aunt 
Clemence, Joe learns that his mother won’t die but that the fact that his mother smelled like 
gas is ethically significant; and, his father explains that the attacker dropped matches because 
he was trying to use them.  Erdrich renders these dialogues as what Gerard Genette calls 
“scene” when the timing of the telling matches the timing of the told; Genette explains 
“needless to say pure dialogue cannot be slowed down” (95).  But dialogue isn’t always a 
rapid back and forth.  Instead, there can also be pauses, significant movements, knowing 
glances.  In these scenes, Erdrich completes this mimesis by filling the space of the 
conversations’ pause with descriptions of the characters’ actions and Joe’s thoughts.  
Through his diligent reporting of these scenes, Joe discloses important information about the 
crime, but as a “two weeks ago, I’d been twelve” teenager, Joe cannot fully interpret what 
these clues mean (3).41  Through these scenes, mature readers, who understand what Joe 
cannot, get a sense of how Erdrich wants us to feel about this knowledge.   
                                                
41 James Phelan explains “narrators perform three main roles—reporting, interpreting, and 
evaluating” and asserts that narrators can fail or underperform on each of these three axes 
(50).  Phelan expands “unreliable reporting occurs along the axis of characters, facts and 
events; unreliable reading (or interpreting) occurs along the axis of knowledge and 
perception; and unreliable regarding (or evaluating) occurs along the axis of ethics and 
evaluation” (50).  For Phelan, narrators can either fail on a given axis and thus misreport, 
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Although Joe’s first “register” models for readers how not to respond, the scene 
establishes a structural and stylistic pattern that the others will follow.  Erdrich stages an 
adult figure across from Joe in the hospital’s waiting room and signals the potential for 
maternal care by casting a woman at the cusp of biological motherhood.  But, as in Gumbs’s 
conception of it, mothering is more than the physical capacity to produce a child.  In Joe’s 
initial conversation with the pregnant woman we can see how Erdrich structures these 
scenes: 
A skinny pregnant woman…. Slumped down next to a quiet old 
woman, across from me, and picked up an old People magazine.     
Don’t you Indians have your own hospital over there?  Aren’t you 
building a new one? 
The emergency room’s under construction, I told her.   
Still, she said. 
Still what?  I made my voice grating and sarcastic.  I was never like so 
many Indian boys, who’d look down quiet in their anger and say nothing.  My 
mother taught me different.  (8) 
Erdrich frames this dialogue with a simple description of the other people in the waiting 
room and Joe’s thoughts about how one should feel about her demeaning attitude.  These 
lines of prose do not break pace with the scene, but instead hold the space of the natural 
pauses in conversation.  This gives the reader time to join Joe in his indignation about her 
racism and understand her final remark about the rape as a mean jab at Joe.  Although this 
                                                                                                                                                  
misread, or misregard or they can fall short on the axis and underreport, underread, or 
underinterpret.   
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woman does help Joe begin to understand what happened, it’s clear that she does so out of a 
sense of hatred.  In this scene, Erdrich aligns our reaction entirely with Joe’s: we should feel 
angry with this woman.  The pregnant woman is the first white character in the novel, and 
Erdrich makes it clear that her readers, many of whom are also white, should not respond like 
she does.  
 While the racist pregnant woman serves as a register for what not to do, Joe’s Aunt 
Clemence functions as a more positive model pushing readers toward a particular feeling.  
Again, Erdrich casts an-almost-mother as Joe’s interlocutor; a few pages before this dialogue, 
Erdrich explains that Clemence, Joe’s maternal aunt, has much in common with his mother.  
Joe describes them both as “[c]alm and direct, with take-charge eyes and movie-star lips” 
(10).  In contrast with the almost paradoxically “skinny pregnant woman,” the maternal 
figures of Clemence and Geraldine are not only “beautiful,” “slim even after their children,” 
but strong powerful women whose very features can command a room (10).  In Joe’s 
conversation with his aunt, where Joe first uses the word “rape” to name the crime, he asks 
his aunt a series of questions rendered in the same unquoted dialogue as the previous scene.  
Just as Bazil’s opening question “where is your mother?” half-addresses the reader, so too do 
Joe’s poignant questions of his aunt query the reader as well: “Was it rape?” “Will she die 
from it?” and “Why did she smell like gas?” (14-15)  Unlike the child-narrator, we already 
know the answer to the first, and if we didn’t suspect the answer to the third already, 
Clemence’s response, confirms our suspicions.  This scene is important to the plot of the 
novel because it discloses to readers that, after raping Geraldine, the attacker attempted to 
immolate her.  This understanding, although still unclear to Joe, should make readers feel as 
sick as he describes his aunt feeling.  Joe explains that, unable to answer his final question, 
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“Clemence stared at me, the Kleenex frozen beside her nose, and her skin went the color of 
old snow.  She bent over suddenly and put her head down on her knees” (15).  Like the 
previous scene, these sentences of prose stand for a tense pause in the dialogue, maintaining 
the pace of the scene.  Clemence models a much more appropriate emotional response than 
the pregnant woman.  Even though Joe still cannot fully interpret the meaning of the smell, 
he knows, from Clemence’s reaction, that it is ethically and emotionally significant.  He 
concludes the scene: “I didn’t ask her about the gasoline again” (15).  While the pregnant 
lady functions as a failed register, Clemence serves as a more perfect, but still flawed, model.  
Even as readers can acknowledge the horror at having to explain the hatred that underlies 
immolation to a child, we might also hope for someone who can comfort Joe more 
completely.    
 Joe’s confusion about gasoline comes up a third time in a conversation between him 
and his father in a scene stylistically and structurally similar to the previous two.  It 
communicates important information about the crime to Joe and the reader even as it 
emphasizes the emotional pain associated with the attack.  Again, Erdrich positions an 
almost-mother, this time Joe’s father   Like Clemence, Bazil hesitates to answer Joe in a way 
that reveals the rapist’s murderous intent, but unlike his sister-in-law, he does respond to his 
son:  
Why’d he drop the matches? 
My father rubbed a hand across his eyes and again had trouble speaking. 
He wanted to, tried to, he was having trouble lighting a match. 
A book match? 
Yes. 
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Oh.  Did he get it lit? 
No… the match was wet. 
So then what happened? 
Suddenly my eyes began to water and I bent over my plate.  (27-28) 
Like the scene with Clemence, the lines of prose stand in the place of the conversation’s 
pause.  Just as his aunt’s physical reaction to Joe’s question alerts him to it’s ethical 
significance, his father’s covered eyes and faltered speech helps Joe see the severity of the 
events.  While Clemence cannot respond at all, Joe’s father gives minimal answers that 
confirm for the reader what Joe still cannot narrate.  Although Joe still cannot bring himself 
to say it, readers can already imagine the response to his final unanswered question.  In this 
scene, Joe’s physical reaction echoes Clemence’s in the hospital.  While she bent over her 
knees in an attempt not to faint, Joe leans over his plate to keep from weeping.  Just as in the 
previous scene, Erdrich arouses our sympathies for both the adult and the child.  As much as 
we feel for the father and aunt who struggle with whether or not and how to explain such 
violence to a child, we also feel for Joe who must come to realize what has happened to his 
mother.  By setting these registers before us, Erdrich simultaneously affirms the horror of the 
crime and creates an appetite for a type of mothering.  The maternal care that Erdrich invites 
resonates with Gumbs’s definition of mothering as an activity that affirms children and 
creates a better world.  In addition to encouraging an empathy with Clemence and Bazil’s 
struggle to explain (or not) to Joe the violent realities of the current world, Erdrich creates a 
desire for a sort of care that assures Joe of something better, some way to cope with such 
hatred.  Although kind and attentive, neither Clemence nor Bazil embrace Joe—they cannot 
explain to him what has happened and comfort him with either physical affirmation or the lie 
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that everything will be okay.  This communicates the way violence radiates throughout a 
family and can foster a desire that someone will comfort Joe in ways his relatives cannot.   
 The concluding scene in the series comes after Joe finally acknowledges attempted 
immolation to himself.  Although readers may have determined the horrible extent of the 
rapist’s intent in any of the previous scenes, Joe does not admit it to himself until the fourth 
chapter when he goes to the round house and retraces his mother’s—and the rapist’s—steps 
to find the gas can in the lake.  Erdrich reminds us of the previous scenes when Joe explains 
his cognitive resistance to imagining what happened to his mother: “I had now come to the 
understanding that my mother’s attacker had also tried to set her on fire. Although this fact 
had been made plain, or was at least implicit in Clemence’s reaction at the hospital and my 
father’s account of my mother’s escape, my understanding had resisted” (62).  Alone at the 
round house, Joe convulses and vomits enacting the physical repulsion implied in his aunt’s 
reaction and his own involuntary tears during the conversation with his father.  Joe has 
discovered on his own what his relatives could not bring themselves to explain to him.   
Now that Joe has full understanding of what his mother survived, Erdrich constructs a 
final scene where Cappy, his best friend, cares for him in a way the parental figures cannot—
the teenage boys model a version of “mothering ourselves.”  After a little more sleuth work 
with his friends, Joe calls his father to let him know where he is.  The ensuing scene mirrors 
the first three stylistically—the pace of narration matches the pace of a conversation, and Joe 
fills the pauses in dialogue with descriptions of the characters’ actions.  But there is a major 
structural difference.  Erdrich locates the adult figure in another physical space at the end of a 
phone line and places Cappy, Joe’s best friend behind him.  Unlike the previous scenes, the 
question of gasoline does not come up, but instead sets the tone for the scene as Joe begins 
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the chapter by answering it for himself.  In place of that plot related question, Joe asks for the 
affirmation and care Erdrich already created a desire for in the previous scenes.  At the end of 
their brief conversation, Joe’s “I love you, Dad” echoes into silence as a plea for connection 
that Joe wasn’t aware he wanted (71).  His father unknowingly places the receiver back in the 
cradle, a twentieth-century telephone word that Erdrich pulls from the past to emphasize his 
unintentional failure to hold his teenage child.  Bazil could not comfort his son in the first 
scene, when Joe explicitly asks about the matches and doesn’t know he needs to in this one.  
Through this series of scenes, Erdrich makes her readers witness these adults’ inability to 
help Joe countenance this awful knowledge, and the repetition of that understandable lack of 
comfort raises a desire for some sort of care.   
Erdrich satisfies the reader’s desire that Joe’s suffering be acknowledged and cared 
for through the figure of Joe’s friend Cappy who Joe finds standing behind him after his 
phone call. In the same mimetic pace, Joe narrates how he lashes out at Cappy, which alerts 
his best friend to what he probably already knew—Joe’s deep distress.  Rather than leaving 
Joe alone with his grief and anger, Cappy waits, creating an opening for Joe.  Like the 
previous scenes, Erdrich uses descriptive prose to hold the time, and tension of the scene’s 
pause, but this time rather than narrating the characters’ actions she traces Joe’s thoughts: 
He turned around.  I put my hands in my pocket and scuffed my shoes on the 
floor.  My dad had refused on principle to buy me the type of basketball shoes 
I had wanted in Fargo.  He said I didn’t need new shoes, which was true.  
Cappy had the shoes I wanted.  He had his hands in his pockets too, and he 
was looking at the floor, ducking his head back and forth. (71)   
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Cappy turns from Joe’s aggression, but does not leave his friend.  Instead, he mirrors Joe’s 
typical teenage posture with his own ducked head and scuffing feet.  Both boys lower their 
eyes, a gesture of shame—Joe for cursing at his friend and Cappy for witnessing Joe’s 
vulnerability.  Importantly, Cappy does not abandon Joe; he does not fold his arms in that 
other, less open standard teenage stance.  Instead, unlike Bazil and Clemence who do not 
indicate whether they know what Joe is thinking or feeling, Cappy reads his friend’s internal 
and tangential thoughts as clearly as we read Erdrich’s unquoted dialogue.  Somehow Cappy 
knows that Joe’s mind had wandered to basketball shoes, one of the few fashion items 
society allows teenage boys to covet, but Erdrich’s choice of object is not just mimetic.  
Walking in other peoples’ shoes, or skin as Atticus puts it to Scout, is a figure of empathy, 
but, as always with Erdrich, she twists the worn metaphor.  Joe narrates: “[s]trangely, he said 
what I had been thinking, though he lied.  / You got the shoes I wanted” (72).  Cappy does 
not claim to feel Joe’s pain or understand his agony, but his gesture acknowledges Joe’s 
suffering.  Cappy’s physical pain, “he walked away from me on pinched feet” convinces Joe 
that Cappy saw his emotional pain, “he had heard what I’d said on the phone” (72).  Cappy 
walks in his friend’s shoes, not to claim that he knows what Joe suffers, but to communicate 
that he sees it.  Unlike Clemence or Joe’s father, who are themselves too hurt to fully 
acknowledge Joe’s agony Cappy can be the friend who helps hold Joe’s pain.  Cappy enacts 
a type of “mothering ourselves” because he faces Joe in his vulnerability and acknowledges 
his pain.   
Erdrich uses a series of stylistically and structurally similar scenes to shape the 
reader’s response to Joe.  She models the wrong reaction in the form of a racist pregnant 
woman.  She illustrates how those closest to Geraldine—her sister and her spouse—cannot 
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bring themselves to help Joe make sense of the violence let alone comfort him through it.  
Then she interposes a friend who can give Joe the attention that his relatives cannot.  While 
Clemence and Bazil can think, but not say what happened to Geraldine, Cappy, who might or 
might not know what the adults do, finds a way to tell Joe he’s thinking of him and feeling 
for him.  Even as Erdrich positions us close to Clemence and Bazil insofar as we know the 
answers to the questions they cannot fully bring themselves to respond to, she positions 
Cappy close to us.  Like the readers, Cappy witnesses Joe in some of his most vulnerable 
moments.  Cappy seems to be able to, like the readers, read Joe’s thoughts.  Cappy can give 
Joe the sort of care that readers may have wanted to fill in during the previous scenes.  He 
affirms Joe in the way Lorde describes in the context of Black women “we have come to 
expect only from our mothers” (173).  In this way, Erdrich positions readers as potential 
friends for Joe in the image of Cappy who practices the radical peer care, a sort of mothering 
ourselves.  This is why Cappy’s death is so devastating.  Throughout the novel, he cared for 
Joe, helped plot and execute the murder, and, as he says to Joe, “I always had your back” 
(291).  He stood behind Joe every morning to follow through on Joe’s attempt to murder the 
rapist just as he stood behind Joe in his conversation with his father.  Joe and Cappy do 
succeed in avenging the rape, but Erdrich kills Cappy in a car accident.  This conclusion both 
resolves the novel’s central conflict and creates a sense of despair.  Cappy’s death not only 
leaves Joe feeling alone and isolated, but it also leaves the reader, whose sympathy was 
shaped in his image, wanting to fill that void.  It gives us the exigency, as we will see in the 
following chapters, to translate the attachment to fiction to real world advocacy.        
TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD 
Atticus was only a man.  It takes a woman to do that kind of work. 
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—Scout in To Kill a Mockingbird    
To Kill A Mockingbird makes important, calculated, shifts in the cultural narrative 
that underpinned the tradition of lynching; it cracks the white supremacist solidarity upon 
which lynch law depended.  Harper Lee not only created an aspirational figure for hopeful 
white liberals to attach to, but she relegated the evils of racism to white “trash.” As Colin D. 
Pearce writes, “To Kill a Mockingbird is the literary face that the South has turned toward the 
world since 1960” (268).  This is an important feat given that the alternative might have been 
framed by the original rhetoric of George Wallace.  Although Lee’s amendments to the 
cultural narrative leave racial hierarchies intact and emphasize class divisions, she does foster 
a desire and create an imaginary role for someone to simultaneously be white and want 
equality before the law.  For me, Mockingbird is meaningful not only because of the shift it 
made in this cultural narrative, but because of how the novel made it.  Even though Lee relies 
on class lines to shift the racist script, as I will discuss in “The Ethics of Killing Birds,” she 
crafts a particular kind of narrator, a child whose innocence in the hands of a sophisticated 
writer can make a nation pause and reconsider the way we think.  Through Mockingbird, Lee 
capitalizes on the human proclivity for attachment to invite readers to join a new ethical code 
where what it means to be a gentleman or a lady involves working toward equality before the 
law not exercising vigilante violence.     
This reveals the darker reason for the absent Mrs. Finch: the figure of the white 
woman is the cornerstone of a Southern code of chivalry that includes lynch law.  In 1892, 
anti-lynching activist Ida B. Wells explained that this extralegal murder of Black men (and 
sometimes women and children) is premised on “the old threadbare lie that Negro men rape 
white women” (Southern Horrors).  As Wells documents, in many southern communities 
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mobs of white men would accuse Black men of raping white women with little or no 
evidence, hold an impromptu and unfair trial, and then torture and murder the accused.  This 
ritualized violence emerged after the civil war as a violent strategy to maintain racial 
hierarchy after the abolition of slavery. Lynching spread in the post-bellum South because, as 
Wells explains, white mobs did not fear “the loss of several hundred dollars” that the murder 
of a slave would cost (75).  While the number of lynchings reached another high in the years 
following the First World War, the instances of this vigilante terror had begun to decline by 
1930s when To Kill A Mockingbird was set.  The 1930s, however, also witnessed the 
publication and rapid transition to Technicolor of Margaret Mitchell’s Gone With the Wind, 
which simultaneously celebrated the Klan, the cult organized around lynching, and 
reimagined racism in a new South. The threadbare lie of white women’s virtue continues to 
play a major role in shaping the narrative around lynching.  While Lee never uses the word 
“lynch,” she does use the euphemism of “Southern womanhood.”  In the novel, Scout 
overhears Atticus arguing with Aunt Alexandra, saying he’s “in favor of Southern 
womanhood as much as anybody, but not for preserving polite fiction at the expense of 
human life” (167).  By removing Mrs. Finch from the picture years before the novel begins, 
Lee can relegate this debate to an overheard conversation rather than staging it in the novel.  
Lee dismisses Mayella, the white woman who cries rape, by relegating her to “white trash” 
as we’ll see in the fourth chapter.  Situating the death of Mrs. Finch off-stage and in the past, 
Lee foregrounds the presence of Tom Robinson and his innocence.  Instead of defending his 
white woman’s virtue, Atticus displays his heroism by defending that of the innocent Black 
man.  As mentioned above, in the film version of To Kill A Mockingbird, the scene that 
acknowledges Mrs. Finch’s death transitions immediately into Atticus taking Tom 
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Robinson’s case almost as if the missing mother creates a space for Atticus’s moral 
leadership.  
The absence of Mrs. Finch allows Lee to capitalize on one of the more conservative 
aspects of maternal care, the activity Ruddick calls training.  Ruddick explains that mothers 
are usually responsible for training their children to behave in a socially acceptable way.  
Many of the Maycomb community believe that Atticus’s loss accounts for his children’s 
(mis)behavior.  Mrs. Dubose, for instance, attributes Scout and Jem’s tendency to “run wild” 
to the fact Atticus never remarried and goes so far to assert that “if our mother were living we 
would not have come to such a state” of “moral degeneration,” which, for Mrs. Dubose, 
includes Atticus’s defense of Tom Robinson  (117, 135).  Lee reminds her readers that in the 
South women were, to a large degree, responsible for training children in a set of ethics built 
upon racial and class divisions.  As Atticus gets deeper into Tom Robinson’s case, his sister 
Alexandra moves in to provide some “feminine influence,” which, as Scout makes clear, 
comes with a strict behavioral code: “let any moral come along and she would uphold it; she 
was born in the objective case” (145, 146).  But Aunt Alexandra is no replacement for Mrs. 
Finch, and Scout and Jem look to their father for their moral guidance instead of their often 
comical, exaggerated aunt.  Importantly, despite their substantive number, the Ewell children 
also lack a mother, an absence that implicitly accounts for the family’s miscreant behavior.   
  Primed with the absence of Scout’s mother, we can read Lee’s efforts to establish 
Atticus’s moral leadership as both paternal (fatherly and legally) and maternal (relationally 
and morally).  Just as Erdrich used a series of stylistically and structurally similar scenes to 
lead readers towards a particular potential of maternal care, so too, Lee crafts three parallel 
scenes to invite readers to enter a relationship between parent and child that invites an 
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investment in social change.  Lee uses Atticus’s defeat of the mad dog as an idealized model 
for how he might face the madness of the lynch mob and irrationality of the jury.  She 
structures these three scenes in similar ways.  Lee threatens the Finch family with a clear evil 
that manifests itself in a sort of madness: a rabid dog, a mob of angry men, and a prejudiced 
jury.  As Carolyn Jones points out, “[l]ike the dog infected with rabies, the citizens of 
Maycomb are infected with Maycomb’s “usual disease,” racism, which makes them just as 
irrational and just as dangerous as Tim Johnson” (148).42  Lee positions the Finches as the 
potential victims of the madness, which may be accurate in the case of the mad dog, but not 
necessarily in the cases of the lynch mob and trial.  Further, all three scenes foreground 
Atticus and his children and renders the rest of the community as mute spectators.  Even the 
in the jailhouse scene, which requires the most participation of others, members of the lynch 
mob have few lines.  Just as Erdrich’s series of dialogues simultaneously help Joe name the 
crime and shift readers into a particular relationship to him, Lee’s scenes establish an 
evolution of recognition and understanding.  In the mad dog scene, Scout and Jem come to an 
endearing recognition of their father’s skill at marksmanship and his gentlemanly humility in 
not boasting about it.  In the jailhouse scene, Scout’s innocence calls Mr. Cunningham to 
recognize his commitments to children over the agenda of the mob.  The third scene, the 
reading of the verdict, marks the first where Scout understands what’s happening as it 
occurs—she has come to a mature recognition of how racism can foreclose justice.  A closer 
reading of each of the three scenes shows how Lee not only helps her narrator acknowledge 
                                                
42 Jones continues, “Atticus’s neighbors and friends, therefore, are those ‘mad dogs’ that he 
must confront” (148).  Although Jones rightly connects these three scenes, like Scout, she 
mistakes the mob and the jury for people in Atticus’s social sphere.   
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how racism structures her world, but also moves readers to want to change that prejudiced 
system.   
While these three scenes are not as stylistically symmetrical as those I discussed from 
The Round House, Lee does emphasize their connection through Scout’s semi-conscious 
reflections and “dreamlike quality,” as Scout puts it in relation to the reading of the verdict 
(240).  By describing these three important scenes as occurring in the liminal space between 
sleeping and waking, Lee positions Scout to make sophisticated connections between them.  
Although the mad dog scene occurs in broad daylight, it has surreal elements.  Scout 
explains, “[i]n a fog, Jem and I watched our father take the gun and walk out into the middle 
of the street.  He walked quickly, but I thought he moved like an underwater swimmer: time 
had slowed to a nauseating crawl” (109).  The fog from which Scout and Jem spectate seems 
to be more figurative than literal, born out of their confusion as to why the sheriff trusts their 
father with the gun.  Their nervousness, perhaps, slowed down his movements evoking the 
sense of nausea.  The jailhouse scene, taking place around Scout’s bedtime, also has subtle 
dreamlike attributes.  Scout describes the members of the mob as materializing out of 
darkness, “[shadows] became substance as light revealed solid shapes moving toward the jail 
door” and, at Atticus’s request, “they spoke in near-whispers” so as not to wake their 
potential victim (171).  When Scout falls asleep after that encounter, she explicitly connects 
it to the showdown with the mad dog: “I was very tired, and was drifting into sleep when the 
memory of Atticus calmly folding his newspaper and pushing back his hat became Atticus 
standing in the middle of an empty waiting street, pushing up his glasses” (177).  On the edge 
of sleep, Scout connects the threat of rabies to that of racism, but doesn’t yet acknowledge 
that it was her own intervention that stopped the later.  In the courtroom scene, Scout again 
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enters the liminal space between sleeping and waking to help readers see the parallels.  
Although she claims to be “reasonably awake,” she also asserts that “in a dream I saw the 
jury return, moving like underwater swimmers, and Judge Taylor’s voice came from far 
away, and was tiny” (240).  She uses the same uncanny swimming adjective to describe the 
jury’s return as she did to describe her father’s walk into the street.  Perhaps, Lee imagines 
both tasks—facing a rabid dog and returning a guilty verdict for an innocent man—harder 
than everyday life, so people doing them seem to struggle against something harder to move 
through than air.   
The mad dog scene establishes the pattern that Lee sets the other two scenes against.43  
The chapter where Scout narrates this story, structured like the rest of Part I as an episodic 
childhood memory, creates an opportunity for recognition in the Aristotelian sense.  Scout 
opens the chapter with resigned disappointment that her “feeble… nearly fifty” year-old 
father “did not do the things our schoolmates’ fathers did” like playing football, hunting, 
drinking, or smoking (102).  The film communicates this sentiment with adult Scout’s voice-
over narration: “Jem and I had to admit he was very good at that [explaining things], but that 
was all he was good at.  We thought….” (41:17).  This sets up an appetite, to borrow 
language from Kenneth Burke, in the audience that the children’s naïve disappointment will 
be turn to respectful admiration of “the deadest shot in Maycomb County” (109).  Lee has no 
                                                
43 The mad dog scene also resonates cruelly with the murder of Tom Robinson.  In addition 
to the uncomfortable similarity of their names, the Sherriff’s insistence that killing Tom 
Johnson is “a one-shot job” juxtaposes eerily with the seventeen shots that murdered Tom 
Robinson.  I take up this connection in “Chapter Four: The Ethics of Killing Birds." 
  
 103 
trouble establishing seven-year-old Scout’s ignorance: Scout doesn’t initially believe that it is 
a mad dog; she doesn’t feel scared until Jem, Cal, and her neighbors have shut themselves 
inside; and, even then, most of her fear stems from her belief that her father can’t shoot.  
When she finally recognizes her father’s abilities, Jem has to explain that her pride should be 
accompanied with humility: “Atticus is real old, but I wouldn’t care if he couldn’t do 
anything—I wouldn’t care if he couldn’t do a blessed thing….  Atticus is a gentleman, just 
like me!” (113).  In Jem’s explanation, Atticus’s primal action of protecting his young from a 
threat gains a social position in a gendered role at the top of a class hierarchy.  What’s 
more—the Maycomb community already recognized Atticus as the gentlemen Jem claims 
him to be, so the children’s discovery of their father’s abilities also marks a recognition of his 
role, and therefore their belonging, in the social group.  Jem’s relational assertion “like me” 
points both to Atticus’s position in society and to his attachment to his father.   
This scene gains its poignancy not only from Scout’s change from ignorance to 
knowledge, but also because of the recursive rendering of care. Lee makes sure that the fear 
she conjures in her characters is not merely a fear of the rabid dog, but also a fear for each 
other, and the matrix constituted by these intentionally-directed emotions contribute more to 
the power of the scene than the threat of the dog itself.  Atticus fears for his children just as 
they fear for him.  While all the other adults hurry inside to protect themselves, Atticus 
rushes home and outside to protect his children.  The first thing Atticus says upon arriving 
home is “[s]tay inside, son,” and as the dog gets closer he directs Calpurnia inside also where 
“she tried to block Jem and me with her body, but we looked out from beneath her arms” 
(108).  On the other end, Scout and Jem feel a variety of confused fears for their father.  
While they might feel scared that he’s in the path of the rabid dog, they certainly worry that 
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he will make a fool of himself with the rifle.  Scout describes the experience of these 
emotions in very physical terms.  When Sherriff Tate first tries to give Atticus the rifle, Scout 
says “Jem and I nearly fainted” (109).  In the film, actress Mary Badham captures Foote’s 
stage directions “[i]n terror for her father” when she cries passionately, “Oh, no, Mr. Tate.  
He don’t know how to shoot” (68).  By now, Scout has not only adopted her neighbors’ fear, 
but she also makes it clear that it’s a fear for her father.  When Atticus assuages all the fears 
by shedding his presumed feebleness and shooting the dog, we’re not really relieved that the 
threat has been removed, but rather, we’re touched by how the children’s disappointment 
changes to awe.  The emotion in this scene is not really directed at the dog, but rather twined 
up in a connection and care between parent and child and vice versa.   
  While the mad dog scene establishes a standard script of masculine heroics, the 
jailhouse scene makes some important shifts—Atticus takes on a more motherly role, and in 
place of the children’s recognition of their father, Lee situates the mob’s recognition of their 
civil social attachments.  Before he’s aware of his own children’s presence, Atticus signals 
his shift from protector to caregiver by asking the lynch mob to speak quietly because Tom 
Robinson is sleeping, “he’s asleep.  Don’t wake him up,” a request that Mrs. Finch might 
have made of him when Jem and Scout were babies (171).  While Atticus’s decision to take 
this maternal role is radical, even queer, in the 1930’s context when the novel is set or in the 
1950’s world in which it was written, his care is patronizing as it infantilizes a grown man.  
This gesture captures my critique and praise of the novel—on the one hand, Lee aspires to 
facilitate important social change, but even as she does it she maintains stereotypical racist 
hierarchies.  When his offspring make their presence known, Atticus switches gears to keep 
them safe, imploring Jem to “[t]ake Scout and Dill home,” that domestic place where they 
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also sought refuge from the mad dog (172).  Unlike the mad dog scene where the parent 
protects his children, it’s Scout and Jem’s turn to protect their father. Scout does not register 
her father’s fear or the seriousness of the situation.  Although she observes “a flash of plain 
fear” in her father’s eyes when she jumps into the scene, she herself feels “hot 
embarrassment” because the men are strangers (172).  Jem, on the other hand, probably does 
and doesn’t follow his father’s instructions because he senses that he needs to protect his 
father more than he needs to protect his sister.  Scout describes Jem’s insubordination as a 
reflection of Atticus: 
As Atticus’s fists went to his hips, so did Jem’s and as they faced each other I 
could see little resemblance between them: Jem’s soft brown hair and eyes, 
his oval face and snug-fitting ears were our mother’s contrasting oddly with 
Atticus’s graying black hair and square-cut features, but they were somehow 
alike.  Mutual defiance made them alike.  (173)     
Just as Atticus positioned his body between the mob and his client, Jem is adamant in his 
desire to stay with his father.  While Scout describes a behavioral similarity between her 
brother and her father, she emphasizes his resemblance to their mother, one of the few times 
she mentions her in the novel.  Jem’s posture mirrors that of the patriarch, but his face brings 
the maternal into the scene.  The absence of the white woman’s body sets aside the scripted 
pretense for lynching, but her presence in the form of her children activates a different sort of 
responsibility—that of parenting instead of protecting.  While the mad dog scene sets up a 
performance of humble heroism, this scene emphasizes relationality—Jem is both his father 
and mother; Atticus must play both roles.   
 106 
Scout’s attempts at “livingroom talk” with Mr. Cunningham extend the familial 
attachment that Lee established between Atticus and his children to the relationship among 
generations in the social group. While Atticus demonstrated poise and bravery in the face of 
the rabid dog, Scout, oblivious to the tension around her, stays calm, even bored in the face 
of the racists.  Scout’s civil address calls the adult to switch gears from the mob mentality, 
heated with hate and alcohol, to the more mature man, one addressed respectfully by 
children.  Scout begins by referencing the humble way Mr. Cunningham paid Atticus.  The 
Cunningham family, as Scout explains in the second chapter, is well-known for their 
honorable trait that “they never took anything of anybody” (22).  The eight-year-old’s 
unintentional reminder of his indebtedness to her father who had provided him legal services 
in exchange for hickory nuts, smilax, holly, and turnip greens might have embarrassed him in 
front of his rural community.  Whatever class hierarchy Scout unwittingly evokes does not 
move Mr. Cunningham to react.  Acknowledging Atticus’s former charity would have 
reasserted the patrician’s power over the mob of country folk, who in this late-night 
encounter have the weight of numbers and the inertia of conservative traditions on their side.  
But, when Scout references her relationship to his son, also called Walter, “Mr. Cunningham 
was moved to a faint nod.  He did know me, after all” (174).  Scout’s reference to little 
Walter may have reminded Mr. Cunningham that he has a smaller version of himself at home 
whom he cares about, just as Atticus’s miniatures interposed themselves to protect their 
father.  Simply by greeting him, Scout invites Mr. Cunningham to play a different part—that 
of a parent.  When she asks him about his entailment and his son, he cannot respond with 
brusque retort of angry men.  In order to understand the “peculiar thing” Mr. Cunningham 
did in response to Scout, readers must take the perspective of caring parents as well (175).  
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Lee emphasizes Mr. Cunningham’s recognition of his possible-parent relationship to Scout 
through repeated size imagery.  Even though Scout knows his name, she begins her first 
description of him with “[t]he big man” (174).  Mr. Cunningham himself accounts for his 
size by “squatt[ing] down and [taking] me by both shoulders” (175).  The film prolongs this 
moment of adult-child eye-to-eye engagement, by raising the jail door, so Atticus and his 
children stand a few steps above the crowd.  While this allows Atticus to tower over the 
country folk, it places Scout on face level with Mr. Cunningham and his companions.  In 
both the film and the novel, he closes the conversation with another reference to size “little 
lady,” an epithet that both praises the maturity of Scout’s civilities and recalls her role as a 
small child (175).  
This is the most radical of Lee’s scenes because the child’s appeal calls the adults to 
inhabit roles of caregivers in their social system.  Instead of protecting a myth, they must 
participate in the civility the child expects.  While, in the mad dog scene, Scout stood next to 
Jem in wide-eyed awe of their father’s marksmanship, Atticus, in this scene, stands side-by-
side with Jem amazed by the effects of his daughter’s small talk: Scout explains, “Atticus’s 
mouth, even, was half-open, an attitude he had once described as uncouth” (174).  Scout’s 
lady-like attempts to force a conversation with Mr. Cunningham renders her father 
speechless leaving him with an ungentlemanly expression of awe.  In addition to 
repositioning Mr. Cunningham from mob member to parent, Scout’s civilities also call 
Atticus into his other role.  Her conversation asks him to be not only the town lawyer who 
stands up for the possibility of fair trials, but also the father, who taught his daughter that “it 
was the polite thing to talk to people about what they were interested in, not about what you 
were interested in” (174).  This scene shows how Ruddick’s “maternal thinking” can lead to 
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non-violence.  Recognizing their relationship to the child does make the mob go home. 
Scout’s “child-thinking” reprograms the adult’s script.  Rather than following racist protocols 
the adults resume their roles as parents raising children to interact civilly and peacefully with 
each other.    
Lee makes a further amendment to the pattern established in the mad dog chapter in 
its final iteration in the courtroom.  The recognition this scene sounds is not encapsulated in 
the scene itself, but rather marks Scout’s transition from ignorance of racism to the 
knowledge that it is strong enough to convict an innocent man.  While Atticus can protect his 
children from the mad dog and Scout can call a mob to civility, in the courtroom, parent and 
child fail in the face of Maycomb’s “usual disease.”  Although Atticus is as skilled an orator 
as he is a marksman, he could not win the case.  Despite the fact that Scout “toy[s] with the 
idea of asking everyone below to concentrate on setting Tom Robinson free” and Jem is 
devastated by the verdict, neither can make a difference in that forum (239).  Unlike the other 
two scenes, where either Scout or her father was surprised by the other’s success, Scout 
describes watching the jury return the verdict as “like watching Atticus walk into the street, 
raise a rifle to his shoulder and pull the trigger, but all the time knowing that the gun was 
empty” (240).  Scout and Atticus knew the whole time the jury would return a guilty verdict. 
  Like the previous two scenes, however, Lee couples the recognition with an 
emphasis on relationality.  Lee juxtaposes the town’s reverence for Atticus’s attempt with 
Jem’s disappointment in his father’s failure.  Unlike the mad dog scene, where the children’s 
embarrassment turns to admiration, or the jailhouse scene where the adult’s argument shifts 
to collective care, in the aftermath of the case, a good swath of the Maycomb mind maintains 
their respect for Atticus, while Jem wallows in confusion and sadness.  The “angry tears” he 
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cries walking home from the courthouse transitions to a measured sulkiness the next day 
(242).  Lee carefully inserts invitations to the readers in the space of this disappointment.  As 
she comforts him, Miss Maudie suggests to Jem in words that echo her praise of Atticus’s 
shooting “he’s the only man in these parts who can keep a jury out so long in a case like that.  
And I thought to myself, well, we’re making a step—it’s just a baby-step, but it’s a step” 
(246).  Just as Jem identifies with his father after the mad dog scene, in response to Miss 
Maudie, he expresses an urgency to continue what his father has started “soon’s I get 
grown—” (246).  Atticus also holds high expectations for the progress in his son’s future; he 
says to Jem “[i]f you had been on that jury, son, and eleven other boys like you, Tom would 
be a free man” (251).  In the words of Miss Maudie and Atticus’s comfort, Lee inserts not so 
subtle suggestions to readers that such progress can be seen in our lifetime: that we can, like 
Jem, make different choices than the adults that so disappointed him.  Lee’s first actual 
readers may have been children, as she herself was, in the very decade that the novel is set.  
As Mockingbird gets taught year after year, more and more children may feel the same 
imperative as Jem to “make up for heathen juries” when they “get grown” (246).  While 
Erdrich’s scenes push her readers to be more like Cappy, Lee encourages her readers to be 
gentlemen like Jem and Atticus who can help “our courts [become] the great levelers… 
[where] all men are created equal” as Atticus claimed in his closing remarks (233).   
THE BLUEST EYE 
Those of us who nurture the lives of those children who are not supposed to 
exist, who are not supposed to grow up, who are revolutionary in their very 
beings are doing some of the most subversive work in the world.  
— Alexis Pauline Gumbs 
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While The Round House pushes readers towards legal change and To Kill a 
Mockingbird facilitates a shift in the cultural narrative of racial justice, Toni Morrison’s The 
Bluest Eye exposes the way white supremacy infects all aspects of society with a violence 
that concentrates on its most vulnerable members.  Morrison’s understanding that systems of 
race, class, and gender intersect rendering Black women and girls especially vulnerable 
anticipates Crenshaw’s pivotal theory of intersectionality.  While Erdrich and Lee who create 
repeated scenes of potential attachment to position readers in relationship to their narratives, 
Morrison crafts complicated patterns that crumble in on themselves like a kaleidoscope to 
show how racism is both structural and interpersonal.  Scenes of potential, and often refused 
or corrupted, maternal care proliferate throughout her oeuvre; recall Sethe’s “rough choice” 
in Beloved, Eva Peace’s immolation of Plum in Sula, or Mavis’s murder of her twins in 
Paradise.  In the very opening of her first novel, The Bluest Eye, Morrison signals how she 
will focus her questions about the failures of maternal care in the frail, wounded bird figure 
of eleven-year-old Pecola Breedlove.  Paula Gallant Eckard calls this a “grotesque inversion” 
of the maternal because “[r]ejected by her mother and raped by her father, Pecola gives birth 
prematurely to an infant whose death symbolizes her own failure to thrive” (38).  Morrison 
provides important insight into her thought-process in a 1993 “Afterword” printed with many 
current versions of the novel.  Morrison’s self-reflection will inform my reading of her 
narrative structure.  Morrison divides The Bluest Eye into four seasons and each has at least 
three distinct styles: her version of a Dick and Jane primer, which provides a subject, 
Claudia’s sections, which create a narrative arc and omniscient sections, which fill out the 
community and Pecola.  By attending in particular to the repeated scenes of maternal 
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(in)attention, we will see how Morrison connects broad social formations to individual 
interpersonal violence.     
Some critics have argued that by prefacing the novel with a repeated, deranged 
recitation of the midcentury Dick and Jane reader (first in plain prose, then without 
capitalization or punctuation, and finally without spaces as well), Morrison alludes to a white 
ideal of normalcy “inappropriate” for Black families.44  The removal of punctuation and then 
spacing draws attention to the fluidity with which the historical primer rendered a hetero-
normative white family the norm and ideal.  By pairing the opening allusion to Dick and Jane 
with Claudia’s prologue that names, in child’s terms, the novel’s tragedy, Morrison does 
seem to establish a binary, but it’s a relational one, where the terms don’t just happen to be 
opposite, but are made so by the mechanics of dominance.   
Instead of a binary, The Bluest Eye rotates between the childhood memories that 
Claudia narrates, omniscient expositions on the various members of the community, and the 
                                                
44 As Andrea O’Reilly writes, “Families like the Breedloves in The Bluest Eye can never be a 
Dick and Jane family though they will continually aspire to achieve the ideal and forever 
measure their own selves against it.  The primer in The Bluest Eye serves to emphasize the 
inappropriateness of this idea for black families and reminds us of the inevitable feelings of 
inferiority that come with not achieving what is presented as the ideal and normal way of 
life” (48).  Chikwenye Okonjo Ogunyemi argues that these opening paragraphs reflect three 
levels of black deviance from this white ideal: the proper prose paragraph correlates to 
Geraldine’s family “a counterfeit of the idealized white family,” the legible, but 
unpunctuated paragraph corresponds to the MacTeers and the unpunctuated unspaced 
paragraph reflects “utter breakdown of order among the Breedloves” (113).   
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Dick and Jane passages that preface them. By juxtaposing the water-color white family with 
the abject incest of the Breedloves, Morrison shows how the illusion of raced normalcy 
depends on the debasement of what she calls a “crippled and crippling” Black family (210).  
She shores up her claims about how the fairy-tale of white perfection requires racist 
defilement by making it clear in the novel’s omniscient sections (titled with angry echoes of 
the Dick and Jane break-down) that white characters’ perversion and manipulation cause the 
Breedloves’ violence.45  As soon as we begin the seasonal cycle that comprises the novel 
proper, however, we realize that Morrison pulls apart this binary to triangulate a third: 
Claudia’s own family the MacTeers, a real ideal, who are closer to what Morrison imagines 
as “the average black family” of the 1940s and may be as Andrea O’Reilly suggests the “only 
one ‘successful’ nuclear family in all of Morrison’s fiction” (210, 25).  Morrison thus twines 
three strands together to create The Bluest Eye, forging the genre of the braided narrative.  So 
even as the opening pages position Pecola opposite an idealized Jane, whose blue eyes she 
yearns to have, Morrison interjects Claudia, the third that releases the polar tension and 
makes the horrible story readable.  By repeating similarly structured scenes of potential care 
for Pecola throughout these differently styled strands, Morrison makes her harsh indictment 
of the infectious relationality of racism.   
In her 1993 “Afterword,” Morrison describes how she intended the novel’s 
fragmented structure both as a formal reflection of Pecola’s unraveling and invitation to 
                                                
45 Cholly, who rapes his daughter, was not born perverse, but was perverted by the white 
spectators who converted his first invitation to sexual intimacy into a crude and violent 
performance.  Further, she prevents Cholly’s wife Pauline from leaving the abusive marriage 
by the controlling whim of a white woman who refuses to pay for Pauline’s labor. 
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readers’ participation and engagement.  She explains that she wanted to “break the narrative 
into parts that had to be reassembled by the reader” (211).  Almost all of The Bluest Eye’s 
pieces begin by centering on a seemingly disconnected story, but wend their way back to 
Pecola— Claudia starts each of her sections with an episodic childhood memory: her own 
illness, her hatred of Maureen Peal, Mr. Henry’s molestation of Frieda, and the omniscient 
narrator’s turns from the Breedlove’s house and family dynamic, to the phenomenon of 
“sugar-brown Mobile girls,” to Pecola’s parents’ backstories, and finally to Soaphead Church 
(82).  By reassembling these parts, the reader might see more of what’s happening to Pecola 
than any of the novel’s characters.  Even though the omniscient narrator discloses the novel’s 
central tragedy, how Cholly rapes his daughter, we learn through Claudia’s eavesdropping 
that Pecola’s mother beat her afterward so badly that “she lucky to be alive herself,” and, 
through Pecola’s insane conversation with herself, we learn that Cholly violated her multiple 
times (189).  The fragmented narratives reflect a shard of this violence, too horrible to be 
disclosed all at once.  Morrison continues 
The shattered world I built (to complement what is happening to Pecola), its 
pieces held together by seasons in childtime and commenting at every turn on 
the incompatible and barren white family primer, does not in its present form 
handle effectively the silence at its center: the void that is Pecola’s ‘unbeing.’ 
(215)  
Morrison intended the novel’s formal structure to mirror the world it narrates.  The 
fragmented glimpses of Lorain’s community as Pecola wanders through it in counterpoint 
with the “barren” reader, held together by Claudia’s episodic memories and desire to 
understand the tragedy, do give a clear picture of how white supremacy structures a society 
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such that as Morrison says “something as grotesque as the demonization of an entire race 
could take root inside the most delicate member of a society: a child; the most vulnerable 
member: a female” (211).  Although this narrative strategy does reflect the world that failed 
Pecola, it does not, according to Morrison’s self-critique, adequately treat Pecola herself.  
Earlier in the “Afterword” Morrison acknowledges that breaking the story into parts was a 
failed solution to the problem that Pecola’s destruction might “lead readers into the comfort 
of pitying her rather than into an interrogation of themselves for the smashing” (211).  
According to Morrison’s own self-reflection, her novel helps readers to see the broken world, 
but not our complicity in it.  In Morrison’s critique, the novel helps readers understand the 
system, but not the role we play in it.  Importantly, this failure has to do with the way 
Morrison’s formal choices position us in relation to Pecola.         
By treating “Autumn,” as a pattern that repeats and refracts over the remainder of the 
novel, we can see how Morrison schools her readers to see the racism that structures our 
society.  In the beginning, even in the prologue, with Claudia’s voice, Morrison primes her 
readers with the childhood plea for attention.  At the end of the novel, a more mature Claudia 
reflects “[n]o body paid us any attention, so we paid very good attention to ourselves,” and 
her narration invites us to join the attentiveness of this sisterly intimacy (191).  Claudia 
explains that if anyone asked her what she wanted for Christmas, she would answer with a 
desire not for an object but an experience: 
“I want to sit on the low stool in Big Mama’s kitchen with my lap full of lilacs 
and to listen to Big Papa play his violin for me alone.”  The lowness of the 
stool made for my body, the security and warmth of Big Mama’s kitchen, the 
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smell of lilacs, the sound of music, and since, it would be good to have all of 
my senses engaged, the taste of a peach, perhaps, afterward. (22) 
Claudia wishes for a sensual embrace.  She imagines the warm atmosphere of her 
grandmother’s kitchen holds her the way the stool seems crafted for her body, and her 
grandfather’s music that might sound the same regardless of his audience gains significance 
when played just for Claudia.   
In describing the barrier that divides Claudia’s childhood experiences from Claudia 
maintains this aural quality: while adults barely see and never converse with the children, 
Claudia and her sister use what they hear to make sense of the grown-up world.  When her 
parents welcome the new boarder, Mr. Henry, Claudia experiences her introduction as one of 
many in the catalogue of household features: “here is the bathroom; the clothes closet is here; 
and these are my kids, Frieda and Claudia; watch out for this window” (15).  Further, she 
explains “[w]e didn’t initiate talk with grown-ups; we answered their questions” (23).  From 
this vantage of almost inanimate automatons, Claudia and Frieda can “listen to and watch out 
for their voices” gaining a particular kind of knowledge that’s more emotional than cognitive 
(14).  As Claudia explains “[t]he edge, the curl, the thrust of their emotions is always clear to 
Frieda and me.  We do not, cannot, know the meanings of all their words for we are nine and 
ten years old.  So we watch their faces, their hands, their feet, and listen for truth in the 
timbre” (15).  Just as Joe did not understand the significance of the gas smell, but registers its 
emotional import because of his aunt’s reaction, so too do Claudia and Frieda understand the 
affective valences of their parents’ conversations even if they cannot follow the content.  
Morrison’s present tense in this passage positions readers as Claudia’s confidants—unlike 
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the adults in her fictional world we see and listen to her, but assuming that many actual 
readers are adults she needs to remind us of this gap of knowledge.            
“Autumn’s” opening scene, where Mrs. MacTeer nurses her daughter through a flu-
like illness, establishes that Claudia receives a sort of love that cuts through this experienced 
divide.  Claudia’s mother is harsh and does abuse her children but serves as a realistic model 
of care—Eckard explains “Morrison does not idealize Mrs. MacTeer. Unlike the placid, 
unreal mother of the primer, Mrs. MacTeer is blunt bossy, and impatient” (42).  Unable to 
understand that her mother “is not angry at me, but at my sickness,” Claudia initially 
conflates the painful effects of the sickness with the rough way her mother rubs salve over 
her body (12).  In a fevered extension of her heightened perception of adult voices, Claudia 
interprets her mother’s frustration with her illness as a disappointment in her: “[s]he is 
talking to the puke, but she is calling it my name: Claudia” (12).  As the fever breaks, 
however, our nine-year-old narrator recognizes her mother’s love: 
Love, thick and dark as Alaga syrup, eased up into that cracked window.  I 
could smell it—taste it—sweet musty, with an edge of wintergreen in its 
base—everywhere in that house.  It stuck, along with my tongue, to the 
frosted windowpanes.  It coated my chest, along with the salve, and when the 
flannel came undone in my sleep, the clear, sharp curves of air outlined its 
presence on my throat.  And in the night, when my coughing was dry and 
tough, feed padded into the room, hands repined the flannel, readjusted the 
quilt, and rested a moment on my forehead.  So when I think of autumn, I 
think of somebody with hands who does not want me to die. (12) 
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While Claudia experiences herself as a household fixture between the closet and the window, 
she also understands that her mother’s love is just as central to the structure of their home, 
accounting even for the imperfections.  The love seals the cracked window allowing enough 
warmth inside for a child to play at the window.  Resonating with her Christmas wish, the 
love Claudia feels satisfies her sense of taste and smell and like her grandmother’s kitchen 
her mother’s love envelops her completely.  Her mother’s love is not just sweet, like syrup, 
but sticky; it clings to the inside and outside of her chest the way her tongue sticks to the 
window.  The repeated imagery of hands, that both rubbed the salve on her body and re-
tucked her in at night, emphasizes that Mrs. MacTeer’s love is physical and emotional; her 
care not only ensures Claudia’s survival, but also lets her daughter know she wants her to 
thrive.     
 This opening scene of maternal care creates both an appetite and a realistic model for 
what should happen for Pecola.  At the close of both Claudia’s section and “Autumn’s” 
omniscient section, Pecola gets a taste of this sort of care.  When Pecola has her first period, 
Mrs. MacTeer initially beats Frieda based on their white neighbor’s accusation that they were 
“playing nasty,” but quickly gathers all three in a hug when she realizes her mistake (30).  
This scene closes with what Claudia overhears as Mrs. MacTeer bathes Pecola: “[t]he water 
gushed, and over its gushing we could hear the music of my mother’s laughter” (32).  If 
Claudia is right that “the truth is in the timbre” of grown-up voices, then Mrs. MacTeer’s 
musical enjoyment must communicate to Pecola some kind of affection and security, at least 
for a moment.  The image of a mother bathing a child recalls scenes of childhood even 
though the reason for the bathing signals, as Claudia puts it “the little-girl-gone-to-woman,” 
passage to adulthood (31).  As the girls whisper in their bed about the child-bearing 
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capabilities that menstruation heralds, Pecola asks a question in negative echo to Claudia’s 
earlier acknowledgement of the love that structures her house: “How do you do that?  I mean 
how to you get somebody to love you?” (32).  In The Round House, Bazil and Clemence 
were unable to answer Joe’s questions about the gasoline because of their own relationship 
with Joe’s mother, and here Claudia cannot answer Pecola because of her position as a child 
who feels her own mother’s love the way she feels the warmth of her house as autumn turns 
to winter.   
Just as Claudia’s opening section ends with Pecola receiving a moment of the 
attention she so deeply needs, the omniscient pieces of “Autumn” conclude with a similar 
scene of positive attention.  Although the omniscient narrator only allows that the prostitutes 
“didn’t despise” Pecola, the terms of endearment they use to address her (Miss Marie’s 
favorite foods) and the way they entertain her questions implies a deeper affection (51).  
While Claudia and Frieda never “initiate talk with grown-ups,” Morrison uses the same verb 
to describe Pecola’s habitual state with the prostitutes: “Pecola always took the initiative with 
Marie” (23, 52).  Like Mrs. MacTeer’s laughter, the prostitutes revelry creates a warm space 
where Pecola feels comfortable enough to lead conversation and not try to become invisible 
as she does in her own home.  The invitation to care for the unwanted child that Morrison 
sounds in the first chapter gets repeated over the course of the novel, but only in “Autumn” 
do characters accept that invitation.        
The narrative structure of “Autumn” creates a pattern where the MacTeers become a 
more realistic counterpoint to the Breedlove’s extremity than the make-believe of Dick and 
Jane.  The novel’s four sections alternate between potential maternal care and potential care 
among friends.  “Autumn” and “Spring” begin with the MacTeers demonstrating good care 
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of their own children, nursing Claudia through her sickness and running Mr. Henry out of the 
neighborhood because he molested Frieda.  This protective parenting sets a standard from 
which Pecola’s care falls short; while in “Autumn” Pecola receives good foster care from the 
MacTeers and positive attention from the prostitutes, in “Spring” she suffers abuse from her 
mother and violation from her father.  Morrison balances the “Autumn” and “Spring” scenes 
of potential maternal care with “Winter” and “Summer” opportunities for a radical sort of 
“mothering ourselves.”  In “Fall,” Frieda intervenes in the school-yard bullying protecting 
Pecola from the boy’s mean taunts although in the omniscient section a boy’s invitation to 
play turns into scapegoating her for the killing of the cat.  In “Summer,” Claudia and Frieda 
also hope to care for Pecola through the adult problems that have been thrust upon her that 
they learn about through cruel gossip.  While the sisters were able to stand up for Pecola in 
the schoolyard, they cannot protect her from the cruel life.  In place of the omniscient section 
for this final season, Morrison crafts a dialogue between Pecola and an imagined friend 
because as Morrison explains in the “Afterword,” “[s]he is not seen by herself until she 
hallucinates a self.  And the fact of her hallucination becomes a kind of outside-the-book 
conversation” (215).  Thus, the whole novel can be read as variations on theme of maternal 
care established in “Autumn.” 
Morrison restages the menstrual scene that closes Claudia’s first section at the end of 
her third when Pecola spills the berry cobbler, and this image of Pecola bleeding between her 
legs reverberates painfully throughout the novel.  The blood that marks the hopeful rite of 
passage becomes signal of the wrong of rape and finally facilitates the tragedy of 
miscarriage.  Through the cobbler scene, Morrison creates a role for Mrs. Breedlove in this 
sad trajectory.  Eckard also connects the scene of Pecola’s first period with the cobbler 
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accident, “[n]ot unlike the menstrual fluids of the earlier image, the hot purple juice splatters 
on Pecola’s legs” (48).  Like the earlier scene, Claudia and Frieda find themselves alone with 
their friend except for the judging eyes of a white child, who gets to call Mrs. Breedlove 
“Polly, when even Pecola called her mother Mrs. Breedlove” (108).  In place of the 
menstrual blood on the MacTeer’s porch steps, Morrison covers the floor of the Fisher’s 
kitchen with the just-cooked berries from the cobbler.  Just as Mrs. MacTeer’s first reaction 
was to whip her girls for “playing nasty,” Mrs. Breedlove “in one gallop” begins to beat 
Pecola, but Mrs. Breedlove does not realize her error the way Mrs. MacTeer does (30, 109).  
Instead, she continues to abuse her burned daughter, and where Mrs. MacTeer’s anger gives 
way to comforting laughter, Mrs. Breedlove’s hatred rides the timbre of her voice; Claudia 
describes her shouts, “[h]er words were hotter and darker than the smoking berries, and we 
backed away in dread” (109).  Morrison does not only juxtapose Mrs. Breedlove’s abuse with 
Mrs. MacTeer’s care, but she also interposes “pink-and-yellow-girl,” colored in the simple 
contrast reminiscent of the Dick and Jane opening, in between Pecola and her mother (109).  
While Mrs. Breedlove physically and verbally bashes her own daughter, she comforts the 
white girl with what Claudia describes as “honey in her words [that] complemented the 
sundown spilling on the lake” (109).  Importantly, Mrs. Breedlove’s is not a complete failure 
of maternal care—her ability to soothe the white child while abusing her own indicates an 
awful redirection of that capacity.  
Just as the closing omniscient section of “Autumn” repeats the care Mrs. MacTeer 
extends to Pecola, the omniscient sections of “Spring” echo and magnify this abuse.  First, 
“SEEMOTHER” traces the history that traps Mrs. Breedlove in an abusive marriage with 
Cholly, a violent life she tries to paper over with her service to the Fishers.  Second, 
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“SEEFATHER” narrates Cholly’s abandonment as a baby, the death of his caregiver Aunt 
Jimmy, and finally his father’s refusal to recognize him, a rejection that causes the adolescent 
to regress to infancy, losing control of his bowels and crying in fetal position for hours.  
While “SEEMOTHER” ends with Cholly’s routine violation of his wife (“[m]ost times he’s 
thrashing away inside me before I’m woke” (131)), “SEEFATHER” concludes with Cholly 
raping his daughter.  Morrison interposes the mother’s face in the father’s violence: “when 
the child regained consciousness, she was lying on the kitchen floor under a heavy quilt, 
trying to connect the pain between her legs with the face of her mother looming over her” 
(163).  Through this disconcerting image, Eckard explains that Morrison “merges the 
maternal and paternal violations Pecola suffers” (50).  While in Lee and Erdrich’s novels the 
father tries to fill the space of this missing mother, in Morrison’s scene the mother furthers 
the harm caused by the father.  Morrison dedicates so much time to these parental backstories 
not to excuse their abusive behavior but to show how it is made possible, and even 
encouraged, by a society structured by white supremacy.  As Morrison writes in the 
“Afterword,” she tried to connect “Cholly’s ‘rape’ by the whitemen to his own of his 
daughter” (215).  Earlier she showed how Mrs. Breedlove could not escape from her abusive 
relationship with Cholly because she did not have the money or support to do so.  In a world 
where the parental figures cannot protect themselves, they channel their impotence into 
violence on the body of what they can control.   
 The Bluest Eye is not only about the awful extent to which a family can crumble, but 
also about the potential for friendship embraces Lorde’s imperative to “mother ourselves.”  
When the adult Claudia reflects on her lack of attention as a child, she asserts that since the 
adults couldn’t attend to her as much as she needed, she and her sister “paid very good 
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attention to ourselves” (191).  As children, the sisters extend this care to Pecola as well, but, 
as they mature, they join the collective dismissal of the wronged child.  “Autumn” establishes 
this initial friendship: when Pecola gets her first period, Claudia and Frieda try to care for 
before Mrs. MacTeer intervenes and as they sleep the sisters help Pecola understand the 
significance of this physical change.  In “Winter,” Frieda follows through with the 
commitments of friendship by intervening when the boys taunt Pecola.  Although Frieda’s 
act of kindness bears traces of her mother’s care (she breaks up the circle of boys with “with 
set lips and Mama’s eyes” (66)), the sisters’ relationship with Pecola does not imply a 
privileged hierarchy.  They play tea with Pecola as equals and Claudia expects Maureen Peal 
to treat them all equally to ice cream.  Upon learning about the adult difficulties that have 
been thrust on their friend, Frieda and Claudia “could think of nothing but our own magic” 
and attempt to use childhood enchantments to ensure the healthy birth of Pecola’s child (5).  
Even though the sisters can see through the adult misconceptions that blame Pecola just as 
quickly as they worship Shirley Temple, because they are children, they cannot be the friends 
Pecola needs.  Instead, witnessing Pecola’s demise causes their loss of innocence, but, in 
their maturation, they join their community in using Pecola as the negative to define 
themselves against.  Claudia explains, 
All of us—all who knew her—felt so wholesome after we cleaned ourselves 
on her.  We were so beautiful when we stood astride her ugliness.  Her 
simplicity decorated us, her guilt sanctified us, her pain made us glow with 
health, her awkwardness made us think we had a sense of humor.  Her 
inarticulateness made us believe we were eloquent.  Her poverty kept us 
generous.  Even her waking dreams we used—to silence our own nightmares.  
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And she let us, and thereby deserved our contempt.  We honed our egos on 
her, padded our characters with her frailty, and yawned in the fantasy of our 
strength. (205) 
Like illustrated fantasy of the Dick and Jane primer, Claudia explains how she came to 
understand her own wholesome identity in contrast to Pecola’s defilement.  In Claudia’s 
explanation her positive traits are not only made clear in light of Pecola’s failures, but 
actually depend on them.  The collective claim of beauty spreads its legs on top of Pecola’s 
assumed ugliness.  Pecola’s negative attributes become the agents of Claudia’s sentences 
causing her positive characteristics.  Importantly, these are not the musings of the naïve nine-
year-old we have followed throughout the novel.  Rather, they reflect the insights of the 
person Claudia has become, the adult who can see how society’s failure to care for her friend 
can make possible the very way we define ourselves.   
 For me, this is the reason why Morrison’s self-critique holds; readers remain as 
Morrison says “touched but not moved” (211).  Although she creates complicated scenes that 
compel readers to see the awful failure of care and potential for friendship, she ultimately 
forecloses it for Pecola.  The repeated, refracting scenes of maternal care and rejection do 
help readers see the complicated affective way racism permeates society, but it does not 
position us to intervene.  Instead of gradually shaping the reader into a particular relation, 
like Erdrich and Lee do, Morrison shifts us from Claudia’s stories to the omniscient 
observations.  Thus, we may pity Pecola like Claudia does or volunteer an anger that Pecola 
cannot feel as Linda Wagner-Martin suggests, but we do not take up a role next to her as we 
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might with Joe.46  Morrison positions Claudia almost as a blood-sister to Pecola in the sense 
that she washes her menses off the porch steps and witnesses Pecola in some moments of 
rejection, but she cannot be her friend after Pecola’s ultimate violation.  Claudia and Frieda 
pity Pecola, but they can neither discuss the rape with her, as they did with her first period, 
nor help her because of the social ostracization the adults forced on her.  So, just as Claudia 
learned to hide her hatred of Shirley Temple in a “fraudulent love,” she learns to bury her 
attachment to Pecola in a socially-imposed scorn (23).   Although Claudia and Frieda want to 
care for their friend, they cannot, and Pecola hallucinates one into existence, a desperate and 
brilliant act.  Even as the child’s reason breaks, she creates what she needs most: an affirming 
confidant.  Unlike the dialogue in The Round House that creates an inviting opening for 
readers to enter the text, this conversation between a fragmented self bars readers from the 
scene causing us to question what we have already read: the pain of the rape gets 
compounded by its repetition and the poignancy of the wish for blue eyes sharpens with the 
false belief of its fulfillment.  While in The Round House we knew the answers to Joe’s 
poignant questions, the dialogue between Pecola and her hallucinated self reveals more to us 
than we already knew.  Morrison’s scenes position readers finally, as Claudia’s confidants, as 
distant witnesses to the violence enacted on Pecola.  We leave the novel with a deeper 
understanding of the affective avenues of racism, but Morrison offers us no clear way out.  
The damage is done.  As Claudia concludes the novel, “it’s much, much, much too late” 
                                                
46 Wagner-Martin posits that Pecola “should be angry at everyone around her, but instead, 
Morrison asks the reader to supply Pecola’s anger.  What stems from the carefully-
constructed scenes of harmful insult is the reader’s anger at injustice unremedied, or of social 
deprivation to which there is neither answer nor remedy” (17).   
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(206).  Unlike Mockingbird which ends with the hope of when Jem grows up or The Round 
House, which ends with an action list of how readers can advocate against sexual violence, 
The Bluest Eye ends on the defeatist note of damage done too late to be redeemed.   
CONCLUSION 
 Erdrich, Lee, and Morrison all channel the radical potential of mothering to 
foreground the social issues they want to address.  Erdrich and Lee craft a series of scenes, 
similar in style and structure, to move readers into a particular position in relation to their 
characters and conflicts.  Morrison, on the other hand, “mount[s] a series of rejections, some 
routine, some exceptional, some monstrous,” as she explains to share with her readers an 
incisive analysis of how racism infects society (210-211).  In all three novels, authors 
activate readerly expectations for maternal care that facilitate an investment in characters and 
open up a potential for social change.  Rather than using traditional familial formations to 
reproduce social norms, Erdrich, Lee, and Morrison use the potential attachment between a 
maternal figure and a vulnerable child-narrator to facilitate a legal change in the case of The 
Round House, an amendment to the cultural narrative of lynching in Mockingbird, and an 
improvement in racial analysis in The Bluest Eye.  This chapter traced the ways that a child-
narrator can invite a particular emotional investment that helps readers imagine social 
change.  The next chapter will put the cognitive affordances of child-narrators into 
conversation with Critical Race Theory’s knowledge of racial formation to grapple with the 
particular shifts these writers imagine.   
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CHAPTER THREE: “HEY, MR. CUNNINGHAM” 
Atticus said nothing.  I looked around and up at Mr. Cunningham, 
whose face was equally impassive.  Then he did a peculiar thing.  He squatted 
down and took me by both shoulders. 
“I’ll tell him you said hey, little lady,” he said. 
Then he straightened up and waved a big paw.  “Let’s clear out,” he 
called.  “Let’s get going, boys.” 
—Scout Finch, To Kill A Mockingbird (175) 
“A Child’s Call” is an extended effort to understand what it is about the appeal of an 
eight-year-old that can cause an adult to call off a lynch mob.  The previous chapter worked 
to make palpable the affective pull, the imperative to care that can arise between a potential 
parent and a child.  This chapter turns to the cognitive mechanisms that not only enable 
characters to make this rational and caring choice but also allows readers to believe and 
enjoy it.  Ultimately, Mr. Cunningham “did a peculiar thing” because Harper Lee wanted him 
to, and readers buy it because we also want social obligations to children to supersede 
supremacist calls to violence.  Published in the wake of the murder and mutilation of Emmett 
Till, the crime that civil rights worker Amzie Moore called “the best advertised lynching,” 
Mockingbird provides a cognitive framework to rethink Southern ethics (cited in Wood 266).  
Through Scout’s admiration of her father, Lee creates an aspirational figure for hopeful white 
liberals to attach to, and through the child’s education she relegates the evils of racism to 
white “trash.” As Colin D. Pearce writes, “To Kill a Mockingbird is the literary face that the 
South has turned toward the world since 1960” (268).  This is an important feat given that the 
alternative might have been framed by the original rhetoric of George Wallace.  Although 
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Lee’s amendments to the cultural narrative leave racial hierarchies intact and emphasize class 
divisions, she does foster a desire and create an imaginary role for someone to 
simultaneously be white and want equality before the law.  As cultural critic Naa Baako Ako-
Adjei says, Lee’s novel “was the literary expression of the position of the white moderate” 
(195).  Mockingbird represents what Miss Maudie might describe as “it’s just a baby-step, 
but it’s a step” (246).  For me, Mockingbird is meaningful not because of the shift it made in 
this cultural narrative, but because of how the novel made it.  Even though Lee’s analysis of 
race and class is lacking, she crafts a particular kind of narrator, a child whose innocence in 
the hands of a sophisticated writer can make a nation pause, like Mr. Cunningham did, and 
reconsider the way we think.    
Louise Erdrich and Toni Morrison’s child-narrators make similar, if more 
sophisticated, shifts in how readers interpret the actual world.  While Mockingbird depends 
on readers filling in a cultural narrative that the child does not know, The Bluest Eye exposes 
the way seemingly innocuous cultural values—such as the adoration of Shirley Temple—
create damaging standards that renders some violence invisible.  The Round House traverses 
the terrain between a crime thriller and an Amnesty International report to raise readers’ 
awareness about an epidemic of sexual violence against Native women.   All three novels 
rely on readers’ ability to fill in what the child cannot name—a national myth, the double 
violation of incest, or the horrible potential of rape and murder.  Because readers infer these 
things, we imagine them in our language and on our terms.  Even as readers supply the 
content of this supplemented material, the authors use their child-narrators to shift the 
interpretive strategies through which we read it.  These novels are thus built through 
asymmetrical exchanges—on the one hand, these authors rely on readers who know more 
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than the young narrators can articulate, but on the other hand, the readers rely on the children 
for information about the story and how to read it.  Through this asymmetrical collaboration 
between narrator who knows what happened and reader who knows what it means, Lee, 
Morrison, and Erdrich might not change what we think but they do influence how we think it.        
The argument of this chapter rests on three assumptions.  First, in the United States 
we share a cultural and literary imaginary.  While different racial and ethnic groups certainly 
have different sets of knowledges, unique literary canons, and, perhaps, different imaginaries, 
to an important extent we also share an imaginary that allows us to understand ourselves as 
members of the same nation in the sense of Benedict Anderson.  In Imagined Communities 
(1983), Anderson delineated how newspapers and novels, among other things, played a 
major role in the modern turn to nation-states because both print genres helped readers 
imagine a wider sense of interconnection.  Toni Morrison takes up a facet of this shared 
imaginary through her interrogation of “our national literature” and “the literary imagination” 
in Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination (1993) (emphasis added 5).  
Morrison understands that “for both black and white American writers, in a wholly racialized 
society, there is no escape from racially inflected language” and (14).  Morrison knows that 
literature is both confined by and contributes to the racialized assumptions encoded in 
language, and her wider project traces how literary constructions of whiteness via an 
“Africanist presence” accrue into tired yet revealing assumptions about identity in the United 
States.  Although Morrison doesn’t address Mockingbird in her book, the shallow character 
Lee creates for Tom Robinson demonstrates Africanism because, like some of the cases in 
Morrison’s study, he is the crux that makes possible the interiority and facilitates the 
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development of white characters: he enables Atticus to become a hero and Scout and Jem to 
come of age.   
 Second, there is a porous boundary between the cultural imaginary and literary 
imaginary.  Morrison’s argument affirms this as well: “[n]ational literatures, like writers get 
along the best way they can, and with what they can.  They do seem to end up describing and 
inscribing what is really on the national mind” (14).  In this formulation, the concerns of the 
nation become the fabric of the writers’ craft, and the particular way an author chooses to 
work with that material further inscribes those anxieties or can shift them.  Morrison 
interrogates the historic concern of U.S. literature with “the architecture of a new white man” 
and I focus on contemporary authors who try to address more consciously the way racism 
and rape continue to plague our society (15).  Rape, real and imagined, is the act that ignites 
the plot of these novels; the mob in Mockingbird seeks vengeance for an imagined crime; 
The Bluest Eye renders real incest and rape as a potential consequence racialized social 
structures; and The Round House testifies to the ongoing predation of Native women by 
white men.  These authors’ focus on rape draws attention to that mode’s of violence pivotal 
role in maintaining racist hierarchies; slave-owners increased their “property” and shored up 
their power and settlers affirmed their nation through rape.  Morrison has dedicated her 
literary career to liberating language, and in so doing liberating society “from its [language’s] 
sometimes sinister, frequently lazy, almost always predictable employment of racially 
informed and determined chains” (xi). Although writers work in a pre-constructed field of 
material, they can, like Morrison, work to loosen and shift racially inflected language.    
The third assumption relies on Carl Gutiérrez-Jones’s opening argument in Critical 
Race Narratives: A Study of Race, Rhetoric, and Injury (2001). Gutiérrez-Jones- observes, 
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“people of different racial and ethnic backgrounds tend to read race and racism in ways that 
are crucially at odds” or, for my purposes here: although we share a cultural and literary 
imaginary—the sequence of events that comprise our cultural narratives are the same—, 
people from different backgrounds read and interpret that imaginary’s constituent narratives 
very differently (1).  Gutiérrez-Jones makes his point through a careful analysis of the 1999 
acquittal of the NYPD officers who murdered Amadou Diallo by shooting him forty-one 
times and an attention to its similarities with the trial of the LAPD officers to brutally beat 
Rodney King in 1992.  Gutiérrez-Jones reveals the interpretive practices implicit in these 
decisions: The trial rhetoric subordinated the personhood of the victim to the projection-as-
threat on the part of the officers; The emphasis on the officers’ split-second decision making 
in the face of this threat, shored up in the King trial by “breaking up the videotape of the 
assault into individual photographic stills” (4); And the mandate for the jury to sympathize 
with the accused, an imperative explicitly issued in the Diallo case where the judge directed 
jurors, as Gutiérrez-Jones explains “to put themselves in the officers’ shoes and view the 
world as they viewed it” (5).  These juries’ bad decisions are not only a result of a racial 
prejudice, but also a reflection of “the receptiveness that jurors have for certain kinds of 
narrative tactics, and the caution they might exercise toward other kinds” (Gutiérrez-Jones 5).  
The discrepancy in the public responses to these trials, as Gutiérrez-Jones notes, reflects that 
this racially marked divide in reading strategies extends far outside the courtroom.   
In addition to the work of revealing how different readerships interpret shared events 
so differently, Gutiérrez-Jones’s argument about difference between ignorant and race-
conscious reading strategies is central to this chapter because the discrepancies he identifies 
belong in a particular ethical register—the rule of law--the “right” of police officers to wield 
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deadly force, the ability of the justice system to “see” racial bias, the different collective 
assumptions about guilt and innocence.  It is in this realm that Gutiérrez-Jones locates the 
insight of race-conscious readers: “minorities recognize in some [narrative practices] racially 
vexed material which taints the justice system” (5).  In other words, because of their lived 
experiences in the United States, people of color can see how the justice system is not blind 
(except, often, to white people’s guilt), but instead perpetuates the racial hierarchy even 
while proclaiming formal equality. Concentrating in the world of literary texts, Peter 
Rabinowitz has helped us understand that reading strategies are born from readers’ previous 
encounters with other literary texts—readers know what to notice, how to draw significance 
from those details, how to configure those patterns in meaningful ways, and how to think all 
these different parts into coherence because of how these rules functioned in texts read 
earlier.  Rabinowitz’s argument accords with Morrison’s interest in the literary 
imagination—regular readings of texts deemed canonical create conventions, such as the 
repeated use of Black characters or dark imagery to underscore white character’s ethical 
dilemmas which Morrison designates as Africanism, that readers can read and interpret more 
easily each time we encounter them.  Because the difference between our cultural and literary 
imagination is so small, the reading strategies we use to apprehend cultural events that 
Gutiérrez-Jones discusses might be one and the same as the reading strategies we use to 
make sense of literary texts.  If we take Rabinowitz’s point that encountering texts form our 
reading strategies seriously, then reading writers like Morrison, who strive to “unhobble the 
imagination from the demands of [racially inflected] language” might help us develop 
interpretative strategies both for fictional texts and cultural narratives (13).  
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 Throughout “A Child’s Call” I have held ethics open as a concept that grasps the pull 
between people, the tension between a crying infant and a potential caregiver, a field of 
possibility, of responsibility between a self and another or many others because this matrix of 
relationally underlies specific ethical choices.  Although Morrison, Lee, and Erdrich 
accomplish their political and aesthetic projects precisely by the way they write this tension, 
the political triumphs of their works can be captured in what Adam Zachary Newton 
criticizes as “moral paraphrase.”  In this chapter, I want to think together the crib note 
version of these authors’ moral interventions and the ethical complexities that underlie them, 
making them possible.  Importantly, as Gutiérrez-Jones understands, changes in 
interpretative strategies are most marked for white and ignorant readerships; racially aware 
audiences probably already practice these interpretive strategies.  Because, as Morrison 
pointed out in 1993, “regardless of the race of the author, the readers of virtually all of 
American fiction have been positioned as white” and because, as Gutiérrez-Jones has shown, 
white ignorant reading strategies are responsible for much injustice, it is important to trace 
how these strategies can change (xii).  Further, just as Morrison and Rabinowitz understand 
that recurring imagery and conventions create readerly expectations, race-conscious readers 
may have their strategies affirmed by widespread appreciation of these novels.  Before To 
Kill A Mockingbird, the master narrative of lynching assumed that Black men rape white 
women—after Mockingbird our literary imagination presumes Black men, when emplotted in 
this story, innocent.47  This shift certainly resulted from years of Black activism, and below 
                                                
47 Even as I claim this as a shift, I recognize that lynchings still occur and that the national 
imaginary still profile Black men as guilty.  I think the shift manifests itself both in the 
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we’ll see that Mockingbird’s contribution is more complicated than I rendered it here, but 
Lee’s novel nonetheless played an important role in this moral revision of the way we read 
lynching narratives.  Further, before the 1970 publication of Morrison’s The Bluest Eye, it 
was easy to imagine racism as the individual, albeit pervasive, prejudice of white people.  
After her novel, and the decades of Critical Race Theory that her text preceded and 
accompanied, it is much easier for readers to understand how white supremacy both 
manifests as individual bias and structures society in damaging ways, channeling violence 
onto the bodies of its most vulnerable members.  Significantly, Morrison’s understanding of 
how white supremacy can damage women and girls in different ways than men anticipates 
Kimberlé Crenshaw’s thesis on intersectionality.  Finally, in 2012 when Louise Erdrich 
published and won the National Book Award for The Round House, white men could rape 
Native women on tribal land without legal consequences because tribal courts could not try 
non-Native people for major crimes.  In 2013, partly as a result of Erdrich’s activist prose, 
Congress renewed the Violence Against Women Act with a provision that extends tribal 
jurisdiction in some limited cases of sexual violence.  Erdrich’s novel not only raises 
awareness about this issue, but also exposes the complicity of federal Indian Law with white 
male predators.  I’m not claiming that these authors single-handedly effected these 
changes—of course, these important shifts are the result of decades if not centuries of 
struggle both in the streets and in institutional settings.  I argue that through these novels, 
Lee, Morrison and Erdrich not only “describe[] … what is on the national mind,” but also 
                                                                                                                                                  
aesthetic realm and in the still-too-small group of people who understand how the justice and 
the executive branches conspire to convict people of color.   
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“inscribe,” to recall Morrison’s language, these significant changes in how we ought to read 
and interpret events.   
 The way that these three novels make such important shifts in the way we read 
depends on a cognitive collaboration between the reader and the child-narrator.  James 
Phelan, who wrote the book on character narration, asserts that it “is an art of indirection: an 
author communicates to her audience by means of the character narrator’s communication to 
a narratee” (1).  Everything readers can know about the storyworld, characters, and plot gets 
funneled through the perspective of a particular character.  Phelan notes that narrators have 
two types of telling functions: narrator functions and disclosure functions; he writes, “the 
narrator acts as reporter, interpreter, and evaluator of the narrated for the narratee” (12).  In 
Phelan’s schema reporting involves telling what happened, interpreting involves drawing 
conclusions based on what happened, and evaluating or regarding involves making ethical 
judgments about those events.  For instance, in Mockingbird Scout reports that a crowd of 
men smelling “of stale whiskey and pigpen” showed up at the Maycomb County Jail, but she 
does not interpret this congregation as a lynch mob nor judge it as a racist and wrong 
assemblage.  Phelan accounts for this sort of communication by explaining that narrators can 
also serve “disclosure functions” where “the narrator unwittingly reports information of all 
kinds to the authorial audience” (12).  In my example, Lee uses Scout successfully to 
disclose to readers that there is a lynch mob even though the child does not know what that 
is.  Phelan uses the discrepancy between the implied author’s version of events and the 
narrator’s account of those events to define six types of unreliability.  Characters can either 
fail (add the prefix mis-) or underperform (add the prefix under-) along the three axes of 
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communication Phelan identifies.  In Lee’s scene, Scout underinterprets and misevaluates the 
crowd that she accurately reports.        
 Lee, Morrison, and Erdrich derive the power of their child-narrators from requiring 
readers to fill in what the child cannot know.  These young narrators reliably report scenes, 
but because of their innocence cannot fully interpret the events they narrate.  In Mockingbird, 
The Bluest Eye, and The Round House, readers must supplement the child’s account with 
knowledge of rape and racism.  Mockingbird relies on the myth that Black men rape white 
women even as it seeks to alter that story.  The Bluest Eye opens with what Morrison 
categorizes as the “shocking information” of incest, a horror her young narrator cannot grasp 
because she does not yet know where babies come from.  The Round House begins with a 
rape and attempted immolation the narrator discloses but struggles to name because he 
cannot register the hatred implicit in this violence.  These three novels hinge on readers’ 
knowledge of this sexual and racialized violence and our ability complete what these 
narrators only partly say.  The assumption of innocence that serves as the essential 
foundation for these novels and others like them is not a mimetic argument but a moral one.  
Children can and do know and experience this type of violence as attested by many memoirs 
such as Elie Wiesel’s Night (1954), Anne Moody’s Coming of Age in Mississippi (1968), 
Maya Angelou’s I Know Why the Caged Bird Sings (1969), and Dorothy Allison’s Bastard 
Out of Carolina (1992).  Both these memoirs and to a greater extent these novels rely not on 
the reality that children have known these types of aggression, but on the moral desire that 
children not have to.  Readers set aside the historical fact that, as Ako-Adjei reminds us, 
children of Scout’s age often participated in lynch mobs because we want to imagine that 
they didn’t.  This human capacity for destruction belongs in a different category than other 
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knowledges that we also tend to censor from children.  Knowledge of rape and racism is not 
the inevitable discovery of sex or death that coming of age usually denotes.  While all young 
might grow up to discover the pleasures of carnal knowledge or the pain of loss, the desire 
for annihilation that underlies both rape and lynching are things we want to be able to protect 
children from both knowing and experiencing.  The first intervention of Mockingbird, The 
Round House, and The Bluest Eye is inviting readers to join in the assumption that the 
violence they narrate is too wrong for children’s minds.  In this sense, readers may empathize 
with characters who cannot bring themselves to explain the violence to the children such as 
Joe’s Aunt Clemence or his father who cannot communicate to the child why his mother 
smelled like gas.   
Even as readers can fill in the violence these writers tell from our own knowledge of 
what hatred is possible in the world, we rely on these child-narrators to provide the details 
about how this social violence manifests itself in the particular instance of this story 
community.  At the same time as we want to protect the character that represents a possible 
child from knowing about these forms of annihilation, we need the “synthetic” child that 
narrates to speak the story for us, which paradoxically makes the horrors they narrate easier 
to bear.48  Morrison writes about the juxtaposition between the childish description of 
marigolds and the adult understanding of incest in The Bluest Eye, “[t]he reader is thereby 
                                                
48 Phelan distinguishes three types of “character functions.”  First, “mimetic functions,” 
which he describes as “the ways in which characters work as representations of possible 
people,” second, “synthetic functions” which includes how characters work “as artificial 
constructs within the larger construct of the work,” and, finally, “thematic functions” which 
grasps how characters can stand “ as representative of larger groups or ideas” (12).    
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protected from a confrontation too soon with the painful details, while simultaneously 
provoked into a desire to know them” (213).  Even as readers wish children did not have to 
know “the painful details,” in Morrison’s analysis, the child’s perspective protects the reader 
also from knowing those details “too soon” (213).  In this way these novels rely on unspoken 
agreement between the author and reader: we will fill in what the child should not know even 
as the child reveals this knowledge to us.  Morrison writes, “the opening provides the stroke 
that announces something more than a secret shared, but a silence broken, a void filled, an 
unspeakable thing spoken at last” (214).  What we agree children should not know becomes 
bearable by communal knowing, communal speaking.  We participate in the breaking of the 
silence by meeting the child part way in their report and filling in with our adult knowledge 
what we do not want them to have to say. 
 In the process of filling in what the child cannot say, readers learn along with the 
child how we ought to interpret, or as Phelan would say “regard” or “evaluate,” the content 
of what we supply.  Through these interpretive lessons that the child-narrators receive and 
give, authors can enact a second ethical intervention: they train their readers in particular 
reading strategies.  Because we have supplied the content of the unspoken, we do not get 
caught up in what happened and instead can be influenced on how to read it.  Readers intuit 
the intent of Mr. Cunningham’s mob; we understand why Geraldine smelled like gas, and we 
know the violence through which Pecola conceived “her father’s baby” (5).  The surety of 
these inferences leaves open how we ought to interpret these events.  For this, we rely 
heavily on what the child knows and learns.  Scout learns from her father behavioral codes 
that hope for a post-race world, but at the same time she sprinkles her narrative with a 
skewed Southern history.  Joe also learns from his father about the exclusive sights of the 
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justice system and draws logical conclusions about what the law will fail to see.  As Claudia 
comes to understand what happened to Pecola, Morrison helps readers see the social 
structures that can make it possible for a father to direct that awful violence onto the body of 
his little girl.  By requiring readers to fill in what their narrators disclose and asking us to 
interpret it along the lines of the children, Lee, Erdrich, and Morrison shift our interpretative 
strategies.                            
TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD 
If our democracy is to work the way it should in this increasingly diverse 
nation, then each one of us needs to try to heed the advice of a great character 
in American fiction, Atticus Finch, who said “You never really understand a 
person until you consider things from his point of view. Until you climb into 
his skin and walk around in it.” 
—President Barack Obama’s “Farewell Address”  
In many ways, To Kill a Mockingbird has done for the United States what Scout did 
for the lynch mob in the example that opens “A Child’s Call.”  Just as Scout’s pleasantries 
interrupt the masculine tension and postpone the racist violence, Lee’s narrative—both in her 
1960 novel and the 1962 film adaptation—arrests audiences, in and outside the storyworld, 
with an imperative to empathize as Atticus’s adage advises.  Just as Atticus claims that 
Scout’s naïve greeting unwittingly “made Walter Cunningham stand in my shoes for a 
minute,” teachers have used the novel, for half a century, to teach children, especially eighth 
graders, empathy (179).  This ethical work resonates with the novel’s widespread acclaim.  In 
English Journal, Michael Milburn called the novel “a Holy Grail among English teachers” 
because it’s “a book that most, if not all students will like, discuss with enthusiasm, and 
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remember fondly” (90).  Mockingbird was “far and away [the] first choice” of Library 
Journal’s librarian’s top books of the 20th century.49  But it’s not just teachers and librarians 
that recognize Mockingbird’s power.  The novel won the Pulitzer Prize in Fiction in 1961, 
and the film won three academy awards including best actor for Gregory Peck who played 
Atticus, a character later recognized by the American Film Institute as the “top movie hero… 
of all time.” When Harper Lee won the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 2007, President 
George Bush claimed, “To Kill a Mockingbird has influenced the character of our country for 
the better.”  President Barack Obama proposes that the successful functioning of a 
democracy in a nation as diverse as the U.S. depends on “heeding” Atticus’s advice.  In 
addition to this pedagogic, aesthetic, and federal recognition, Mockingbird has been 
embraced by the legal and medical professions.  The American Bar Association honored the 
novel on its 50th anniversary.  In recommendation of the acknowledgment attorney Clark 
Cooper wrote, “[t]aken as a whole, the influence of To Kill A Mockingbird and of Atticus 
Finch on us, as lawyers, is remarkable…. Atticus Finch encourages us to supplant our 
cynicism and malaise with integrity and empathy.  We, as a profession, are better because of 
Atticus Finch” (Podgers 55).  James Podgers, the managing editor for the American Bar 
Association Journal, further asserts that Mockingbird is “[a]rguably is the most beloved 
American novel written in the 20th century” and “Atticus Finch, perhaps the ultimate role 
                                                
49 The Library Journal created their list in response to the Modern Library’s list, “100 Best 
Novels,” claiming that “your top titles reflect more of the books that people actually read that 
those they feel they should have read” (34). John M. Gist points out that British librarians 
also acclaim the novel; he writes, “[i]n 2006, British librarians ranked To Kill A Mockingbird 
as the most recommended book in the world, the bible coming in second” (248). 
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model for lawyers seeking to find their ethical bearings an increasingly harsh legal 
environment” (57).50  Further, in The American Journal of Medicine, Doctors Darryl Potyk 
and Judy Swanson call the novel a “clarion call for racial and social justice.”  Across the 
board, Americans recognize To Kill A Mockingbird as an important narrative about 
empathy—not only in middle school classrooms, but also from the White House to 
Hollywood and the courtrooms and hospitals in between.   
Although students must enjoy Mockingbird enough for teachers to keep teaching it, 
all of the praise I’ve cited above comes from professional adults: teachers, librarians, 
lawyers, and doctors.  Surprisingly, however, this positive attention does not come from 
literary critics, as many mention when writing about the novel.51  In his opening to Critical 
                                                
50 Stephen Lubet also rehearses this praise for Atticus, before making a hypothetical (what if 
Mayella was telling the truth?) critique character of this character: “[n]o real-life lawyer has 
done more for the self-image or public perception of the legal profession than the hero of 
Harper Lee's novel, To Kill a Mockingbird” (1339).  
51 How has Mockingbird claimed such a central role in the heart of the American imaginary?  
What is it about this particular novel that has arrested generations?  On Vox’s YouTube 
channel, “ephemera correspondent” Phil Edwards attributed Mockingbrid’s ascent “from hit 
to legend” to what the New York Times called in 1961 “the paperback revolution.”  
Mockingbird, Edwards argued, became so widely taught because it was a “cheap, popular, 
respectable book.” Although this media transition must have facilitated Mockingbird’s 
success, it doesn’t answer the question: Why this novel?  Critic and writer Naa Baako Ako-
Adjei suggests that the novel’s sentimentality seduces readers into reimagining our racial 
history.  She writes,   
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Insights: To Kill A Mockingbird, Don Noble writes, “[t]his 1960 American novel is one of 
the most popular books of all time, but it has attracted relatively little critical commentary” 
(viii).  Many dismiss the novel, in the words of Flannery O’Connor, as “a children’s book,”52 
or point out that although the book is widely embraced in middle and high-school 
                                                                                                                                                  
Mockingbird’s immutable place on school curriculums rests, I think, on the 
fact that it gives voice to the collective and peculiar American delusion that 
racism in the United States wasn’t really about the systemic use of terror, or 
the threat of terror on black people in order to maintain white supremacy, but 
that racism and racist violence, were perpetrated by a negligible number of 
Americans who were not dissimilar from Bob Ewell. (185)          
While Ako-Adjei is right about the racial politics of Mockingbird, she misses both how Lee 
does this and why those strategies were successful.  Lee’s novel does render racism a “white 
trash” problem: Atticus explains to his children that “[o]ur stout Maycomb citizens aren’t 
interested” in serving on juries because making such decisions might be bad for business, so 
Tom Robinson’s jury was comprised of people like the Cunninghams, who Aunt Alexandra 
describes as “trash” (253, 256).  Although Tom Robinson may be an “Uncle Tom” in the 
tradition of Stowe, Mockingbird does not work by inviting readers to feel overly-wrought 
pity on his behalf, but rather by asking us to fill-in what the child doesn’t know.  Lee 
perpetuates the delusion not through sentimentalism, but through carefully crafted cognitive 
transactions.  Further, this “delusion” only works because Mockingbird taps a desire on the 
part of white people not to be racist or at least not be read as racist.     
52 Flannery O’Conner wrote this in a letter.  I cited her from Carol Iannone’s “Afterword” to 
“No Longer Black and White: A Forum on To Kill A Mockingbird.” 
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classrooms, it is rarely taught at the college level.53  But, a child-narrator does not a 
children’s book make.  And, it is precisely this narrator, Jean Louise Finch, who makes 
Mockingbird the American novel of the twentieth century.  Literary criticism’s dismissal of 
this little narrator as a sentimental tool or a marker of young adult literature has blinded us to 
a narrative strategy that is powerful enough to make readers want to stop, like Mr. 
Cunningham did, and at least consider questions of racism and prejudice.  While many of the 
remarks above understand Atticus as the central avenue of Mockingbird’s moral advice (an 
important attachment I explored in the previous chapter), from a narrative perspective we can 
see that the novel’s ethical work has as much or more to do with the way Lee positions us in 
relationship to her child-narrator.  If we believe the publication lore about Go Set A 
Watchman (2015), we can see how Lee idealizes Atticus in Mockingbird in order to facilitate 
Scout’s second coming of age in Watchman, where she learns she cannot take her father’s 
moral guidance forever, but must, set her own moral compass, as in the bible passage to 
which the title alludes.54  Mockingbird works not because of Atticus’s actions, but because of 
                                                
53 Those that don’t quote Flannery might point out that the novel is almost exclusively taught 
in middle- or high schools and rarely at the university level.  John M. Gist writes, “[a]s a 
veteran university professor in humanities, I have never come across a colleague who 
assigned Mockingbird in a college—level literature course. In middle and high schools, 
however, it seems to serve as a coming-of-age story par excellence” (250). …might the not 
assigning also have to do with knowing students have already studied the book growing up? 
54 Lee originally submitted the Watchman manuscript to literary agent Annie Laurie 
Williams, in 1957.  Both Williams and her husband Maurice Crain realized the potential of 
Lee’s original draft and encouraged Lee to revise.  With the help of her editor Tay Hohoff, 
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Scout’s narration.  A child-narrator creates various cognitive challenges on the individual and 
collective level that invite the reader to fill in a lot of what the child doesn’t know.  At the 
same time, however, child-narrators share with actual children the tendency to explain the 
world.  In the hands of sophisticated writers, this balance of asking the reader to supplement 
the child’s naivety and explaining certain aspects of the world in the voice of endearing 
innocence facilitates a shift in our imaginary. 
Is it empathy that stops the lynch mob, as Atticus believes?  Suzanne Keen defines 
empathy as “a vicarious, spontaneous sharing of affect, [which] can be provoked by 
witnessing another’s emotional state, by hearing about another’s condition, or even by 
reading” (4).  Scout describes only a few emotions in this five-page encounter.  When Scout 
first thrusts herself into the scene, living up to the military connotation of her name, she sees 
that “[a] flash of plain fear was going out of [Atticus’s] eyes,” but Scout doesn’t adopt his 
affect as Keen’s definition would require (172).  Instead, she feels “[h]ot embarrassment” for 
“leap[ing] triumphantly into a ring of people I had never seen before” (172).  I’d hazard that 
readers feel neither “plain fear” nor “[h]ot embarrassment;” we know that Scout narrates 
from a point in the future, having survived this scene, and we don’t really care about the 
crowd judges our precocious narrator (172).  Lee’s scene seems closer to Lisa Zunshine’s 
account of how Theory of Mind, which cognitive theorists link closely to empathy, works in 
                                                                                                                                                  
Lee reworked the manuscript so that it focused on her protagonist’s childhood.  Historical 
evidence comes from The Washington Post’s “To shill a mockingbird: How a manuscript’s 
discovery became Harper Lee’s ‘new’ novel” by Neely Tucker on 2/16/2015 and James B. 
Kelley’s “Reading TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD and GO SET A WATCHMAN as 
Palimpsest” (2016).   
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fiction.  Zunshine defines Theory of Mind or mindreading as “our ability to explain people’s 
behavior in terms of their thoughts, feelings, beliefs, and desires” (6).  The almost universal 
prevalence of this ability allows us to determine, as Zunshine explains with her first example, 
that Peter Walsh’s trembling hands can be “accounted for by his excitement at seeing his old 
love [Mrs. Dalloway] again after all these years and not, for instance, by his progressing 
Parkinson’s disease” (3).  This capability also makes possible the innumerable scenes in 
literature where “we automatically read a character’s body language as indicative of his 
thoughts and feelings” (Zunshine 3). Through a series of instances like this, Zunshine argues 
that the primary reason we read literature is for the pleasure and practice of mindreading—of 
figuring out why those around us do what they do with their bodies.  The metaphoric 
endorphins of this ToM workout kick in strongest, as Zunshine argues, when texts represent 
multiple layers of embeddedness: for instance, we reach the third level when we realize 
Scout doesn’t know (1) that her father knows (2) that the men want to lynch Tom Robinson 
(3).  As Zunshine points out, literature is the stuff of misreadings and this scene is no 
exception.  Like Peter Walsh, Atticus’s hands “tremble[e] a little” as he puts down the 
newspaper to extricate his children from the crowd of angry men (172).  Just as we know that 
Peter Walsh is nervous to see Mrs. Dalloway again, readers easily infer that Atticus’s hands 
shake because he is worried about his children.        
Although Zunshine’s account of mindreading allows us to trace the not-so-
spontaneous way characters pick up on other’s emotions, Theory of Mind doesn’t fully 
account for the lynch mob’s change of mind, either.  As the collective desire of the mob 
suggests, fictional minds are not limited to the individual.  In addition to using behaviors to 
intuit a single person’s mental state, we also, and often in fiction, use the actions of a group 
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to infer a collective thinking or emotion.  Alan Palmer uses the term “social minds” to 
describe this phenomenon; he explains “social minds … are public, embodied, and so 
available to each other without the need of speech” (2).  In Mockingbird, the lynch mob 
constitutes what Palmer might call “intermental thought, which is joint, group, shared or 
collective thought, as opposed to intramental, or private individual thought” (2).  Lee 
describes her mob as thinking and moving as one being both before and after Scout singles 
out the individual face she recognizes: “[i]n ones and twos, men got out of the cars.  Shadows 
became substance as light revealed solid shapes moving toward the jail door” (171).  The 
crowd’s coordinated behavior, choreographed as it were by a single mind, indicates a single 
intention, a shared emotion. Although Scout picks the one face she recognizes to practice her 
pleasantries with, his change of heart determines the actions of the whole group.  Like the 
eponymous town in Middlemarch, the novel which Palmer considers “the fulcrum around 
which the subject of [social minds] turns,” Lee’s Maycomb has a mind of its own (35).  
Scout recognizes that her town shares much collective thought and assumptions.  Her 
narration is full of phrases like “people said,” “according to neighborhood legend,” “the 
neighborhood thought” etc. (9, 10, 13).  The attribution of shared thought to the community 
resonates with the phrases Palmer draws our attention to in Eliot’s opening: “was usually 
spoken of,” “to close observers,” “according to custom,” etc. (68).  Further, Palmer points out 
“there are several different Middlemarch minds….  Sometimes the town appears to be of one 
mind, but more often there are references to differences of view between the various social, 
geographical, and professional groups” (75).  Maycomb too is made of multiple group minds, 
but Scout does not read them as separate at first.  Scout’s narration dialogues productively 
with Palmer’s concept in two ways—first, as a character narrator, she can reflect on an 
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individual’s role in and thoughts on the intermental units to which she belongs, and second, 
as a child-narrator, she can develop her own awareness of the intermental units that shape her 
community.   
Palmer’s concept of “social minds” brings us closer to understanding the lynch mob 
and helps us see that Mockingbird is not just about “climb[ing] into [an individual’s] skin and 
walk[ing] around in it,” but also about understanding the way communities fragment into 
social groups that can fall into stagnant patterns of thought.  Lee dedicates much of 
Mockingbird to Scout’s illustration of Maycomb’s different social groups but makes it clear 
that one of Scout’s major lessons is learning that these units think differently.  On her first 
day of school, Scout distinguishes between “the bus delegation” and “the town people,” but 
claims the same set of knowledge for both groups (22).  Scout asserts that everyone, save the 
new teacher, knew why Walter Cunningham Junior didn’t have a lunch.  Scout says, “[i]t was 
clear enough to the rest of us: Walter Cunningham was sitting there lying his head off.  He 
didn’t forget his lunch, he didn’t have any” (22).  Even though Scout recognizes a difference 
between those from the country and those from the town, she assumes, correctly in this case, 
that they share some basic understandings that the single mind of their new teacher doesn’t 
get.  The group mind of Maycomb County faces the individual mind of the new teacher.  For 
much of the novel, Scout makes the assumption that the Maycomb mind thinks and feels as 
one.  Like this initial scene, she allows individuals their ignorance and peculiarities, but she 
doesn’t see their beliefs and desires as conflicting in the way individuals can disagree or 
misunderstand.  Scout explains that acknowledging these personal differences actually gives 
shape to the Maycomb mind: 
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[T]the present generation of people who had lived side by side for years and 
years, were utterly predictable to one another: they took for granted attitudes, 
character shadings, even gestures, as having been repeated in each generation 
and refined by time. Thus the dicta No Crawford Minds His Own Business, 
Every Third Merriweather Is Morbid, The Truth Is Not in the Delafields, All 
the Bufords Walk Like That, were simply guides to daily living… (149) 
Thus, the individual expression of family traits is actually part of the monolith of the 
Maycomb mind.  Even those individuals as seemingly extreme in their actions as Dolphus 
Raymond take precautions to make sure they conform in appearances to the Maycomb mind.  
When Scout sees the fathers of “bus delegation” congregated in front of her father, she sees, 
as she did in school, a group in the face of an individual, but does not initially understand that 
this group of adults could think differently than her father.  
The intermental unit of the lynch mob operates because Lee’s readers understand the 
cultural narrative Scout does not.  It’s not just that we can infer someone’s mental state based 
on their actions, as Zunshine asserts, or that we know minds can think as one, as Palmer 
attests, but we also know what they will think.  Just as surely as Chekhov’s pistol, placed on 
the wall in the first act, will fire by the last, the white cry of rape, in American fiction and too 
much of our history, will conjure a lynch mob.  These stock stories, narrative structures that 
we all are familiar with, can be understood as what James Phelan calls “cultural narratives.”  
He explains, “by a cultural narrative, I mean one that has a sufficiently wide circulation so 
that we can legitimately say that its author, rather than being a clearly identified individual, is 
a larger collective entity, perhaps a whole society or at least some significant subgroup of 
society” (8).  Phelan’s examples include “the story of the triumph of the individual over 
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hardship due to hard work and intelligence, and the story of the individual’s corruption, the 
abandonment of worthy ideals in exchange for money, sex, or power—or some combination 
of the three” (8-9).  Lee’s novel takes up a particular cultural narrative that was widespread 
in the period between the Civil War and the Second World War.  In 1892, anti-lynching 
activist Ida B. Wells summarized this shared story succinctly as “the old thread bare lie that 
Negro men rape white women” (Southern Horrors).  Through lynching, the ritualized murder 
and mutilation of Black men falsely accused of raping white women, white people not only 
convinced themselves of the delusion of white womanhood, but also maintained white 
supremacy.  This cultural narrative of lynching is another key situation that bears out 
Gutiérrez Jones’ argument that people from different racial and ethnic backgrounds “read[] 
race as well as racism differently” (1-2).  Just as in the late 20th -century examples that 
Gutiérrez-Jones begins with such as the guilt of the police in the murder of Rodney King or 
Amadou Diallo, different groups have interpreted the mythical guilt of the Black rapist 
differently.  Many Black people have understood the accusation all along as the “threadbare 
lie” Ida B. Wells called it.  Although white people must have known, on some level, that the 
accusation of rape was a fantastic (in both the psychoanalytic and fictional sense) rationale 
for horrific violence that shored up white supremacy, white liberals didn’t embrace the reality 
of the situation en masse until the early twentieth century.  This fiction of violation and 
history of violence both precedes Lee’s story and is so pervasive that she doesn’t need to say 
much to allude to it. In fact, Lee does not even use the word “lynch” in the entire novel.    
Lee published Mockingbird in the shadow of the lynching of fourteen-year-old 
Emmett Till and acquittal of his murderers, Roy Bryant and J. W. Milam.  Patrick Chura 
notes the several intersections between Mockingbird’s plot and the series of events leading to 
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the lynching and the acquittal of the two white men who murdered him.  As many have 
noted, Till’s open-casket funeral and the brutality captured on film by Jet magazine gave 
important impetus to the civil rights movement.  Lee’s novel engages Till’s lynching not only 
because the same cultural narrative condemned Tom Robinson, but also because Till’s youth, 
like Scout’s, proclaims his innocence and demands protection.  Further, Lee sets 
Mockingbird in the 1930s a decade that began with the conviction of eight Black men, 
commonly known as the “Scottsboro Boys” of a rape that one of the “victims” later admitted 
didn’t occur.  The second half of the decade witnessed the publication of Margaret Mitchell’s 
wildly popular novel Gone With The Wind (1936) and production of the film adaptation 
(1939).  Both the novel and the film celebrate a midnight lynching, a scene I’ll return to in 
the following chapter.   
Scout’s ignorance of this cultural narrative allows Lee to fracture this damaging 
sequence of events with the expectations of a child.  Because Scout does not know what 
lynch mobs have done historically, she cannot comment on the glaring differences between 
the historical script and the story she narrates.  Before her character’s intervention, the child’s 
voice alters the scene’s tone creating an openness where readers can rework our own 
interpretive strategies.  Instead of the angry shouts we might expect from a racist mob, Scout 
asks us to believe that “in obedience to my father, there followed what I later realized was a 
sickeningly comic aspect of an unfunny situation: the men talked in near-whispers” (171-
172).  The parental pact not to wake the sleeping baby seems both patronizing and 
inappropriate given the adult, awake Tom Robinson’s awareness that he’s the mob’s intended 
target, a knowledge readers’ share.  The naivety of Scout’s narration reorients the threat from 
the Black man’s body to the child’s innocence.  Atticus’s eyes flash with fear and his hands 
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tremble because he doesn’t want his children to witness vigilante violence. In an over-
aggressive agreement with Atticus’s wish that his children would leave, the mob directs its 
energies towards Jem in an effort “to send him home” but also gives Atticus an opportunity 
to get his children in line (173).  Because, as Ako-Adjei reminds us, children often 
participated in lynch mobs, both Scout’s ignorance about what’s going on and the mob’s 
patience with Atticus’s efforts “to make Jem mind him” are ahistorical (Lee 173).  Even as 
this scene depends on readers filling in what Scout doesn’t understand, the distance between 
the historic pattern and the fictional scene asks readers to shift how we read that narrative.  
Scout’s ignorance of the cultural narrative allows Lee to build an openness into the scene that 
the fevered rush between accusation and vengeance forecloses in historical accounts.  In the 
novel, Lee describes Scout as bursting into a “circle of light” between “the dark smelly 
bodies” of the lynch mob, who form a “semi-circle” around the Finches (172, 173).  The film 
renders this distance vertically rather than horizontally by positioning Atticus on a porch in 
front of the jail.  This physical, temporal, and factual space allows readers both to supplement 
Scout’s narration with our knowledge of the historical context and to reconsider the strategies 
we use to interpret that narrative.  
In place of the affective appeal of the illusion of the violated white women, Lee 
inserts presence and innocence of a little white girl.  Neither Atticus nor the mob knows how 
to address Scout when behaves like a “little lady” (175).  The only time Atticus speaks to her 
in the entire scene is to chastise her for her Tom-boyish gesture of kicking the man who 
grabbed Jem; he directs all his other communication and demands to Jem, whose masculine 
defiance matches his father’s.  Likewise the men in the mob offer neither response nor 
retaliation to her defensive kick.  Her seemingly futile attempt at “livingroom talk” with Mr. 
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Cunningham render all the men including her father, brother, and Dill mute spectators (175).  
Scout describes her realization of their surprise: 
‘Entailments are bad,’ I was advising [Mr. Cunningham], when I slowly 
awoke to the fact that I was addressing the entire aggregation.  The men were 
all looking at me, some had their moths half-open.  Atticus had stopped 
poking at Jem: they were standing together beside Dill.  Their attention 
amounted to fascination.  Atticus’s mouth, even, was half-open, an attitude he 
had once described as uncouth.  Our eyes met and he shut it. (174)   
Scout’s efforts to adopt the adult script of “polite conversation” with Mr. Cunningham and 
enact feminine intention “of mak[ing] him feel at home” silence the masculine posturing 
(174).  When confronted with the presence of a child pretending to be a woman, the men lose 
sight of the pretense that they are protecting white femininity.  The mob becomes captivated 
with Scout, looking at her with fascinated awe, instead of fixated on their original target held 
captive in the jail above.  Their mouths hang half-open as if they could almost respond to 
Scout’s everyday pleasantries in another situation.  Atticus, at least, demonstrates this self-
awareness when he makes eye contact with Scout and shuts his mouth in observance of an 
etiquette he’d previously imparted to his daughter.      
 Lee stops the lynch mob by putting the child’s expectations in conflict with the 
demands of the lynch narrative.  Scout’s innocent efforts to assert a connection with Mr. 
Cunningham reveal that what had previously been interpreted as the requirement of a 
particular code of honor undermines the civility of their society.  Scout chooses Mr. 
Cunningham because she recognizes him as part of her community, as part of a familiar 
family that she introduces in the second chapter as well-known for their honorable trait that 
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“they never took anything of anybody” (22).  Scout begins by reminding Mr. Cunningham of 
his economic agreement with her father.  At first, Mr. Cunningham cannot seem to hear the 
child’s greeting in the racist noise of the mob mentality; instead, “the big man blinked and 
hooked his thumbs in his overall straps.  He cleared his throat and looked away” (174).  
While Scout interprets his discomfort as the failure of her own “friendly overture,” readers 
might interpret his avoidance of her eyes as shame: for having had needed Atticus’s services, 
for paying him back in hickory nuts; and for having Scout know all about it.  At the same 
time, readers aware of what Mr. Cunningham was planning to do might also interpret his 
shame as recognition the dissonance between the child’s request for small talk and the adult’s 
intent to murder, an acknowledgement of the incompatibility between civil discourse and 
racist spectacle and we can interpret his reluctance to meet her eyes as shame for being 
caught in the latter.  
Unaware of the internal struggle behind what Scout later describes as Mr. 
Cunningham’s “impassive” face, she presses on explaining that their social relationship not 
only stems from her father’s involvement in his legal affairs but also from her family’s 
hospitality to his son.  Scout’s implied analogy, ‘you are to little Walter what Atticus is to 
me’ moves Mr. Cunningham to recognition, “[h]e did know me, after all” (174).  Scout’s 
reference to little Walter may have reminded Mr. Cunningham that he has a smaller version 
of himself at home who he cares about, just as Atticus’s miniatures interposed themselves to 
protect their father.  Mr. Cunningham’s “faint nod” is not just an acknowledgment of his 
paternity, but rather an affirmation that their society is comprised of many familial units 
where adults share a responsibility for the children (174).  Just as Atticus shows hospitality to 
little Walter, Mr. Cunningham is moved to return Scout’s civilities— not only to “not owe 
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her anything” but also to affirm which type of society he belongs to—one that models 
behavior for children not one that asserts fantasies through racist spectacle.  Mr. 
Cunningham’s final, simple response to Scout, “I’ll tell him you said hey, little lady,” 
acknowledges this parental responsibility and concludes the stand-off.  Mr. Cunningham’s 
epithet for Scout recalls the chivalric code that got them into the situation in the first place, 
but the diminutive “little” means that instead of protecting her virtue, he can protect her 
innocence.   Having decided to be parents, the men can go home.  Lee’s scene brings to the 
fore a set of inferences that Lee’s initial white readers, may have outsourced, as Morrison 
suggests through the shopkeeper, to an ocular mechanics.  In the space between the child’s 
failed mindreading and readers’ understanding of the cultural narrative, Lee revises our 
interpretive strategies.  By replacing the violated white woman’s implied call for vengeance 
with the child’s innocent attempts at conversation, Lee juxtaposes racist masculinity with 
social responsibility for other people’s children.      
Scout’s questions did invite Mr. Cunningham to stand in Atticus’s shoes for a minute, 
and Lee’s scene renders good parenting as protecting little white children from knowledge of 
racist violence.  But what about children of color?  The importance of the lynching of 
Emmett Till in the historical moment of Mockingbird’s publication meant that Black children 
were on the nation’s mind even if they were not the subjects of Lee’s novel. Further, both the 
novel and the lynching followed the Brown v Board of Education (1954) decision that sought 
to place Black and white children in the same classroom.  While mixing the children of 
“country folk” with those of “professional people” is as close as Lee gets to school 
integration, that question which some related, in a Freudian leap, to miscegenation, creates 
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the central historical context of the novel’s publication (23).55  The film version of 
Mockingbird alludes to the hope of integration more directly through a brief scene of 
potential friendship between Jem and an unnamed child who we might assume is Tom 
Robinson’s son because he’s playing outside the Robinson house when Atticus first visits.  
 
 
Figure 3: To Kill A Mockingbird 1962: 45:24-46:20 
                                                
55 Scout’s Uncle Jack criticizes the illogic of this connection in Go Set a Watchman: 
“[t]here’s nothing under the sun that says because you go to school with one Negro, or go to 
school with them in droves, you’ll want to marry one” (270).   
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While Atticus is inside and with Scout asleep on the front seat, the unknown child slowly 
approaches Jem; they exchange waves; and Jem gives a small smile to his potential friend. 
The lawyer’s actions—both Atticus’s defense of Tom Robinson and Thurgood Marshall’s 
team in Brown— make possible interracial friendship among children.  But before the 
children have an opportunity to speak, Mr. Ewell stumbles onto the scene, a threat framed by 
both the camera and the windshield. Mr. Ewell is the fear of miscegenation incarnate 
because, as we learn through Atticus’s cross examination, he abused Mayella into accusing 
Tom when, in fact, she had both invited Tom inside and attempted to seduce him.  This fear, 
figured in the novel and the film as drunk and disgusting, forecloses this friendship as Jem’s 
first words ask for help rather than introduction. 
Part of the reason To Kill A Mockingbird has become such an important novel to the 
imagined community of the United States is because it deals with that “thing,” that national 
wrong, that continues to plague our communities and trouble our psyches.  Even as Lee 
positions Atticus, Jem, and Scout as models for how we might move forward from this sordid 
violence, her novel makes serious shifts in the way we understand the tradition of lynching 
once called “rough justice.”  In “The Interpretation of Dreams” Freud notes that Hamlet “is 
rooted in the same soil as Oedipus Rex,” but while Sophocles’s tragedy “[brings] to life” the 
cultural fantasy of the oedipal complex, Shakespeare’s play represses the same proclivity for 
incest and fratricide so that “we learn of its existence-- as we discover the relevant facts in a 
neurosis-- only through the inhibitory effects which proceed from it” (31).  Along the same 
lines, To Kill A Mockingbird raises and represses, or raises through repression, some of 
America’s darkest— or, to be more accurate— whitest demons.  The eerie intersection of 
race and gender in the ritual of lynching is most clearly exposed in Jean Toomer’s poem 
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“Portrait in Georgia.”  Toomer’s careful catalogue of a southern belle slides into a 
description of a Black corpse mutilated through the ritualized violence of lynching: 
Hair--braided chestnut, 
coiled like a lyncher’s rope,  
Eyes--fagots,  
Lips--old scars, or the first red blisters,  
Breath--the last sweet scent of cane,  
And her slim body, white as the ash       
of black flesh after flame. 
Like an optical illusion, Toomer’s poem renders the features of a white lady as the very tools 
and evidence of violence that made them significant.  The constructed ideal of femininity it 
seems depends on mob violence focused on Black bodies.  While Lee raises the foundational 
violence towards Native people and represses it in the same breath “If General Jackson 
hadn’t run the Creeks up the creek,” she sustains her not-so-critical engagement with the 
national neurosis of lynching, so that her subtle choices have serious consequences for the 
popular imaginary (3).  To Kill A Mockingbird finalized the fissure in the white inter-class 
solidarity that made lynching possible for so long, but also sublimated this extralegal 
violence into the hands of the police.   
Mockingbird’s central role in our national imaginary stems in large part from the way 
it helped white people rework how we read racist cultural narratives and rethink what role we 
want to play in them.  In this way, Mockingbird, is the clearest example of a societal version 
of what midcentury psychoanalyst Donald Winnicott proposed as a “transitional object.”  As 
we saw in the previous chapter, some infants attach to a special object such as a teddy bear or 
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blanket in order to deal with separation from their parents.  The “transitional object” works 
because parents become aware of the objects significance and go to great lengths to maintain 
the fantasy. Winnicott postulates that “when we witness the infant’s employment of a 
transitional object, the first not-me possession, we are witnessing both the child’s first use of 
symbol and first experience of play” (130).56  Winnicott calls the space where this rich 
interchange between reality and fantasy occurs the potential space and postulates that this is 
the space of cultural experience.57  So just as a child might reach for a blanket out of fear of 
                                                
56 Bowlby, who like Winnicott, spent much time considering infants’ relationships with their 
mothers also observed attachment to objects like teddy bears and blankets.  Unlike 
Winnicott, however, he does not believe that this behavior plays a large role in the 
development of symbolic thought.  Bowlby writes, “[a] much more parsimonious way of 
looking at the role of these inanimate objects is to regard them simply as objects towards 
which certain components of attachment behavior come to be directed or redirected because 
the ‘natural’ object is unavailable….  Since, pending more evidence, there is no reason to 
suppose that so-called transitional objects play any special role in a child’s development, 
cognitive or other, a more appropriate term for them would be simply ‘substitute objects.’” 
(312).   
57 Psychoanalyst Christopher Bollas thinks more specifically about how an aesthetic 
experience may emerge from a person’s primary relationship with his mother.  He argues that 
“[t]he mother’s idiom of care and the infant’s experience of this handling is the first human 
aesthetic” (41).  Bollas believes that the mother equips her child with two primary 
transformations; first, she transforms her child from a state of hunger to a state of satiety, and 
second, she shares language, and, as Bollas writes, “[w]ith the word, the infant has found a 
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separation, a society might reach for a story out of shame for our history, hope for 
transformation, and even fear for our privilege.  But adults are different than children, and the 
collectivity that comprises a nation is different than the pair that constitutes the mother child 
partnership, and this is why Mockingbird works.  Some works of art do feel like they are 
transforming us, or at least, I believe we seek them out because we want them to.  As we saw 
in the first section, the voice of a child allows readers to fill in not only the adult mental 
states that Scout misses, but also the complicated cultural narratives that she doesn’t 
understand.  Lee, who avoids the word “lynch,” allows readers to supplement Scout’s 
innocence with what of our collective guilt we’re willing to admit.   
THE BLUEST EYE 
I had only one desire: to dismember it.  To see of what it was made, to 
discover the dearness, to find the beauty, the desirability that had escaped me, 
but apparently only me.  Adults, older girls, shops, magazines, newspapers, 
window signs—all the world had agreed that a blue-eyed, yellow-haired, pink-
skinned doll was what every girl child treasured.  “Here,” they said, “this is 
beautiful, and if you are on this day ‘worthy’ you may have it.” …  I could not 
                                                                                                                                                  
new transformational object, which facilitates the transition from deep enigmatic privacy 
toward the culture of the human village” (43). The first transformational experiences shaped 
in the mother and child “rapport,” give form to future aesthetic experiences, they do not 
determine them.  Bollas explains, “the ego has internalized not simply an object (the mother) 
but a process (her aesthetic transformation,) and this process is a paradigm of subject relating 
to an object that transforms the subject’s being” (44).  We seek aesthetic experiences, to 
some extent, because we want to transform our ego.   
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love it.  But I could examine it to see what it was all the world said was 
lovable.  Break off the tiny fingers, bend the flat feet, loosen the hair, twist the 
head around, and the thing made one sound—a sound they said that was the 
sweet and plaintive cry “Mama,” but which sounded to me like the bleat of a 
dying lamb, or, more precisely, our icebox door opening on rusty hinges in 
July.  Remove the cold and stupid eyeball, it would bleat still, “Ahhhhhh,” 
take off the head, shake out the sawdust, crack the back against the brass bed 
rail, it would bleat still.  The gauze back would split, and I could see the disk 
with six holes, the secret of the sound.  A mere metal roundness. 
— Claudia MacTeer The Bluest Eye (20-21) 
Morrison steeps The Bluest Eye (1970) in a different, sadder knowledge about dolls 
than Winnicott’s ideas of the “transitional object.”  Morrison knows that children don’t attach 
to particular toys solely out of a desire to deal with separation, but that the particularity and 
significance of those toys is already determined by their parents and society.  By choosing 
nine-year-old Claudia MacTeer to deliver a brief exposition on “blue-eyed, yellow-haired, 
pink-skinned doll[s],” Morrison reminds us that children know the lessons that their parents 
forgot they buried in the toy-gifts.  Claudia knows that the gift of the doll simultaneously 
rewards her “worth[iness]” and establishes a standard of “dearness,” “beauty,” “desirability,” 
“lov[ability].”  This seemingly arbitrary standard baffles and bewilders the child.  Far from 
inspiring physical affection, in Claudia’s experience, the doll causes physical pain and 
discomfort.  When she tries to sleep with it like the little girls in picture books, the doll’s 
“unyielding limbs resisted my flesh—the tapered fingertips on those dimpled hands 
scratched… the bone-cold head collided with my own” (20).  Morrison’s description alludes 
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to narratives the child doesn’t know—the doll’s unyielding limbs allude to the protected 
feminine in the myth that Mockingbird rewrites; the scratching hands and the hard, cold head 
gesture towards the unconscious, unadmitted violence that that chastity requires.  Claudia, 
whose parents beat her, cannot understand how the adults hear the doll’s complaining cry 
“Mama” as “sweet and plaintive,” how the death croak of a lamb or creak of the ice-box 
could invite such care.  While the child does not understand the myths to which she alludes, 
she does know that the doll irritates her own flesh, annoys her own head.  She also knows 
that the adults’ commitment to the dolls belies this lived experience.  In a catalogue that 
categorizes “adults” and “older girls” alongside “shops, magazines, newspapers, window 
signs,” Claudia explains how “all the world” sets aside this physical discomfort to love and 
value the dolls.   
The young girl that Morrison chooses to narrate most of The Bluest Eye dismembers 
the doll to find out what it is about the doll that invites “the unfulfilled longing” of all around 
her (21).  While readers rely on Claudia to explain what it feels like to be told she should 
love and adore a cold hard piece of plastic, at the same time we see what the child cannot.  
The child does not attribute her violence-laced curiosity to the way her body diverges from 
the cold standard set by blonde baby dolls.  While Morrison makes this devaluation apparent 
by her choice of narrator, the child attributes her curiosity to an interest in what attracts adult 
and societal desire and attention.  In this way, Morrison exposes a damaging value system 
contained in the seeming innocuous dolls without making her child-narrator participate in it.  
Claudia’s indignation is born of a self-worth that the very imagery Morrison uses her to 
critique seeks to extinguish.       
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As Anne Anlin Cheng traces in the introduction to The Melancholy of Race, by 
focusing on dolls, Morrison alludes to the “now famous ‘doll tests’” conducted by social 
psychologists Kenneth and Mamie Clark.  Cheng explains that in those experiments, “[i]n 
interview after interview, when given the choice, the majority of the African American 
children, including three-year-olds, found the brown dolls to be ‘bad’ and preferred instead to 
play with the ‘good,’ white dolls” (ix).  While the Clarks demonstrated the early development 
of internalized racism, Morrison’s Claudia MacTeer narrates the moment before adopting the 
skewed social standard that her older sister and Pecola already embrace.  While Frieda and 
Pecola have “a loving conversation about how “cu-ute Shirley Temple was,” Claudia, like 
the psychologists, can see how ethical standards of good and bad get coded into visual of 
white features (19).  These “doll tests” became “famous” not only because they present such 
clear psychological evidence for the double-standard the U.S. is founded on, but also because 
Thurgood Marshall incorporated it into his argument in Brown v Board of Education (1954).  
The evidence that Marshall used to dismantle segregation becomes a literary trope that 
Morrison uses to expose the way a racialized value system still structures society.  She 
published the novel in 1970, after the decade celebrated for civil rights and set her novel in 
1941 when the U.S. entered WWII.  Notably, the novel’s setting and publication frame the 
Brown decision by thirteen years on one side and seventeen on the other.  While Morrison’s 
novel dialogues with this important case, it takes as its subject a skewed value system that 
both undergirded segregation and survived its formal dismantling.  In the 1940s Ohio where 
Morrison sets her novel, Claudia does not live in a segregated neighborhood (the novel 
begins with the MacTeer sisters white “next-door friend,” Rosemary Villanucci) and the 
sisters do not attend a segregated school (9).  Instead, Morrison emphasizes the racialized 
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value system that made segregation possible.  Mrs. MacTeer believes Rosemary when she 
accuses the sisters of “playing nasty” with Pecola, and even though the girls attend an 
integrated school, “white girls didn’t suck their teeth when [Maureen Peal, a light-skinned 
classmate] was assigned to be their work partners” (30, 62).   
Importantly, Claudia does not internalize the value-system she exposes to us, but 
instead identifies it as a misalignment of adult love and attention.  Claudia knows that her 
parents give her the doll out of love for her: “I knew that the doll represented what they 
thought was my fondest wish” (20).  Through the reciprocal framing of intention, Morrison 
emphasizes the way racism infiltrates individual attachments.  Claudia’s parents give her the 
gift because they think she wants it and she is curious about the doll because she wants to 
understand what they see and value in the doll.58  Further, even as Claudia understands the 
doll invites play mothering, she introduces her exposition on the dolls through a jealousy not 
only of maternal but also of paternal attention.  She begins with her hatred of Shirley 
Temple; Claudia “hated Shirley.  Not because she was cute, but because she danced with 
Bojangles, who was my friend, my uncle, my daddy, and who ought to have been soft-shoeing 
it and chuckling with me” (19).  Claudia’s anger towards Shirley and her violence towards 
dolls (and little white girls) doesn’t have as much to do with their essence—their cuteness, or 
beauty, or color—but rather with the attention they attract from adults, especially adults like 
the famous dancer Bojangles and her parents who should be playing with her.  Attention, for 
                                                
58 See Bernstein’s discussion of the doll tests for a discussion of how dolls can create what 
she calls “scriptive behavior” in Racial Innocence: Performing American Childhood from 
Slavery to Civil Rights. 
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Claudia, means engagement in play—dancing and laughing, recognition of attachment—
whether that’s an uncle or a father, and possession, hers alone.   
This desire for appropriate paternal attention not only triggers her tangent on the dolls 
but also comprises her proposed alternative.  If anyone had asked Claudia what she would 
like for Christmas, she would have “spoken up, ‘I want to sit on the low stool in Big Mama’s 
kitchen with my lap full of lilacs and listen to Big Papa play his violin for me alone’” (22).  
Just as she imagines Bojangles dancing with her, she yearns for her grandfather to play for 
her alone. While Claudia’s wish is balanced in terms of genders and sensory perception, it’s 
telling that Morrison makes a space for male music.  Before the end of the chapter, we will 
learn how Claudia already enjoys her mother’s singing, which not only stands as a necessary 
reprieve after Mrs. MacTeer’s “fussing soliloquies” but also makes deep sadness bearable 
(24).  Claudia describes the magical power of her mother’s song: “[m]isery colored by the 
greens and blues in my mother’s voice took all of the grief out of the words and left me with 
a conviction that pain was not only endurable, it was sweet” (26).  Although Mr. MacTeer 
plays the part of a good father in providing shelter (in “Winter,” Claudia describes him as 
“[a] Vulcan guarding the flames, he gives us instructions about which doors to keep closed or 
opened for proper distribution of heat, lays kindling by, discusses qualities of coal, and 
teaches us how to rake, feed and bank the fire”) and protection (he chases away Mr. Henry 
when he molests Frieda), Claudia never describes him as playing with or for his children 
(61).  Later, Claudia makes the connection clear: “[d]olls we could destroy, but we could not 
destroy the honey voices of parents” and other adults that somewhere on the edge of their 
consciousness privilege white children over Black children (74).   
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By braiding Claudia’s chapters with omniscient sections that wend their way to 
Pecola, Morrison juxtaposes the child who has good enough self-love to hate the baby dolls, 
with the child who doesn’t.  Pecola is too abused emotionally and physically to reject the 
white standard.  Instead, she convinces herself that “if those eyes of hers were different, that 
is to say, beautiful, she herself would be different…. If she looked different, beautiful, maybe 
Cholly would be different, and Mrs. Breedlove too.” (46).  This omniscient account of 
Pecola’s thought uses the same names for the parents that the child has been trained to do.  In 
place of Claudia’s “Daddy” and “Mama,” Pecola calls her own parents by the names their 
known for in the community—Cholly and Mrs. Breedlove.  Forced to witness her parents 
abuse each other, the child feels herself responsible and imagines that if she were different, 
her parents would behave better.  In her sections, Claudia witnesses the way Pecola 
internalizes the violence that surrounds her.  When Maureen Peal, their fair-skinned 
classmate, teases Pecola, Claudia describes her friend as “fold[ing] into herself, like a pleated 
wing.  Her pain antagonized me.  I wanted to open her up, crisp her edges, ram a stick down 
that hunched and curving spine, force her to stand erect and spit the misery out on the streets.  
But she held it in where it could lap up into her eyes” (73-74).  Unlike the too-hard doll, 
Claudia’s friend is not hard enough; like a rag-doll she crumbles into the abuse.59  Adult 
readers can see that Claudia’s self-worth not only does not tolerate false standards of beauty, 
                                                
59 In Racial Innocence: Performing American Childhood from Slavery to Civil Rights (2010), 
Robin Bernstein details how the physical construction of dolls, combined with the people 
they were supposed to represent, dictated how children would play with them.  Hard fragile 
white dolls required careful, tender play and admiration while rag dolls, often adorned with 
exaggerated features of blackface minstrelsy, withstood rough play.        
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but also the internalization of that hatred.  It angers Claudia that Pecola cannot “spit the 
misery out,” but instead buries that sadness inside of herself causing her to crumple into 
herself like a folded wing.  The child who Morrison allows to narrate has enough self-worth 
to share with readers’ unclouded observations of society’s skewed standards while the 
omniscient narrator illustrates how that value system can crush other children. 
Morrison demonstrates how children intuit this power structure even if they are not as 
aware of it as Claudia is. In “Winter,” in addition to introducing the light-skinned Maureen 
Peal, who both teachers and other students seem to prefer, Claudia describes a group of boys 
taunting Pecola, “Black e mo.  Black e mo.  Yadaddsleepnekked.  Black e mo black e mo ya 
dadd sleeps necked.  Black e mo” (65).  While the spelling indicates the dialect the boys use 
to torment Pecola, it also recalls the creative punctuation Morrison uses with the Dick and 
Jane primer, drawing attention to the many ways that false ideal gets inscribed.  Morrison’s 
argument becomes more complicated as Claudia, in her more mature voice, comments on 
how the boys devised a taunt based on their own insecurities and inferences about their 
target’s weakness: 
They had extemporized a verse made up of two insults about matters over 
which the victim had no control: the color of her skin and speculations on the 
sleeping habits of an adult, wildly fitting in its incoherence.  That they 
themselves were black, or that their own father had similarly relaxed habits 
was irrelevant.  It was their contempt for their own blackness that gave them 
the first insult its teeth.  They seemed to have taken all of their smoothly 
cultivated ignorance, their exquisitely learned self-hatred, their elaborately 
designed hopelessness and sucked it all up into a fiery cone of scorn that had 
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burned for ages in the hollows of their minds—cooled—and spilled over lips 
of outrage, consuming whatever was in its path.  They danced a macabre 
ballet around the victim, whom, for their own sake, they were prepared to 
sacrifice to the flaming pit. (65) 
Claudia’s insight into her classmates’ minds demonstrates that boys also internalize the 
double standard taught to her through dolls.  Morrison’s choice of adverbs “exquisitely” and 
“elaborately” indicate that this almost-inescapable “self-hatred” gets learned through 
complicated, but all-encompassing mechanisms.  Like Claudia who did not initially stomach 
the world’s preference for white girls, her male peers stored up their loathing until they found 
a weaker person to project it onto.  Frieda’s sister “with set lips and Mama’s eyes” 
demonstrates the confidence that may be a product of their raising or inheritance puts an end 
to the teasing by hitting one of the boys over the head with her schoolbooks (66).  Claudia 
shares her sister’s indignation but directs her anger at Maureen Peal, who after a brief bout of 
feigned friendship begins interrogating Pecola on whether she had actually seen a naked man 
and why she associates naked men with her father.  Claudia admits, “I was glad to have a 
chance to show anger.  Not only because of the ice cream, but because we had seen our own 
father naked and didn’t care to be reminded of it and feel the shame brought on by the 
absence of shame” (72).  Claudia’s self-reflection echoes what her older-voice had already 
observed—the shape this teasing takes renders what’s normal, being Black or accidentally 
glimpsing one’s naked father on the way to the bathroom, abnormal and shameful.  Both, as 
Claudia asserts, are not only outside of the victim’s control and also are not bad.  Instead, in 
this section Morrison demonstrates how racial hierarchies inform playground bullying and 
foreshadows how easily normal paternal relationships can become perverted.   
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 The Bluest Eye demonstrates how blackness gets rendered as wrong through the racist 
value system that structures society by connecting these standards to the incest taboo.  In the 
“Afterword,” Morrison explains that “[i]n trying to dramatize the devastation that even 
casual racial contempt can cause, I chose a unique situation, not a representative one.  The 
extremity of Pecola’s case stemmed largely from a crippled and crippling family—unlike the 
average Black family and unlike the narrator’s” (210).  By sharing the details of Pecola’s 
rape in the omniscient sections that follow Claudia’s confident chapters, Morrison invites 
readers to read Cholly’s aggression through the child-narrator’s naïve insights.  On her first 
page, Claudia warns readers that “Pecola was having her father’s baby,” but interprets that 
evidence of rape and incest as failure of cultivation: “there were no marigolds in the fall of 
1941” (5).  After three seasons of Claudia explaining in her no-nonsense-nine-year-old way 
about the double standards that privilege white dolls and light-skinned girls over her and her 
sister, Morrison provides Cholly’s backstory in a section called:  
SEEFATHERHEISBIGANDSTRONGFATH 
ERWILLYOUPLAYWITHJANEFATHER 
ISSMILINGSMILEFATHERSMILESMILE (132) 
The way Morrison collapses her version of the Dick and Jane primer into all caps unspaced 
lines already hints at a perversion of the desire for paternal attention that Claudia expressed 
in “Autumn.”  As Cholly’s youth unfolds in the voice of the omniscient narrator, it becomes 
clear that the value system Morrison exposes is not only about a preference for signs of white 
beauty but also about the way white hatred can get channeled onto the bodies of Black 
women and girls.  Morrison describes how white hunters pervert Cholly’s first sexual 
experience into a gross spectacle for their racist ridicule.  Because of the racialized power 
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structure and the firearms of the white hunters, Cholly cannot stand up for himself and 
protect his partner.  Instead, the narrator explains: 
They were big, white, armed men.  He was small, black, helpless.  His 
subconscious knew what his conscious mind did not guess—that hating them 
would have consumed him, burned him up like a piece of soft coal, leaving 
only flakes of ash and a question mark of smoke.  He was, in time, to discover 
that hatred of white men—but not now.  Not in impotence, but later, when the 
hatred could find sweet expression.  For now, he hated the one who had 
created the situation, the one who bore witness to his failure, his impotence.  
The one whom he had not been able to protect, to spare, to cover from the 
round moon glow of the flashlight. (151) 
In this description, Morrison explains why Cholly was unable to direct his hatred at the white 
men who demeaned him.  Morrison’s decision to describe embracing this hate as death by 
fire recalls both Claudia’s classmates’ taunts and the ritualized torture of lynching.  Instead 
of doing anything that may cost him his life, Cholly turns to the women beneath him and 
misdirects his hate towards her.  His innocent attraction to a girl his own age created an 
opportunity for white men to supplement their sport of hunting with another kind of violence.  
Although Darlene covered her face in shame, Cholly believes she witnessed his emasculation 
and blames him for his failure to protect her.  In this scene, the white men’s perverted gaze 
and potential violence constitute “rape,” as Morrison categorizes the violation Cholly and 
Darlene.  Morrison explains in her “Afterword” that she intended to “connect[] Cholly’s 
‘rape’ by the whitemen to his own of his daughter.  The most masculine act of aggression 
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becomes feminized in my language, ‘passive,’ and, I think, more accurately repellent when 
deprived of the male ‘glamour of shame’ rape is (or once was) routinely given” (215).   
 Morrison asks readers to hold Cholly’s violation alongside that of his daughter by 
inviting us to read his story with sympathy even as we remain committed to the 
condemnation born of Claudia’s commentary. Although Claudia describes a desire for 
maternal affection and paternal play, she has enough love from her parents to equip her with 
enough self-worth to see the misalignment of attention demonstrated by the dolls.  Cholly, on 
the other hand, receives only refusal from his father and mother.  Cholly’s unnamed single 
mother abandons the infant Cholly “on a junk heap by the railroad,” and when he tracks 
down a person he believes to be his father fourteen years later, the man rejects him cruelly 
“[g]et the fuck outta my face!” (132, 156).  This repeated parental rejection causes Cholly to 
regress to infancy: the fourteen-year-old “soiled himself like a baby” (157).  When the 
teenager collects himself to escape the public street, he crouches under a pier: “[h]e remained 
knotted there in fetal position, paralyzed, his first covering his eyes, for a long time.  No 
sound, no sight, only darkness and heat and the press of his knuckles on his eyelids.  He even 
forgot his messed-up trousers” (157).  The father’s refusal causes the young man to crumple 
into his infant self.  The “SEEFATHER” section plays out what Claudia couldn’t say in her 
exposition on dolls; while the child critiqued the misalignment of adult love to white dolls 
and girls, the omniscient narrator describes a Black child raised without love.  Where Claudia 
lashes out in the face of rejection through violence towards dolls and anger towards Maureen 
Peal, Cholly reverts to childhood.  Where Claudia understands the value system that cause 
others to treat her and her sister differently, Cholly turns his anger on Black women.  As 
Morrison writes in the paragraphs that conclude Cholly’s childhood and transition to the rape 
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of Pecola, “[h]aving no idea of how to raise children, and having never watched any parent 
raise himself, he could not even comprehend what such a relationship should be” (160).  
Because of the careful way Morrison describes Cholly’s childhood in relation to Claudia’s 
insights, his aggression can be understood to stand for a social perversion in addition to an 
individual one.   
The horror that Morrison’s novel speaks is not only the societal forces that pressure 
these children into shattering like Pecola or “pay[ing] very good attention to ourselves,” as 
Claudia categorizes her and Frieda’s strategy of mothering each other, but also the particular 
crime of incest of the most inappropriate paternal attention (190).  The image of Pecola’s 
dead child completes the comparison implied in Claudia’s curiosity about white baby dolls.  
At the end of the novel, a more mature Claudia understands the juxtaposition that Morrison 
has been inviting readers to fill in throughout the novel.  Claudia describes Pecola’s child: 
I thought about the baby that everybody wanted dead, and saw it very clearly.  
It was in a dark, wet place, its head covered with great O’s of wool, the black 
face holding, like nickels, two clean black eyes, the flared nose, kissing-thick 
lips, and the living, breathing silk of black skin.  No synthetic yellow bands 
suspended over marble-blue eyes, no pinched nose and bowline mouth.  More 
strongly than my fondness for Pecola, I felt a need for someone to want the 
black baby to live—just to counteract the universal love of white baby dolls, 
Shirley Temples, and Maureen Peals. (190) 
Claudia imagines Pecola’s child as lovable and touchable in a way that white dolls are not.  
In place of the doll’s “bone-cold head” and fake flat hair, Claudia sees a cushion of thick 
curly wool (20).  In place of the hard hands that scratch, Claudia can feel the soft and smooth 
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aliveness of Black skin. In place of a mouth pursed like a weapon, Claudia describes kiss-
inviting lips.  This imagined child’s nose even opens itself to the world in ways foreclosed by 
the scrunched up almost sneer of the white doll.  For Claudia and her sister, the problem is 
the misalignment of “universal love,” the acute awareness that the world prefers white plastic 
and the girls that represents to the real lives of Black babies (190). Claudia explains, “[W] e 
did not dwell on the fact that the baby’s father was Pecola’s father too; the process of having 
a baby by any male was incomprehensible to us—at least she knew her father.  We thought 
only of the overwhelming hatred for the unborn baby” (191).  In their naivety about where 
babies come from, Claudia and Pecola overlook the individual crime—the father’s act of 
incestuous rape— at the expense of the social sin—the conceptual annihilation of Black 
children.  By braiding these two wrongs together, Morrison trains her readers to see the way 
the racist value system both enables the father’s violence and causes harm far beyond the 
individual victim of that crime.       
THE ROUND HOUSE 
Violently raped, I thought.  I knew those words fit together.  Probably from some 
court case I’d read in my father’s books or from a newspaper article of the cherished 
paperback thrillers my uncle, Whitey, kept on his handmade bookshelf. 
—Joe Coutts The Round House (15) 
Just as Claudia does not understand the incest her friend endured, thirteen-year-old 
Joe Coutts, narrator and protagonist of Louise Erdrich’s 2012 The Round House cannot 
register the awful crime that his mother survives before the novel opens.  When he attempts 
to discuss it with his Aunt Clemence, he understands on an intellectual level what he cannot 
on an emotional one.  Despite his familiarity with case history, with current events, and even 
 172 
with fiction, Joe cannot fully know what his mother endured or why, as he poignantly asks 
his aunt, “did she smell like gas?” (15).  Joe cannot think-feel the truth of the attacker’s 
aggression until the ceremonial place that gives the novel its name speaks it to him—in his 
mother’s voice.  As readers use Joe’s words to “fit together” the story of what happened to 
his mother, we fill in what we don’t want children to know: that men rape women; that this is 
a violent strategy of domination, not only of one sex over another, but also of one nation, as 
Erdrich’s novel foregrounds, over another; that this aggression enacts a desire to annihilate so 
deep it can also manifest in an attempt to immolate another person.  At the same time, 
through our reliance on Joe not only for plot details but also for clues about what will be 
important, readers develop, along with the child, particular interpretative strategies that put 
us on alert us to what the U.S. law will fail to see and attune us to ways of knowing that are 
illegible to western discourse.  First, through the painstaking and devastated attempts of Joe’s 
father, the tribal judge, to bring the rapist to trial, Erdrich exposes the way the U.S. legal 
system renders tribal lands into hunting grounds of sexual predators like her novel’s villain 
Linden Lark.  As she chronicles the “rotten casserole” of Indian Law, Erdrich’s novel not 
only claims a place next to the legal tomes on Joe’s father’s bookshelf but also raises 
awareness about an actual epidemic of violence against Native women that newspapers have 
been remiss in reporting.  Erdrich capitalizes on the suspense strategies more at home among 
Whitey’s thrillers to involve readers in a revenge plot necessitated by the law’s failure.  Even 
as Erdrich capitalizes on these black and white strategies—the letter of the law, tangible 
evidence, and the imperative for vengeance— she reveals the way these hard facts both 
determine and limit what the courts will see.  Through Joe’s juvenile detective work and 
 173 
naïve faith in the law, Erdrich educates her readers on the narrow and limited way courts see 
rape cases, especially on reservations.   
  Just as Lee and Morrison did before her, Erdrich positions Joe with a child’s 
innocence and an adult’s knowledge, which both invites readers to fill in what a child cannot 
register and asks us to trust what the adult has learned.  We know that Joe narrates “at a 
removal of time, from that summer in 1988, when my mother refused to come down the 
stairs” (142).  Erdrich establishes this distance from the beginning: as the young Joe sits 
weeding at his parents’ house, the narrator offers an adult commentary on his own 
dedication: “[y]ou would think then that I would have stopped, a thirteen-year-old boy with 
better things to do, but on the contrary” (Erdrich 2).  Later in the paragraph, the narrator 
again acknowledges his distance from his younger self, “[e]ven now, I wonder at the 
steepness of my focus” (Erdrich 2).  These assertions that he is no longer thirteen serve to 
connect readers to the older Joe narrator; “you would think” commands readers to admire his 
younger self and “[e]ven now, I wonder” acknowledges the adult Joe’s role as the 
intermediary between the book’s readers and the vulnerable thirteen-year-old.  While the 
narration is dedicated, for the most part, to the voice, perspective, and vocabulary of the 
thirteen-year-old Joe, the periodic commentary of the adult narrator lets the reader know that 
Joe survives to become a lawyer, a public prosecutor, and, like his father, a tribal judge.  
Joe’s adult profession positions him to draw reader’s attention to the important legal cases 
that prevent the family from bringing the rapist to trial.   As in a traditional suspense plot, the 
first half of The Round House investigates the pre-novel crime—how we come to know what 
happened—and the second half concentrates on bringing the culprit to justice—how we read 
what happened.  These two halves frame Geraldine’s testimony, which Erdrich places at the 
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exact midpoint of her novel.  For the majority of The Round House, we rely on Joe, the child-
narrator, to report the central events of the plot.  Because he’s only recently become a 
teenager, “[t]wo weeks ago, I’d been twelve,” he often “underinterprets” events to use James 
Phelan’s term for a particular type of unreliability that occurs when “the narrator’s lack of 
knowledge, perceptiveness, or sophistication yields an insufficient interpretation of an event, 
character, or situation” (3, 52).  Joe’s naivety foregrounds questions of interpretation—we’re 
not so concerned with what happened, as mature readers we can infer the awful extent of the 
rape from the first pages, but with how Joe comes to know it and how he has to read it.  
Joe’s initial discovery of the off-stage crime that opens The Round House 
demonstrates the poignant power that child-narrators afford.  Although the child’s innocence 
prevents Joe from fully interpreting what his mother survived, his narration reliably reports 
and evaluates the sequence of events.  After the ominous search for his missing mother, 
Geraldine returns home on her own, and in an almost-matter-of-fact tone, Joe reports, 
“[t]here was vomit down the front of her dress and, soaking her skirt and soaking the gray 
cloth of the car seat, her dark blood” (7).  The repetition of soaking framed by vomit and 
blood speaks to the severity of the assault and to the child’s horror at his mother’s injury.  
While Joe’s simple description gives readers enough evidence to infer that his mother just 
survived a rape, the son hesitates before making that interpretation himself.  Even as an adult 
looking backward, Joe avoids the word ‘rape’ until his younger self determines its relevance 
and asks about the violation by name.  In Phelan’s taxonomy of unreliability Joe’s spare 
narration would be considered “underreading.” In that initial scene, Joe also reliably reports, 
but underreads the “strong smell [that] rose from her, the vomit and something else, like gas 
or kerosene,” but cannot interpret this as evidence of attempted immolation (7).  As we saw 
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in the last chapter, neither Joe’s aunt nor his father can explain this violence to him—as if in 
unspoken agreement to protect the child from the very thought that a person would want to 
immolate another.  Even though Joe cannot reliably interpret the awful extent of what his 
mother survived, his ethical evaluation matches that of the adult characters.  Without naming 
the attacker’s offenses, he registers their wrongness; as he puts it: “I wanted to know that 
whoever had attacked my mother would be found, punished, and killed” (12).  Joe’s ethical 
assessment does not only involve imagined retribution for the perpetrator, but also a revision 
of his own behavior.  Before he can bring himself to name the aggression that so injured his 
mother, he knows he should refuse his father’s plan to drop him off before taking her to the 
hospital.  Although his aunt cannot explain to him why his mother smelled like gas, he knew, 
from her reaction, not “to ask her about the gasoline again” (15).  Because Joe’s mother will 
not recount what happened to her until she ensures the safety of another woman’s child and 
because Joe’s father tries half-heartedly not to involve him in the case, Joe and his friends 
take it upon themselves to solve the crime.    
Erdrich’s decision to narrate the rape as a gradual realization of survivor’s son has 
several important repercussions.  First, because Joe reliably reports but underinterprets the 
evidence of the crime, a general understanding of sequence of events becomes the readers’ 
responsibility—any errors in that interpretation become an error in reading not in reporting.  
This forecloses many of the inappropriate questions that too often come up around sex crimes 
such as “was it rape?” or “was she asking for it?”  Because readers’ fill in the crime that the 
child cannot narrate, we know what happened to Geraldine.  Erdrich makes us so sure of what 
happened so she can focus on how we read it.  Second, by choosing the son rather than the 
survivor to narrate, Erdrich does not put Geraldine in a position where she has to testify—
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determining what happened becomes Joe’s burden and our responsibility.  In other words, 
Erdrich does not ask us to try to know or appropriate Geraldine’s trauma.  Instead, she asks 
us to understand how traumatic experiences influence an entire family and community and to 
know the violence that caused it.  Third, because we piece together crime before we know the 
attacker’s identity our assessment of his guilt and malice is not influenced by preconceived 
assumptions.  Finally, because we already know in a general sense what happened, Erdrich 
can focus our attention more clearly on the questions of the father—the legal issues of how to 
bring the perpetrator to justice.   
At the time Erdrich wrote The Round House and when she published it in 2012, tribal 
courts could not try white men who raped Native women on tribal land.  The Round House 
intervenes on behalf of Native women, 1 in 3 of whom are raped, and seeks to close the legal 
loophole that distinguishes crimes by race on tribal lands (Erdrich 319).  Less than a year 
after Erdrich published The Round House, congress renewed the Violence Against Women 
Act.  Because of lobbying efforts by tribal and other groups—and because of Erdrich’s 
prose—congress included a provision that allows tribal courts to try non-natives for some sex 
crimes. Although this measure does not end the sexual violence pervasive on tribal lands, as 
Erdrich argues in her New York Times opinion, “Rape on the Reservation,” the provision 
does offer what Erdrich considers “a slim margin of hope for justice.”  The refusal of U.S. 
law to exact justice in cases of sexual violence on reservations is not just a fictional conflict.  
Erdrich’s narrative makes clear that the conflict lies not in the fictional world of the novel but 
in the case-lawed “maze of injustice”60 that prevents Native women and tribal courts from 
                                                
60 “Maze of Injustice” is the title of an Amnesty International Report on sexual violence 
against indigenous women in the United States.   
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prosecuting sexual predators.  Erdrich published The Round House in 2012 at the beginning 
of a two-yearlong legislative battle in both the house and the senate to renew the Violence 
Against Women Act. Notably, a provision to extend the jurisdiction of tribal courts in some 
cases of domestic violence was a major point of contention.  This provisional victory, an 
important step, is limited in scope.  This provision only extends to perpetrators in the context 
of a relationship—this law as it has been revised would still not extend to Linden.  Erdrich 
advocates for these small steps as necessary in progress toward a long-term vision of justice.   
The Round House enacts its political victory primarily by training readers to see the 
way the U.S. justice system is not blind, but “exclusively sighted.”  Erdrich’s child-narrator 
helps us come to this reading through Joe’s youthful curiosity and his admiration for his 
father, the tribal judge.  These choices of characterization serve what Phelan would call 
“synthetic functions,” which are the ways in which characters serve as “artificial 
constructions within the larger construct of the work” (13).  Julie Tharp describes Bazil as “a 
respected tribal judge, making it perfectly natural that the novel should be liberally sprinkled 
with references to Felix Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law—a much-thumbed family 
favorite—…. This allows Erdrich to make her real world critiques without damaging the 
verisimilitude of the novel” (Tharp 29).  The legal discussions between father and son 
become compelling for the reader and necessary for understanding the plot because the 
young narrator makes clear from the beginning that these seemingly mundane questions will 
determine justice for his mother.  In the very first chapter, the young narrator tells us that 
after rushing his mother to the hospital, his father calls both the state and tribal police:             
My father had insisted that they each take a statement from my mother 
because it wasn’t clear where the crime had been committed—on state or 
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tribal land—or who had committed it—an Indian or a non-Indian.  I already 
knew, in a rudimentary way, that these questions would swirl around the facts.  
I already knew, too, that these questions would not change the facts.  But they 
would inevitably change the way we sought justice. (Erdrich 12)  
The tribal judge and his son already know that justice will depend not on the severity of the 
crime nor on their ability to prove it, but on the land the crime was committed and on the 
identity of the criminal.  As we learn along with the child the patchwork of laws that 
foreclose justice for his mother, we rely on his older self, who followed his father to become 
a tribal judge, to highlight, which questions will be important and which laws make it that 
way. The sophisticated Joe (having gone to law school) knows when to point out which 
details will become legally significant such as the “where” and the “who” in the hospital 
scene.  
   The visuals the judge uses to teach his son about the jurisdictional challenge helps 
readers to see that justice in the United States is a matter of how we choose to see.  As Joe 
learns more about what happened at the round house, his father draws a picture to explain 
why no court will hear his mother’s case: 
He turned over a scrap of paper and drew a circle on it, tapped his pencil on 
the circle.  He made a map. 
Here’s the round house.  Just behind it, you have the Smoker allotment, which 
is now so fractioned nobody can get much use of it.  Then a strip that was 
sold—fee land.  The round house is on the far edge of tribal trust, where our 
court has jurisdiction, though of course not over a white man.  So federal law 
applies.  Down to the lake, that is also tribal trust.  But just to one side, a 
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corner of that is state park, where state law applies.  On the other side of the 
pasture, more words, we have an extension of round house land. (196) 
The judge’s diagram reveals a patchwork of jurisdiction caused by a history of colonialism: 
through allotment policies the U.S. government acquired two thirds of Native land61; land 
held in “trust” by the U.S. government echoes of the paternalism that prevented recognition 
of full sovereignty; and state parks evoke a statist protection of wild places for human 
recreation rather than a traditional stewardship of the natural world.  These twisted histories 
also result in what Erdrich describes in the novel’s “Afterword” as a “tangle of laws that 
hinder the prosecution of rape cases on many reservations” (319).  Amnesty International 
titles their 2009 report that documents this tangle “Maze of Injustice.”  The Coutts cannot 
find their way to a courtroom through this tangled maze because the question of “where” 
Linden committed the crime remains unanswered.  The judge’s explanation still holds, 
however, for many non-fictional Native women who can prove where they were assaulted 
because of the question of the “who.”  As Bazil explains to his son, when tribal courts have 
jurisdiction over the place, such as the round house, but not the people, non-natives, “federal 
law applies” (Erdrich 196).  Erdrich asserts in the novel’s “Afterword” that “86 percent of 
rapes and sexual assaults upon Native women are perpetrated by non-native men” like her 
novel’s Linden Lark (319).  While the judge’s lesson tells us that federal courts should take 
these cases, Erdrich draws our attention to the fact that these courts refuse to prosecute “67 
percent of sexual abuse cases” (“Rape on the Reservation”).  Linden ensures that his violence 
towards Geraldine would fall into this large percentage of unprosecuted cases by working 
                                                
61 For more discussion see chapter 2 and Eric Cheyfitz’s The Columbia Guide to American 
Indian Literatures of the United States Since 1945 (2006). 
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with the same map the judge drew for his son, but the circles that Bazil draws as a 
jurisdictional maze, look to the rapist like an easy target.  Geraldine’s testimony attests to the 
way Linden saw this gap between jurisdictions as an open field for his sexual violence.  After 
he raped her, Geraldine explains how Linden has taunted her: “I won’t get caught, he said.  
I’ve been boning up on law.  Funny.  Laugh.  He nudged me with his shoe.  I know as much 
law as a judge.  Know any judges?  I have no fear” (Erdrich 161).  What Erdrich calls a 
“tangle” and Amnesty describes as a “maze” arouses and allows the rapist’s sexual appetites.  
Rather than inspiring fear the law endows the white predator with a sense of confidence.   
 Erdrich does not just leave us with Bazil’s word to establish the jurisdictional 
problems, but backs him up with a history of case law braided together from historic and 
fictional cases.  Joe, who was actually reading the Handbook of Federal Indian Law, when 
his father introduces the central conflict in the form of a missing mother, refers to relevant 
cases throughout the novel. When we first meet the FBI agent assigned to Geraldine’s case, 
Joe explains,  
That Bjerke was here anyway went back to Ex Parte Crow Dog and then the 
Major Crimes Act of 1885. That was when the federal government first 
intervened in the decisions Indians made among themselves regarding 
restitution and punishment. The reasons for Bjerke’s presence continued on 
through that rotten year for Indians, 1953, when Congress not only decided to 
try Termination out on us but passed Public Law 280, which gave certain 
states criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indian lands within their borders. If 
there was one law that could be repealed or amended for Indians to this day, 
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that would be Public Law 280. But on our particular reservation Bjerke’s 
presence was a statement of our toothless sovereignty. (Erdrich 142) 
Joe’s references to Ex Parte Crow Dog and the Major Crimes Act build credibility for 
Erdrich’s legal assertions.  Although Joe doesn’t dwell on the details of these cases and laws, 
his conclusions hold up.  The 1883 Supreme Court decision in Ex Parte Crow Dog ruled that 
Native nations did have jurisdiction over crimes committed on their land, but a year later the 
U.S. legislature passed a law claiming federal jurisdiction over felonies and other major 
crimes.  Joe’s elaboration reminds us that these subjugating policies are not limited to the 
U.S. nineteenth- century colonial expansion, but persist into the twentieth century when the 
government tried to “terminate” tribes by writing them out of legal existence.  This policy 
targeted many tribes including Erdrich’s own, the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa 
Indians, but her grandfather tribal Chairman Patrick Gourneau successfully advocated for 
their continued existence.  Public Law 280 applies to other reservations where Congress 
decided states should have jurisdiction instead of tribal governments or the federal 
government.  While Joe doesn’t summarize each of these decisions, his allusions attest to the 
tangled maze of Indian law.     
 Even as she delineates the way Indian law fails Native women, Erdrich emphasizes a 
faith in the potential for legal change through Bazil, the tribal judge.  Frustrated by Bazil’s 
commitment to the legal system, even when it so clearly failed Geraldine, Joe asks his father 
why he bothers: 
 I’m going to illustrate this for you, son. 
He sat down and waved a couple of forks at me.  Then with cool absorption he 
laid a large carving knife carefully on top of the frozen casserole and all 
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around it proceeded to stack one fork, another fork, one on the next adding a 
spoon here, a butter knife, a ladle, a spatula, until he had a jumble somehow 
organized into a weird sculpture.  He carried over the other four butcher 
knives my mother always kept keen.  These he balanced precariously on top 
of the other silverware.  Then sat back, stroking his chin. (227) 
Although Joe thinks his father had “gone a little crazy,” he understands how the addled 
edifice represents Indian law.  As the old casserole begins to melt, Joe and his father help 
readers understand that past legal decisions are not the cool rationale associated with law 
libraries.  Bazil’s crazed art equates “the fuzzy black noodles” with the foundational decision 
of Johnson v. McIntosh where “Justice Marshall went out of his way to strip all Indian title to 
all lands viewed—i.e. discovered by Europeans” (228).  As father and son work their way 
through subsequent decisions, readers can imagine how the previous cases Joe’s mentioned 
fit into this precarious tower of casserole and cutlery.  Bazil’s construction even accounts for 
recent cases like Oliphant v. Suquamish (1978), “a particularly disgusting bit of sludge” 
where the Supreme Court “[t]ook from us the right to prosecute non-Indians who commit 
crimes on our land. So even if…” (229).  Bazil’s unfinished sentence connects the casserole 
conceit with the novel’s conflict: even if they did know where Lark committed the crime, 
Bazil cannot prosecute white men.  Despite the spoiled stench that rises from this case 
history, Bazil emphasizes his commitment to making a more sturdy foundation through Joe’s 
mother’s keen butcher knives.  In opposition to the rotten mess of bad decisions, Bazil asserts 
that he and “other tribal judges” work “to build a solid base here for our sovereignty. We 
want the right to prosecute criminals of all races on all lands within our original boundaries.  
Which is why I try to run a tight courtroom Joe.  What I am doing now is for the future, 
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though it may seem small, or trivial, or boring to you” (Erdrich 229).  Even small advances 
are important in an ongoing struggle.  The Round House shows how the U.S. legal system 
denies justice for many Native peoples, but it does not reject the legal system.  Rather, by 
having Joe enact extra-legal justice and still become a tribal judge, Erdrich argues that legal 
solutions, which honor tribal sovereignty, are possible.  As we’ll see in the following chapter, 
The Round House helps to envision a type of justice that can anticipate and prevent violence 
instead of seeking vigilante vengeance.  The didactic yet endearing encounters between Joe 
and his father help prepare readers for the real need of radical revision to Indian Law.       
CONCLUSION 
 Just as Scout “leaped triumphantly into a ring of people” who decided not to be a 
lynch mob, Lee published Mockingbird at a time in U.S. history when many were deciding 
not to cling to prejudice (172).  Scout’s questions positioned Mr. Cunningham as a parent 
deciding not to raise children to be racist, and many have turned to the novel as a collective 
version of Winnicott’s “transitional object” in the hopes that we together may create a society 
not forged around forced inequality.  As we’ll see in greater detail in the following chapter, 
Lee accomplished her shift in the cultural narrative of lynching by breaking white class 
solidarity and retaining the racial hierarchy.  Morrison and Erdrich take up Lee’s 
understanding of the power of the child-narrator and inflect their protagonist’s voices with 
incisive analyses of how racial antagonisms function in the United States.  While Lee invites 
her readers to fill in a worn cultural narrative based on a rape that does not occur, Morrison 
and Erdrich implore their readers to fill in the specifics of violence that did occur in the 
novel.  Scout’s naïve understanding of this social violence allows Lee to shift the way readers 
interpret that cultural narrative.  Morrison and Lee, on the other hand, position their child-
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narrators with knowledge that the readers might not know, such as what if feels like to be 
forced to love a hard white doll or the twisted history of Indian Law.  This asymmetrical 
collaboration not only makes the fiction possible, but also informs the way readers may 
interpret non-fictional events as well.       
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE ETHICS OF KILLING BIRDS  
I know why the caged bird beats his wing 
Till its blood is red on the cruel bars; 
For he must fly back to his perch and cling 
When he fain would be on the bough a-swing; 
And a pain still throbs in the old, old scars 
And they pulse again with a keener sting— 
I know why he beats his wing! 
 
I know why the caged bird sings, ah me, 
When his wing is bruised and his bosom sore,— 
When he beats his bars and he would be free; 
It is not a carol of joy or glee, 
But a prayer that he sends from his heart’s deep core, 
But a plea, that upward to Heaven he flings— 
I know why the caged bird sings! 
 
—Paul Laurence Dunbar “Sympathy” (1899) 
8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 
But a caged bird stands on the grave of dreams 
his shadow shouts on a nightmare scream 
his wings are clipped and his feet are tied 
so he opens his throat to sing. 
 
The caged bird sings 
with a fearful trill 
of things unknown 
but longed for still 
and his tune is heard 
on the distant hill 
for the caged bird 
sings of freedom. 
 
—Maya Angelou “Caged Bird” (1983) 
27 
 
 
 
 
31 
 
Less than half a century after the formal abolition of slavery in the United States, Paul 
Laurence Dunbar expressed a deep sympathy between the speaker of his poem and a caged 
bird.  The speaker asserts an intimate knowledge of the caged bird’s pain by repeating again 
and again, “I know why.”  While the bird’s “old, old scars” may throb with the continual 
resistance to incarceration, Dunbar qualifies this pain with “a keener sting” perhaps to 
express the sharp disappointment of meeting with the same bloody bars even in an era when 
one would expect greater opportunities (13).  The better part of a century later, Maya 
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Angelou alludes to Dunbar’s refrain in the title of her memoir I Know Why The Caged Bird 
Sings (1969), and she adopts his conceit in her 1983 poem “Caged Bird” (1983).  Although 
Angelou describes her bird as caged, its cell is not as visible as Dunbar’s “cruel bars” (9).  
Instead, Angelou’s bird cannot fly because “his wings are clipped and his feet are tied” (29).  
While Dunbar wrote in the wake of a failed reconstruction when Jim Crow was both the 
letter and the wish of the law, Angelou wrote in a time when opportunities are limited by 
other means.  Unlike Dunbar’s poem, which features a speaker and solitary bird, Angelou 
contrasts her caged bird with a free one in an objective third person.  Formal boundaries do 
not keep Angelou’s bird from the sky, but painful histories of buried dreams and severed 
opportunities chain it to the ground.  Even as these two poems attest to a subjugation that 
endures the destruction of forms of chains, they also identify a surprising mode of recourse—
art, and in particular, song.   
The figure of singing a prayer for freedom acknowledges a tradition from slave times.  
Using an adjective that at once acknowledges and defies the master discourse’s deafness, 
Frederick Douglass describes these “wild songs” in his Narrative (1845), “[e]very tone was a 
testimony against slavery, and prayer to God for deliverance from chains” (8).  In this legal 
and religious framing, the songs do the work that Douglass hopes his Narrative will do: 
abolish slavery.  For Douglass, these songs measure the extent to which slavery desecrates 
humanity: “[t]o those songs I trace my first glimmering conception of the dehumanizing 
character of slavery.  I can never get rid of that conception.  Those songs still follow me, to 
deepen my hatred of slavery, and quicken my sympathies for my brethren in bonds” (9).  
Almost sixty years after Douglass’s Narrative, DuBois published his revolutionary book The 
Souls of Black Folk.  DuBois prefaced each chapter with a bar of music from what he terms 
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the “Sorrow Songs;” in the concluding chapter he explains, “before each thought I have 
written in this book I have set a phrase, a haunting echo of these weird old songs in which the 
soul of the black slave spoke to men” (155).  Like Douglass’s adjective “wild,” DuBois’s 
descriptor “weird” acknowledges a dominant discourse that seeks to render these songs and 
this grievance illegible.  What is it about song that defies dehumanization that makes deep 
suffering bearable?  In contrast to the hegemonic silencing tendency, DuBois knows that this 
music serves as an important medium through which the souls of Black folk speak.  He 
asserts, “the ten master songs I have mentioned tell in word and music of trouble and exile, 
of strife and hiding; they grope toward some unseen power and sigh for rest in the End” 
(159).  These songs “haunt” because the grief they sing did not die with the formal abolition 
of slavery or the official death of Jim Crow.  For the poets, abolitionists, and philosophers the 
art of song stands as an important testament of humanity. 
In the field of contemporary philosophy, Judith Butler has been wondering “[w]hat 
makes for a grievable life?” (italics in original 20).  She understands that loss is one 
commonality that constitutes “a tenuous ‘we’ of us all” and queries the way that political 
machinations mobilize this human potential for grief in ways that render some lives 
ungrievable and, by extension, not lives at all (22).  She knows that our other primary 
commonality, and perhaps the other face of loss, is vulnerability to violence and annihilation, 
that “life itself can be expunged by the willful action of another” (28, 29).  Butler vacillates 
between a meditation on the individual, personal loss of the “‘you [that] is part of what 
composes who ‘I’ am” and a consideration of the many anonymous losses that our collective 
consciousness cannot mark, that the “genre of the obituary” and “the silence of the 
newspaper” cannot record (22, 32, 36).  Her argument traces an inverse relationship between 
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vulnerability and grievability; she notes that those Palestinian, Iraqi, Afghani lives lost to 
Israeli, U.S., and European violence do not register as grievable in the collective psyches of 
the aggressor nations: “[t]here are no obituaries for the war causalities that the United States 
inflicts, and there cannot be” (34).  Like the foreign deaths, Butler explains how some local 
losses, such as victims of AIDS and queer victims of the 9/11 attacks trouble our mechanisms 
of grief.  In Butler’s analysis, such deaths, abroad and at home, “vanish[], not into explicit 
discourse, but in the ellipses by which public discourse proceeds” (35).  These losses, 
rendered unfamiliar on the national stage, disappear into silence.  Butler clarifies “[i]f there is 
a ‘discourse,’ it is silent and melancholic one in which there have been no lives, and no 
losses; there has been no common bodily condition, no vulnerability that serves as the basis 
for an apprehension of our commonality; and there has been no surrendering of that 
commonality” (36).  Butler captures and critiques the discursive void through which human 
commonality disappeared in the “War on Terror” and policies that followed.   
The spirit of the Sorrow Songs that continues to echo through both literature and 
music stands as witness to the discursive evasion that preexists Butler’s analysis and the 
attacks that precipitated it.  The failure of recognition that forecloses grief of others stands as 
a studied condition for the founding of the United States.  National newspapers did not record 
and state curricula still avoid the genocides through which the “land of the free” was forged. 
While slavery and its legacies have been the “problem” of multiple centuries and often the 
center of political debate, and the world’s oldest surviving democracy has yet to 
acknowledge these grievances.  Unlike other nations that have perpetrated genocide and 
enslaved races, the United States has offered no official apology, no Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, no reparations.  The State’s refusal to grieve is no new thing, as the determined 
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deafness to the sorrow shared through song indicates.  Just as Dunbar’s speaker has to clarify 
that the caged bird’s cry “is not a carol of joy or glee,” Douglass and DuBois needed to 
explain that, in Douglass’s words “[i]t is impossible to conceive of a greater mistake” than 
interpreting “singing, among slaves, as evidence of their contentment and happiness” (18).  
While DuBois allows that some may have been “careless and happy” these songs “are the 
music of an unhappy people, of the children of disappointment; they tell of death and 
suffering and unvoiced longing toward a truer world” (157).  In the absence of a public 
accounting of the wrongs grieved in the songs and those that followed them, members of 
aggrieved communities in the United States turn to art and activism as the phrases “Sixty 
Million and more” and “Black Lives Matter” indicate.  Both Beloved’s dedication and the 
movement’s name state facts that are not yet true.  Morrison counts the unknowable number 
of lives lost through the slave trade according to the abacus of the European Holocaust to 
condemn the United States’ failure to recognize and memorialize its foundational crime and 
the hashtag’s indicative description becomes an ethical imperative in a nation whose past and 
present behavior practices the contrary.   
I begin with the dialogue between Butler’s thoughts on grievability and this aesthetic 
tradition of grief because it raises important questions about how lives matter in the United 
States that Morrison, Lee and Erdrich raise in their novels. On one hand, all three authors 
know that the history of the United States is strewn with ungrieved corpses.  They position 
their novels to face the violent history through which U.S. forged its sovereignty.  Morrison’s 
oeuvre narrates both slavery as Beloved does and the damaging power dynamics that ensued 
as in The Bluest Eye, and Lee engages the tradition of lynching that followed the Civil War.  
After abolition, southern whites began a tradition of lynching to maintain white supremacy 
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after the formal abolition of slavery.  Ramón Saldívar notes that, during the same period, 
white people in Texas and the southwest territories committed similar acts of violence 
against Mexican American people for the same purpose.  The same century witnessed the 
hundreds of massacres through which the United States declared its hegemony.  Erdrich’s 
The Plague of Doves, as will be discussed in the following chapter on the braided narrative, 
deals with lynching as “frontier justice.”  In the south, west, and Texas, these acts of 
racialized violence were committed by both state and vigilante actors creating a nebulous 
collaboration that renders those deaths not only ungrievable in the discursive sense indicated 
by Butler’s interest in obituaries and newspapers, but also in the legal sense of a crime in 
want of justice.  Even with such strong traditions of expressing grief and mourning, some 
Black deaths and grievances remain ungrieved by the U.S. justice system.  At the same time 
as this historical grievance, as we have seen with the genre of Sorrow Songs, grief and 
mourning can be expressed even if the dominant discourse strives not to hear it.  For 
instance, many civil rights activists and historians cite the murder and funeral of Emmett Till 
as the beginning of the movement.  Despite the public and publicized grief demonstrated at 
the fourteen-year-old’s funeral, the courts acquitted the white men who perpetrated the crime. 
More recently, grief for seventeen-year-old Trayvon Martin and eighteen-year-old Michael 
Brown sparked the Black Lives Matter movement.  Just as the U.S. justice system refused to 
convict the men who lynched Emmett Till, the white vigilante who killed Trayvon Martin 
was acquitted of the crime, and a grand jury refused to charge the police officer who 
murdered Michael Brown.  The way in which these murders were grieved publicly but were 
not legible in the court of law suggests that there is a third term between vulnerability and 
grievability: the historical and continuing conspiracy between law enforcement and vigilante 
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violence renders some people “killable” irrespective of their grievability.  Being “killable” 
means that the skewed cultural logic has deemed one’s murder permissible—that one’s 
extralegal execution, if not justified, cannot be adjudicated in a court of law.          
The question of how a person can become killable or escape that fate is the child’s 
concern in The Bluest Eye, To Kill a Mockingbird, and The Round House.  Claudia frames 
The Bluest Eye with “a need for someone to want the black baby to live” (190).  Although 
she tells us that Pecola’s child is dead by her third paragraph, she also makes clear that her 
purpose is to invite readers to join her in imagining a world in which this child should live.  
Against the current of the adult women’s consensus at the novel’s close that there “[o]ught to 
be a law: two ugly people doubling up like that to make more ugly. Be better off in the 
ground,” Claudia and her sister want to imagine the baby’s life as desirable, livable, lovable 
(190).  The unnamed friend of their mother who voices the easy negation of the child born of 
incest frames her condemnation in the ethical terms of “ought” and the “law.”  To Kill a 
Mockingbird’s titular and oft-repeated aphorism foregrounds the same concern that Claudia 
raises.  Although Atticus couches his rule in the language of the church, “the only time I ever 
heard Atticus say it was a sin to do something,” Scout uses the saying to evaluate and excuse 
Atticus’s decision to lie about how Mr. Ewell died (103).  The child’s interpretation agrees 
with the adult’s determination that one man’s death is not grievable if it means the unwanted 
social exposure of a heroic neighbor.  While many critics read the temporary postponement 
of Tom Robinson’s lynching as another fulfillment of Atticus’s precept, his eventual death at 
the unrestrained hands of a prison guard demands a different interpretation—even if his life 
is worth defending in a court of law, the carceral system makes him killable.   
 192 
Erdrich, who strategically patterns The Round House after Mockingbird, makes more 
incisive arguments about killability. First, as we have already seen, she raises awareness 
about violence against Native women; the novel’s opening crime is not just a rape, but also a 
murder of a seventeen-year-old whose body is never found.  Erdrich includes the ungrieved 
and unsolved murder of Mayla Wolfskin to argue that the femicide the U.S. likes to imagine 
as occurring outside, or at least at our borders, is happening here, too.  Unlike Canada where 
the government in 2016 established a National Inquiry into “Missing and Murdered 
Indigenous Girls and Women” or Mexico, which received international scrutiny for its failure 
to stop the murders in Juarez, the United States does not keep statistics on and has not 
acknowledged this problem.62  At the same time, Erdrich asks her readers to consider what 
makes a white man killable.  While Erdrich does not advocate for the vigilante murder that 
she depicts in the novel, her engagement with the question may help us understand the 
contemporary violence that infects our society.         
Where Butler makes persuasive and thoughtful claims about broad categories, the 
novelists concern themselves with particular situations, particular instances, particular 
stories, which in turn comment on social forces.  This attention to the specific is important 
because, as we saw in the second chapter, the particular makes legible and accessible certain 
                                                
62 Erdrich is not alone in offering aesthetic testament to the violence against Native women: 
the 2017 thriller Wind River represents the violence Native women may face and tries to 
explain how hard those crimes are to trace and try.  Like the “Afterword” at the end of The 
Round House which explains the accuracy of the novel’s central violence, the film closes 
with a statement of fact: “[w]hile missing person statistics are compiled for every other 
demographic, none exist for Native American women.” 
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understandings about racial hierarchies that some have trained themselves to be blind to.  At 
the same time, the particularity essential to a novel can also prevent the wide-sweeping 
assumptions that every member of a given category shares the same experiences.  For 
instance, in The Bluest Eye being killable or grievable is not a condition of an entire race 
even in the limited context of 1940s United States, but rather is something that can happen to 
individuals under certain conditions.  Like Angelou’s poem which contrasts a free bird with a 
caged one, Morrison’s novel focuses on two young girls: first, nine-year-old Claudia, who 
narrates in her confident, insightful voice, and second, eleven-year-old Pecola, who Morrison 
has Claudia describe as “a wounded bird.”  While Morrison allows the first to mature into a 
thoughtful, reflective person, indicated by the temporal moment of narrating, she, in her own 
words “smash[es]” the second (211). Morrison’s novel certainly comments on racial 
assumptions, but it does so through specific personalities and individual histories.  After the 
teasing of her classmates, for instance, Pecola “seemed to fold into herself, like a pleated 
wing” (73).  While the painful experiences that trap Pecola in her life do seem to be the 
“nightmare scream” Angelou describes in her poem, they do not cause Pecola to sing (29).  
Instead, Claudia ends the novel with a description of Pecola stalks her yard, just as Dunbar 
and Angelou’s birds circle their cages, but importantly Pecola paces without voice: “[e]lbows 
bent, hands on shoulders, she flailed her arms like a bird in an eternal, grotesquely futile 
effort to fly.  Beating the air, a winged but grounded bird, intent on the blue void it could not 
reach—could not even see—but which filled the valleys of the mind” (204).  While the free 
bird in Angelou’s poem “names the sky his own,” Pecola still obsesses over “the blue void” 
that describes both the sky where her broken-bird self cannot fly and the vacuity of the bluest 
eye that cause and cannot solve her problems (26).  “The upland slopes” that Dunbar’s bird 
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longs for become the mental contours of Pecola’s mind filled with the fantasy she invents to 
make her life bearable (2).   
Although the children care about these questions of life or death, in all three novels, 
authors use different strategies to raise these ethical queries in readers’ minds without full 
awareness of their child-narrators.  By juxtaposing the child’s voice with omniscient sections 
that account for Pecola’s experience, Morrison helps to forge the genre of the braided 
narrative, which I focus on in the next chapter.  Through these sections we learn, among 
other things, about Pecola’s parents’ backgrounds, and just as Claudia asks us to care for 
Pecola, Morrison frames these sections in a way that invites a sort of sympathy with the 
parents who cause her harm.  Different narrative strands, narrated in different voices, help 
readers hold different ethical questions in our mind simultaneously.  Even as she demands we 
condemn Cholly’s violence, Morrison makes us understand how it came to be.  While Lee’s 
narrative remains inside Scout’s perspective, she equips Scout with particular values and 
imagery that serve to maintain white supremacy even as Lee attempts to rework those 
assumptions. Scout learns not to judge people before you’ve seen the world from their front 
porch, but Lee weakens her progressive project by sprinkling Scout’s narration with 
Confederate values and describing Tom Robinson’s death with imagery that echoes the 
execution of the mad dog.  Erdrich, like Morrison, intersperses her narrative with stories told 
in different voices that the child-narrator hears but does not fully understand.  Taken 
together, “Linda’s Story,” Geraldine’s testimony, and Mooshum’s three-part dream, impart a 
traditional form of justice and propose how it might apply to contemporary predators.  
Erdrich and Morrison’s choice to include different voices within their children’s narration 
attests to the ethical power of sound.  Their novels attune readers to different modes of 
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perception that envelop and expand the limits of traditional Western discourse.  In this way, 
Morrison and Erdrich show that ethics is about more than just sight—it’s not only about 
standing in someone else’s shoes, but also about allowing their experience to resonate with 
that of others and our own. 
Because the central (alleged in Mockingbird) crimes occurred before their respective 
novel opens, the narrative progression deals more with how that violence is possible than 
with why it occurred.  As Claudia remarks at the beginning of The Bluest Eye, “since why is 
difficult to handle, one must take refuge in how” (italics in original 6). Judging the crime is 
not at stake in any of the novels.  In Mockingbird, readers understand Tom Robinson’s 
innocence—if there was a crime, it is the violence Mr. Ewell inflicted on his own daughter.  
The Bluest Eye opens and closes with a condemnation of incestual rape—this horrible 
aggression shatters Pecola, breaks her family, and damages Claudia and Frieda, the child 
witnesses.  Further, in The Round House, although we do not know the full details about the 
pre-novel rape, there is no doubt that it occurred.  Because all these crimes (or in the case of 
Mockingbird imagined crimes) occurred before the novels’ stories, the authors do not focus 
on those acts of violence themselves, but rather how to live in a world and respond to the 
aggressors after the events occur.  In other words, there is no question of Cholly and Linden’s 
guilt or Tom Robinson’s innocence, but rather, the issue at the core of all the novels is how to 
make sense of that guilt and innocence—how to understand the sexual violence and how to 
work towards justice.  This involves the social scripts and cultural narratives discussed in the 
last chapter.  For Lee, interpreting Tom Robinson’s innocence has to do with breaking a 
social group—rather than trafficking only in the Black white divide, Lee has her child 
characters learn about a variety of “kinds” of people.  By separating the Ewells from the 
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town folk, Lee can create another other, poor white people, to blame for racial violence.  On 
the one hand, this allows her to shift the cultural narrative to one that accepts and assumes 
Tom Robinson innocent, but killable, but on the other hand it renders the Ewells both 
violable (Mayella was beaten and possibly sexually abused) and killable (Mr. Ewell’s murder 
is accepted by the law and father).  Just as Lee creates “kinds” of white folk, in The Bluest 
Eye, Morrison disrupts the social script that assumes Black men as sexually aggressive.  
While still condemning Cholly’s actions, she makes his story a particular, non-representative 
case and works to explain how social structures push him to rape and incest.  The Round 
House returns to “kinds” of white people by proposing windiigoo hermeneutics as a way of 
reading white predatory greed that manifests itself both in terms of sexual violence and 
conquest.         
THE BLUEST EYE  
If my mother was in a singing mood, it wasn’t so bad.  She would sing about 
hard times, bad times, and somebody-done-gone-and left-me times.  But her 
voice was so sweet and her singing-eyes so melty I found myself longing for 
those hard-times, yearning to be grown without “a thin di-i-ime to my name.”  
I looked forward to the delicious time when “my man” would leave me, when 
I would know “my man has left this town.”  Misery colored by the greens and 
blues in my mother’s voice took all of the grief out of the words and left me 
with a conviction that pain was not only endurable, it was sweet.  
—Claudia MacTeer The Bluest Eye (25-26)  
As the many murders in Morrison’s fiction attest, it is not the plot event that matters 
as much as way the writer asks readers to interpret it.  The double deaths at the beginning of 
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The Bluest Eye, Pecola’s baby and her psyche, are the first of many child-deaths that mark 
the pages of Morrison’s fiction (the murder at the center of Beloved, the immolation of Eva 
Peace’s children in Sula, and the suffocation of Marvis’s twins in Paradise name other 
important instances).  Claudia MacTeer, The Bluest Eye’s major character narrator reads the 
cause of Pecola’s miscarriage in her own failure to cultivate marigolds, imagery that opens 
and closes the novel.  Morrison encourages readers to interpret the infant’s death as a 
question of responsibility by locating Claudia’s hopes that the marigolds “will change the 
course of events and alter human life” in what Rabinowitz would call the “privileged 
position” of the beginning and the end because writers often locate information important to 
the novel’s interpretation (191).  Further, while Morrison uses an omniscient narrator to 
describe the process through which Pecola sublimates the “profound wish that she herself 
could die” into the fantasy of having blue eyes, she, again turns to Claudia’s narrative voice 
to help readers know how we should read that self-hatred (43).  Morrison adopts motifs of 
singing and storytelling that not only help characters interpret their own lives—sometimes in 
damaging ways—but also figure the novel’s narrative structure.  In this way, Morrison’s 
prose is almost like the “greens and blues” Mrs. MacTeer’s songs.  The author, like her 
character, gives voice to misery in a way that endows it with a melty-eyed beauty that makes 
it speakable, bearable.  Claudia loves her mother’s songs not only because they pause Mrs. 
MacTeer’s tirades, but more so because she enjoys the very sound of her mother’s voice.  
Mrs. MacTeer’s songs echo, in a softer key, the way the Sorrow Songs simultaneously 
express pain and make it bearable.  Douglass writes, “the songs of the slave represent the 
sorrows of his heart; and he is relieved by them, only as an aching heart is relieved by its 
tears” (9).  In Morrison’s prose, female voices not only hold pain and give voice to violence 
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in a way that makes that suffering endurable, even “sweet” from the perspective of a child.  
Although Morrison asks her adult readers to acknowledge the grief in the words, the 
sweetness of the voice makes that an accessible, even inviting prospect.   
Morrison situates her young girls as the contended audience of songs even as they 
become the subject of her song—in both senses, the image of a mother holding her child in 
song or a woman holding another’s pain in her voice figures Morrison’s narrative project.  In 
her 1993 “Afterword” Morrison explains,  
And since the victim [Pecola] does not have the vocabulary to understand the 
violence or its context, gullible vulnerable girlfriends [Claudia and Frieda], 
looking back as the knowing adults they pretended to be in the beginning, 
would have to do that for her, and would have to fill those silences with their 
own reflective lives.  Thus, the opening provides the stroke that announces 
something more than a secret shared, but a silence broken, a void filled, an 
unspeakable thing spoken at last. (214) 
In the face of Pecola’s devastating silence, her bred inability to speak her own pain, Claudia, 
our narrator, and her sister Frieda “fill in” what the victim cannot say both as children and as 
adults reflecting back.  The fragile voices of girlfriends, even if inflected by their adult 
understanding, help speak the unspeakable thing.  While Morrison conceptualizes the motif 
that mobilizes the female voice as “black fence” gossip through which secrets are shared, we 
can also see how she figures this sharing through song (212).  Both forms require a choral 
telling, both tolerate different versions of events, both embrace ranges of voices, and both 
position their audience as potential participants.  Gossip has a cheap connotation as 
someone’s hardship becomes the currency of neighborhood chatter, whereas song, especially 
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in the aesthetic tradition of the Sorrow Songs, is transformative not only for those whose 
stories are sung, but for the listeners, too.  Considering The Bluest Eye as a testament of 
music as well as a test of gossip help us to see the narrative innovations Morrison makes 
through her first novel.  In addition to championing the child’s voice to narrate collective 
violence, Morrison shapes a braided narrative, where different stories harmonize to form a 
novel.   
Morrison dedicates much of the novel’s 1993 “Afterword” to detailing her decision to 
write from the perspective of the child in a Black feminine voice.  Morrison attributes The 
Bluest Eye’s novelty to this narrative perspective: “this story of female violation revealed 
from the vantage point of the victims or could-be victims of rape—persons no one inquired 
of (certainly not in 1965): the girls themselves” (214).  Just as Claudia and her sister have to 
fill in their girlfriend’s silences, Morrison positions readers to fill in what the children cannot 
say.  For Morrison, Claudia’s opening line “[q]uiet as it’s kept” best captures this intention 
because of its familiarity “to me as a child listening to adults; to Black women conversing 
with one another, telling a story, an anecdote, gossip about some one or event within the 
circle, the family, the neighborhood” (211-2).  The intimacy and conspiracy associated with 
gossip serves as an important motif for Morrison.   The opening phrase invites readers to 
participate as other woman or children listening on the porch.   In this way Morrison 
positions her readers as the recipients of privileged knowledge, secrets in the community, but 
“the one who knows, is a child speaking, mimicking the adult Black women on the porch or 
in the backyard” (213).  Morrison sounds the child’s lack of knowledge, and initiates the 
reader’s need to fill it in in these first sentences, without making us put down the text.  In 
order to do this, Morrison relies on the instant relationship established through illicit sharing 
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of secrets; she writes, “[s]udden familiarity or instant intimacy seemed crucial to me.  I did 
not want the reader to have time to wonder, ‘What do I have to do, to give up, in order to 
read this?  What defense do I need, what distance maintain?’” (213) Instead, she primes us 
with the child’s articulation and interpretation of the crime: “We thought, at the time, that it 
was because Pecola was having her father’s baby that the marigolds did not grow” (5).  By 
the second sentence of the novel, we know the violation, but the child’s voice suggests it will 
be narrated gently, naively. The child tries to be mature about the knowledge she’s sharing 
by striving to speak in her mother’s voice, and in the same gesture invites readers to join this 
community.  Just as the child-narrator longs to be the protagonist of her mother’s songs, her 
narration strives for the mature woman’s voice, but her youth prevents her from fully 
knowing the grief the songs and story sing.  As Morrison puts it, Claudia and her sister 
“spend that whole year of childhood (and afterword) trying to fathom [the violence they 
disclose], and cannot.  If they have any success, it will be in transferring the problem of 
fathoming to the presumably adult reader, to the inner circle of listeners” (214).  Accepting 
Claudia’s secrets and supplementing them with our own understanding bind readers in her 
communicative community.  We take on her task of fathoming the violence that the children 
cannot.    
Like the polyvocality of gossip itself, Morrison supplements Claudia’s story with 
omniscient sections providing backstories for other characters, and thus equips readers with 
other stories, other knowledge, other intimacies, that we must layer with Claudia’s 
knowledge.  These supplemental stories make the novel a braided narrative: each omniscient 
section follows a different set of characters, mainly the Breedloves, but also Geraldine and 
Soaphead Church, as they interact with Pecola.  Morrison titles each of these sections with a 
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fast (un-spaced) and angry (capitalized) excerpt from the Dick and Jane story that opens the 
novel.  After Claudia’s introduction of to home and the major characters in “Autumn,” 
Morrison invites us into the Breedlove’s bare, violent house in “HEREISTHEHOUSE.”  The 
omniscient section does not explain the specific instance that causes the state to place Pecola 
in the MacTeer’s home, but does give a glimpse of the lack of love and intimacy that makes 
domestic abuse routine.  After Claudia’s “Winter” section on schoolyard bullying, the 
omniscient narrator takes us inside the starched white home of the chaste “brown girls” to 
show how racialized hierarchies breed cruelty even within the subordinated community (81).  
Morrison follows Claudia’s account of her parent’s protection of Frieda with Pecola’s 
parents’ backstories, and another consideration of colorisim through the character of 
Soaphead Church closes with the final fulfillment Pecola’s wish.  By layering Claudia’s 
narration with these omniscient sections, Morrison foregrounds Claudia’s own interpretation 
not as a definitive account, but as a hermeneutic model.  Although Claudia knows Cholly 
fathered Pecola’s deceased child, she does not know enough to blame him for the death of 
the infant or the shattering of his daughter.  Instead, Claudia petitions for Pecola and her 
child’s life to matter. Morrison’s braided narrative asks us to also consider the other death 
that Claudia discloses almost in the same breath: “Cholly Breedlove is dead; our innocence 
too.  The seeds shriveled and died; her baby too” (6).   While Claudia’s sections query how to 
help Pecola and her child, the omniscient sections that follow them both narrate Pecola’s 
experiences and attempt to explain the social conditions that lead to that abuse.  Morrison 
asks her readers to hold Cholly responsible and accountable for his crime, but she also 
prevents his total condemnation.  Instead, if we approach the several omniscient sections 
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with the concern for life that Claudia models, we can see how she pushes us to care for the 
lives of those who abused Pecola as well.     
Morrison frames the omniscient sections that detail Pauline and Cholly’s backstory 
by two parental rejections—Claudia witnesses the first and has already told us about the 
second.  “SEEMOTHER” immediately follows the scene where Mrs. Breedlove turns away 
from her daughter, burned by the accidentally spilt cobbler, in order to comfort the white 
child, and “SEEFATHER” closes with the omniscient account of the child’s rape that we 
have been dreading and anticipating since Claudia first spoke.  Morrison makes sure to blame 
both parents for this violation with that section’s closing sentence: “[s]o when the child 
regained consciousness, she was lying on the kitchen floor under a heavy quilt, trying to 
connect the pain between her legs with the face of her mother looming over her” (163).  
Because we already know the paternal crime and just read the maternal rejection, the opening 
sentence of “SEEMOTHER” positions these sections as a defense of the parents: “[t]he 
easiest thing to do would be to build a case out of her foot.  That is what she herself did.  But 
to find out the truth about how dreams die, one should never take the word of the dreamer” 
(110).  While Morrison doesn’t make clear which crime we’re trying Pauline for, she does 
allow Mrs. Breedlove to testify by interspersing italicized quotes in Pauline’s own voice 
throughout the omniscient narration.  Just as we couldn’t fully trust the child’s account, the 
narrator cautions us not to trust the dreamer’s version either. Morrison’s framing invites 
sympathy, but not full forgiveness for Pauline—instead, as she does with the other sections, 
she pushes us to consider the conditions that make violence possible.  In Pauline’s case, 
Morrison is more explicit.  While Pauline would like to blame her unnamed crime on a bad 
foot, Morrison points to a missing tooth, but even that has facilitating circumstances: “[b]ut 
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even before the little brown speck, there must have been the conditions, the setting that 
would allow it to exist in the first place” (116).  The narrator and the dreamer agree on the 
condemning conditions and sorry setting for Pauline: the lonesomeness of Lorain, Ohio.  
Pauline, in her own italicized voice, explains, “[n]orthern colored folk was different too.  
Dicty-like.  No better than whites for meanness.  They could make you feel just as no-count, 
’cept I didn’t expect if from them.  That was the lonesomest time of my life” (italics in original 
117).  The turning point for Pauline is not Cholly’s violence, but rather the cruelty of the 
community, which precedes and causes the domestic abuse.   
While loneliness seems a poor excuse to reject one’s child, the way Morrison renders 
Pauline’s life in Lorain reveals the painful dissonance that can result when one’s own 
experience is not reflected in society’s social fabric or held by a community of friends.  
Pauline yearns in particular for female attention and felt “uncomfortable with the few black 
women she met” because their “goading glances and private snickers” judged her hair and 
accent (119).  Morrison presents Pauline with an alternative narrative on the silver screen, 
where “in the dark [Pauline’s] memory was refreshed, and she succumbed to her earlier 
dreams” (122).  What she cannot find in life, Pauline finds in the fiction of the cinema: in the 
darkness the demeaning eyes cannot see Pauline and she can give herself over to the dramas 
on the screen.  This refreshment involves a reset however because it realigns Pauline’s moral 
compass along the false cardinals of Hollywood’s beauty standard.  Morrison writes, “[s]he 
was never able, after her education in the movies, to look at a face and not assign it some 
category in the scale of absolute beauty, and the scale was one she absorbed in full from the 
silver screen” (121).  At first, Pauline tries to emulate the picture perfect beauty of the stars 
on the screen, but then she loses her tooth: “[t]here I was, five months pregnant, trying to 
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look like Jean Harlow, and a front tooth gone. Everything went then. Look like I just didn’t 
care no more after that. I let my hair go back, plaited it up, and settled down to just being 
ugly” (123).  In her own voice, Pauline not only notices the difference between herself and 
the star, but also codes it according to her moralized standards of beauty: in Pauline’s mind 
the difference marks her as ugly.  Pauline cannot conform to the ideal of the movies any 
easier than she can meet the standard of her northern peers, but in the “magnificent whole” of 
the “black-and-white images,” Pauline learns the only role available to her in the U.S.’s 
master fiction: “the ideal servant” (122).  What Pauline cannot obtain for her own life and 
family, comes easily to the white family she works for, and as their servant, she can serve as 
arbiter of it all.  While playing the social role of servant, Pauline can walk on carpeted floors, 
sort a month’s worth of canned food, and expect the choicest meat, a stark contrast to the 
bare hardness and hunger of her own home.  Playing a part also helps Pauline “[come] into 
own with the women who had despised her” she changes her accent to conform with the 
community, attempts “be[] more moral” by casting Cholly as her “cross to bear,” and joins a 
church that “frowns on” traditions associated with Black evangelical churches such as 
shouting (126-7). Just as Pauline excels at the role of “ideal servant” she survives by the part 
she’s formed for herself at the church.   
While Pauline’s coming of age involves forming herself according to socially 
imposed subordinating standards, Morrison does offer an art form that gives voice to 
Pauline’s feelings rather than predetermining what her behavior should be.  In church in 
Kentucky, Pauline feels herself to be the subject of song.  Gospel music gives voice and 
vocabulary to emotions Pauline does not yet have words for: “[t]here was a woman named 
Ivy who seemed to hold in her mouth all of the sounds of Pauline’s soul.  Standing a little 
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apart from the choir, Ivy sang the dark sweetness that Pauline could not name” (114).  
Although this song, like the movies, comes from outside Pauline, Ivy sings sounds already 
inside her.  Instead of educating Pauline on skewed beauty standards as the cinema does, the 
church’s “songs caressed her” and affirm her own emotions and experience (113).  While the 
films train Pauline in a perverse moral code, she does not adopt the Christian hermeneutics 
associated with the song in this initial scene, but rather uses the lyrics to read her own life.  
The narrator frames Cholly’s arrival by the song Ivy was singing: “Take My Hand Precious 
Lord.”  In place of the savior’s arrival, the narrator locates Cholly: “the Stranger, the 
someone, did appear out of nowhere,” and because she heard it first in song “Pauline was 
grateful but not surprised” (114).  Even after moving to Lorain, Pauline uses the lyrics of 
Ivy’s song to make sense of her life.  Confronted with the physical dreariness of Ohio, the 
logistical dreariness of economics, and most importantly the social dreariness of the 
community, Pauline remembers the second verse.  
She was still no more than a girl, and still waiting for that plateau of 
happiness, that hand of a precious Lord who, when her way grew drear, would 
always linger near.  Only now she had a clearer idea of what drear meant.  
Money became the focus of all their discussions, hers for clothes, his for 
drink.  The sad thing was that Pauline did not really care for clothes and 
makeup.  Pauline did not really care for clothes and makeup.  She merely 
wanted other women to cast favorable glances her way. (118) 
The words that had originally given voice to “the sounds of Pauline’s soul” now give her 
vocabulary to describe her experience in Lorain.  Morrison makes clear that it’s not only the 
interpretive power of the song, but the very attention it carries.  Morrison introduces the 
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particular song through the name and timber of the singer: Ivy sings “a dark sweetness” and 
she closes this passage with the same desire: feminine acknowledgement. 
 Although Morrison emphasizes the power of the female voice, she does not limit her 
argument to women alone: in “SEEFATHER” she describes one of Cholly’s only positive 
attachments also in terms of the verbal arts.  Instead of caring for the child through song, the 
“nice old man called Blue Jack” shows his affection for Cholly through narrative:     
Blue used to tell him old-timey stories about how it was when the 
Emancipation Proclamation came.  How the black people hollered, cried, and 
sang.  And ghost stories about how a white man cut off his wife’s head and 
buried her in the swamp, and the headless body came out at night and went 
stumbling around the yard, knocking over stuff because it couldn’t see, and 
crying all the time for a comb. They talked about the women Blue had had, 
and the fights he’d been in when he was younger, about how he talked his way 
out of getting lynched once, and how others hadn’t. (133-4) 
While Pauline learns her ways of reading the world through Gospel and cinema, Cholly gets 
his education through stories. Blue teaches him about history, white people’s violence and 
whims, women.  Morrison begins and ends the catalogue with casual references to the U.S.’s 
chronologic strategies of subordination: slavery and lynching.  That Morrison folds ghost 
stories neatly between the presidential decree, the teller’s personal history, and extralegal 
violence anticipates her eventual vision in Beloved of U.S. history as a ghost story.  Just as 
Claudia’s contentment comes from the sweetness of her mother’s voice, and Pauline’s 
pleasure comes from the affirmation in the dark sweetness of Ivy’s notes, Cholly’s love for 
Blue comes from the comfort he feels in the good times he shared with the older man (135).  
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After the white hunters violate Cholly’s first sexual encounter, he wants to turn to Blue, but, 
as the narrator reports, “[o]ld Blue was too drunk too often these days to make sense. 
Besides, Cholly doubted if he could reveal his shame to Blue. He would have to lie a little to 
tell Blue, Blue the woman-killer. It seemed to him that lonely was much better than alone” 
(151).   Just as Pauline’s loneliness in Lorain stems from the absence of an affirming 
intersubjective community, positive acknowledgement from other women, Cholly’s choice of 
loneliness comes from Blue’s inebriated inability to engage in conversation and Cholly’s 
own fear that he could not bring himself to confide in Blue.  While Pauline uses the lyrics to 
“Take My Hand Precious Lord,” Cholly mixes his own emotions with the stories Blue tells.  
None of the stories mentioned in the text position Blue as a murderer, but after Cholly turns 
his own shame and impotence into hatred to Darlene, “the one who bore witness to his 
failure,” he re-remembers Blue as “Blue the woman-killer” (151).   This new memory twines 
the stories Blue does tell (the white man murdering his wife, Blue’s lovers, Blue’s fights, and 
the escaped lynching) with Cholly’s recent experience.  Just as Pauline uses the feminine 
voice to frame her experiences, Cholly uses Blue’s stories to think through his.  In both 
cases, the absence of an intersubjective community to respond to these thoughts facilitates 
the loneliness that turns to violence.   
 Just as Pauline’s “education at the movies” lead her to adopt a moral compass that 
conflates a white beauty standard with goodness, Cholly’s interpretive strategies map a 
skewed morality onto stories.  Morrison uses a favorite memory with Blue to frame an 
allegory that emerges in Cholly’s mind: 
Long after he was a man, he remembered the good times they had had.  How 
at a July 4 at a church picnic a family was about to break open a watermelon.  
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Several children were standing around watching.  Blue was hovering about on 
the periphery of the circle—a faint smile of anticipation softening his face.  
The father of the family lifted the melon high over his head—his big arms 
looked taller than the trees to Cholly, and the melon blotted out the sun.  Tall, 
head forward, eyes fastened on a rock, his arms higher than the pines, his 
hands holding a melon bigger than the sun, he paused an instant to get his 
bearing and secure his aim.  Watching the figure etched against the bright blue 
sky, Cholly felt goose pimples popping along his arms and neck.  He 
wondered if God looked like that.  No.  God was a nice old white man, with 
long white hair, flowing white beard, and little blue eyes that looked sad when 
people died and mean when they were bad.  It must be the devil who looks 
like that—holding the world in his hands, ready to dash it to the ground and 
spill the red guts so ni----- could eat the sweet, warm insides.  If the devil did 
look like that, Cholly preferred him.  He never felt anything thinking about 
God, but just the idea of the devil excited him.  And now the strong, black 
devil was blotting out the sun and getting ready to split open the world. (134) 
In this memory, Cholly and Blue frame the picture of a Black family headed by a larger than 
life father.  While the narrator doesn’t mention a mother, the “several children” implies that 
there was one, and the exaggerated image of the father underscores the absence of Cholly’s.  
In young Cholly’s mind the giant figure of the father looks as if he could hold the world in 
his hands.  While the child wants to imagine that the Black father could be God, his own 
Christian education taught him that “God was a nice old white man” (134).  The narrator’s 
voice shifts from describing the child’s wonder and emotion, “goose pimples popping along 
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his arms and neck” to asserting the indicative ‘fact’ of white dominance and imperative of 
Black sin: “God was” white, the Black man “must be the devil” (134).  Cholly, who has no 
parents, admires and “prefer[s] … the strong, black devil,” and even though Blue hasn’t yet 
turned to alcohol, he doesn’t correct the child’s moral misinterpretation.  While Pauline who 
embraces her role as “ideal servant” in the white hierarchy, Cholly even as a child is 
“excited” by an identification with depravity.  He sees destruction as the path to pleasure—
the father must break the world in order to enjoy the “sweet, warm insides” (134).  What is a 
wholesome fourth of July family activity becomes for the spectating child a model for 
violence.  For the reader, the watermelon’s “red guts” not only echo the spilt cobbler that 
burned Pecola’s legs, but prefigure the blood that will mark her rape at the end of this 
section.   
 Song, stories, and gossip do not only serve as powerful ways for characters to make 
sense of their lives, but also as strong figures for Morrison’s narrative voice and structure.  
Although Morrison is self-critical about her ability to sustain the female voice throughout the 
novel, we can see that it carriers through song.  In the “Afterword,” Morrison writes, 
“although I was pressing for a female expressiveness, it eluded me for the most part, and I 
had to content myself with female personae because I was not able to secure throughout the 
work the feminine subtext that is present in the opening sentence (the women gossiping, 
eager and aghast in ‘Quiet as it’s kept’)” (215).  Although she may not maintain the gossipy 
tone, she does communicate the consistent power of song and story.  In between the 
comforting cadence of Mrs. MacTeer’s singing voice and the knowing notes of Ivy’s Gospel 
songs, Morrison gives, Poland, one of the prostitutes who Pecola likes to visit a “sweet, 
strawberry voice” (58).  Further, Pecola delights in Miss Marie’s stories just as Cholly enjoys 
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Blues’s.  Pecola loves the prostitutes because they are some of the only adults in the novel 
who give her attention, “concoct[] stories for her,” and sing her songs (57).  As melodies of 
Blues, Jazz, and Gospel, descendants of the Sorrow Songs, drift through the text intertwined 
with traditions of storytelling, Morrison herself layers stories on top of Claudia’s dominant 
account.  The figure of music allows for multiple voices singing different melodies and we 
have to read in a way that hears the harmony.  Characters enjoy being the audience of songs 
and stories because it feels good—because the singer’s voice gives them a positive, affirming 
attention even when the songs are sad.  The words speak a shared sadness, but the melody 
and sound—“the greens and blues” in the voice hold the listener as a loved audience, worthy 
of a “for me alone” performance (Morrison 25, 22). Although Morrison positions us Claudia 
as a model for readers in many ways, she does not ask us to forget “the grief [] of the words,” 
but instead to acknowledge it (26).  We must read in a way that attends to the polyvocality 
because speaking unspeakable things helps make them endurable.   
TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD 
The caged birds’ songs encourage us to read Atticus’s aphorism more closely.  
Atticus concedes to his children’s demand for air-rifles but won’t teach them to shoot; 
instead he cautions them: “[s]hoot all the bluejays you want, if you can hit ’em, but 
remember it’s a sin to kill a mockingbird” (103).  The way Lee asks us to interpret this moral 
advice should shed light on the way that reading figurative language can connect to the way 
we interpret actual events (103).  By the end of the novel, Scout’s memory of her father’s 
rule becomes the necessary excuse for Atticus to agree with the sheriff’s decision to interpret 
the murder of Mr. Ewell as an accident: he “fell on his own knife” (317).  Acknowledging 
that Boo stabbed Mr. Ewell to protect the Finches would be akin to shooting an innocent 
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songbird that, in Miss Maudie’s terms, “do[esn’t] do one thing but make music for us to 
enjoy” (103).  While in Lee’s novel this gentlemen’s agreement is an act of kindness even 
acknowledgment of a someone who, as Sheriff Tate says, has “done you and this town a 
great service,” in our own moment, when mental illness is used to explain white terrorism, 
this decision not to see white guilt becomes more uncomfortable (317).  In the novel, Scout 
and her father’s recognition of Boo’s heroism and respect for his “shy ways” stands as one of 
the major acts of empathy that is well-worth teaching in eighth grade (317).  However, this 
late-night forgiveness cannot serve as precedent and renders Bob Ewell killable—the 
characters do not believe this villain deserves a fair trial.  Although sanity is an important 
subtext of this chapter and Lee’s novel might also support to the contemporary critique of the 
state apparatus for dealing with this insanity, here, I want to turn to the underexplained half 
of Atticus’s dictum.   
What make the bluejays killable?  Miss Maudie’s explanation implies that bluejays 
don’t deserve the same protection as mockingbirds because they “eat up people’s gardens” or 
“nest in corncribs,” an explanation that seems to concur with the earlier statement of Mr. 
Radley’s shotgun: messing around in his collard patch is a capital offense, regardless of 
whether the offender is, in Miss Stephanie’s words “a dog, a n---, or— Jem Finch!” (italics in 
original 61).  Miss Stephanie didn’t intend to include Jem in this odd list, but Lee inserts him 
there in a gesture of dramatic irony as he, having left his pants at the scene of the crime, 
approaches the gossiping adults.  It is an unfortunate list to be on, as both a particular dog 
and particular man get shot over the course of the novel, and, although Jem survives 
Mockingbird, he is the only Finch who has died before Go Set a Watchman, Mockingbird’s 
storied sequel, opens.  In “Where is your mother?”, we saw how the mad dog scene sets a 
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pattern that Lee repeats to help her readers read Scout’s actions in the lynch scene and 
Atticus’s defense as heroic.  In that scene, Atticus had to shoot the rabid dog to protect his 
children and the town, just as he has to stand up against his community who, as he says, “go 
stark raving mad when anything involving a Negro comes up” (100).  Connecting rabies and 
racism seems reasonable, but why shoot Tom Robinson?  In the brief scene Lee allows to the 
story of his death, Atticus explains that at the prison Tom “just broke into a blind raving 
charge at the fence” (268).  In lazy or sinister accident, Lee crosses the lines of her 
imagery—the rabid madness she mapped onto racist mob is here projected onto the racialized 
subject (although we might have seen this coming in the resonance of the names of the 
canine and human victims: Tim Johnson and Tom Robinson).  As Lee’s progressive agenda 
breaks down, Tom runs “raving” like the mad dog might, the jail guards fire a warning shot 
into the air as Mr. Radley did for his collard-patch intruder, and then take aim, hitting Tom 
seventeen times, an excess that “One-Shot Finch” judges: “they didn’t have to shoot him that 
much” (100, 268).  But for Tom Robinson, like Amadou Diallo, Michael Brown, Trayvon 
Martin, and all the other people killed by police or Mr. Radley-like neighbors, one shot was 
too much. 
While it’d be nice to think that Lee included this detail in an effort to critique police 
violence or even the prison system, as I’ve already written more words on the scene than she 
included in it, I doubt that’s the case.  Instead, I think Tom Robinson’s death is further 
evidence that his character functions as an Africanist, synthetic device for the moral 
development of Atticus, his children, and white readers.  Lee accomplishes some lofty goals 
through Mockingbird—she helps change the lynch narrative, and she shifts gender 
expectations through Scout—but she does not escape the viral impulses of white supremacy.  
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Although she strives to rewrite the lynching narrative that demands Black men’s deaths, she 
diverts that urge to another narrative, one that Gutiérrez-Jones already outlined in the trials of 
the beating of Rodney King and murder of Amadou Diallo.  Atticus, perhaps expressing his 
grief through sarcasm or exposing the prejudice that will overtake him in old age in 
Watchman, rehearses his perspective-taking strategy: “[d]epends on how you look at it…  
What was one Negro, more or less, among two hundred of ’em?  He wasn’t Tom to them, he 
was an escaping prisoner” (269).  Just as the prosecutors and judges in the trials of King and 
Diallo asked jurors to sympathize with the police officers, Atticus explains how the jail 
guards must have seen it.  Atticus understands that prison guards cannot see Tom’s 
individuality, his personhood, but instead see him as a prisoner, who must be shot before 
escaping.  Interestingly, Lee sets this scene in the domestic space of the kitchen at a moment 
when the Finch house had been taken over by Aunt Alexandra’s missionary group.  Unlike 
his progressive gestures in the masculine spaces of the jailhouse or the courtroom, Atticus’s 
cynicism emerges in the presence of adult white women.  Importantly, in Atticus’s formation, 
Tom is not an innocent man escaping wrongful confinement, but a prisoner who has lost faith 
in appeal.  The breakdown of Lee’s imagery and the bitter, supremacist direction Atticus’s 
strategies of empathy render Black lives, in the novel’s imagery, as less valuable than 
mockingbirds. 
Lee balances the innocence of what Scout doesn’t know with not-so-subtle lessons in 
Southern pride.  While most readers take Lee at her word that Scout didn’t know what the 
lynch mob intended, Ako-Adjei reminds us that children often participated in such violence.  
We believe in Scout’s innocence, however, because her explanations, all along, demonstrate 
detailed understanding of her culture’s history that blatantly dismisses the historical 
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experience of non-white people.  On the very first page, Scout rather cavalierly names the 
original sin that not only made possible the novel’s story, but also the tale of the American 
dream itself.  Scout asserts “it really began with Andrew Jackson.  If General Jackson hadn’t 
run the Creeks up the creek, Simon Finch would never have paddled up the Alabama and 
where would we be if he hadn’t?” (3).  Rather than engaging the history of the violent 
removal of the Creek people through the trail of tears, Scout’s childish assertion touches on 
the truth that both the United States’ capitalist dreams and Lee’s story of Southern life are 
founded on stolen land and forged through genocide.  Scout roots her family’s history on this 
stolen land, taking care to note their racial, religious and class background.  “Being 
Southerners,” she explains “it was a source of shame to some members of the family that we 
had no recorded ancestors on either side of the Battle of the Hastings” (4).  The 
embarrassment that the Finches cannot claim tenth-century blood from either the Anglo-
Saxons or Normans is assuaged by the fortune established by their Methodist ancestor Simon 
Finch.  While this narrative falls short of what Scout poses as Southern perfection, it 
certainly conforms to the cultural narrative of the American dream as Simon escapes from 
the poverty and persecution of England to make a lucrative life for himself in America where 
he “lived to an impressive age and died rich” (4).   
Just as Scout names and trivializes the Creek people, she almost avoids mentioning 
the people her family enslaved.  Scout makes a single mention of those whose labor built the 
Finch fortune; she explains, “Simon, having forgotten his teacher’s dictum on the possession 
of human chattels, bought three slaves and with their aid established a homestead on the 
banks of the Alabama River” (4).  In this way, Lee dispatches with the issue of slavery in the 
first chapter, and only mentions the word once more in the entire novel when she describes 
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the etymology of the First Purchase African M.E. Church.  Scout recognizes that the sin of 
slavery is part of her family’s history, but she easily dismisses it as a lapse in her ancestor’s 
memory of Christian teachings.  While she acknowledges the slaves “aid” in founding the 
Finch “homestead,” she claims that her family “ma[de] their living from cotton,” a phrase 
that incorporates slave labor into the product it produces (4).  When Scout visits Aunt 
Alexandra at Finch Landing, she includes the enslaved people in her physical description: 
“beyond the bluff, were traces of an old cotton landing, where Finch Negroes had loaded 
bales and produce, unloaded blocks of ice, flour and sugar, farm equipment, and feminine 
apparel” (91).  While slavery is part of the history of her family and her home, Scout makes 
as little mention of it as possible.  
The repression of slavery in Scout’s account of history becomes even more glaring as 
it becomes clear that what she calls “the disturbance between the North and the South” 
shapes the way she evaluates characters and events (4).  Scout’s classmates are skeptical of 
their new teacher because she came from Winston County, a characteristic the class perceives 
as a warning sign because, as Scout explains parenthetically to her readers, “[w]hen Alabama 
seceded from the Union on January 11, 1861, Winston County seceded from Alabama, and 
every child in Maycomb County knew it” (18).  While most of the students failed first grade 
the previous year, they all know this detail of their Civil War history.  Lee’s choice to mark 
the fact parenthetically suggests that readers should accept it, too, and, by extension, the 
warning Scout derives from it.  Further, when Atticus tells Scout that he’ll probably lose 
Tom Robinson’s case “[s]imply because we were licked a hundred years before we started,” 
Scout immediately thinks of their relative “Cousin Ike Finch [who] was Maycomb County’s 
sole surviving Confederate veteran” (87).  Scout’s connection does not demonstrate an 
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awareness that Jim Crow racism stems from failed reconstruction, but because Atticus’s 
attitude reminds her of Cousin Ike saying “the Missouri Compromise was what licked us, but 
if I had to go through it agin I’d walk every step of the way there an’ every step back jist like 
I did before an’ furthermore we’d whip ’em this time…” (87).  In Scout’s mind, Atticus’s 
decision to defend Tom Robinson is as hopeless, yet as honorable as Ike’s commitment to the 
Confederate cause.  How one behaved during the Civil War seems to be a rubric Scout uses 
to judge behavior in the present.  Her schoolteacher’s ancestors abandoned Alabama, so she’s 
hesitant to accept the teacher.  Atticus’s courage in the face of sure defeat, on the other hand, 
is as impressive as her cousin fighting for a lost cause.   
Scout’s simultaneous repression of the history of slavery and valorization of the 
Confederacy as an ethical standard is as important as it is ironic.  On the one hand, we might 
not expect a narrative advocating for fair treatment of African Americans to simultaneously 
laud Confederate values.  What Scout calls “the possession of human chattel” was central to 
the South’s antebellum economy and social structure (4).  The failed reconstruction that 
followed the war not only facilitated the rise of lynchings, but also laid the legal groundwork 
for the sort of Jim Crow policies that foreclose fair trials.  On the other hand, Lee’s desire to 
uphold the Southern gentry as good Christians and moral citizens requires that she disconnect 
their values from the stereotype of white supremacy.  Refusing to acknowledge how the 
legacy of slavery caused the conflict of her novel, allows Lee to make Atticus’s cause and 
values seem connected to Cousin Ike’s.  Even as we have to fill in for Scout in terms of 
individual Theory of Mind, social mindreading, and cultural narratives, we rely on her for the 
plot of the novel, which we get steeped in Southern pride.  This helps Lee to shift the cultural 
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narrative surrounding lynching and craft a model for a white man who is not prejudiced 
against Black people. 
 To Kill A Mockingbird is the aesthetic object that broke the interclass solidarity that 
made lynchings possible and prevalent for the hundred years after the civil war.  Because of 
Mockingbird and related anti-lynching rhetoric, the United States’s cultural memory may 
want to forget a time in which lynch mobs included and depended on the active participation 
of the South’s “best citizens,” a fact activist journalist Ida B. Wells often cites from 
contemporary newspapers in her anti-lynching pamphlets (125). We may prefer to believe, as 
Atticus explains to Jem, that “whenever a white man does that [lynches? or sentences to 
death?] to a black man, no matter who he is, how rich he is, or how fine a family he comes 
from, that white man is trash” (252).  Lest we think that Lee uses Attics to forge a new 
understanding for the term “trash,” we might remember the Economics 101 Jem offers to 
Scout at the end of the same chapter.  Jem explains, “[t]here’s four kinds of folk in the world.  
There’s the ordinary kind like us and the neighbors, there’s the kind like the Cunninghams 
out in the woods, and the kind like the Ewells down at the dump, and the Negros” (258). As 
Scout and Jem well know, the only “kind[] of folk” horrible enough to enact extralegal 
violence are “Ewells down at the dump” and, as they learn through the trial, the only “kind” 
ignorant enough (whose families haven’t been “readin’ and writin’” as long as the Finches) 
to convict an innocent man in court are the “kind like the Cunninghams out in the woods” 
(258).  The constituency that Jem and Scout identify as the “kind of people” Aunt Alexandra, 
at least, considers “trash” is, in a telling instance of historical transcendence, the same that 
many blame for electing Trump (256).  Lee inscribes her classist analysis into the very 
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landscape of Maycomb County in the well-worn metonymy that’s part of common parlance.  
The Ewells, literally live in the dump.  Scout describes, the Ewell homestead  
Maycomb’s Ewells lived behind the town garbage dump in what was once a 
Negro cabin.…  Its windows were merely open spaces in the walls, which in 
the summertime were covered with greasy strips of cheesecloth to keep out 
the varmints that feasted on Maycomb’s refuse.    
The varmints had a lean time of it, for the Ewells gave the dump a thorough 
tough gleaning every day, and the fruits of their industry (those that were not 
eaten) made the plot of ground around the cabin look like the playhouse of an 
insane child” (citation).  The walls of the Ewell house offer only a preamble 
boundary between their home and the dump itself and like scavenging rodents, 
the Ewell’s create their home out of whatever they can find. (193-194)  
Just as the epithet trash conflates people with society’s refuse, Lee describes the Ewell 
homestead as part of the town dump.  Lee’s work is the opposite of Morrison’s; while 
Morrison mounts a specific case for the particular life experiences of Cholly and Pauline, Lee 
lumps the Ewell’s in a broad category—a “kind of people.”  The synecdoche that collapses 
the characters into the place is a similar gesture to the way she described “Finch Negroes” as 
part of the physical landscape of Finch Landing.  The Ewells, in Lee’s description, are more 
varmint-like than the rodents themselves.  Just as in Ako-Adjei’s critique, Lee positions 
Atticus as a white savior and casts the poorest white characters as the ultimate racists.  As 
Teresa Godwin Phelps argues Mockingbird “teaches us to desire to be like Atticus—
courageous in the face of our community's prejudices. But it also teaches us to fear and 
deplore the Ewells and Lula. The book shapes what we see and that to which we aspire, and 
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it leaves Lula and the Ewells marginalized” (529-531).  Lula belongs in the same textual 
margin for Phelps because she does not welcome the Finch children to the Black church. 
But it has not always been this way— for a long time, donning the white pillowcase 
so often associated with this extralegal violence, had been understood as an aristocratic 
gesture, in defense of the white womanhood, made by white elites and yeomen alike.  In fact, 
this interclass complicity is precisely what made lynch law possible.  Although “the 
coroner’s inevitable verdict” as Dray points out attributed the crime to “the hands of persons 
unknown,” members from every level of the white community would participate in the lynch 
mob (ix).  In The Tragedy of Lynching (1933), one of the earliest sociological monographs on 
the subject, Arthur Raper explains “[l]ynchings tend to minimize social and class distinctions 
between white plantation owners and white tenants” (cited from Tolnay and Beck 123).  The 
cross-class white complicity not only made this extralegal violence pragmatically possible, 
but also affirmed the end-goal of white supremacy.  In Rough Justice (2004), Michael Pfeifer 
writes, “broad sectors of the population, tied together by racist ideology or common 
residence in a neighborhood, united in lynching.  For instance, in areas of the Cotton Belt 
South, including the Red River and Ouachita River valleys of northern Louisiana, white 
planters and small farmers often united in vivid extralegal demonstrations of the 
consequences of defying white supremacy” (50).   
Historical accounts are not alone in documenting the cross-class collaboration that 
facilitated the defense of white supremacy in the name of white women—national cinema 
celebrated this complicity as well.  In D.W. Giffith’s The Birth of the Nation (1915), 
Southern elites form the Klan to defend the Aryan race, and are even protected by former 
members of the Union army.  As Wood points out, the film crosscuts between scenes of a 
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KKK ‘trial’ and a dying white woman, mirroring for a less critical purpose the causal relation 
established in Jean Toomer’s “Portrait in Georgia.”63  The Birth of the Nation is credited not 
only with being the first full length motion picture showed at the white house but also the 
rallying cry for the resurgence of the Klan.  Margaret Mitchell’s Gone With the Wind (1936) 
traffics with the same cultural narrative.  Both the wildly popular novel and film adaptation, 
which premiered in 1939 the decade that Lee set her novel, continue to influence the 
American imaginary.  Mitchell activates her lynch mob by confronting Scarlett with a 
multiracial team comprised of bandits, a white man and Black man unite in their common 
need for money.  True to her craft of racist caricature, Mitchell depicts the black limbs 
moving only at the direction of the white mind: “‘Shut her up!  Drag her out!’ cried the white 
man, and the black hand fumbled across Scarlett’s face to her mouth” (547).  Although 
Scarlett escapes with her purse and virtue as unscathed as they were before, the moneyed 
men in her life set aside their political differences to avenge this aggression.  Ashley, the frail 
relic of the Old South and Frank Kennedy, Scarlett’s store-owning stand-in husband convene 
the old gentry to ride through the night, murder the aggressors, and raze the shantytown 
where they lived.  Rhett Butler, who models the modern man and new money, orchestrates 
the alibies, choreographs the corpses, and orders the burning of the robes (although, to his 
                                                
63 Wood explains, “[t]hrough parallel editing, Griffith could thus represent, in place of the 
actual lynching, the image of wronged white womanhood that, according to lynching 
rhetoric, dominated the imaginations of lynching participants as they tortured and hanged 
their victims.  The suffering of the black man’s body is literally replaced, in this instance, 
with that of the lifeless white woman” (157). 
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credit, he does chastise Scarlett for causing her husband’s death).  In Mitchell’s novel, the 
upper classes conspire across political divides to defend Scarlett against a perceived threat 
that is as much raced as classed.    
 Wood locates the shift of attributing racist violence to classed chivalry to “out in the 
woods” poor whites in the 1930s, the decade Mockingbird takes place.  Her monograph 
traces the way the spectacle aspects of lynching, which once shored up the myth of extralegal 
justice, became evidence of a despicable practice through the 1930s.  She writes,  
Lynching spectacles, which had once served to substantiate and normalize 
white claims to moral superiority, now served as documentary and 
incontrovertible evidence of just the opposite….  To view a lynching spectacle 
was to witness—to bear witness to—a most deplorable act of moral 
barbarism; any other response to the sight soon became unimaginable.  Once 
white elite and middle-class southerners began to perceive lynching in this 
way, the white solidarity that lynching was meant to enact showed signs of 
fissure.  (262)  
While the fissure Wood describes began in the 1930s, especially in political and activist 
discourses, the breach became complete after Mockingbird’s publication in 1960.  After 
Lee’s narrative, what Ida B. Wells always knew was a “threadbare lie” had become part of 
the cultural narrative we tell about lynching.  Now, when we remember that shameful ritual, 
we imagine, in both fact and fiction, that the mob is comprised of poor people, like Mr. Ewell 
from the dump, and Mr. Cunningham when he forgets himself.   
 Mockingbird has made a decided shift in the cultural narrative around lynching and 
racism in general.  Lee not only created an aspirational figure for hopeful white liberals to 
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attach to, but she relegated the evils of racism to white “trash.” As Colin D. Pearce writes, 
“To Kill a Mockingbird is the literary face that the South has turned toward the world since 
1960” (268).  This is an important feat given that the alternative might have been framed by 
the original rhetoric of George Wallace.  Although Lee’s amendments to the cultural 
narrative leave racial hierarchies intact and emphasize class divisions, she does foster a desire 
and create an imaginary role for someone to simultaneously be white and want equality 
before the law.  But at what price?  In her efforts to divorce the figure of the southern 
gentleman from racism, Lee shackles social change—even if “it’s just a baby step” as Miss 
Maudie says— to the villanization of poor white people (246).  While this may seem a step in 
the right direction, the way we still rely on this rhetorical strategy of blaming that same 
constituency for backwards political choices, such as the results of the 2016 election, sixty 
years after the publication of Lee’s novel, shows that it’s no step at all.  Further, even as Lee 
strives to render extralegal violence as an irrational impulse and makes a compelling and 
memorable case for equality before the law, she sublimates the racist urge to murder to the 
state itself.  Even after Atticus lost the case and became a hero, Lee has a prison guard shoot 
Tom Robinson seventeen times in eerie anticipation of the police and carceral violence that 
seems to escalate in the twenty-first century.  The traditional strategies of Western justice are 
insufficient to effect social change.             
THE ROUND HOUSE  
I knew the general location of the crime. But I didn’t know the exact 
whereness of it. At that moment, a certainty entered. I knew. He had attacked 
her here. The old ceremonial place had told me—cried out to me in my 
mother’s anguished voice, I now thought, and tears started into my eyes. I let 
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them flood down my cheeks. Nobody was there to see me so I did not even 
wipe them away. I stood there in the shadowed doorway thinking with my 
tears. Yes, tears can be thoughts, why not?  
— Joe Coutts The Round House (60) 
Erdrich engages Atticus’s aphorism by naming The Round House’s white supremacist 
family for another breed of lighthearted songbirds, and, because the U.S. government refuses 
to see Linden Lark as guilty of raping Geraldine, his murder becomes a central desire of the 
novel’s plot and poetics.  Erdrich uses a child-narrator to lead readers towards a particular 
reading of this essential death.  Just as Atticus couches the murder of a mockingbird in the 
language of sins, Joe, although not Catholic, begins to think of Linden’s crime according to 
the doctrine of mortal sins that cry out to heaven for vengeance, but Joe, judge’s son that he 
is, offers his opinion by replacing vengeance with justice: “Sins Crying Out to Heaven for 
Justice” (260).  Unlike many of Erdrich’s other novels such as the Plague of Doves where, as 
we’ll see in the next chapter, “guilt and victim” get “mixed in the spring of our existence,” 
The Round House paints good and evil in clear brushstrokes (243). Erdrich demonstrates 
Linden’s depravity not only through the horrendous nature of his crimes (rape, murder, 
kidnapping, and extortion), but also in his own self-assessment as “one sick fuck” (161).  In 
Erdrich’s deft allusion to Lee, Linden becomes both the mad dog that must be shot to protect 
the community and Boo Radley who the U.S. law decides not to see.   
Although Erdrich paints Linden as her particular villain, her novel takes as its subject 
the jurisdictional issues that make reservations targets for sexual predators.  In an interview 
before the novel’s release, Erdrich expressed her exigency that her novel “should be about 
the law, it should be about the complexity of this, but if I go around, say on a book tour, and 
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say ‘I’ve just written a book about jurisdictional issues!’ [audience laughs] Exactly.  You 
need a thirteen-year-old boy—you need a thirteen-year-old-boy.”64  From the beginning, 
Erdrich wanted her novel to be about the law’s failure to speak in cases of violence against 
women: the term jurisdiction, the political target of the novel, derives from the Latin jūris, 
genitive of jūs ‘law’ and dictio, the noun form of dīcere ‘to say, declare’ (OED).  In order for 
Erdrich to speak what the law cannot, she turns to a thirteen-year-old boy, Joe Coutts, whose 
mother survives a crime the law cannot see before the novel begins.  Like the other child-
narrators, Joe’s narration works because of a cognitive collaboration with the readers—we 
fill in what the child cannot understand, and, at the same time, we learn from and with the 
child to change the way we interpret the world.  Erdrich situates Joe as the predominant 
narrator of a suspense plot, a generic choice that she makes to “hook you in, [so that] you 
want to read it, you want to know what happens, you want to solve.”65  As Joyce Carol Oates 
observes in her review of the novel, the “‘suspense’ is rather more theoretical than evident” 
(18).  The question of “what happened” is only a mystery to the child-narrator because of his 
innocence and his mother’s reserve.  Until her significant testimony half way through the 
novel, Geraldine refuses to describe what she survived in an effort to protect both Joe and 
Mayla’s child.  While readers can imagine the crime that resists the child’s registration, we 
join Joe in his naïve and devastated hope that his father Bazil, who as a tribal judge speaks 
for the law, can make the courts take the case.  In Erdrich’s novel, solving the crime becomes 
                                                
64 “Louise Erdrich: A Reading and a Conversation.”  YouTube, uploaded by Dartmouth,  
11/13/2012.  
 
65 Ibid. 
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not about identifying the rapist or proving his guilt, but about getting the law to see him in 
the first place.  The failure The Round House speaks is not Mockingbird’s “inevitable 
verdict,” the racist refusal to speak the truth (ver is Latin for ‘truth’ and ‘dict’ derives from 
dictum for utterance, order, or saying), but rather a testament to U.S. law’s structural, 
systematic, and historic inability to see and speak on its own injustice (OED).  Joe’s narration 
trains readers to read for the glaring areas where U.S. law and justice remain obdurately 
blind, but also, as many critics have pointed out, encourage us to advocate for actual legal 
change, such as the extension of Violence Against Women Act that extends tribal 
jurisdiction.   
Even as readers learn from the child-narrator and his father about the exclusive sights 
of the justice system, we also become aware of broader modes of perception, of traditional 
ways of knowing, that expand the ways we imagine justice.  Joe’s openness to the 
communication of the round house, for instance, attunes readers to an interconnectedness 
between human actors and the world that Erdrich acknowledges throughout the novel.  Joe’s 
responsiveness to extrasensory knowledge lead him to important clues such as the gas can 
and Mayla’s doll, but at the same time Joe’s too late recognition of some signs—such as the 
spirit that visits him and Bugger Pourier’s dream, result both in Cappy’s death and the failure 
to find Mayla’s body.  The way Erdrich braids this openness to extrasensory knowledge with 
a consideration of Western jurisprudence both motivates readers to see the need to change 
current laws and attunes us to wider range of voices and ways of knowing.  In particular, she 
sets “wiindigoo justice” alongside western justice and asks readers to adopt another way of 
reading those who “crave[] the flesh of others” that does not only apply to her novel’s rapist 
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but also helps us think about sexual predators and serial killers in contemporary society (187, 
214).   
While Erdrich does dwell in the binary logic of western discourse in order to critique 
the justice system, critics that adopt this lens too fully miss important aspects of the novel.  
The courts refuse to hear Geraldine’s case because they refuse to see the rapist, and some 
critics can’t hear Geraldine’s voice because she refuses to speak in the legal register.  Julie 
Tharp shares the sentiment of many readers when she explains that “[t]he attack on her 
silences her, renders her voiceless” (29). It’s true that Linden threatens to kill Mayla, his 
other victim, and her baby if Geraldine speaks; he sneers, “[y]ou are going to die but if you 
say one word even one word up in heaven after you are dead I will kill them both” (162).  
The very means through which we know this, however, belies Geraldine’s silence; we learn 
of his threat through her own words and testimony.  In fact, Geraldine speaks frequently even 
before this important account.  Her first request in the hospital is to speak with Joe to assert a 
wellness the narrator doesn’t believe: “I’m alright, Joe.  Look at me.  See?” (10).  Geraldine 
converses with Joe about rotten milk; she laughs with her son about Bazil’s performed 
culinary failures; and, she has long talks with Linda Lark, Linden’s twin sister who had been 
adopted into the tribe as an infant.  The silence that many readers attribute to Geraldine may 
stem from her divergence from her role as mother in the symbolic order, an interpretation 
Erdrich underscores by making food and sustenance the subject of many of Geraldine’s 
conversations.  Even after Bazil accidentally startles her into dropping the casserole, a 
shattering both of the dish and her efforts or pretense to be “alright,” Geraldine still speaks. 
She uses her “before-mother” voice to admonish Joe not to go after the man who attacked her 
(89).  Geraldine practices a strategic silence in the face of the law in order to protect children: 
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both her son and Mayla’s baby.  When Bazil tries to get Geraldine to tell what happened at 
the round house, she says “[l]et him go, Bazil.  Then I’ll talk to you” (151).  Just as Mr. 
Cunningham deems the lynch script inappropriate for Scout, Geraldine does not want her son 
to hear the violence she endured.  At the same time, she will not share what happened until 
she knows that Mayla’s child is safe.  Even when she does speak, the fact that the rapist put a 
bag over her head, prevents her from speaking in a way the courts can hear: she cannot 
identify where the crime occurred, so the authorities do not know which court should hear 
her case.  Geraldine knows this at some level and puts a stop to her husband’s legal inquiries 
at the beginning of her disclosure by admonishing her husband, “[g]et out of the courtroom, 
get the damn hell out” (160).  Geraldine is silenced, but only in the specific register of 
western legal discourse.  In all other registers, Geraldine’s story, almost like The Bluest Eye, 
is spoken chorally.  The harmony between Joe’s older and younger self speaks what 
Geraldine survived so clearly that what happened is not tainted with the patriarchal doubt that 
too often shrouds rape cases.  The round house speaks the crime it witnessed so the child can 
know what his aunt and father cannot communicate. Geraldine speaks her own story 
precisely at the center of the novel.  
Joe’s openness to extrasensory guidance and traditional knowledge attune readers to 
larger practices of justice.  Erdrich does not figure this Indigenous approach in opposition to 
U.S. law, but rather as a broader mode that can improve western justice even as it exists 
outside of it. In this section’s epigraph, the round house bears witness to Geraldine’s injury in 
a way western courts can never conceive, but through that communication, Joe discovers the 
gas can, concrete, court-admissible evidence.  When the boys learn from the police radio that 
the crime occurred at the round house, the place itself communicates to Joe what happened.  
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Joe arrives before his friends to discover that the police had already “minutely combed” the 
scene for physical evidence, but the thirteen-year-old is open to other kinds of truth (59).  Joe 
remembers “[t]here was a moment of intense quiet.  Then a low moan of air passed through 
the cracks in the silvery logs of the round house.  I started with emotion.  The grieving cry 
seemed emitted by the structure itself.  The sound filled me and flooded me” (59).  What 
begins as an observation of a natural scene—the calm before a breeze passes through old 
wood—becomes an important sign: the ceremonial place calls out to the child.  The sound 
fills him with emotion, a type of knowledge.  While Joe had understood the facts of the case 
on cognitive level “I knew the general location of the crime, but I didn’t know the exact 
whereness of it,” the round house phenomenologically completes his understanding “[a]t that 
moment, a certainty entered.  I knew.  He had attacked her here” (60).  The round house 
communicates to Joe what his mother refused and his father and aunt failed to speak: “the old 
ceremonial place had told me—cried out to me in my mother’s anguished voice, I now 
thought, and tears started into my eyes” (60).  The sacred place remembers the crime that had 
been committed there and speaks it to the child in his own mother’s voice.  The pain the 
place shares with Joe, the emotion that fills him, becomes thoughts, and, in the next four 
paragraphs, he narrates the precise blocking of the attack and his mother’s escape.  
Geraldine’s eventual testimony will confirm and build on the understanding the round house 
imparts to Joe by adding Linden’s other victim, Mayla Wolfskin, whose body is never found.  
In this early scene, Joe’s new knowledge leads him to the gas can, a piece of physical 
evidence overlooked by the police.  Importantly, the round house communicates to Joe what 
his family cannot in a way that he can hear: “I had now come to the understanding that my 
mother’s attacker had also tried to set her on fire.  Although this fact had been made plain, or 
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was at least implicit in Clemence’s reaction at the hospital and my father’s account of my 
mother’s escape, my understanding had resisted” (62).  Immolation resists comprehension.  It 
is an awful form of annihilation that the child cannot know and those who care for him do not 
want him to have to.  But the round house, the old spiritual center, remembers the desecration 
and speaks it, cries it, to the child. 
Just as listening to the maternal voice opens us to an interpretative mode foreclosed 
by the paternal legal discourse, the voice of the round house attunes us to the breadth of 
Erdrich’s aesthetics.  Just as she can write mother’s voice and the legal discourse that 
silences it, Erdrich’s imagery invokes multiple interpretations that sit alongside even as they 
contradict each other.  To begin with the title’s image, many critics note that Linden’s chose 
to violate Geraldine and Mayla at the round house in order to desecrate the sacred space as 
well as the women.  As Jacob Bender and Lydia Maunz-Breese put it: 
The round house thus becomes a metonymic feminine body. In violating 
Geraldine within the precincts of the round house, Lark simultaneously 
profanes the sacred feminized body representative of the Ojibway tribe and 
culture. This is a rape not only of one woman but of an entire community. 
(145) 
While this interpretation reflects Linden’s intent and resonates with the Christian imagery 
that Erdrich incorporates throughout the novel, the way the round house remembers the crime 
and communicates it to the child in a way that he can understand also asserts an inviolability.  
The Indigenous ceremonial space can both survive and speak of atrocities in a way 
foreclosed in the Christian frame.  Bender and Maunz-Breese’s statement effaces Mayla who 
Linden rapes and murders, an act that both further desecrates the place, but also undermines 
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their emphasis on “one woman” representing the entire community.   Erdrich’s aesthetics 
traffic in the “both/ and;” the round house is both desecrated by Linden’s violation and 
cannot be profaned.  Further, as we have already begun to see, Erdrich adopts the western 
gender system that associates fatherhood and masculinity with the law and language and the 
mother and femininity with silence and feeling.  In Bender and Maunz-Breese’s passage, we 
can see how this gendered binary maps onto the western nation colonized people dichotomy.  
In their interpretation, Geraldine’s body and the body of the round house, metonymically 
related, stand for all Ojibwe people.  Other critics agree; Mary Paniccia Carden writes, 
“[p]ositioning Geraldine’s rape as representative of ‘most Indian rape cases’ and Geraldine 
herself as representative of Ojibwe culture, the novel makes the unprosecuted rape a 
metaphor for a wider and more far-reaching crime, a crime as old as the earliest colonial 
enterprise in the New World” (110).  Carden also overlooks Mayla in her claims about 
Geraldine’s status as representative. Raping women is a central tool of colonialism and an 
important figure in settler poetics that Erdrich activates in her novel, but she doesn’t leave it 
there.  Even as Erdrich evokes with these tropes, she, like Morrison, works “to free up the 
language from its sometimes sinister, frequently lazy, almost always predictable employment 
of racially informed and determined chains” (Morrison  xi).   
 The way Joe and the readers learn about traditional Annishinaabe justice belie the 
gender binaries foundational for western thought. While maternal care is important, Erdrich 
makes living in a good way the responsibility of all genders.  As Cholly used Old Blue’s 
stories to orient his moral compass in The Bluest Eye, Joe, and especially his father, use the 
content of Mooshum’s stories as ancestral precedent.  We learn about “wiindigoo justice” 
through the talking dreams of Joe’s grandfather Mooshum and Joe’s father helps us connect 
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these traditions with the conflict of the novel.  The spirit of the last buffalo charges 
Nanapush, the protagonist of Mooshum’s stories and recurring character in Erdrich’s oeuvre, 
to build the round house.  In the final installment of Mooshum’s dream story, importantly 
titled “The Round House” we learn the explicit instructions the “old female buffalo” gave to 
Nanapush:   
The round house will be my body, the poles my ribs, the fire my heart.  It will 
be the body of your mother and it must be respected the same way.  As the 
mother is intent on her baby’s life, so your people should think of their 
children.   
That is how it came about, said Mooshum, I was a young man when the 
people built it—they followed Nanapush’s instructions. (215) 
While the round house is, as the critics assert, built from the feminine body and requires a 
maternal care of the people, it is not exclusively female.  Rather, a man received the initial 
instructions and the collective built that place.  Even as Mooshum’s story shares an 
Indigenous perspective on how to live, the words Erdrich uses echo the Christian sacrament 
of communion.  Further, while the buffalo woman uses the figure of a mother as a model, she 
directs all the people to be good parents, to be “intent” on their children’s lives.  In her 
message, men and women alike pass down knowledge of wiindigoo justice.  Unlike Western 
logic that renders women silent in the patriarchal discourse of the law, Annishinaabe justice, 
although modeled on maternal care, requires the participation of all genders.  Further, this 
place built for people “to do things in a good way” cannot be undone or violated by a single 
man.  Instead, just as Nanapush and the people built the ceremonial place to practice justice, 
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so too does Erdrich’s novel, also called the round house, become a space where readers can 
join in the justice she imagines.  
The traditional interpretive strategies that Erdrich weaves into The Round House 
become most compelling for critics and characters who want to forgive, excuse, and even 
congratulate Joe for murdering Linden Lark.  In their efforts to explain and understand the 
vigilante murder that closes the novel’s penultimate chapter, Jacob Bender and Lydia Maunz-
Breese assert “the novel offers the possibility that the climactic murder of Linden can 
actually be interpreted as a legitimate form of redress through recourse to the Native legal 
system” (147).  Joe’s father makes this case to his son in a conversation that seems calculated 
to allow Joe to confess his crime to his parents, so they might share his guilt.  Bazil explains 
to his son that he would defend Lark’s murderer by “argue[ing] that Lark met the definition 
of a wiindigoo, and that with no other recourse, his killing fulfilled the requirements of a very 
old law” (306).  Like Bender and Maunz Breese, Bazil turns to what he calls “traditional 
precedent” in a western way: the critics and the character use wiindigoo justice to justify past 
actions rather than compel future behavior (307).  Although Joe feels sufficient compulsion 
to murder Lark his exigency stems more from the U.S. justice system’s failures than from his 
ancestors’ traditions; he explains “if they could prosecute Linden Lark, I would not have to 
lie about the ammunition or practice to do what someone had to do” (Erdrich 261).   
Far from considering tribal precedent, Joe understands his obligation through U.S. 
law: “I was only thirteen and if I got caught I would only be subject to juvenile justice laws, 
not to mention there were clearly extenuating circumstances” (261).  Joe frames his reluctant 
resolve to murder Linden in the legal language of his father and the manufactured maturity of 
a teenager more often used to excuse missing schoolwork.  Importantly, Joe’s mother evokes 
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the wiindigoo tradition not to avenge past crimes, but to prevent future ones.  When she 
learns that Linden has set his sights on Sonja, she declares, “[i]t’s something Daddy told me.  
A story about a wiindigoo.  Lark’s trying to eat us, Joe.  I won’t let him, she said.  I will be 
the one to stop him” (248).  While his mother’s determination plays a major role in Joe’s 
decision to kill Linden, the thirteen-year-old does not use the story of the wiindigoo to make 
sense of his choice.  Instead, even as he pursues Catholicism as a failed ruse to get the priest 
to teach him how to shoot, Joe, as we have seen, adapts the Christian tradition in order to 
think of Linden’s crime as a “Sin[] Crying Out to Heaven for Justice” (260).  While the child 
approaches the revenge murder through the lens of Christian morality, the adult narrator 
educates readers about the tradition of the wiindigoo through Mooshum’s dreams and waking 
stories, Geraldine’s assessment of Linden’s hunger, and Bazil’s explicit declaration that the 
murder satisfies the intent of the traditional law.  After his father’s explanation, the adult 
narrator draws our attention to the distance between the wiindigoo interpretative lens and the 
thinking of his child-self, “it was beyond me at the time to think of Mooshum’s sleeptalking 
as a reading of traditional case law” (307).  In this distance between the adult and the child, 
Erdrich trains her readers in a wiindigoo hermeneutics that shifts the way we think about 
justice but does not map onto Western jurisprudence as neatly as the judge and critics may 
like. 
As the older narrator points out at the end of Bazil’s case for “traditional precedent,” 
Mooshum’s dreams offer the novel’s paradigmatic definition of the wiindigoo figure.  Like 
made-for-T.V.-specials, Mooshum gives his dreams in three episodes that are each a self-
contained story and cohere into a larger narrative.  Erdrich underscores the importance of 
these stories-within-the-story not only by narrating them in the sleep-talking-voice of the 
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local elder (Mooshum claims to be one hundred and twelve), but also by focalizing twelve-
year-old Nanapush, whose adult self plays a major role across Erdrich’s oeuvre in homage, as 
many critics have pointed out, to the Ojibwe trickster Nanabozho.  Further, through these 
stories, Erdrich explains that Nanapush was charged to build the round house because 
“[w]iindigoo justice must be pursued with great care.  A place should be built so that people 
could do things in a good way” (187).  To emphasize the importance of this place and its 
purpose, Erdrich titles the final installment of Mooshum’s dreams “The Round House.”  As if 
aware that the audience of his dreams are ignorant readers and children, Mooshum explains 
how people can go wiindigoo, “[s]ome people in hungry times became possessed.  A 
wiindigoo could cast its spirit inside of a person.  That person would become an animal, and 
see fellow humans as prey meat” (180).  As Bender and Maunz-Breese note, Erdrich plays 
with the redness of Linden’s lips describing them as both “thick, dark red, like he had a 
fever” and “thin and red” in the pages that frame Mooshum’s dream as if his mouth were like 
the wiindigoo’s “similarly bloody from constant chewing” (Erdrich 170, 210, Bender Maunz-
Breese 153).  The novel’s sexual predator’s mouth masticates with the figured blood of his 
victims.   
Just as Joe sees no alternative to murder in stopping Linden’s sexual hunger, 
Mooshum’s dream stipulates that in the face of such cannibalistic hunger, “[t]he thing to do 
as you had to kill that person right away.  But not before you had agreement in the matter” 
(180).  The commitment to follow U.S. law prevents characters from publicly discussing how 
to deal with Linden as they may have in a traditional Anishinaabe society, so Joe and his best 
friend Cappy independently and in sworn secrecy decide to murder the predator.  Joe’s 
community does express unanimous endorsement by becoming accessories to the murder 
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after the fact.  The child, not yet attuned to wiindigoo justice, does not fully feel the 
consensus that Erdrich has primed her readers to look for.  Immediately after the murder, 
Joe’s Uncle Whitey asks for Joe’s shirt and directs both Joe and Cappy to touch the bottle 
they drank from.  He keeps these things as evidence, so he can give the boys an alibi. Linda 
Lark comforts Joe by affirming “[t]wo and two makes three. However, I have decided that 
you are too young to have accomplished this. Maybe you’re not, but I’ve decided you are” 
(Erdrich 298).  Linda, like Whitey, shows solidarity with Joe and Cappy by participating in 
the cover-up of the murder.  Linda finds the murder rifle, gets her adoptive brother to 
dismantle it, and disposes the parts in rivers, back roads, and sloughs.  Even the sheriff shows 
his support for Joe by returning a jar Joe left at the crime scene to Joe’s mother and asking 
her to make it into an ordinary object: to fill it with preserved pickles.  Joe’s parents 
participate in this after-the-fact consensus by explaining the tribal precedent to Joe. 
According to Mooshum’s dream however, even after coming to consensus, only “someone in 
the blood family” could execute the decision (180).  Linda, Linden’s only surviving relative, 
had the opportunity to kill him by denying him her kidney, but misses this opportunity in an 
act of compassion.  As if anticipating that his dreams might provide a future legal 
framework, Mooshum clarifies “[t]he cure for a wiindigoo was often simple: large quantities 
of hot soup” (214).  While sustenance seems a logical remedy for cannibalism, Erdrich does 
not propose a corollary for sexual predation save Linda’s generosity in gifting her own organ, 
an act of kindness that cannot cure Linden’s carnivorous urges.       
While Mooshum’s dream delineates clear standards for dealing with wiindigoog (-g 
indicates the plural) that as many critics explain accord with traditional Annishinaabe justice, 
the story Mooshum dreams does not provide a good case law for Bazil’s theoretical case.  
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While Mooshum’s story, like Erdrich’s novel, positions the adolescent child to protect and 
defend his mother, the status of the wiindigoo is different in each.  Nanapush’s father falsely 
accuses his mother of going wiindigoo.  In Mooshum’s dream, Nanapush’s father wields the 
term as a way of removing a wife he “tired of,” whereas in Erdrich’s novel Linden really is 
possessed by that cannibalistic spirit (180).  In fact, in the entire novel, there are no 
wiindigoog in the traditional sense that Mooshum reiterates in the final installment: “people 
who lost all human compunctions in hungry times and craved the flesh of others” (214).  
Instead, the characters that Erdrich depicts as ravenous for human flesh are not driven there 
by hunger, but by greed and entitlement.  Mooshum’s other wiindigoo story, one that he tells 
while awake, provides a more precise precedent for Linden. Unlike Nanapush’s mother, this 
“white wiindigoo,” a turn-of-the-century trapper known as Liver-Eating Johnson does “see 
fellow humans as prey meat” as Mooshum attests “that old rascal used to track down Indians 
and kill us and take and eat our livers” (180, 236).  But Mooshum’s anecdote diverges from 
the dream’s criteria because lack of food did not cause Liver-Eating Johnson’s cannibalism.  
Instead, in Erdrich’s careful prose, the trapper’s very profession in concert with the settler-
state’s laws caused the hunger of the Native people.  The second part of Mooshum’s dream 
opens with the connection between colonization and starvation: “[a]h, those first reservation 
years, when they squeezed us!  Down to only a few square miles.  We starved while the cows 
of settlers lived fat off the fenced grass of our old hunting grounds.  In those first years our 
white father with the big belly ate ten ducks for dinner and didn’t even send us the feet” 
(184).  Erdrich makes clear that the extreme scarcity that starved Nanapush’s father into 
falsely accusing his wife of going wiindigoo was a direct result of the U.S.’s settlement 
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policies.66  The girth of U.S. national boundaries, the private property and pockets of its 
white citizens, and the belly of its president expand in direct proportion to the shrinking of 
Native hunting grounds and the forced starvation of Native peoples.  Even in this era of 
extreme starvation, however, Erdrich does not depict any Native character as “crav[ing] the 
flesh of others,” but rather it is the unjustified craving of settlers that causes the starvation in 
the first place (214).  Further, categorizing Liver-Eater as a wiindigoo is not just an accurate 
assessment of his predatory behavior, but a rhetorical strategy that he himself embraces to 
explain the teeth he lost chewing through the rawhide bindings that Mooshum and others had 
used to trap the trapper.  Mooshum explains that after his escape, Liver-Eater, “made up a 
story about eating the Indian’s leg because unless he had a good story who’d believe a 
toothless cross-eyed old bugger?” (338) In this intersection, the figure of the wiindigoo 
becomes not only a way for Native storytelling to account for white greed, but also a name 
for a colonizing rhetoric through which settlers and supremacists can build ethos through the 
consumption of Native lands and bodies.   
While the figure of a wiindigoo certainly works to help characters and critics forgive 
and commend Joe’s crime, it is even more compelling as a way of reading and interpreting 
the ongoing cannibalistic project of settler-colonialism.  Erdrich prepares readers for this 
interpretation both before readers learn about the wiindigoo and before Joe knows Linden is 
the one who attacked his mother. Throughout the novel, Erdrich has her characters adopt a 
language that not only categorizes Linden as evil, but also anticipates his death.  Before Joe 
knows the rapist’s identity, he overhears his father and uncle describe the attacker as a 
                                                
66 Joshua Miner also comments on this connection in “Consuming the Wiindiigo: Native 
Figurations of Hunger and Food Bureaucracy.”  
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“damned carcass” (187).  In the circular logic afforded to poetic language, by the end of the 
novel Linden will become what Joe’s first referent for him figures.  After Joe learns Linden’s 
identity, he and Cappy adopt a Star Trekkian code to avoid the rapist’s name as “the skin of 
evil,” an allusion that also suggests a body already lacking a human soul (256).  Further, Joe 
learns that Linden is a monster before he knows that Linden is the monster, and this is one of 
the ways Linden becomes a prime suspect for the readers before the child-narrator guesses 
his guilt.  The second two fictional court cases Erdrich introduces in the novel deal with the 
Lark family.  First, we learn that the Larks were convicted of overcharging Native people at 
their family run “gas and grocery business” (49).  Joe initially believes that his father marked 
this case because his father succeeded in asserting tribal jurisdiction over non-Native people, 
signaling the importance of jurisdiction for the novel, but his father says he’s more interested 
in “the people involved” (50).  The Lark family, he explains, are “small-time hypocrites, who 
may in special cases be capable of monstrous acts if given the chance” (50).  Their hypocrisy 
manifests itself not only in crimes against other races but also in violence in their own 
family.  Bazil explains to his son: although “[s]hrill opponents of abortion,” the Larks 
attempt to put to death and later abandon Linden’s twin sister Linda because she was 
deformed at birth (Erdrich 50).  As we learn in the novel’s first story-within-the-story 
“Linda’s Story,” Linden already demonstrated the family trait of hate in utero where he 
crushes his twin sister Linda— an act she characterizes as compassion because her resulting 
deformity saves her from the Lark family who prides itself as having participated in the 
Plague of Doves lynching.  The Wishkobs, an Ojibwe family, rescue Linda from both death 
and being raised racist by adopting her into the tribe.  Linden inherited his aggressive 
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impulse as one would a genetic disease or white privilege—the hatred he’s predisposed to 
feel gets cultivated in the home.  Linda explains how her birth mother must have felt: 
She would have to have turned her fury at herself, her shame, on someone 
else—the child she’d chosen. She’d have blamed Linden, transferred her 
warped hatreds to him. I had felt the contempt and triumph in her touch. I was 
thankful for the way things had turned out. Before we were born, my twin had 
the compassion to crush against me, to perfect me by deforming me, so that I 
would be the one who was spared. (123) 
While Linda’s adoptive family teach her empathy and love, Linden learns greed, a sense of 
entitlement, and hatred from his birth parents.  In the subsequent case that Bazil reviews with 
Joe, the Larks try and fail to use a now-adult Linda to gain control of the Wishkob’s 
allotment land.  In response, the Wishkobs organize a boycott of the Larks’ store and help 
Joe’s Uncle Whitey establish his gas station, which eventually puts the Larks out of business.  
Joe’s father connects to Linden: “He blames the Wishkobs, his sister, Linda, Whitey and 
Sonja, and the judge in this case, me, for her death and his near bankruptcy, which now 
seems inevitable” (52).  Linden’s upbringing disfigures his psyche to the point where, as 
Erdrich says in an interview, “he has simply no human empathy.”   
While Erdrich bases her figure on traditional ways of dealing with those who turn to 
cannibalism in times of hunger, her version of wiindigoo better diagnoses the particular 
psychoses of entitled white men who believe themselves to be disenfranchised in an era that 
is beginning to recognize the harms of colonization and white supremacy.  Joshua Miner 
argues that Erdrich, like some other contemporary Native writers, mobalize wiindigoo 
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imagery to critique settler-colonialisim.67  Linden’s craving, like Liver-Eater’s, does not stem 
from actual hunger or need but rather manifests itself in the major modes through which 
white men historically sought to establish their power—by possessing and controlling bodies 
of women and people of color, bodies these men conceptualized as things or land to be 
violated and turned into money.  Although we don’t know Linden is the attacker when 
Geraldine shares her story, his rant reveals his belief in his entitlement to women’s bodies.  
He blames Mayla for having another man’s baby and argues it is her fault he has raped and 
plans to kill the women.  Later in that scene Linden’s tirade reveals an awareness of his own 
mental instability and sadism; Geraldine explains, “[h]e rose and kicked me and went over 
and kicked her [Mayla] so hard she wheezed. Then he bent over and looked into my face. He 
said to me, I’m sorry. I might be having an episode. I’m not really a bad person. I didn’t hurt 
you, did I?” (Erdrich 162)  Rather than seeing Geraldine as representative of all Indigenous 
women as some critics suggested above, we can see Linden as representative of a too-often 
anonymous group of sexual predators.  Erdrich assertion in the novel’s “Afterword” that “86 
percent of rapes and sexual assaults upon Native women are perpetrated by white men” 
situates Linden as emblematic of this pervasive problem (319).  Further, Erdrich casts Linden 
not only as a rapist, but also a murderer; he kills Mayla Wolfskin, and although Joe learns 
                                                
67 In his nuanced discussion of Erdrich and Stephen Graham Jones, Miner argues,  “wiindi- 
goo poetics, having emerged in response to corrupt settler-bureaucratic and neocolonial 
appetites, expresses agency against all vectors of the Eurowestern rationalization of 
Indigenous ecologies and food cultures” (248). 
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through Bugger Pourier’s dream that Linden buried her at the construction site, her body is 
never found.   
The way Erdrich’s version of the wiindigoo connects sexual predation and murderous 
greed to settler-colonialism creates a lens through which we can better understand violence 
that post-dates her novel.  The figure of wiindigoo becomes incisive political commentary in 
the wake of mentally disturbed mass-murderers in Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, 
California, South Carolina, Oregon, Nevada, Florida, Texas, and Toronto.68  Elliot Rodger, 
the example closest to our community at UCSB, murdered six people in the student 
                                                
68 In 2011, Jared Loughner shot thirteen people killing six in an attack targeted on Tucson 
Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords. In 2012, James Holmes opened fire at a batman movie 
in Aurora Colorado killing twelve people and injuring seventy more.  In the same year, 
Adam Lanza murdered twenty-seven teachers and students at Sandy Hook Elementary school 
after killing his mother and before killing himself.  In 2015, Dylan Roof killed nine African 
American people at an Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina; and Chris Harper-
Mercer shot nine people at his community college in Roseburg, Oregon.  In 2017, Stephen 
Paddock murdered fifty-eight people at a music festival in Las Vegas, Nevada and Devin 
Patrick Kelley murdered twenty-six people in a Baptist Church outside San Antonio, Texas.  
In 2018, Nikolas Cruz killed seventeen people at Majority Stoneman Douglas High School in 
Parkland, Florida; Dimitrios Pagourtzis killed ten people at Santa Fe High School outside 
Houston, Texas; and Alek Minassian murdered ten people with a van in Toronto.  Loughner, 
Holmes, Roof are serving life sentences.  Lanza, Harper-Mercer, Paddock, Patrick Kelley 
took their own lives or were killed by police during their attacks.  Cruz, Pagourtzis and 
Minassian are being tried.  
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residential area adjacent to campus before taking his own life in 2014.  Just as Linden felt his 
thwarted entitlement to Mayla’s body reason enough to kidnap, rape, and murder her, Elliot 
Rodger explained his rampage in his Youtube video and manifesto as “retribution” against a 
society that frustrated his sexual desires.  While Linden concentrated his racism and sexism 
on the women he attacked, Elliot Rodger preceded his attack on the sorority by stabbing his 
Chinese American roommates and their friend.  All of the killers responsible for the 
massacres listed above expressed white supremacist or misogynist sentiments before their 
attacks or were reported as being abusive towards women by those close to them afterward.  
Some of these later murderers even modeled their violence after the Isla Vista tragedy; on 
Facebook, the Toronto killer claimed his attack shared the same goals as “Supreme 
Gentleman Elliot Rodger” (BBC).  According to BBC, Elliot Rodger “has been virtually 
canonised by some fringe communities online” such as “[a]n online community known as the 
"involuntarily celibate", or incels, who blame women for their sexual failings” (BBC).  While 
it was the justice system that refused to see Linden’s guilt in Erdrich’s novel, the executive 
branch failed to see Elliot Rodger’s murderous intent.  According to the Washington Post, the 
sheriff’s officers who visited the Isla Vista killer at the warning of this therapist and mother, 
found him “quiet and timid . . . polite and courteous” according to Santa Barbara Sherriff Bill 
Brown.  The police and FBI were also warned or even encountered the other murderers 
before their attacks, but failed to read them as threatening and prevent their attacks.   
 While the idea of wiindigoo justice might be the most explicit “traditional precedent” 
Erdrich raises in The Round House, after finishing the novel we can see that she has been 
inviting us all along to adopt broader interpretive strategies.  We have already seen how Joe’s 
openness to extra-sensory communication allows him to hear what his mother endured from 
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the place that witnessed it.  By the end of the novel, we also know that the vision that 
appeared to Randall and the “ghost” that visits Joe was a spirit from the future trying to 
prevent Cappy’s death.  Although the same parental figures that teach Joe about the 
wiindigoo push him to consider the vision as a real helper, Joe does not follow that 
interpretive lines as thoroughly as he considers the court’s failures to hear his mother’s case.  
When he first mentions the ghost to his father, he accepts Bazil’s assertion that “sometimes a 
ghost is a person out of your future. A person dropping back through time, I guess, by 
mistake,” but Joe refuses the ghost’s knowledge “[t]he last thing I want to know is something 
that a ghost wants to tell me” (82).  While Joe believes his father enough to seek Mooshum’s 
advice he still thinks that the sprit has something to do with the past crime, rather than future 
aid.  Mooshum clarifies that it’s not a ghost, but a benevolent spirit: “[w]hen somebody 
throws their spirit at you they don’t even know it, but they mean to help” (133).  In addition 
to voicing the truth of spirits through the mouth of the judge and elder, Erdrich helps her 
readers believe what Joe doesn’t fully explain by having this path reveal real clues.  The 
“doodem” or clan animal that Mooshum advises Joe to follow does lead him to Mayla’s doll 
in the lake, but rather than offering the doll to the authorities as evidence, Joe brings it to 
Sonja who helps him deposit the forty thousand dollars they find inside.   
While the visions portend what will happen to Cappy, the doll becomes a clue in the 
mystery of what happened to Mayla.  In reader’s minds, the discovered doll connects to the 
rumor Bazil shares about Governor Yetlow’s odd attempts to adopt an Indian child whose 
mother has disappeared and the detail that Geraldine discloses about Linden’s anger at Mayla 
not only for having another man’s child, but also hiding a large sum of money that man paid 
her.  We can conclude that the governor, guilty of statutory rape, paid Mayla not to press 
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charges in the court or papers. Although Joe understands this at some level, he’s too 
“poison[ed]” by hearing what happened to his mother to follow this other thread.  He does 
know that finding Mayla’s body will be the habeas corpus the government demands to 
prosecute Linden, but, having never met her, he does not feel the personal connection and 
imperative to open himself up to hearing her story.  As readers connect the clues Joe learns 
from dreams and ghosts to the evidence he collects through Western means, we begin to 
adopt a more holistic hermeneutic strategy.  If we fully embrace what places remember, 
readers can attune ourselves to knowledge that Joe himself misses.  Erdrich makes Joe feel 
his guilt and anxiety about Mayla when he’s near the place Linden buried her body.  While 
Joe is biking with his friends, he remembers particular thoughts surfacing: 
Into my mind there came the picture of that scrap of blue-and-white checked 
cloth, and the knowledge I kept pushing away about the doll being in that car. 
By throwing out the doll I’d obviously destroyed evidence, maybe even 
something that would tell Mayla’s whereabouts. Where she lay, in a place so 
obscure that even the dogs could not find her. I put the thought of Mayla from 
my mind. And Sonja. I tried also not to think of my mother. Of what had 
maybe happened in Bismarck. All of these thoughts were reasons I did not 
want to go home, or to be alone. They came up over me, shrouding my mind, 
covering my heart. Even as I rode, I tried to get rid of the thoughts by taking 
my bicycle over the dirt hills behind the hospital. I began to course violently 
up and down, jumping so high that when I landed my bones jarred. Whirling. 
Skidding. Raising clouds of grit that filled my mouth until I was sick and 
thirsty and dripping with sweat so I could finally go home. (225-226) 
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Unlike Joe’s experience at the round house, when he was looking for clues, at the 
construction site, he does not consider that his feelings may be thoughts too.  In both 
locations, however, Erdrich has the place communicate accurate information to Joe about 
what had occurred there in the past.  Although he thinks of Mayla as he bikes back and forth 
over the place where her body is hidden, he does not open himself to considering that the 
place may be communicating to him they way the round house had.  Instead, he “push[es] 
away” that knowledge and “tri[es] to get rid” of those thoughts.  Joe, raised in a world that 
values objective truth and concerned over his mother’s fate, cannot receive the knowledge of 
the place even though the thoughts “came up over me, shrouding my mind, covering my 
heart” (226).  Instead, the thirteen-year-old finally learns this painful fact from asking Bugger 
about a dream Joe ignored earlier in the novel: 
He kept crying about her. He mumbled about construction and I knew. She 
was in the construction site, the earth mounded over her. I couldn’t help the 
picture from forming. Us jumping our bikes, flying back and forth, and her 
below. I stood up, jolted. I knew, down to the core of me, that he had seen 
Mayla Wolfskin. He had seen her dead body. If we hadn’t killed Lark, he’d 
have gone to jail for life anyway. (310) 
By the end of the novel, Joe understands that he should attend more to extrasensory forms of 
knowledge.  Erdrich pushes readers to do the same by expecting readers to believe Joe’s 
“core” knowledge without offering any corroborating western style evidence. Just as opening 
himself up to the spirit may have saved Cappy, listening to Bugger’s dream may have helped 
him bring Linden to justice for both rape and murder.    
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Erdrich’s aesthetic adaptation of traditional forms of justice and extrasensory modes 
of communication asks us to read as connected what western strategies of sense-making see 
as isolated, unrelated, and separate, but she does not ask us to reject the U.S. justice system 
entirely.  Instead, her novel argues that Anishinaabe ways of knowing can provide a 
supplement (if a supplement can be broader and more expansive than that which is 
supplements) to Western epistemology.  While the U.S. justice system creates strict limits 
and careful categories about the particular people who can be tried for particular crimes in 
particular cases based on particular evidence, traditional systems of justice make 
connections across those limited boundaries.  In The Round House, the scene of the crime 
itself becomes a place that can speak and testify.  Those who were not there, like Joe, might 
become the best witnesses.  Further, both the spirit visitors and the figure of the wiindigoo 
indicate that Annishinaabe justice can look into the future as well as the past.  Joe’s father 
already understands how wiindigoo justice might serve as traditional precedent and attempts 
to use it to absolve Joe of his crime.  The stories Mooshum tells, however, push readers to 
see the proscriptive, preventative nature of this justice—the wiindigoo must be killed before 
it starts consuming human flesh.  Thus, while the U.S. Justice system speaks in a rhetoric that 
Aristotle would classify as “forensic speech” because “[t]he party in a case at law is 
concerned with the past; one man accuses the other, and the other defends himself, with 
reference to things already done.”  In Erdrich’s novel, Annishinaabe justice faces forward as 
well as backward. The police officer unwittingly threw his spirit from the future to warn Joe 
about the impending accident.  In Erdrich’s novel, this interconnection across space and time 
is always present whether characters are aware of it or not as Joe’s thoughts about Mayla 
while he’s biking at the construction site indicate.  By the end of the novel, it’s clear that 
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opening oneself to this hermeneutic model is as important if not more so than understanding 
the limited sights of the U.S. justice system.  After Joe hears Mooshum dream the story of the 
round house, the place built so the people could practice justice in a good way, he reflects, “I 
lay awake thinking of the place on the hill, the holy wind in the grass, and how the structure 
had cried out to me. I could see a part of something larger, an idea, a truth, but just a 
fragment. I could not see the whole, but just a shadow of that way of life” (214).  In his 
grandfather’s dream, Joe can see a different way of life, one that embraces broader modes of 
interconnection and understanding.  In Erdrich’s novel, we can also see the “shadow of that 
way of life,” and like the ceremonial place her characters built to practice justice, the pages 
of her story become a place where readers can imagine another kind of justice as well.   
CONCLUSION 
 As children, Scout, Claudia, and Joe do not initially understand the full weight of the 
crimes they narrate.  By balancing the narration between the naïve voice of the child and 
particular hermeneutic strategies, Lee, Morrison, and Erdrich invite readers to both fill in 
what the child doesn’t know and adopt a new interpretive strategy.  Lee requires that readers 
supplement Scout’s story with our own understanding of the history of lynching in the United 
States, and, at the same time, she has Scout include small lessons in Southern pride.  In this 
way, she breaks the white consensus that made lynch law possible and positions the Ewells 
as a “kind” of people responsible for racism.  Morrison makes her readers register the 
meaning of a daughter having her father’s baby before her young narrators do.  At the same 
time, the omniscient sections make Cholly’s a particular, rather than representative, case that 
sheds light on the power dynamics that render the bodies of Black women and girls 
vulnerable to sexual violence.  In The Bluest Eye, we have to condemn the father’s violence, 
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but also understand how it came to happen.   Finally, in The Round House, Erdrich proposes 
wiindigoo hermeneutics as an important way of reading white predatory violence.  Rather 
than targeting people for their race or class, this lens makes visible people whose aggression 
stems from a sense of entitlement and greed.  Instead of punishing people after the fact, this 
interpretive strategy asks us to seek ways to prevent sexual violence.   
While Mockingbird stages the primary sense associated with empathy—sight, 
standing in someone’s shoes or on their front porch, The Bluest Eye and The Round House 
offer an important supplement—sound, hearing someone else’s song or story or even the 
memories spoken by a place.  Looking at the world from a perspective not one’s own is an 
important strategy for understanding others, but sound offers a more robust and mature 
additional layer.  While our eyes can only focus on one thing at a time, we can hear multiple, 
different melodies and appreciate the harmony between them.  In The Bluest Eye for instance 
we can hear what happened to Pecola, condemn Cholly for it, and, at the same time, hold in 
our mind the experiences that led him to become so violent.  While child-narrators rely 
heavily on the empathy made possible by sight—we experience the story from their naïve 
eyes, as we will see in the following chapter, the braided narrative makes the ethical harmony 
afforded by sound a formal quality of the novel.   
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CHAPTER FIVE: “THERE IS NO UNRAVELING THE ROPE”: THE 
ETHICS OF BRAIDED NARRATIVES 
PRELUDE 
The first sentence of Louise Erdrich’s The Plague of Doves (2008) opens with a 
child’s call: “[t]he gun jammed on the last shot and the baby stood holding the crib rail, eyes 
wild, bawling” (1).  The novel begins in medias res of what we later learn is the mass murder 
of five members of a North Dakota settler family.  In the opening paragraph, however, we 
only see the murderer, unmarked except by his gender and insanity, “set … on edge” by the 
wail of his would-be-last victim (1).  The irritating quality of child’s cry compels the adult to 
turn from his bloody work.  Instead of finding another weapon to hurt the child, the murderer 
plays a record waiting on the gramophone.  The “unearthly violin solo” not only hushes the 
infant, but also “made the man stop, the pieces of the gun in his hands” (1).  He plays the 
solo three times putting the baby to sleep and calming himself, so he can fix his gun.  These 
fragile recorded notes are but the first non-verbal sounds that force characters to stop, arrest 
them temporarily, and then call them to a different course of action.  In this opening scene, 
the music pauses the murderer before he finishes his crime and that frail solo saves his last 
victim.  But we don’t know it then.  Erdrich waits fifty pages, almost a fifth of the novel, to 
return to the scene of this crime.  This single opening paragraph, titled “Solo,” ends with a 
disconcerting ellipsis: “[h]e raised the gun.  The odor of raw blood was all around him in the 
closed room” (1).  Erdrich leaves us with the undetermined fate of the child, whose screams 
still echo in our ears, and the smell of blood as we turn the page and enter the eleven-year-old 
mind of character narrator, Evelina Coutts, whose worries about her grade school crushes and 
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fascination with her family’s history seem unrelated to the initial unexplained violence.  Four 
score pages later, Erdrich switches stories again, and then fifty pages after that she shifts 
narratives again.  Why does Erdrich make such jarring narrative shifts?  What purpose does 
the twining together of multiple narrative threads serve?  What ethical affordances does this 
narrative structure offer?  
Importantly, most of The Plague of Doves’s distinct narrative strands revolve around 
the central core of this opening crime and its false and violent vengeance.  When Evelina’s 
anecdotal narrative wends back to this opening murder, it comes as a story-within-a-story 
that Mooshum recounts to his granddaughter, our narrator.  Mooshum remembers how the 
groaning of un-milked cows from the barn and the house’s blood-smeared door announced to 
him and three friends the crime that had taken place there.  Knowing that, as Native people in 
turn-of-the-century North Dakota, their guilt rather than their innocence will be assumed, the 
four men want to turn away from the horror of the house, but the cry of the cows arrests 
them: “[t]he desperation in their resonant bawls stopped the men in the trampled yard” (61).  
They cannot move because of the intense need evident in the sound of the animals’ appeal. 
The men try to resist the bovine call and leave the terrible scene, but are stopped by the weak 
wailing of the human child.  Just as the sound of the infant stops the murderer, so too does 
her cry prevent the men from passing the bloodstained farm.  Erdrich snares the men with the 
vulnerability of two matched needs, both communicated clearly by non-verbal cries: the 
cows moan with the pain of the very milk the infant cries for.  While the men might have 
resisted the plea of the cows, they cannot turn away from the child’s call, and they satisfy 
both primal needs with one act.  Although they knew that entering the house might cost them 
their life, the cry of a child resonates deeper than their own self-preservation and common 
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sense.  White settlers later lynch these Métis and Ojibwe men in a raving and racist attempt at 
revenge— only Mooshum was cut down before he died.  This double wound, the secret 
slaughter of a settler family and the public murder of innocent Native men, becomes the 
central core of The Plague of Doves.   
But Erdrich does not allow these two crazed acts of violence to frame the ethical 
power of her child’s call in her narrative, as they seem to in the story.  Erdrich represents the 
way a child’s cry can compel both murderers and bystanders with a claim that undermines 
both a killer’s fury and four men’s better-judgment. But she doesn’t let the child’s 
satisfaction satiate her readers in either case.  Instead, she separates the single omniscient 
paragraph where we witness the murderer at the climax of his crime from the telling of story 
of the rescue and vigilante revenge by fifty pages, two narrators, and half a century. Although 
the men respond to the child’s cry almost immediately in story time, readers must wait, 
remembering the desperate vulnerability of the infant in the opening scene as we shift our 
attention to Evelina’s adolescent anxieties.  The distance between the baby’s wild wail in the 
novel’s opening line and the eventual care she receives from the passing Native men troubles 
readers not only with the mystery of the crime but also with the primal yearning for someone 
hold the infant as we can only hold the book.  When Erdrich finally allows characters to 
respond to this instinctual desire, we read it filtered through an historical rubric of race that 
renders this basic gesture of care into a death sentence signed by the contagion of vigilante 
mobs that haunt the birth of the nation.  What first seemed a basic response, known across 
species—to hold a crying child—now seems an untenable risk because of the particular 
psychoses of human settlers.  The space between the diegetic opening and the recounted 
story of response not only complicates this scene of care with the sins of the imagined 
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national community that we share with Erdrich and her characters, but also with the 
relationships among her imagined characters’ stories.  While we witness the opening crime 
through the detached lens of an omniscient third person, we read the story of the response 
filtered through the minds of both a child and her grandfather Mooshum who himself 
experienced the horror of the events.   Mooshum’s narrative alerts us to the ethical anguish of 
experiencing such events, the phenomenological embeddedness of hearing the baby cry “as if 
it knew they were out there,” an acknowledgement of their presence and potential to respond 
that precedes their relationship (62).69  Evelina’s response to Mooshum’s testimony, as both 
our narrator and Mooshum’s narratee, registers for readers the relational implications of 
hearing such a story.70  Evelina writes, “[t]he story Mooshum told us had its repercussions—
the first being that I could not look at anyone in quite the same way anymore” (86).  The 
story’s ramifications are ethical in the sense that they both attune Evelina to the relational 
complexities of her community and give her a moral rubric— however cloudy— with which 
to evaluate the other characters.  In a fitting description of the cognitive work readers need to 
do to keep track of the many characters in Erdrich’s novel, Evelina writes that after hearing 
                                                
69 That the infant calls to the adult before seeing, hearing, or knowing the adult inverts Walter 
Benjamin’s formulation: “[b]y giving names, parents dedicate their children to God; the 
names they give do not correspond—in a metaphysical rather than etymological sense—to 
any knowledge, for they name newborn children” (69). 
70 In Vehement Passions (2002), as we have seen, Philip Fisher writes, “an author often sets 
between us and a report a figure we can call the ‘register,’ whose response models our 
response” (145).  
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the story, she “traced the blood history of the murders through my classmates and friends 
until I could draw out elaborate spider webs of lines and intersecting circles” (86).   
The Plague of Doves forces readers to attend simultaneously both to the vivid 
particularity of individual stories, such as the opening violence and later Evelina’s discovery 
of it, and also to the broader formal structure of the novel itself comprised, as it is, from 
braided narrative strands.  In so doing, The Plague of Doves grapples with both the poignant 
fissure that separates us from those with whom we are most intimate and that chasm that 
historical violences carve between social groups.  The jarring distance in discourse time and 
surprising shift in narrative perspective between the novel’s opening cry and the telling of the 
response formally affirms the novel’s concern with the ethical murkiness of human 
attachment in a world clouded by social antagonisms.  But Erdrich does not only make this 
split between the opening “Solo” and her first narrator, Evelina; rather, she shifts narrators 
eight times, balancing the novel’s progression among four character narrators and that eerie 
opening omniscience.  Although Erdrich does not leave readers with the “odor of raw blood” 
in the subsequent transitions between narrators, the shift of both perspective and plot still 
jars, raising coherence challenges and ethical questions.  Each time we turn the page to find 
ourselves at the mercy of another narrator— we not only wonder what their story will be, but 
also ask how it could possibly relate to the thread that came before.  While Evelina seeks to 
trace the relationship of her contemporary community to the vigilante violence half a century 
prior, other narrators seem unconcerned about the crime.  Antone Bazil Coutts, an unnamed 
suitor in Evelina’s section, narrates his courtship of Geraldine and focalizes a few other 
characters’ stories.  Marn Wolde, the first white narrator, tells of her marriage to and murder 
of cult leader Billy Peace, a descendent of one of the lynching’s victims, and Cordelia 
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Lochren, the sole survivor of the crime closes the novel some seventy or eighty years after it 
began.  Although the murder is not the first event chronologically in the novel, it is the first 
told, which as Peter Rabinowitz would point out, is a “privileged position” which signals to 
readers the interpretive importance of the event (58).  Partly because of this convention 
privileging opening events and partly because of Evelina’s interest, readers question the 
connection of new narrators to those early crimes.  Erdrich cautions us, however, from using 
a black and white rubric of good and evil.  Evelina writes, “I still loved Mooshum, of course, 
but with this tale something in my regard of him was disturbed, as if I’d stepped into a clear 
stream and silt had billowed up around my feet” (86).     
The violent story of call and response, infant need and adult care, insane violence and 
crazed vengeance activated in the initial scene seems to fragment the constituent narrative 
threads, but also functions as a heuristic inviting readers to see a braid connecting the 
multiple stories.  The first scene not only strikes the traditional opening of a whodunit plot 
and sounds the ethical cue of a crime in want of justice, but also introduces us to a first 
aesthetic that will tinge how we experience the future encounters of the novel.71  Further, 
primed with Evelina’s attention to the blood connection among her community—both in 
terms of heritage and guilt—we wonder what responsibility each new narrative will have to 
the opening violence. The Plague of Doves tackles both the “problem of other minds” and 
“the problem of the color line,” the challenge of our most loved other, as in the painful tryst 
                                                
71 Christopher Bollas writes, “[t]he aesthetic experience is not something learned by the 
adult, but is an existential recollection of an experience where being handled by the maternal 
aesthetic made thinking irrelevant to survival” (43).  Just as a person’s first relationships 
shape her aesthetic experiences, so too does a first scene mold the way we read a text.   
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between Marne and Billy or the poignant understanding of Bazil and Geraldine’s marriage, 
and the test of the most despised, as in Cordelia’s lingering racism towards those who she 
had falsely believed killed her family.  The space between The Plague of Doves’s several 
narrative threads may seem a formal representation of that incommensurate chasm between 
people magnified by historical atrocities that not only seem to foreclose human connection 
but also to rupture any sense of ethical or epistemological progress, as some characters seem 
to constantly revisit the lynching even in their sexual encounters.72  But this distance between 
perspectives, the time between tellings, and difference among experiences also opens up a 
space for a different relatedness, an invitation to reach across the rupture, a potential to make 
meaning after violence, a call for connection.  The “blood history” that stems from the 
novel’s opening massacre and lynching not only connects all the characters in the novel, but 
also, because Erdrich bases the crimes on historical murders, connects the narrative to our 
reality.73  Evelina offers a fitting description of the novel’s genre as she ponders the lynching:   
                                                
72 John Wildstrand, the grandson of a lead vigilante, finds forgiveness for his family’s 
responsibility for the lynching through his intimacy with Maggie Peace, a relative of one of 
its victims.  Wildstrand, who often cried with Maggie before and during sex, feels “an 
element of forgiveness in her weeping with him” (120).   
73 The Plague of Doves acknowledgement section states “[a]s in all of Louise Erdrich’s 
books, the reservation, towns, and people depicted are imagined places and characters, with 
these exceptions: Louis Riel, and also the name Holy Track.  In 1897, at the age of thirteen, 
Paul Holy Track was hanged by a mob in Emmons County, North Dakota” (313).  In his 
distastefully titled book Murdering Indians: A Documentary History of the 1897 Killings 
That Inspired Louise Erdrich’s The Plague of Doves, Peter Beidler pieces together many 
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I think of how history works itself out in the living.  The Buckendorfs, the 
other Wildstrands, the Peace family, all of these people whose backgrounds 
tangled in the hanging.…  Now that some of us have mixed in the spring of 
our existence both guilt and victim, there is no unraveling the rope. (243) 
This image of a knotted rope not only helps us to imagine the narrative structure of the novel, 
but also captures the sense of ethical responsibility through the tangled call and response.  
Although Erdrich positions the members of this historic generation at opposite ends of a 
lynch rope, she has Evelina conceptualize the current generation as emerging from muddy 
waters where responsibility and injury have mixed.          
 I argue Erdrich and others concentrate this narrative strategy on particular questions 
to forge a new novel of formation— the braided narrative: distinct stories told by different 
narrators that twine together to form a single novel.  Marie-Laure Ryan has used the term 
“braided narrativity” in her descriptive taxonomy of the modes through which narrative can 
manifest in various media.  I propose the braided narrative as a particular subtype of the 
novel that would both belong in Ryan’s broad category, and, offer a specific set of formal 
criteria conducive to rethinking ethical issues.74  More broadly, I posit that braided narratives 
                                                                                                                                                  
primary sources from the 1897 murder of the Spicer family and the following lynching of 
three Native men from Standing Rock.   
74 Marie-Laure Ryan writes defines “braided narrativity” as “type of narrative follows the 
intertwined destinies of a large cast of The text presents no global plot, but a number of 
parallel and subplots developing along the destiny line of the characters” (374).  She 
proposes soap operas as the prime example.   Ryan proposed “ modes of narrativity” to 
account for the various ways narrative exists in non-narrated media.  Returning to the term 
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train readers to hold multiple, often incommensurate, subjectivities in our mind 
simultaneously, pushing us to embrace new channels of responsibility.  In braided narratives, 
the spaces between narrative threads become apertures through which we can apprehend that 
which we cannot usually see—an intersubjective field linking people through a web of 
everyday attachments.75  The complicated layering and intertwining of multiple narrative 
threads both activates readerly attachments to individual characters and forces a broader 
attention to the interconnections of a community.  The act of reading, of making sense of 
many others’ stories, of responding to their claims, knots us into a complicated braid where 
we must recognize a series of different narrators, acknowledge their interdependence and 
contradictions, and develop a series of responses that evolves into a sensibility of response 
that resonates across the novel.  Erdrich is not the only novelist to pair multiple narrators who 
tell seemingly disconnected stories to pose questions about the possibility of human 
attachment in the shadow of our violent histories.  Nicole Krauss rotates The History of Love 
(2005) among three character narrators, a third-person narrator, and an obituary.  David 
Mitchell divides Cloud Atlas (2004) among six different narrators, whose relatedness across 
                                                                                                                                                  
“narrative” both acknowledges that her taxonomy accurately describes the genre I’m 
discussing and seeks to limit this genre to forms with narrators.     
75 Psychoanalyst and philosopher Robert Stolorow explains that “intersubjective-systems 
theory” depends on the intersection between “phenomenological contextualism” and 
“affect—that is subjective emotional experience— [which] from birth onward is regulated, or 
misregulated, within ongoing relational systems” (1). See Chapter Two for a more detailed 
discussion of intersubjectivity.   
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time queries the potential of individual relationships in the face of social violence, and 
Margaret Atwood splits The Year of The Flood (2009) between a third-person narrator, a 
character narrator, and excerpts of sermons and hymns from God’s Gardener services to 
redefine humanity in a world of creaturely connection.  Toni Morrison’s The Bluest Eye 
(1970), Karen Tei Yamashita’s The Tropic of Orange (1997), and Ana Castillo’s The 
Guardians (2007) also call on multiple narrators to tell distinct stories that cohere into novels 
about the potential for attachments in world shaded by devastating socially organized 
violence.       
In this chapter, I focus on Erdrich’s The Plague of Doves and Krauss’ The History of 
Love to propose the genre of the braided narrative: novels comprised of multiple narrative 
threads that braid together to push readers toward an historically conditioned responsibility.  
Although these two novels are rarely discussed together, partly because they address such 
different histories and also because the academy still sorts along identity lines, both novels 
use this similar narrative structure both to face and to move forward from a different extreme 
of the human capacity for annihilation.  The History of Love unfolds in the shadow of the 
catastrophic devastation of the Holocaust, a period appalling because of the concentration of 
so many deaths in such a small span of time, while The Plague of Doves revolves around the 
lynching of four Native men, a single instance of the centuries long insidious and chameleon 
killings of indigenous peoples in the Americas.  The horror of the Holocaust stems in part 
from both the colossal scope of the massacre and the idea that such a huge genocide could be 
rendered invisible at the time by a collective refusal to see and to believe.  As we know from 
historical experience of African Americans in the United States, the evil efficacy of 
lynchings, on the other hand, depends precisely on their visibility, a spectacle staged to 
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construct a race as sub-human.76 The ritualized and public murder of individuals framed as 
exceptions made possible the exploitation and oppression of the rest whereas the Nazis 
efforts at elimination sought to make no exceptions.  Although Erdrich centers her novel on a 
particular lynching, she situates that crime at the end of a long century of massacres called 
battles through which the United States won the west underscoring the way in which a series 
of violences recorded as separate fuse into what Leslie Marmon Silko calls in Almanac of the 
Dead “the Native American holocaust.”77  The European Holocaust is conceived as the 
ultimate atrocity that destroyed any sense of ethical or epistemological progress in Western 
history.  Lyotard rhetorically asks: “[w]hat kind of thought is able to sublate (Aufheben) 
Auschwitz in a general (either empirical or speculative) process towards a universal 
emancipation?” the answer, to this unanswerable question, is, of course, that no thought can 
rationalize or even make sense of the terrible massacre that took place there or in other 
concentration camps (1934). “The killing of the Indians,” on the other hand, is one of the 
“hard facts” that, as Philip Fisher argues in his book of the same title, made possible the 
foundation of the United States (5).  Further, while the violence of lynching is imagined to 
have occurred outside of the state apparatus whose white supremacy it shored up, another 
horror of Holocaust, is that its destructive effort to eliminate an entire community was the 
explicit project of the state itself.  Neither The History of Love nor The Plague of Doves seeks 
                                                
76 Amy Louise Wood’s book on the subject, Lynching and Spectacle: Witnessing and Racial 
Violence in America, 1890-1940 (2009), argues “[t]he cultural power of lynching—indeed, 
the cultural power of white supremacy itself—rested on spectacle: the crowds, the rituals and 
performances, and their sensational representations in narratives, photographs, and films” (3). 
77 From a chapter called “On The Trial for Crimes Against Tribal Histories.”   
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to make sense of the historical violence that each takes as its central thread.   Instead, the 
interlaced narratives dwell on questions about how we can live in a world thus shattered and 
even find joy after experiences of such pain.   
Although dealing with such different horrors, The History of Love and The Plague of 
Doves both turn to, and help to craft, the genre of the braided narrative.  Both Krauss and 
Erdrich’s novels balance an engagement with the dark histories of attempted annihilation 
with an attention to the frustrations and joys of individual intimacies that we all might 
experience.  Each text spans the twentieth century, braiding together the experiences of 
multiple characters to trace the aftershock of historic trauma.   The History of Love follows 
two generations: first, character narrator Leo Gursky and focalized Zvi Litvinoff, two 
refugees from the “sometimes Pol[ish] and sometimes Russia[n]” town of Slonim, who end 
up in New York City and Valparaiso, Chile, respectively (7).  Second, Krauss twines these 
immigrant narratives with the first person voices of Alma and Bird, a sister and brother, two 
generations younger than Leo and Zvi.  The Plague of Doves chronicles the complex 
interrelations between the turn-of-the-century contact generation and their mid-twentieth 
century descendants who forge their relationships on the plains of what we might call North 
Dakota, but what Erdrich pushes us to see as the contested borderlands of not only the United 
States and Canada, but also the sovereign nations of Ojibwe and Métis peoples.  In Krauss 
and Erdrich’s novels, as in many braided narratives, historical collective pain radiates and 
refracts from moment to moment in personal intimacies, even decades later.  For both the 
novelists and their narrators, a faith in narrative, whether fiction or storytelling, becomes 
central to the project of forming meaningful attachments in a world so wrought with 
historical cruelty.  In The Plague of Doves, Erdrich proposes oral storytelling as a sister art to 
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music; while sound temporarily arrests her characters and then calls them toward a greater 
responsibility towards others, telling stories about shared history forces characters to both 
experience their story world differently and behave differently in it.  The History of Love, on 
the other hand, makes palpable the stakes of the silence associated with the Holocaust and 
puts forward a fiction-within-a-fiction, also called The History of Love, as the single most 
powerful force pulling characters towards touching human connections.  In both novels, the 
space between narrative threads, the twining together of distinct stories, pushes readers to 
face the way history still bleeds in the present and challenges us develop a type of 
responsibility that is attentive to different and possibly incommensurate human experiences.  
Importantly, both The History of Love and The Plague of Doves foreground a child-narrator 
who pushes readers toward a reading that attends to the interconnectedness among disparate 
narrative threads.   
Before focusing on the way in which Erdrich and Krauss craft the genre of the 
braided narrative to trace the potential for human attachments after such destruction, I outline 
the formal elements of the braided narrative and try to mark the ethical stakes of the genre.  
The definition I propose is more interested in drawing attention to a set of novels that 
although not usually discussed together seem to be doing similar work than in demarcating 
strict boundaries of what this genre is or isn’t.  Because many writers who are helping to 
mold the genre of the braided narrative are considered postmodern artists (“post-modern” is 
the slur Silko famously used to critique Erdrich’s Beet Queen), I pause to consider the 
braided narrative’s relationship to that period.78  While the novels considered here do grapple 
                                                
78 In her review, “Here’s An Odd Artifact for the Fairy-Tale Shelf” Leslie Marmon Silko 
argues that Erdrich’s postmodern style prevents adequate attention to historical material 
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with questions central to postmodern thought, I suggest that the braided narrative comes to 
different conclusions or moves the postmodern project towards a less nihilistic sense of 
attachment.  After sketching my formal understanding of braided narratives, I turn to their 
ethical work because I believe they foster an important sense of awareness and responsibility 
that is exigent in our contemporary moment because our world is burdened by the same 
historical violence that shadows Krauss and Erdrich’s novels.  Finally, I return to The Plague 
of Doves and The History of Love as two braided narratives that exemplify the way this genre 
can train readers both to “take in” history and to develop a sense of responsibility that is 
attentive to socially conditioned difference.  
BRAIDED NARRATIVE 
Formally, braided narratives have distinct narrators who tell different stories that both 
conflict and intertwine in the same story world. I hope that naming and tracing the 
characteristics of the braided narrative will bring due attention to a genre whose ethical work 
is especially important to our current political climate.  The drawings below should illustrate 
the complex intertwining of narrative threads in The History of Love and The Plague of 
Doves.   
                                                                                                                                                  
realities.  Silko writes, “Post-modern, self-referential writing reflects the isolation and 
alienation of the individual who shares nothing in common with other human beings but 
language and its hygienic grammatical mechanisms. Self-referential writing is light-years 
away from shared or communal experience that underlies oral narrative and modern fiction” 
(180).    
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   The History of Love (2005) Nicole Krauss    The Plague of Doves (2008) Louise Erdrich 
 
Figure 4: Drawings of the braided structure of The History of Love and The Plague of Doves 
In both drawings the braid represents a progression of discourse time; the top of the braid 
indicates the beginning of the novel, and the bottom illustrates the end.  Each narrator has a 
specific color, and the thickness of their strand is roughly proportionate to the length of that 
section of the novel; for instance, Leo and Alma each speak for longer chapters in the 
beginning of the History of Love than they do in the end.  In The Plague of Doves, Erdrich 
names her sections after her narrators, and Krauss marks her chapters with a series of 
identifying symbols, as you can see in the key.  Artists crafting the braided narrative vary in 
terms of how they allot pages to their narrators.  I refer Erdrich’s divisions as sections 
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because she allows some of her narrators multiple chapters, themselves separated by their 
own title and/ or an aviary/ floral symbol: .  Some of those chapters are divided into 
smaller subchapters, separated by the same symbol, which can be as short as a paragraph.  
Krauss, on the other hand, has her characters take chapter-long turns (with the exception of a 
final scene that I’ll focus on below), and lets each character determine the internal divisions: 
Leo mixes his creative writing with his narration, Alma numbers the notes in her journal, and 
Bird dates his diary entries.   
As the term and image imply, braided narratives must be comprised of multiple 
narratives that twine together to form a novel.  I’m thinking of narrative both in the classical 
sense as a story represented in discourse and the rhetorical sense that James Phelan explains 
as “somebody telling somebody else on some occasion and for some purpose(s) that 
something happened” (18). While the text of novels themselves stand as a single discourse 
designed by the implied author, the component narrative threads have different discursive 
voices. Each of Krauss’s three character narrators and a fourth character focalized in the third 
person tell different stories in different styles for different purposes. Leo wants recognition 
from someone, anyone, especially from the son who never met him; Alma struggles to help 
her family find happiness after her father’s death; Bird considers his religious callings; and 
Zvi, the focalized character, deals with his own decision to plagiarize Leo’s novel as his own. 
In The Plague of Doves as well, each of Erdrich’s character-narrators tell different stories in 
distinct voices for their individual reasons.  Evelina comes of age and comes out; Bazil courts 
Geraldine even as he recounts other’s histories; Marne Wolde tells of her relationship with 
Billy Peace; and Cordelia describes the twilight of Pluto.  Both novels are braided narratives 
because each narrator tells a particular and unique narrative. 
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 Braided narratives trouble the narratological distinction between discourse time and 
story time.  While these terms usually help us to distinguish the order of the telling from the 
chronology of the told, each narrator in braided narratives demands her own discourse time, 
which readers must comprehend in relation to the novel’s discourse time.  For instance, Leo 
begins The History of Love by unreliably narrating his story in chronological order beginning 
at the end of the summer of his eightieth year with brief analepses that share important 
moments of his past.  Although she takes her narrative turn after Leo, Alma narrates at a 
different discourse time than he; in her first chapter she indicates that she is already fifteen, 
an event that, we later learn will not occur until September 30th, at least a month after the 
discourse time of the majority of Leo’s chapters (38,170).  Further, fifteen pages into his 
story, Leo narrates a passing moment, that occurs in both his story and discourse present, 
where he meets a teenage girl in a tattered oversized sweatshirt (15).  Three quarters of the 
novel later, Alma, narrating from a discourse moment in the future, explains how she started 
attending art classes, which might make her the teenage girl Leo met earlier (193).  To make 
things more complicated, the sections that focalize Zvi Litvinoff, begin with his death and 
work backwards to his earlier life.  In braided narratives, readers must account for the novel’s 
discourse time (the way the words on the pages in the chapters progress) and the discourse 
time of each narrator, which, as Krauss’s novel illustrates, might not overlap.  In The Plague 
of Doves, the discourse time among all narrators seems to progress in chronologic order, but 
Erdrich has many narrators focalize or frame the accounts of other character’s stories, so the 
story time wavers between the discourse present in the mid 20th century and turn of the 
century period of the characters’ ancestors.  In Affective Narratology: The Emotional 
Structure of Stories (2011), Patrick Hogan proposes a descriptive distinction between 
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discourse and story.  He writes, “[a] story, descriptively characterized, is first of all a given 
reader’s intentional object built up from his or her experience of a particular discourse” 
(100).  In other words, the discourse is the author’s words on the page, and the story is how 
readers use those words to fill in and imagine a coherent story in our mind.  Because the 
words on the page literally represent the novel’s discourse, that is a shared category. The 
story, on the other hand, may vary individually from reader to reader even as we strive to 
collaborate with the author’s words to create a single story that finds coherence among the 
various narrators’ accounts.  Hogan’s understanding of this distinction can help us see how 
readers can become so imbricated in braided narratives.  Since the relationship between the 
various narrators’ discourses is so complex, readers must do a lot of imaginative work to 
make a story.    
In addition to telling multiple unique stories, braided narratives must also have 
multiple distinct narrators.  Krauss divides The History of Love among three character 
narrators and one omniscient narrator, and Erdrich balances The Plague of Doves among four 
different character narrators, and that eerie opening omniscience.  Toni Morrison famously 
divides Jazz (1992) among several different first person and third person narrators.  Karen 
Tei Yamashita splits The Tropic of Orange (1997) among seven narrative threads, two of 
which have identifiably distinct narrators: Gabriel narrates his sections in the first person, and 
a different third person, marked by its Spanglish street cred syntax, focalizes Bobby Ngu.  
Novels that do not enact both formal criteria do not participate fully in the genre and do not 
afford the ethical possibilities that I discuss below. For instance, many novels, such as 
several of Faulkner’s works, do have multiple narrators, but they collaborate to tell the same 
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story rather than distinct narratives.79  Likewise, in Barbara Kingsolver’s The Poisonwood 
Bible (1998), the Price women take turns telling their stories as they relate to the father’s 
folly. In these examples, characters do narrate from their own perspectives, but they center 
their contributions on a shared experience that functions as a single plot line rather than 
focusing on distinct, seemingly unrelated, stories. Novels that have several story lines but a 
single narrator are not braided narratives either. For instance, although Helena Maria 
Viramontes’s Their Dogs Came with Them and Leslie Marmon Silko’s The Almanac of The 
Dead do focus on multiple stories, they each have a single narrator.80  
The formal emphasis on difference, in both perspective and plot, affirms the braided 
narrative’s intervention into how we imagine collective experience.  Novels with single 
narrators and protagonists tend to shore up the legal emphasis on individuality associated 
with nation-states in the liberal Western tradition.  As Critical Legal Studies scholar Mark 
Kelman points out,  
                                                
79 To my mind, Faulkner’s novels often focus relentlessly on the same series of events or on 
anxiety about the mysterious dark space Faulkner associates with women: all the narrators of 
As I Lay Dying (1930) work together to narrate the burial of Addie Bundren. In the same 
vein, the narrators of The Sound and the Fury (1929) all contribute to Faulkner’s obsession 
with the female reproductive system as they each express fascination with or a desire to 
control the sexual activities and uterine spaces of the Compson women.   
80 The desire to tell multiple stories is not new, but the addition of multiple narrators might 
be.  In George Eliot’s Middlemarch, a single beloved narrator guides us between three 
distinct narratives, and a single narrator leads us through the many stories that collide in 
Victor Hugo’s Les Misérables.    
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[t]he synthetic individualist tradition that liberal legalism both reflects and 
recreates helps to fool us into believing that we ought always to be able to 
imagine concrete individual dyads, particular paired persons, one burdened 
party owing a duty to the other rights holder, a hypothetical plaintiff and a 
defendant in a law suit. (279) 
By emphasizing the interrelationship between distinct stories of multiple narrators, braided 
narratives trouble this easy dyad.  However, braided narratives are not just about expanding 
the legal relationship from a dyad to a plurality; rather, this genre tries to shift the very way 
we imagine human beings as connected.  Critical Race Scholar Patricia Williams offers an 
example that describes this necessary turn: 
Imagine a glass half full (or half empty) of blue marbles. Their very hard-
edged, discrete, yet identical nature makes it possible for the community of 
blue marbles to say to one another with perfect consistency both "we are all 
the same" and, if a few roll away and are lost in a sidewalk grate, "that's just 
their experience, fate, choice, bad luck." If, on the other hand, one imagines a 
glass full of soap-bubbles, with shifting permeable boundaries, expanding and 
contracting in size like a living organism, then it is not possible for the 
collective bubbles to describe themselves as "all the same." Furthermore, if 
one of the bubbles bursts, it cannot be isolated as a singular phenomenon. It 
will be felt as a tremor, a realignment, a reclustering among all. (546) 
Braided narratives embrace Williams’s soap-bubbles concept.  Unlike the marbles that read 
themselves as equal and therefore the same because of a rigid rubric of individual rights, 
narrators and focalized characters within braided narratives insist on their particularity even 
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as their authors pushes readers to understand their connectedness.  For instance, Louise 
Erdrich’s Tracks (1988) may seem to fall into the dyadic structure facilitated by the liberal 
model of the nation-state because it has only two narrators, Nanapush and Pauline, who do 
give each other much grievance.  However, Erdrich crafts her novel so that both narrators not 
only tell their own stories, but also unwillingly and conflictingly collaborate to focalize 
Fleur’s.  As much as Pauline and Nanapush hate each other and wish the other would roll 
away through the sidewalk grate, Erdrich emphasizes how their stories and Fleur’s shake, 
tremble, and reform because of the experiences of the others.  Importantly, Williams does not 
intend the idea of multiple soap-bubbles to preclude an understanding that membership in a 
particular group privileges some soap-bubbles at the expense of others.  The formal structure 
of braided narratives also positions that genre to highlight the way inequities tend to ascribe 
to socially constructed group lines, as we have seen in the way The Plague of Doves stitches 
the insidious logic of lynching into the subsequent tellings of the opening scene’s violence.          
Because of their interconnected soap-bubble nature, braided narratives cannot be 
called short story cycles, as some have claimed.  Although scholarship on this genre is 
varied, most established theorists, such as James Nagel, describe the short story cycle as a 
literary form where “each component work must stand alone (with a beginning, middle, and 
end) yet be enriched in the context of the interrelated stories” (15).  James Joyce’s Dubliners 
(1914) and Richard Wright’s Uncle Tom’s Children (1938) epitomize the short story cycle 
because each constituent story in those respective works can be read, studied, and enjoyed on 
its own although the companion stories do enrich the thematic threads.  Like words in 
English sentences, each story in a short story cycle can stand alone, with its own sense, 
meaning and significance—they function as discrete interchangeable pieces, like blue 
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marbles.  The strands of a braided narrative, on the other hand, are more like units in 
polysynthetic languages where several variable morphemes constitute a single nuanced word 
that itself can function as a sentence.  Although some parts of Plague of Doves appeared first 
as short stories in publications such as The New Yorker and The Atlantic Monthly, Erdrich 
does not incorporate them in the omnibus nature characteristic of the short story cycle.  
Rather, she amends, embeds, and inflects them in such a way that they become tangled with 
the novel’s plot strands.  In fact, Erdrich wrote the important scene between character 
narrator Bazil Coutts and his wife Geraldine that I discuss at the close of this chapter only for 
the novel.  Although braided narratives are comprised of several distinct narratives, those 
stories cannot usually “stand alone” as Nagel claims of the short story cycle.  Instead, the 
writers of the genre tend to divide the various narratives into small fragments and intertwine 
them with pieces from other narrators.  Even if we only read a single narrator’s contributions, 
we’d miss much of the plot, which readers can fill in based on information shared by the 
other narrators.  For instance, in The History of Love, we would not fully understand what 
happened to Leo’s manuscript if it weren’t for the chapters focalizing Zvi Litvinoff.  
Similarly, in The Plague of Doves, we only understand Bazil’s allusions to history because 
Evelina spells out the history for us in her sections.  Further, braided narratives require 
multiple narrators, which is not essential to the short story cycle tradition.  Some of the most 
well-known short story cycles have a single narrator whether that is a character narrator as in 
Sarah Orne Jewett’s Country of the Pointed Firs (1896), a consistent third-person as in 
Sherwood Anderson’s Winesburg, Ohio (1919), or a regular frame such as in the northern 
narrator who frames character narrator Uncle Julian’s stories in Charles Chesnutt’s The 
Conjure Woman (1899).  Finally, the component narratives of short story cycles do not need 
 271 
to belong in the same story world.  In Richard Wright’s Uncle Tom’s Children and James 
Joyce’s The Dubliners, the stories clearly “enrich” each other with their thematic tones, but 
we do not expect to meet any recurring characters we work through the cycles (Nagel 15).  
That all the narrative threads of a given braided narratives take place in the same story world 
help to make that genre a novel. The short story cycle, on the other hand, is usually 
understood, as Forrest Ingram proposed, as a spectrum bounded by collected stories on one 
side and the novel on the other.   
Braided narratives are necessarily novels not only because, as Bakhtin points out, the 
novel “incorporates other [genres] into its own peculiar structure”, but also because braided 
narratives do the work often attributed to novels, such as imagining communities as Benedict 
Anderson has explained and narrating personality as Suzanne Langer has noted (Bakhtin 5; 
Langer 286).  Anderson argues that the novel and the newspaper are “two forms of imagining 
which first flowered in Europe in the eighteenth century…. For these forms provided the 
technical means for ‘re-presenting’ the kind of imagined community that is the nation” (25).  
In particular, Anderson asserts that novels help people imagine an interconnection among 
multiple anonymous individuals living in the same period in a nationally defined physical 
space.  More specifically, Lynn Hunt isolates the eighteenth century epistolary novel as a 
particular form that helped Europeans to imagine “a new form of empathy” that facilitated 
the emergence of rights rhetoric associated with modern nation-states (38).  Braided 
narratives do help readers to imagine community, but they do not ascribe to the geographic or 
temporal boundaries that Anderson associates with the genre.  Both Erdrich and Krauss’s 
novels span multiple generations and multiple nations foregrounding the profound influence 
history has on the present and drawing a horizon that transcends the nation-state.  In The 
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History of Love, Krauss follows the older generation from the small town of Slonim to the 
streets of New York City and the cafés of Valparaíso Chile, and allows her younger 
generation to imagine their mother’s youth in England and to visit their grandparents in 
Israel.  Erdrich positions her story world at the border of multiple nation-states: the settler-
colonies of the U.S. and Canada, the sovereign nations of the Ojibwe and the Métis national 
movement led by Louis Riel.  Like The Plague of Doves and The History of Love, many 
braided narratives embrace an interest in characters simultaneously connected across and 
separated by time and national borders.  For instance, Mitchell’s Cloud Atlas jumps from a 
Californian in mid-nineteenth century New Zealand to an artificially intelligent “fabricant” in 
a future East Asian state, stopping in 1930s Belgium, 1970s California, and contemporary 
Britain in between.  So, just as the epistolary novel may be the key form of the 18th century 
emergence of nation-states, the braided narrative may be a central genre that helps 
contemporary readers to imagine a globalized interconnectedness.  In both periods, however, 
the broader category of the novel pushes readers to imagine community by inviting us to join 
the fictional experience of characters who seem as if they could possibly inhabit our own 
social world.  Just as the eponymous heroines of Julie, Pamela, and Clarissa helped 
Europeans to broaden their understanding of who belonged in their communities and 
deserved similar rights in Hunt’s argument, the diverse narrators of braided narratives help 
contemporary readers to reconsider the conceptual and geographic boundaries of our own 
imagined communities.  
Even two centuries after the formative moment Anderson and Hunt discuss, the novel 
remains an important aesthetic force for imagining connectivity, perhaps because of the 
immersive nature of story worlds, a key characteristic that make braided narratives novels.  
 273 
In 1953, Langer argued, “the novel is particularly suited to formulate our modern life by 
taking our most pervasive interest for its theme—the evaluation and the hazards of 
personality” (286).  By attending to the individual lives of characters in the context of “the 
social order,” Langer argues novels help us to face the “[u]nfamiliar feelings” engendered by 
our historical moment that “make us afraid of ourselves and each other” (286-7).  Braided 
narratives embrace this interest in personality by foregrounding multiple distinct narrators 
and negotiate a social order where connections and challenges transcend national boundaries.  
In tacit acknowledgement of Langer’s argument that “above all the novel [is] our staple 
poetic diet” many publishers label novels as such on the cover (286).  Since 2006 Erdrich’s 
current publisher, Harper Collins, has labeled almost all her novels “a novel.”81 Like Harper 
Collins, Norton, Penguin, Random House and others use this strategy for many of their 
contemporary authors.  Readers also read braided narratives as novels (in chronologic order 
and all the way through) partially because constituent narratives take place in the same story 
world even as they focus on different stories.  The way braided narratives play with the 
discourse story distinction is only possible because the texts push readers to imagine that the 
multiple stories intersect in a single story world.  In both Krauss’ The History of Love and 
Erdrich’s The Plague of Doves, we anticipate possible meetings between the characters.  In 
both novels, the first narrator describes the second narrator without naming them, priming the 
readers to look for interconnections among the stories.  This expectation that narrators may 
be background characters in other narrator’s sections is a common characteristic of braided 
narratives.  In Zadie Smith's NW (2012), also labeled a novel, we look for Leah and Natalie 
                                                
81 Before 2006, Erdrich’s novels were not labeled novels.  After 2006 editions of previously 
published novels, as well as new novels, have been labeled as such.   
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to turn up in Felix's section in ways we don't expect the various characters from Joyce’s 
Dubliners to show up in each other's stories.  Further, in The Year of the Flood, we are not 
surprised to learn that one focalized character appears as a character in another narrator’s 
section.  This expectation to find seemingly unrelated characters in other character’s sections 
facilitates the imaginative work that Anderson and Hunt first imagined.  Rather than helping 
readers to broaden their community from those they recognize in their parish to those who 
identify with a similar nation, braided narratives push us to expect connections even among 
diverse and disconnected characters. 
PAUSE FOR POSTMODERN PLAY 
Before turning to the ethical work of braided narratives, we should pause briefly to 
consider this genre’s relationship to the postmodern period for a few reasons.  First, many 
have claimed that postmodern aesthetics emerged to negotiate our contemporary social 
experience, and insofar as I believe braided narratives do just that, they must be in 
conversation with the postmodern project.  Second, fragmentation is both a major organizing 
principle of braided narratives and a central trope of postmodern fiction.  Finally, as I have 
indicated, many authors crafting the braided narrative get critically (in both senses of the 
word) glossed as postmodern artists. My purpose here is not as much to prove that the writers 
I associate with the braided narrative are not postmodern as to trace the ways in which this 
genre develops or moves beyond the theorized horizons of the postmodern project.  The 
primary point of departure is the phenomenological relationship between the present and 
history, which, as Silko’s critique of Erdrich suggests, has important ramifications for 
understanding individuals as both subjects and as members of groups.         
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Braided narratives do not fully embody the aesthetics and epistemology Jameson and 
others associate with the postmodern period.  First, postmodernism usually presupposes, as 
Jameson writes, “some radical break or coupure, generally traced back to the end of the 
1950s or the early 1960s” (1).  Brian McHale, tongue only partly in cheek, locates this shift 
“in or about 1966” not only because Italian architects began their postmodern musings then, 
but also because that year witnessed Andy Warhol’s Silver Clouds, Pynchon’s The Crying of 
Lot 49, a plethora of “rock breakthroughs” and many other innovations in art and literature 
(406, 401).  This revolution in the art world reflects a wider skepticism and ultimate break 
with the Western enlightenment idea of progress; as Lyotard explains, “[t]his idea of progress 
as possible, probable or necessary was rooted in the certainty that the development of arts, 
technology, knowledge, and liberty would be profitable to mankind as a whole” and was 
believed to lead to a universal “emancipation of mankind” (Lyotard 1934).  The cataclysmic 
events of the twentieth century refute this hopeful notion, and instead assert a human aptitude 
for annihilation that Lyotard and others acknowledge through the place name “Auschwitz.”  
Braided narratives also broach mankind’s potential for destruction, but do so in ways that 
don’t “stall out” as McHale says of Bob Dylan, the Beatles, and The Crying of Lot 49 or 
“break down” as Andreas Killen titles his book on the period (406,7).  Perhaps, this is 
because some of the artists crafting braided narratives work with a history that already had 
rejected the grand narrative of progress and realized the potential for human aggression and 
destruction long before the twentieth century.  As Erdrich understands, for many Indigenous 
tribes, the world-altering rift began in 1492 and devastated in waves as settlement wormed its 
way across the continent.  As Morrison remembers, Black people wrestled with slavery in the 
Americas for centuries longer than they have struggled in freedom.  Helena Maria 
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Viramontes condemns the continuing legacy of the Spanish conquest in the title of her novel 
Their Dogs Came With Them (2007) and Maxine Hong Kingston confronts the ghosts that 
continue to haunt this land in Woman Warrior: Memoir of a Girlhood Among Ghosts (1976).  
Five centuries of facing such destruction creates a certain sense of what Gerald Vizenor calls 
survivance; he writes “[t]he shimmers of imagination are reason and the simulations are 
survivance, not dominance; an aesthetic restoration of trickster hermeneutics, the stories of 
liberation and survivance without the dominance of closure” (14). For Vizenor, survivance 
embraces a comic turn that not only asserts survival in the face of repeated attempted 
extermination but also refutes the tragic narrative structures that the social sciences turn to to 
write the history of Native peoples.82  This sort of survivance aesthetic not only 
acknowledges the long history of annihilation, but also embraces and elicits a sort of joie de 
vivre not associated with the burnout of the 1960s and 70s art that McHale interrogates.  
Although Vizenor participates in postmodern theorizing, I see his ideas as marking an 
important point of departure both because he roots his theory in the trickster tradition, which 
has strong links to the past, and because his turn to comedy asserts the affect of joy.  Krauss, 
who writes after and in the shadow of the Holocaust, the event that marks for postmodern 
theory the ultimate rupture of Western experience, does not rely on the tragic mode that 
usually holds art addressing that history.  Instead, Krauss draws on hopeful humor similar to 
that which Vizenor associates survivance.       
                                                
82 Vizenor notes that “[Alan] Velie was the first scholar to observe the comic and ironic 
themes in Native American Indian literature.  His interpretations were literary, a wise 
departure from the surveillance of the social sciences.  The tribes were tragic, never comic, or 
ironic, in the literature of dominance” (79).    
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Erdrich plays with architecture, the field that pioneered postmodern art, to foreground 
her investment in history through the very stage of her story world.  Many scenes in The 
Plague of Doves, notably in the closing chapter, take place under “[t]he granite façade, 
arched windows, and twenty-foot ceilings” of the 4-B’s Café (295).  The odd design of 
Pluto’s town-center would fascinate Jameson who finds “the random cannibalization of all 
the styles of the past, the play of random stylistic allusion” central to his concept of pastiche 
(10).  Although the 4-B’s décor appears random, Erdrich mixes history into the very mortar 
of the walls themselves.83  What Jameson poses as simulacrum Erdrich shapes as the 
sedimented original.  Evelina explains that “[t]he restaurant had once been the National Bank 
of Pluto” and describes its elaborate turn-of-the-century architecture:  
The ceilings were high and the lights hung down on elegant brass fixtures 
fixed to decorative scalloped plaster bowls.  There were brass rails along the 
counters and the floors were old terrazzo, the walls sheeted with marble, and 
in the corners there were a set of dignified marble half columns. (190)   
When the bank folded in the mid-fifties, subsequent owners layered on their era’s style.  
Evelina points to the café’s sign: “four B’s hooked together, an old livestock brand belonging 
to the first owner,” perhaps an artifact from the cattle industry central to North Dakota’s early 
economy (190).  Evelina notes the clash between this ranching relic and the bumblebee 
                                                
83 Although the 4-B’s Café seems a direct pun on postmodern architecture, it also participates 
in a broader argument Erdrich makes about history that is larger than a periodization dispute.  
In Four Souls, the sequel to Tracks, Erdrich builds the logging company owner’s house out 
of the very timber stolen from the woods surrounding Matchimanito Lake in the earlier 
novel. 
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theme that the 1960s owners contributed: “[b]ees here, bees there, bees printed on the 
napkins.  The waitresses wore yellow shirts with black pants or skirts, our ‘uniform’” (190).  
When we visit the café again in the early eighties of the last chapter, we don’t think twice 
about the ornate architecture leftover from the early bank, the rustic repurposed livestock 
brand, or the gaudy bees.  Instead, this historic spot now “serves as office space for town 
council and hobby club members, meeting place for church society and card playing groups” 
and, tellingly, the workplace of Pluto’s Historical Society (296).  While the 4-B’s Café does 
display a historical eclecticism, it cannot be called postmodern architecture, which as 
Jameson tells us “randomly and without principle but with gusto cannibalizes all the 
architectural styles of the past and combines them in overstimulating ensembles” (11). Rather 
than fetishizing historical styles while effacing history as a referent altogether as Jameson 
suggests, Erdrich layers her stage with the historical sets of past scenes, enriching every 
narrative moment with its historical depth.   
Just as the 4-B’s Café makes present multiple eras of Pluto’s history, so too do 
braided narratives invite us to hold the past together with the present.  Erdrich’s play with the 
pastiche of postmodern architecture takes a more somber turn as she crafts the Pluto Town 
Cemetery, where Bazil worked before becoming a lawyer and tribal judge.  There, the 
various styles of preceding periods collect under the moss of the headstones and monuments.  
More importantly, the manager learns the particular history of each person interred there, but 
Erdrich’s spatial investment in time extends into the future as well as the past.  In the same 
tour of the cemetery’s history, the manager observes that Bazil’s family’s plot has room for 
his future family, a thought that “seemed far off and laughable then, but as time has passed I 
have become increasingly grateful that those places next to my ancestors lie empty and 
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waiting” (275).  For Erdrich, history is not only built into the physical world of the present, 
but also generations from the past and future haunt each moment.   
 The investment in the presence of history that Erdrich makes manifest in the 4-B’s 
Café is a central feature of the narrative structure of braided narratives.  History is not just the 
spatial stage of Erdrich’s novels, but the central thread and conflict that all her characters 
must confront— as Evelina says, “I think of how history works itself out in the living” (243). 
Jameson writes that postmodern art is realist only to the extent that it describes a “new and 
original historical situation in which we are condemned to seek History by way of our own 
pop images and simulacra of that history, which itself remains forever out of reach” (15).  
The narratives of The History of Love and The Plague of Doves waver relentlessly between 
the historical generations that survived horrific traumas of the Holocaust and lynching and a 
contemporary generation that tries to understand that very present historical presence.  For 
Erdrich, history not only calls to her narrators, asking to be told, but also courses through the 
veins of her characters.  The violence of the past plays such a large role in the novel that 
history becomes a character itself that other characters must acknowledge. Braided narratives 
and postmodernism both confront a history in which annihilation is a real threat and an 
epistemology in which we cannot really fully know a single truth, but they respond 
differently. While the postmodern project dwells on these fissures between perspectives, 
braided narratives strive to bridge them.  Both postmodern aesthetics and braided narratives 
recognize a rupture between our ability to know each other and the world, but braided 
narratives see that abyss as a “potential space” for meaning-making pretense.  As we have 
seen contemporary psychoanalysts have built on Winnicott’s concept of “potential space” to 
develop theories of intersubjectivity, which, as I’ll explain in greater detail below, I see as the 
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third term that can help us best understand the ethical work of braided narratives beyond the 
postmodern project.   
Postmodern aesthetics attempt to represent an epistemological shattering through “the 
death of the subject,” “schizophrenic writing,” or a “breakdown in the signifying chain” 
where coherent meaning gets lost (Jameson 8,15). Although the structure of braided 
narratives can be called fragmented because we do not get anyone’s full story, the subjects 
who narrate are not themselves fragmented in the sense of Pynchon’s Slothrop or other 
postmodern anti-heroes.  Rather, both Krauss and Erdrich’s characters narrate with a fierce 
desire for recognition of their subjectivity; as Leo Gurksy unapologetically puts it on the first 
page of The History of Love, “I try to make a point of being seen” (3).  Although Krauss’s 
characters do struggle with experiences of being invisible or hollow, they never lose their 
mimetic status as possible people or indicate an awareness of themselves as characters.  Just 
as Erdrich challenged postmodern aesthetics through the architecture of the 4-Bs Café, she 
questions the “death of the subject” by concretizing the theory in Evelina’s “Entropy”-like 
college experience.  After trying acid, Evelina realizes, “what a slim rail I walked.  I had lost 
my unifier of sensations, lost mind, lost confidence in my own control over my sanity” (225). 
The drug trip weakened Evelina’s ability to cohere her experiences into a single narrative, 
just as high postmodern literature resists comprehensible interpretations in an effort to 
represent the decentered subject.  The fragmentation of Evelina’s psyche worsens during her 
internship and eventual internment in a mental hospital where she fears  
[l]osing my observer, the self that tells me what to do.  My consciousness is 
fragile ground, shaky as forming ice.  Every morning, when I open my eyes 
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and experience my first thought I am flooded with relief.  The I is still here.  If 
it goes, there will be only gravity (241).   
Through Evelina, Erdrich illustrates the pain and fear associated with the dissolution of a 
particular subject and demonstrates what the theory would look like if it were real.  Evelina 
clings to a particular I in an effort to ground herself in this world.  Corwin’s violin music 
ultimately helps her to build a “whole” self around that fragile core.  Corwin’s solo helps 
Evelina to acknowledge her small, but complete, self in relation to the larger, immense 
world, a connectedness she lost after her acid trip. Evelina gains a “dark assurance” from the 
chords that claims an outside reality regardless of her mental state (246).  The music itself 
not only helps Evelina to center herself as a small individual in relation to a greater emotion, 
but also empowers her to leave the mental hospital.  In the car ride home, Evelina comes out 
to Corwin, putting words to an important aspect of her identity that we may have suspected 
since her sixth grade crush on her teacher, Sister Mary Anita.  Although Erdrich 
acknowledges the allure of postmodern fragmentation, she ultimately allows her characters to 
find a sense of wholeness and interconnection through music, an important art form that 
we’ll develop more below.  Importantly, Evelina’s recentering not only helps her to come 
out, but also prepares her to share the description of the braided narrative, where she asserts 
“that some of us have mixed in the spring of our existence both guilt and victim, there is no 
unraveling the rope” (243).  The knotted rope that is a braided narrative depends on multiple 
subjects, not the shattering of a single subject. 
ETHICS AND INTERSUBJECTIVITY    
While all narrative situations are themselves ethical (in the sense that we can refuse 
recognition as easily as putting the book down and that every set of human attachments 
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inflects with a certain ethical tension), braided narratives facilitate a particularly challenging 
ethical work.  On the one hand, the strategy of shifting narrators draws on our readerly 
tendency to identify with the various protagonists, but it also repeatedly distances us, 
positioning us again and again as listeners, respondents to new and different calls.  Each time 
we shift narrators in the braided narrative, a new character tugs on the reader’s sleeve with a 
new desire, like Leo’s, to be seen.  As those various narrative threads “expose themselves,” 
in Newton’s words, over the course of their sections their calls evolve into particular claims, 
whether those claims are explicitly voiced by a character as in Leo’s plea for recognition or 
evoked by the narrative situation such as the issue of plagiarism in the sections focalizing Zvi 
Litvinoff (22).  The representation and formal structure of repeated narrative situations 
emphasizes the sense of narrative ethics that Newton discusses.  While Newton draws on 
philosophies of Emmanuel Levinas, Stanley Cavell, and Mikhail Bakhtin to theorize the 
ethical ramifications of narrative, Phelan has delineated a schema we might use to see how 
particular ethical questions arise from the texts themselves.  He identifies four ethical 
positions in narrative: first, “that of the characters within the story world,” second, “that of 
the narrator in relation to the telling, to the told, and to the audience,” third, “that of the 
implied author in relation to the telling, the told, and the authorial audience,” and fourth, 
“that of the flesh-and-blood reader in relation to the set of values, beliefs, and locations 
operating in situations 1-3” (Phelan 23).   Phelan’s schema helps us to differentiate between 
the ethical claims characters pose within the story world, the ethical ambiguities that arise in 
the various narrative situations, and the way those interrelated challenges contribute to the 
ethical work of particular novels.       
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In braided narratives, readers find ourselves claimed by not one, but multiple 
narratives, resulting in a complicated layering of calls that we must negotiate in order to even 
make sense of the novel.  With each new narrator, we not only get to see the story from a 
particular perspective, but also are arrested with a new and different appeal—to listen, to 
respond, to witness, even to resist.  These multiple narrators claim us in the first ethical 
dimension; they pull us to feel different pleas or to recognize different subjects.  The 
intersections and overlaps between narratives however emphasize the second ethical 
dimension of ought or responsibility.  Even as we try to make sense out of the relationship 
between two narrative strands, we must develop some criteria with which to evaluate the 
different events and characters.  Often certain character narrators help us develop these 
criteria.  In The History of Love, we hold Leo’s call in mind as we turn to subsequent 
narrators who raise distinct questions and concerns.  Grappling with the sometimes 
conflicting relationship of these various calls not only helps us to find coherence in the novel, 
but also pushes us to develop a sensibility of response that resonates among all narrators.  In 
Krauss’s novel the major characters feel called to and compelled by the fiction-within-the-
fiction, also called The History of Love, that eighty-year-old Leo originally composed for his 
childhood sweetheart.  Because the second narrator, adolescent Alma, draws our attention to 
the significance of this text-within-the-text, certain details become salient in other characters’ 
sections.  Alma’s questions about the novel-within-the-novel orient readers both to interpret 
the plot level connections between sections and to regard the various narrators’ actions and 
narrative choices.  Just as Alma’s inquiry did in The History of Love, Evelina’s questions in 
The Plague of Doves, alert readers to relevant details in other character’s sections.  To make 
things more complicated, many narrators position themselves as the audience of oral stories, 
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readers of others’ texts, and even as tellers of other characters’ testimonies.  The characters 
who narrate their own experience as narratees model for us how we might respond to the 
multiple raconteurs.  In The History of Love, many characters are arrested by text-within-the-
text’s heroine, also named Alma.  In Erdrich’s The Plague of Doves, we only learn the story 
of the lynching because Evelina solicits the story from her grandfather, and the questions she 
asks about it orient readers as we traverse through the many narrators’ sections.   
The formal structure of braided narratives, which kaleidoscopally expand narrative 
situations, complicate Phelan’s schema of ethical situations. Braided narratives not only 
multiply his  “ethical positions” by the number of narrators, but also create a productive 
tension between situations and narrators.  For instance, we can consider Phelan’s second 
position “that of the narrator” not only in relation to what she tells, but also in relation to 
what the other narrators tell.  In The History of Love, because we know of character-narrator 
Leo’s fierce desire for recognition, we might evaluate Zvi’s act of plagiarism more harshly.  
Similarly, in the penultimate chapter of The Plague of Doves, Bazil acknowledges his formal 
lover’s racism.  When that character, called C in Bazil’s section, becomes the narrator of the 
final section, we may hold her account of events to a different moral rubric because of 
Bazil’s convincing assessment.  Appreciating the ethical power of the braided narrative is not 
just a matter of calculating the particular quirks of each added narrator, but also the ethical 
engagement is a function of the genre itself.  In order to even address Phelan’s third position, 
“that of the implied author in relation to the telling, the told, and the authorial audience,” we 
must first make sense out of the complex interrelations between the various narrator’s 
tellings and tolds (23).  The work of sorting through this tangled web of interrelations and 
interlocked, but discrete, claims imbricates the reader in the intersubjective world of the text.  
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Even as we evaluate characters according to the ever-evolving ethical rubric of the novel, we 
begin to question also, our own connection and complicity.  
The way in which the tension between multiple subjects can become a web that 
includes the reader becomes clearest for me through the concept of intersubjectivity 
particularly as theorized by feminist psychoanalyst Jessica Benjamin, who built on 
Winnicott’s theory of “potential space.”  In “Recognition and Destruction,” Benjamin 
describes the process through which an infant learns that her mother has different needs, 
desires, and decisions and is not under the omnipotent control of the child.  This momentary 
and fleeting recognition of another person’s subjectivity in tension with one’s own is 
intersubjectivity.    Importantly, intersubjectivity depends on a difference between 
subjectivities just as braided narratives require multiple distinct narrative voices.  This 
recognition of difference makes possible the recognition of the self.  Infant psychologist 
Daniel Stern noticed a related phenomenon in his observations of mother infant play.  He 
noticed that when mothers play with their infants they do not mimic exactly the activity of 
the child, but rather, make music in harmony with the infant.  Stern calls this affective 
attunement, which he defines as “the performance of behaviors that express … the feeling of 
a shared affect state without imitating the exact behavioral expression of the inner state” 
(142).  In order to communicate shared feeling, mothers and infants make different but 
compatible sounds and expressions.  In braided narratives, each character narrator claims 
space in a subject position and invites the reader to share their perspective for a while.  As 
readers move from one narrative to the next, we inhabit multiple subjectivities and negotiate 
the space between them.  As we hold each narrative thread in mind, we can hear the harmony 
or the discord between the distinct narrative strands.  This space between stories, the distance 
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between experiences, the jarring transition between narrators creates the sense of 
fragmentation that causes many to tag the genre as postmodern; however, intersubjective 
theory gives us different language to negotiate that rupture.  
   Any novel can invite an intersubjective relationship between the author and the 
reader as the latter brings the former’s imagination to life in their mind.  Novels featuring 
character narrators add another level to this potential intersubjectivity, as readers explore the 
narrator’s mind via the text. Occasionally cunning and compelling character narrators ask us 
to assimilate their world-view and ethical stance entirely, in which case the intersubjectivity 
exists mostly between our mind and the author’s as we imagine her creation.  Narrators like 
these ask us to set aside our own perspective and see the world completely through their 
eyes, even when the author wants us to resist that temptation. It is precisely this allure that 
makes Lolita such a fascinating text for scholars of narrative theory.  While most novels 
invite intersubjectivity insofar as they ask readers to adopt the narrator or protagonist’s 
subjectivity, braided narratives take the project further in multiple directions.  We must not 
only adopt a new subjectivity with each new narrator, but also account for the third space 
created between the narrative voices.  Braided narratives both formally manifest Levinas’ 
“facing position, opposition par excellence” insofar as multiple narratives face and oppose 
each other and position readers as a third inviting us to hold the different narratives together 
in our mind (196).  We must negotiate that complex terrain of thirdness to even make sense 
of the novel as a whole.  Braided formally shift the narrative perspective from one character’s 
mind to another.  Rather than assimilating a single character’s perspective, readers must 
negotiate the intersubjective field between the many fictional minds.  In braided narratives, 
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we not only engage the author’s mind, but also become engrossed in the varying ways her 
characters relate to each other and the story world.   
THE PLAGUE OF DOVES AND THE HISTORY OF LOVE 
In her analysis of Middlemarch, Kay Young explains how George Eliot “uses the 
metaphors of voice, deafness, musicality, and attunement to sound” to propose “a physical 
solution to the problem of other minds” (77).  Asking, as Eliot does, whether we can truly 
know the mind of another or probing, as Cavell does, whether we can feel another’s pain are 
necessarily questions of intersubjectivity: is there a space where our two subjectivities can 
co-exist in harmony with each other?  The sense of sound that Young traces in Eliot’s 
exposition of these questions also draws our attention to the central conceit of the ethical 
thought I have drawn on, which imagines the claim of the other as a call, an aural cry that 
actually penetrates us with the literal vibrations of another’s appeal.  Both Erdrich and 
Krauss turn to sound as a central trope of intersubjectivity and ethics.  For Erdrich sound 
represents that foundational dimension of ethics that Nussbaum imagines as an awareness 
and perception of the invisible strands that pull people toward each other.  For Krauss, like 
many authors after the Holocaust, the absence of sound illustrates the foreclosure of 
intersubjectivity constituted by the historic refusal to hear or see that devastation.  Both 
Erdrich and Krauss foreground the art of narrative as a medium central to facilitating the 
second ethical dimension that Nussbaum understands as responsibility.  Erdrich figures the 
ethical work of narrative trough the representation of storytelling within her novel even as 
she practices it in her prose.  Krauss has her characters turn to the eponymous fiction-within-
a-fiction to assert the power of narrative that she demonstrates in her novel. Erdrich and 
Krauss reflect their ethical arguments in the formal structure of the novels themselves.  As 
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braided narratives, The Plague of Doves and The History of Love twine together separate 
narrative strands in the same way that an orchestra conjures a symphony out of the distinct 
melodies of varied instruments.  Just as a physical sound must enter our mind for us to hear 
another’s call, braided narratives fill our imaginations with layered, co-occurring, and 
sometimes conflicting stories.  Each narrative thread asks us to attend to the particular plea of 
an individual subject, and even as these stories multiply into a chorus or cacophony of claims 
we must develop provisional and ever-evolving rubrics to evaluate, respond to, and make 
sense of these various calls.  Developing and altering this tenuous criteria trains readers in the 
second ethical dimension that Nussbaum understands as responsibility.  In this way, braided 
narratives help readers to develop a sensibility of response that resonates across different 
subjectivities.           
In The Plague of Doves, Erdrich celebrates music as both a conceptual model of 
braided narratives and the trope of intersubjectivity.  Judge Antone Bazil Coutts attempts to 
use words, however inadequate, to explain the remarkable power of sound embodied in 
Shamengwa’s violin music: 
Here I come to some trouble with words.  The inside became the outside when 
Shamengwa played music.  Yet inside to outside does not half sum it up.  The 
music was more than music—at least what we are used to hearing.  The music 
was feeling itself.  The sound connected instantly with something deep and 
joyous.  Those powerful moments of true knowledge that we have to paper 
over with daily life.  The music tapped the back of our terrors, too.  Things 
we’d lived through and didn’t want to ever repeat.  Shredded imaginings, 
unadmitted longings, fear and also surprising pleasures.  No, we can’t live at 
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that pitch.  But every so often something shatters like ice and we are in the 
river of our existence.  We are aware.  And this realization was in the music, 
somehow, or in the way Shamengwa played it.  (Erdrich 196). 
Bazil claims “music was feeling itself” (196).  He describes the unsettling art of Métis elder, 
Shamengwa, whose music can penetrate the habituated individuality of human life, pushing 
people to the precipice of their deepest emotions regardless of their valence, and sometimes 
sweeping people away in a shared stream of collective knowing.  The transcendent powers of 
violin chords echo through the pages of Erdrich’s novel; the music stops murders and 
motivates escapes, brings unbridled joy and acknowledges desperate pain, arrests characters 
and moves them to action.  In this passage, Erdrich gives Bazil the same word to describe the 
unique plane where Shamengwa’s music transports its audience.  But Erdrich does not assign 
this power to music alone.  Raw sounds— non-verbal cries— share the ability to penetrate 
characters with an attachment deeper than their articulable commitments and conscious 
desires.  There is something about sound, whether it is the gentle summit of a string solo, the 
violent drum of thunder, or grating bawl of a baby’s cry, that enters someone’s soul in ways 
mere images cannot, drawing us out into “the river of our existence” (196).   
 As the violin music reverberates through the novel, it claims the power to free and to 
kill.  Corwin Peace, a distant descendant of one of the lynching’s victims and one of its 
perpetrators, visits Evelina in the mental asylum where she has made the Chekhovian switch 
from staff to patient.  Evelina explains how Corwin’s chords captivate herself and the other 
patients.  Evelina describes the mesmerizing effect of the music: 
The playing of the violin is the only thing in the world and in that music there 
is dark assurance.  The music understands, and it will be there whether we 
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stay in pain or gain our sanity, which is also painful.  I am small.  I am whole.  
Nothing matters.  Things are startling and immense.  (246) 
While Bazil begins with language of inversion to describe the power of Shamengwa’s music, 
Evelina turns to size to describe the craft of his apprentice. Corwin’s music helps her to 
evade the written rules and to escape the asylum: “‘I can’t leave here,’ I say. / And I walk out 
of that place” (246).  Evelina, who has been practicing the art of journaling, describes the 
effect Corwin’s music has on the other patients.  Most significantly and tellingly, Warren 
Wolde, who wanders on the periphery of many sections muttering violently to himself, reacts 
wildly to the music.  He paces rapidly around the room, suffers a heart attack, and slumps 
against the wall.  This is only the most obvious tell that Warren is the murderer in the 
opening scene.  Warren’s death at the Corwin’s bow may be considered a moment of poetic 
justice—the descendant of a victim of the lynching unknowingly takes musical revenge on 
the actual perpetrator.  On the other hand, the same type of music that originally stopped 
Warren’s from violent fury also stops his heart, releasing him from his life-long struggles 
with sanity.  So perhaps both sets of strings vibrate with a similar compassion.  
However, even as she asserts the power of non-verbal sounds, Erdrich proposes a 
special relationship between this pure feeling made possible through music and the craft of 
narrative.  Erdrich gifts Shamengwa’s brother, Mooshum, the patriarch of the novel’s central 
family, with music’s sister art of storytelling: “Shamengwa was driven to music and 
Mooshum to stories” (22).  In some ways a good narrative, especially when penned by 
Erdrich’s hand or imparted by one of her character narrators, has the same characteristics as 
Shamengwa’s music.  Good stories too can freeze us with the bareness of their emotional 
pitch; they can make us laugh or cry, and, like the music, they can move us to a deeper 
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awareness.  But stories also differ from sound.  They are not transitory reverberations 
floating in air, but rather kernels of plot or turns of phrase that lodge themselves in the mind.  
Stories do not maintain the unbearable intensity of Shamengwa’s music the whole way 
through, but instead are the stuff of daily life with brief peaks of poignancy.  As Kay Young 
and Jeff Saver explain, narrative is the autobiographical aptitude for how we know ourselves 
as individuals and, as Hayden White, Benedict Anderson, and Patrick Hogan suggest, 
narrative is a key tool for imagining ourselves in relation to others, as communities, nations, 
and histories.  Erdrich, who Carl Gutiérrez-Jones aptly calls “a literary pillager,” uses her art 
not only to craft “those powerful moments of true knowledge” but also to give us 
frameworks for how we might understand the pull of these emotions and respond responsibly 
(Gutiérrez-Jones 103; Erdrich 196).   
We have already seen how the fragile recorded notes of a violin solo not only stopped 
the murderer at the height of his bloody deed and how the frail desperation in the infant’s cry 
compelled the passing men to care for her despite their higher order judgment.  But we have 
also seen how Erdrich splits this story, not only between the omniscient opening narrator and 
character narrator Evelina, but also among Mooshum and other community members’ varied 
versions.  Erdrich represents the compelling power of sound through both the gramophone 
recording and the infant’s desperate cries, but each time she refers to it, she shifts the 
narrative lens, so, as in a kaleidoscope, we see the same event multiplied and fragmented 
drawing our attention to the complicated relationship between the crimes and the expanding 
generations.  Each time we hear the story, the primal cries still pull, but we also understand 
the scene through layered rubrics of “historically conditioned” responsibility.  The idea of 
“historically conditioned” attempts to echo in both sound and sense American Studies scholar 
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Tricia Rose’s concept of “politically conditioned love,” which she explains as “a love that 
connects interpersonal healing to larger social contexts, but does not allow those contexts to 
justify all responses to it” (37).  Just as Rose’s concept opens a space for love and 
attachment, even while holding our loved one’s politically accountable, historically 
conditioned responsibility seeks to attend both the historic and socially constructed lenses 
that frame an event as well as the needs of the participants themselves.  As we have seen 
Mooshum’s initial version introduces the racist threat of lynching, which complicates the 
ways the passing men can respond to the child’s wails.  Even though adolescent Evelina 
believes Mooshum’s initial confession to her “was the one time he told the story whole,” she 
later learns her grandfather left out his own complicity (68).  At the beginning of her 
adulthood, Evelina learns from sister Mary Anita, a descendant of one of the lynch mob 
members, that Mooshum had told the vigilante ringleader that he and his friends found the 
dead at Lochren farm.  Upon hearing Sister Mary Anita’s story Evelina writes,   
Nowhere in Mooshum’s telling of the events did he make himself responsible.  
He never said that he had been the one who betrayed the others, yet instantly I 
knew it was true.  Here was why the others would not speak to him in the 
wagon.  Here was the reason he was cut down before he died. (251) 
Evelina understands that this is a strand of the story that Mooshum could not tell although the 
truth of it echoes in his details.  Instead, Sister Mary Anita, who feels the guilt of her 
ancestors in her own veins, becomes another represented narrator who plaits her thread with 
Mooshum’s pushing Evelina to evaluate the event with another lens of knotted complicity.  
Importantly, Evelina does not use this new version to override her grandfather’s previous 
accounts, and she does not use his complicity to condemn him or dismiss him from her life.  
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Instead, she confronts him with her awareness, twining her own voice in braid of stories that 
collectively attempt to acknowledge this history.  As Rose writes,  “politically conditioned 
love” is not “reserved only for those who offer politically sanctioned behavior,” bur rather, it 
“aims to affirm and transform, to show compassion while” acknowledging the real suffering 
that person may have helped to cause (37).84  Evelina and Mooshum visit the hanging tree 
together each aware that the victims of the past still cry with wounds that cannot find justice 
in the present.  The grandfather and granddaughter hold the history between them; while we 
can speculate that her acknowledgement of his complicity helps Mooshum to find some sort 
of peace, we do know that Evelina’s awareness and embrace of the history helps her to find 
her place in the community.                
 While the power of music and sound echoes through the multiple and distinct 
narratives, Evelina’s description of Corwin’s playing can help us to imagine the 
intersubjective work of braided narratives.  Corwin begins his asylum performance with a 
few simple melodies: “a slow and pretty tune that makes people’s eyes unfocus,” “a lively jig 
that has a sense of humor in the phrasing,” and “a Red River jig” (245).  These opening 
numbers are not unlike the opening stories of Erdrich’s novel.  Evelina’s first section dwells 
                                                
84 Rose proposes “politically conditioned love” in her discussion of Lorraine Hansberry’s A 
Raisin in the Sun (1959).  Rose argues that “Mama demands that Beneatha account for the 
real pressures and suffering caused by Walter’s experiences with racism and their 
relationship to his expectations regarding proper manhood; she suggests that his plan be 
rejected but that he remain fundamentally loved” (37).  For Rose and Erdrich, political 
accountability and love are not mutually exclusive.    
 
 294 
patiently on her adolescent attachments; Bazil’s focalization of John Wildstrand has humor 
not only in the phrasing, but in the premise of the plot itself: Wildstrand stages his own 
wife’s kidnapping to steal money from himself; and the Red River jig reminds us of the 
passionate love affairs the Milk family is known for.  After these introductory phrases, 
Evelina writes, “[t]hen something monstrous happens.  All sounds merge for a moment in the 
belly of the violin and fill the room with distress” (245).  While the physical reality of words 
prevent Erdrich’s narrative strands from merging on the page, at some point in her novel the 
various stories coalesce in our mind overwhelming us with the bloody interconnections of 
lineage and guilt, the sweet affinity of layered attachments, and the moving resonance of 
repeated imagery.  Like Evelina did at the beginning of the novel and this chapter, some 
readers trace complicated family trees or plot maps in an impossible effort to keep the 
narrative threads separate.  Erdrich’s novels render readers’ minds into the “belly of the 
violin” where multiple narratives, and the subjectivities they contain, intermingle in an 
unsettling chaos of awareness that evolves into a sensibility of responsibility.   
 While Erdrich foregrounds the power of sound to represent a human interconnection 
that transcends the physical limits of our bodies, Krauss stages her novel in the vacuum of 
perception associated with the Holocaust, the fundamental denial of human recognition 
constituted by attempted annihilation.  Krauss, like many authors who attempt to write in the 
shadow of that terrible massacre, turns to the trope of silence and invisibility almost as if the 
historic failure to recognize and respond to the cries of millions results in an experience of 
the self as absent for those who survive.  Krauss’s first narrator Leo claims that when he 
came to the states in 1947 he did not show up in photographs because “the way others had 
lost a leg or an arm, I’d lost whatever the thing is that makes people indelible” (81).  Zvi 
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Litvinoff, the other major character from Leo’s generation who Krauss focalizes through a 
third-person narrator in a separate narrative strand, escapes to Chile where he thinks of his 
love interest Rosa that “sooner or later she’ll figure out the truth: you’re a shell of a man, all 
she has to do is knock against you to find out you’re empty” (158).  Krauss makes clear that 
both her survivors’ experience of themselves as invisible and hollow stems from what they 
think of as an inability to conceive of what happened to their families.  Many have pointed 
out that such immense violations resist comprehension.  Psychoanalyst Dori Laub, who 
founded Yale’s Video Archive for Holocaust Testimonies, writes, “[m]assive trauma 
precludes its registration; the observing and recording mechanisms of the human mind are 
temporarily knocked out, malfunction” (57).  The human mind, it seems, does not want to 
fathom, cannot make sense of, and resists witnessing such horrific violence.  Leo narrates his 
escape three times in the novel; in the first he writes,  
The morning we heard their tanks approaching, my mother told me to hide in 
the woods.  I wanted to take my youngest brother, he was only thirteen, but 
she said she would take him herself.  Why did I listen?  Because it was easier?  
I ran out to the woods.  I lay on the ground.  Dogs barked in the distance.  
Hours went by.  And then the shots.  So many shots.  For some reason they 
didn’t scream.  Or maybe I didn’t hear their screams.  Afterwards, only 
silence.  (8) 
In this first telling, Leo not only affirms Daub’s observation that people do not want to 
acknowledge the possibility of such destruction, but Krauss adds an aural distinction.  Leo 
can hear the logic of his mother’s command, the barks of the dogs and so many guns, but he 
cannot hear any screams.  Importantly, Leo separates the lack of screams from the possibility 
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that he didn’t hear them scream to hold open the space for a trauma that his younger self did 
not want to believe could happen.  Laub writes, “speakers about trauma on some level prefer 
silence so as to protect themselves from the fear of being listened to—and of listening to 
themselves” (58).  Although Leo is not silent, like many of those who shared their testimony 
with Laub, the silence in his story speaks to the same fear—not hearing the screams protects 
him from calls he could not answer.85  The difference between the profound emphasis on 
sound in The Plague of Doves and the focus on silence in The History of Love does not 
indicate a disparity in intersubjective understanding of the two novels.  Rather, Krauss 
emphasizes silence to underscore the foreclosure of intersubjectivity constituted by attempted 
annihilation—the ultimate refusal to feel the pull of another translates into a world defined by 
visceral absences.  Although Erdrich’s novel too brushes up against this world of silence, her 
characters insist on the power sound.  In dark scene of the lynching, the Native men face 
hatred and destruction by singing their death songs, even when strangled by the rope.   
Although Krauss dwells on the silence her characters experience, they, like Erdrich’s, 
turn to art as a way out of darkness.  Rather than turning to sound as Erdrich’s characters do 
                                                
85 Zvi, who escaped sooner than Leo, also feels suffocated by what happened to his family, 
which, Krauss refuses to write.  Rather than explain how Zvi’s family was killed, Krauss 
writes “[b]it by bit Litvinoff learned what had happened to his sister Miriam, and to his 
parents, and to four of his other siblings (what had become of his oldest brother, Andre, he 
could only piece together from probabilities” (156).  While Leo couldn’t see or hear and 
didn’t want to believe what happened to his family, Zvi, does know or can at least piece it 
together, but Krauss doesn’t share the content of the knowledge with readers just as Zvi does 
not confide it in Rosa.  Instead, the inability to assimilate such knowledge crushes Zvi.   
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by singing their death songs, Krauss’s characters look to narrative fiction.  Leo narrates his 
escape from the Nazis a second time in his autobiographical novel Words for Everything; he 
writes in the third-person, “[o]n a bright, hot day in July, they entered Slonim.  At that hour, 
the boy happened to be lying on his back in the woods thinking about the girl.  You could say 
it was love for her that saved him” (12).  Although this second account begins almost the 
same way as the first, with the ominous approach of the Nazis, Leo replaces the hours of 
silence with thoughts of the girl he loved.  In the difference between these accounts, Krauss 
shifts the project from trying to know or make sense of an incomprehensible violence to 
considering how one can survive it.   
In his second novel, tagged as story world fiction, Leo introduces his beloved with a 
call that wants a response: “[o]nce upon a time there was a boy who loved a girl, and her 
laughter was a question he wanted to spend his whole life answering” (11).  Leo’s response 
comes in the form of fiction: he writes both the first novel The History of Love and his 
second novel Words For Everything in an effort to translate his feelings for Alma into words 
that can be shared.  Just as the sound of his beloved’s laughter calls the boy to poetic 
response, so too does the hope of attachment with her call Leo to want to survive.  Just as 
Benjamin described in her discussion of mother infant engagement, the intersubjective 
interplay in The History of Love suggests that two subjectivities are necessary to existence: 
we cannot see ourselves without the recognition of another just as that person cannot see 
herself without our recognition. Leo explains this intersubjective interdependency when he 
decides to take his cousin’s photograph after he himself didn’t show up in the film.  When his 
cousin’s photo does appear, they both laugh, and Leo explains “[i]t was I who’d taken the 
picture, and if it was proof of his existence, it was also proof of my own” (82).  The 
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photograph is not the first or most important object characters attach to in an effort to affirm 
their existence despite great rupture.  The History of Love’s eponymous book-within-a-book 
that Leo wrote for Alma functions at first it seems as a flimsy hope for connection in the 
impending shadow of what will become the Holocaust.  When his girlfriend leaves for 
America, young Leo sends her his manuscript pages of the book-within-the-book.  Here, just 
as in Winnicott’s vision of the “transitional object” that both parents and children use to 
make possible their separation, Leo imagines that his book will help bridge his separation 
with Alma.  In the second telling of his escape in Words for Everything, the writer Leo 
asserts this faith in a future attachment, a love for his childhood sweetheart, Alma saves him 
from death.  According to Leo’s account in Words for Everything and his obituary (printed as 
the last page of both Krauss’s novel and the book-within-the-book), responding to the call of 
his lover not only saves his life, but is his life.   
In the face of the unfathomable, Zvi, in his narrative thread, also looks to fiction.  Zvi, 
devastated by reality, begins to translate his copy of the manuscript that Leo had entrusted 
him to keep, which again shifts the question from ‘can we make sense of the Holocaust?’ to 
‘can we make a life knowing that such horrors are possible?’  By having the third person 
narrator who focalizes Zvi claim that he did not “think to himself: I am going to plagiarize 
my friend who was murdered by the Nazi’s.  Nor did he think: If she thinks I wrote this, she 
will love me,” Krauss frames Zvi’s plagiarism/translation of Leo’s manuscript as an 
uncritical turn to fiction because “the truth” failed him (183, 156).  Because Zvi’s sections 
progress backwards in time, we know that Zvi dies unable to confess this lie that weighs on 
him still haunted by the belief that Rosa only loves him because he authored the novel-
within-the-novel.  Rosa, as it happens, already knew and went to great lengths, such as 
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flooding their house, to protect his secret.  Their relationship exemplifies a poignant and 
bitter intersubjective understanding, also founded on a transitional object.  The couple built 
their shared commitment around his authorship of Leo’s novel, a fiction that they both know 
is a lie, but because of their love for one another, it’s a lie that neither can admit.  In an odd 
turn, narrator-Leo shares the novel with his imaginary friend Bruno, a character perhaps 
based on the actual writer Bruno Shultz, but Krauss’s Bruno accuses Leo of stealing “bits” 
(132).  If there is a logic to imaginary friends, Bruno’s jibe suggests that Leo himself knows 
he took parts of his novel from his childhood friend.  Thus, both Leo and Zvi turn to the 
fiction-within-a-fiction in an effort intentional or not to make life worth living in the face of 
the Holocaust and neither can take full credit for the novel-within-the-novel.   
Importantly, fiction provides a medium that makes possible what the Holocaust 
sought to foreclose: recognition and attachment.  In The History of Love, Krauss suggests that 
when one actually sees another, one ought to respond with an acknowledgement of that sight.  
Leo named every girl in the novel after his childhood sweetheart, Alma, the single name Zvi 
cannot change to a Spanish counterpart.  Zvi attempts to rename Alma Rosa, after his own 
love, “[b]ut if, when he want to write a capital R where there had been a capital A, 
Litvinoff’s hand stalled, perhaps it was because he was the only person, aside from its true 
author, to have read The History of Love and known the real Alma” (183).  Zvi cannot write 
Rosa because he knows that Alma was real.  Zvi must acknowledge Alma’s reality partly 
because as Laub pointed out, the Holocaust not only sought to annihilate a people but also to 
destroy the knowledge of that violence.   Here, it is the very knowledge that crushed Zvi, the 
acknowledgment of an event that resists knowing, the understanding of something that 
cannot be seen or heard, that prevents Zvi from changing Alma’s name.  Zvi’s act of 
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acknowledgement might stand for Krauss’s intervention.  Perhaps, it is right that we cannot 
comprehend the horror of the Holocaust, but we should never fail to acknowledge the reality 
of its victims.  The narrator goes on to explain that the original Alma played no true-love role 
in Zvi’s memories aside from the model of his adolescent “reveries (which relied heavily on 
the technique of montage)” (184).  Instead, Zvi cannot change Alma’s name because she was 
once real, and her very reality inspired his friend Leo to write the novel.  Zvi’s narrative is so 
poignant because buried within his act of plagiarism is an act of witnessing.  Although Zvi’s 
plagiarism of Leo effaces the great writer, his recognition of Alma makes possible, as we will 
see, the poignant connection that ends the novel.  
The History of Love’s eponymous fiction-within-a-fiction runs through multiple 
narrators’ chapters, the way the story of the lynching runs through The Plague of Doves, 
creating a pull that twines the narrative threads together despite the historical forces that try 
to rend the characters apart.  Like in The Plague of Doves, these various, and sometimes 
conflicting narrative threads, intermingle in the reader’s mind leaving us with an awareness 
of an interconnection too profound for the characters themselves to grasp.  Leo’s first novel 
not only connects his narrative strand to Zvi’s, but the text also provides the medium for 
Alma’s parents’ relationship, a fact that Alma details in her sections but that remains 
unknown to both Leo and Zvi.  Alma’s father fell in love with Zvi’s translation and gifted it 
to her mother, who in turn named their daughter “after every girl in a book called The History 
of Love” (243).   
This book-within-a-book, however, is not only the means of romantic attachments; it 
also connects across generations, another understanding that only Alma elaborates.  Alma 
seeks to know more about her father, who died when she was seven, by reading the novel 
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that he gave to her mother.  Further, Leo’s son, who never knew his true father, suspected 
that Leo authored The History of Love and hired Alma’s mother to translate it from Spanish 
to English, so he could compare it with the Yiddish manuscript in his mother’s love letters.  
The History of Love does not only call to characters, asking to be read, but also pushes them 
towards actual attachments.  Just as Evelina’s adolescent curiosity primes readers for the 
cohering importance of the opening violence and awful vengeance, teenage Alma orients us 
towards the way The History of Love-within-The History of Love functions as a heuristic 
connecting the novel’s fragmented narrative strands.  When Alma feels the recognition of her 
namesake’s reality in Zvi’s translation, she begins collecting clues alerting readers to the 
novel’s central thread.  We carry Alma’s questions with us in other narrator’s chapters and 
continue her sleuthing even when she gives up.  Because Alma directs us towards the 
connective function of the novel-within-the-novel, we learn that Leo’s son was able to read 
some of his father’s work because of Zvi and Alma’s mother’s respective translation, 
partially satisfying Leo’s deepest wish that “there had been a brief window of time in which 
Issac [his son] and I [Leo] both lived, each aware of the other’s existence” (212).  We can 
feel The History of Love’s intersubjectivity both in the relationship’s between characters and 
in the structure of the novel itself.             
The formal and felt intersubjectivity of braided narratives is clearest perhaps in the 
final scene of The History of Love where our first two narrators aged Leo and teenage Alma 
meet for the first time.  Until this point, Alma and Leo’s narrative perspectives have 
remained as disparate as when we opened the novel; the two characters are not even aware of 
the other’s existence as they head to Central Park for a meeting mysteriously arranged by 
Alma’s younger brother.  Unlike every other chapter in the book, which Krauss assigns to a 
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single narrator, this final scene, titled “A+L,” is shared by Alma and Leo.  The figure 
illustrates how Krauss puts Leo’s narration on the left, odd pages and Alma’s on the right, 
even pages.   
 
Figure 5: Pages 242-243 in Nicole Krauss’s The History of Love 
As we know from spending the novel in each of their minds, Leo and Alma rely on opposite 
modes for making sense of the world.  Leo has spent much of his life living in fantasy, a 
strategy that not only allows him to see elephants and his imaginary friend Bruno, but also 
helps him to survive the deep losses caused by the Holocaust.  While Leo lives his life in his 
imagination, Alma clings to the distinction between what is and what is not.  Her belief in 
reality leads her on a search through the record offices of New York for a non-fiction 
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corollary to the heroine of the book-within-the-book.  Although Alma’s trust in truth is the 
opposite, so to speak, of Leo’s faith in fantasy, both mental organizing principles prevent the 
characters from recognizing each other.  When Alma arrives at Central Park where Leo had 
already been waiting, she sits on a different bench, and only eventually finds Leo because he 
labeled himself with the index card that reads “MY NAME IS LEO GURSKY” (239).  Even 
after they begin conversing, Leo persists in believing that Alma is the angelic version of his 
childhood sweetheart coming to lead him to death, and Alma continues to collect facts and 
insist on truths.   
Only through conversation, a dialogue mirrored by the shared narration, can Leo and 
Alma break out of their rigid organizing scripts and co-create an intersubjectivity mirrored in 
the chapter’s structure. Krauss demonstrates their intersubjective encounter in the form of the 
chapter by having their alternating pages become closer and closer to narrating the same 
moment, although importantly, just as in Stern’s model of affective attunement, they never 
reach perfect synch. This thirty-page alternation between narrators shows on the level of the 
page what braided narratives usually do on the level of the chapter: represent the inner 
thoughts and feelings of multiple subjectivities as they falteringly try to establish a 
connection. The large spaces Krauss leaves blank stand for both the physical and figurative 
distance that separates Alma and Leo and the potential for their connection. Because of 
Alma’s facial expression in response to his questions, Leo thinks “[w]hat if the girl sitting 
next to me on this bench was real?” (248). Asking this question, which in itself suspends his 
modus operandi of imagining everything, also opens Leo up to other understandings. This 
openness, in turn, releases Alma from the premise of her research; she writes, “[a]nd then I 
realized that I’d been searching for the wrong person. I looked into the eyes of the oldest man 
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in the world for a boy who fell in love when he was ten” (251). Through the dialectical 
progress of their conversation, Alma unwittingly responds to Leo’s early ethical call to be 
seen (3). Although the opposing pages seem to adopt a dyadic structure, Alma and Leo relate 
more like soap-bubbles than interchangeable blue marbles—their sense of being shifts and 
changes in relation to the other. Because the fifteen-year-old Alma “was named after every 
girl” in Leo’s book, she is, in a sense, the product of his imagination, but not in the same 
register as the elephant or as Bruno (243). Instead, the power of the novel-within-the-novel 
lead both Leo and Alma to a real, but temporary, connection as other subjects. This mutual 
recognition emerges in the third space between the two characters, a space held open for 
readers by the literal blanks on the page. Krauss’s novel closes with the wavering between 
subjectivities, an embrace between the two major narrators, a real relationship forged through 
fiction. By staging this momentary meeting as the novel’s final scene, in what Peter 
Rabinowitz would call the “privileged position” of the ending, Krauss endows the characters’ 
connection with greater significance for readers (58). The third potential space that emerges 
between Alma and Leo becomes, from a different angle, the potential space between the 
author and the reader.  
While The History of Love proposes a potential for human recognition and attachment 
even in the shadow of deep grief and collective trauma, The Plague of Doves cautions that 
such an acknowledgment should include an accounting of personal responsibility, a 
measuring made possible by narrative. Bazil, who rarely mentions the lynching despite the 
historical focus of his sections, finally admits his own relationship to the legacy of the 
violence that manifests itself as an affair with the mass murder’s survivor, Dr. Cordelia 
Lochren, who slept with Bazil, but will not treat Native people. Despite his formative 
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attachment to Cordelia, which Bazil had spent the whole chapter divulging to us, he had not 
yet discussed her with his wife, Geraldine. Erdrich previously published the part of the 
chapter chronicling Bazil and Cordelia’s relationship as a short story titled “Demolition” in 
the New Yorker, but she added the final conversation between Bazil and Geraldine for the 
novel. In that scene, Bazil first wants to “defend [the] innocence” of his early attachment to 
Cordelia, but just as Alma’s subjectivity jars Leo out of his regular organizing principles, so 
too does Geraldine’s subjectivity challenge Bazil’s (291). Bazil senses “a sudden cleft of 
space between us,” a distance that becomes a potential space; he catches a glimpse of 
“disappointment” in her eyes, but most importantly listens to the series of condemning 
anecdotes that his wife has to share (291). Geraldine helps Bazil understand how his prior 
relationship allows Cordelia to feel a false sense of absolution for the crime committed in her 
name and a temporary forgiveness for the lingering racism that shapes her medical practice. 
Geraldine’s stories function for Bazil the way the multiple accounts of the murder and 
lynching function for readers—they layer the event with historic contexts pushing the 
audience to a richer sense of responsibility for our own complicity in benefiting from or 
helping to forget the violence of our shared history. When Bazil finally realizes Cordelia’s 
racism, he writes, “I’d always be her one exception. Or worse, her absolution. Every time I 
touched her, she was forgiven. I thought the whole thing out—as Geraldine says, I took in the 
history” (292). While Cordelia uses Bazil to try to absolve herself of an historic crime, 
Geraldine faces him with an accounting of the past that both facilitates a deeper recognition 
within their relationship and calls Bazil to acknowledge a responsibility for his present and 
future attachments. While Bazil and Geraldine’s interaction may seem simply a scene of 
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intersubjectivity between characters, it takes on greater significance when we turn the page 
and find that Erdrich allows Cordelia to narrate the novel’s final chapter.  
Erdrich raises ethical questions in this wide intersubjective gap between Bazil and 
Cordelia’s narrative perspectives: How should we evaluate Cordelia’s account? Can we trust 
her story knowing what Bazil and Geraldine know? Although Bazil’s offers an apt and 
condemning assessment of her character, Erdrich both privileges Cordelia with the final word 
and prevents her from acknowledging or growing from her own racism. Erdrich also 
published this final chapter “Disaster Stamps of Pluto” in the New Yorker. However, she 
added all of Cordelia’s references to her former lover, indications of her own prejudice, and 
references to the revenge lynching for the novel. In those small but significant additions, 
Erdrich muddies Cordelia’s clear conscience, “[i]t is as though the freak of my survival 
charged my disposition with gratitude. Or as if my family absorbed all of the misfortune that 
might have come my way. I have loved intensely. I have lived an ordinary and a satisfying 
life, and I have been privileged to be of service to people. Most people. There is no one I 
mourn to the point of mad- ness and nothing I would really do over again” (I italicized 
phrases added for the novel 308). Cordelia’s concession, “[m]ost people,” not only affirms 
the truth of Bazil’s critique, but also alerts us that she is only partially aware of her own flaw. 
Rather than using our imagination to fill the space between characters, as we did in The 
History of Love, in Erdrich’s novel, we must use Bazil’s final words to color our reading of 
Cordelia. The discrepancy between the ways Bazil and Cordelia report and regard her refusal 
to treat Indians poses ethical questions for the readers. Remembering Evelina’s claim “now 
that some of us have mixed in the spring of our existence both guilt and victim, there is no 
unraveling the rope,” we see the final narrator, not only as the novel’s first victim, but also as 
 307 
an adult who bears responsibility to her community (243). The transition from the 
represented intersubjectivity between Bazil and Geraldine to the formal intersubjectivity 
between Bazil and Cordelia’s narrative perspectives challenges readers to hold multiple 
subjectivities in our minds simultaneously. We not only read Cordelia through Bazil’s 
realization, but also trust her, as Erdrich does, with the novel’s final word. Instead of 
adopting Cordelia’s perspective completely, as we might if she were the sole narrator, we 
hold her at a distance made possible by the intersubjective space of braided narratives. Like 
the “sudden cleft of space” between Bazil and Geraldine this distance between subjectivities 
becomes a potential space for recognition and acknowledgement (291). While The History of 
Love poses fiction as the space through which we can form real connections, The Plague of 
Doves proposes storytelling as the essential venue for characters to “as Geraldine says . . . 
[take] in the history” (292). As Erdrich makes her characters account for their potential 
complicity in past crimes, her novel invites readers to consider how our own ethical 
commitments should also be responsible for our shared history.  
  The genre of braided narratives negotiate, as The Plague of Doves and The History 
of Love do, both the gulf between people craved by historic violence and those small fissures 
that separate us even from those whom we most love.  By plaiting together separate narrative 
strands, distinct in terms of both the teller and the told, braided narratives push readers to 
attend to multiple subjectivities simultaneously.  Unlike some rubrics that seek to redress 
socially constructed differences through assimilation and effacement of particularity, braided 
narratives function like an orchestral performance where the production itself depends on the 
intermingling of distinct and different sounds, melodies, and instruments.  In this way, 
braided narratives train readers in a different sort of ethics, one that emphasizes an awareness 
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of a variety of particular calls and one that demands a historically and politically conditioned 
responsibility.  Unlike musical performances however, where a different artist conjures their 
part of the composer’s arrangement on their particular instrument, readers use the author’s 
words to create the stories in our mind.  What Evelina describes as sounds “merge[ing] for a 
moment in the belly of the violin” happens for readers on the stage of our own imagination 
(245).  This can be distressing and uncomfortable as Evelina describes of the violin’s climax, 
but it can also feel good and rewarding because our mind becomes the “potential space” that 
makes intersubjectivity possible.  As we have seen in our reading of The History of Love, the 
joy of recognition requires two different subjects, and as we learned in The Plague of Doves, 
such recognition sometimes demands a response that is accountable to history even as it faces 
towards the future.  
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CODA 
My girl, I saw the passing of times you will never know. 
I guided the last buffalo hunt.  I saw the last bear shot.  I trapped the last 
beaver with a pelt of more than two years’ growth.  I spoke aloud the words of 
the government treaty, and refused to sign the settlement papers that would 
take away our woods and lake.  I axed the last birch that was older than I, and 
I saved the last Pillager. 
 Fleur, the one you will not call mother. 
—Nanapush Louise Erdrich’s Tracks (2) 
Throughout “A Child’s Call,” I have traced the interpersonal, cognitive, affective, and 
ethical affordances of child-narrators to help readers face issues of racial violence and sexual 
violation.  I conclude, however, with Louise Erdrich’s Tracks (1988), a braided narrative that 
testifies to the power of a child’s call, not through the voice of a child, but through the 
narration of an “old man” (2).  Nanapush, one of two narrators in Tracks, tells all his chapters 
to Lulu, the woman the child he helped to raise has become.  As an adult narrating his 
response to the implicit appeal of a child, and the adult she has grown into, Nanapush 
demonstrates how readers might respond to call sounded by the narrative voice of children.  
At the same time, Tracks both participates in and helps to forge the genre I am calling the 
braided narrative, which, as we saw in the last chapter, offers formal strategies that push 
readers face historical violence and rethink how we might live in its wake.  Erdrich pairs the 
grandfather’s stories with the fantastic musings of Pauline Puyat, a notoriously unreliable 
narrator who my students easily gloss as crazy.  Erdrich writes Pauline’s sections in dense 
paragraphs with shifting imagery that prevents readers from fully imagining the scenes she 
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narrates.  However, the gaps between Nanapush’s chapters and Pauline’s, the discrepancies 
between his versions of events and hers, the distance between knowing what might have 
happened in the novel and what was imagined, all create an intersubjective space for readers 
to enter the text.  These fissures form a challenge for readers to witness and acknowledge 
historical violence. Through the braided narrative of Tracks, Erdrich asks reader to better 
understand the historical violence and rise to a higher sense of collective responsibility in the 
present.   
Erdrich activates a matrixial awareness in Tracks by foregrounding the destruction of 
mother-child relationships through historical violence.  Tracks begins in the middle of what 
Anishinaabe critic Lawrence Gross categorizes as an “apocalypse.... the end of the world as 
the Anishinaabe had known it” (49).  As Gross notices, Nanapush’s repetition of “last” 
laments the loss of the natural world and human relations—like the “last Pillager,” Nanapush 
and Pauline, Tracks’s other narrator, are the sole surviving members of their entire families.86  
Like the absent Mrs. Finch that makes possible the ethical intervention of Mockingbird, or 
the “missing mother” that activates the suspense of The Round House, the deceased mothers 
of Tracks leave behind vulnerable children who need different sorts of attachment and care.  
Nanapush saves Fleur from the consumption in the first chapter just as he cures Lulu of 
frostbite in his penultimate chapter.  Although Pauline never gets confirmation of her 
family’s death of the same epidemic, early in the novel she has recurring dreams of her 
“sisters and my mother swaying in the branches, buried too high to reach, wrapped in lace I 
                                                
86 Nanapush admits that the emphasis on last in terms of the Pillagers is a rhetorical gesture, 
as Fleur’s cousin Moses survives as well. 
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never hooked” (15).  That the “Anishinaabe apocalypse” left so many characters orphaned 
allows Erdrich to emphasize other sorts of attachment and care.   
Nanapush, like many of Erdrich’s characters, practices a radical sort of mothering in 
the sense that Alexis Pauline Gumbs explains.  After rescuing her, Nanapush greets Fleur 
with the epithet “daughter” and understands himself as responsible for her even though they 
have no blood or legal connection (34).  He claims Lulu, too, by offering his name when the 
local priest comes to baptize her.  While this may seem to enact paternity in the western 
sense that associates the father with the law, Erdrich makes Nanapush’s gesture both a 
masculine claim to sexual power and a maternal act that allows him to care for Lulu when 
Fleur cannot.  Like Atticus in Mockingbird, Nanapush frames his actions in the paternal 
sphere of law and politics through a relationship with his adoptive daughters.  Savvy to the 
wily ways of white settlers, Nanapush understands that his name “loses power every time 
that it is written and stored in a government file” (32).  The fact that he let his name be 
recorded once on the day of Lulu’s birth allows him to rescue her from boarding school.  At 
the end of the novel he explains that he used that document to “wade through the letters, the 
reports, the only place where I could find a ledge to kneel on, to reach through the loophole 
and draw you home” (225).  Nanapush not only acts the father in name and law, but also acts 
the mother in the sense that he cures Fleur and Lulu in their sickness and does what he can to 
shift the world so Lulu can stay home in her community.   
In addition to claiming Lulu through the law of baptism, Nanapush enacts a maternal 
care not only by nursing her in sickness and caring for her into adulthood.  While men and 
women can practice these behaviors, Nanapush conceives of them as feminine.  Nanapush 
recalls his musings while curing Lulu of her frostbite: 
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Many times in my life, as my children were born, I wondered what it was like 
to be a woman, able to invent a human from the extra materials of her own 
body.  In the terrible times, the evils I do not speak of, when the earth 
swallowed back all it had given me to love, I gave birth in loss.  I was like a 
woman in my suffering, but my children were all delivered into death.  It was 
contrary, backward, but now I had a chance to put things into proper order.  
(167)     
The consumption epidemic killed Nanapush’s wives and all his children rendering him 
feminine in his grief.  Instead of bearing a child as his wives had, Nanapush births loss.  His 
sadness of their deaths becomes like a child.  Lulu, however, the live child in his arms calls 
him to nurture the living rather than mourn the dead.  He can put care back in “proper order” 
my nursing her through her illness, by caring for her the way his wives had cared for his 
children.  In this way, while Nanapush “was like a woman in [his] suffering” he becomes like 
a mother in his realigning of attachments and care.  Unlike Aunt Clemence and Bazil in The 
Round House, Nanapush can provide his adopted daughter and granddaughter with the sort of 
attention they need to face the trauma at the core of their novels.  While Joe has to find out 
for himself what his mother endured, Lulu hears the violence that her own mother survived 
from the voice of her adoptive grandfather.  The chapters themselves, written to represent the 
oral story that Nanapush tells Lulu, enact the sort of attention that Claudia and Frieda gave 
each other in The Bluest Eye.   
 As we saw in chapter two, the scene where Nanapush cures Lulu from frostbite best 
models the sort of intersubjectivity activated by child-narrators and braided narratives.  Like 
the sound of Mrs. MacTeer’s singing, which “took all of the grief out of the words and left 
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[Claudia] with a conviction that pain was not only endurable, it was sweet,” Nanapush’s cure 
songs help make Lulu’s physical pain of frostbite bearable, and survivable (26).  Nanapush 
can heal Lulu not only because he knows the right songs, but also because he recognizes 
Lulu’s unique subjectivity.  When the priest brings the doctor to help care for Lulu the white 
men pressure Nanapush to send her to a hospital.  Nanapush’s recognition of Lulu makes him 
resist:       
We all knew what was unsaid, but only I knew you.  You were no quiet child, 
no pensive thing who could survive without running.  You were a butterfly, a 
flash of wit and fire, a blur of movement who could not keep still.  Saving you 
the doctor’s way would kill you, which did not mean I was completely 
confident in my ability to save you, either. (168) 
The collective knowledge of the adults represents the intrapsychic elaboration that as Jessica 
Benjamin explained in chapter two, we need to make sense of the world. The men know that 
Lulu suffers extreme frostbite and may die even if brought to advanced medical care.  At the 
same time, Nanapush allows his relationship with Lulu to break through those intrapsychic 
representations in intersubjective recognition.  The way that Erdrich writes his understanding 
of Lulu’s subjectivity accords with Benjamin’s assertion that moments of intersubjective 
recognition are temporary and fleeting.  Rather than describing Lulu as a fixed entity, 
Nanapush offers glimpses of the child in motion—a butterfly, a flash, a blur.  The same sort 
of recognition that Leo demands in The History of Love becomes key to saving Lulu in 
Tracks.   
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 Even though Nanapush acts on his momentary recognition of Lulu’s subjectivity, he 
also acknowledges that he cannot fully know her or pin down her identity.  In the paragraph 
that follows the passage above, Nanapush explains, 
When you’re married and have your children, you will know this: We don’t 
have as much to do with our young as we think.  They do not come from us.  
They just appear, as if they broke through the net of vines.  Once they live in 
our lives and speak our language, they slowly seem to become like us.  But 
Lulu, sinking past my sight then, you were not enough like me yet to tell me 
where you were going or how long you would stay. (168-169) 
Almost in the same breath as expressing deep intersubjective recognition of Lulu, Nanapush 
admits her almost insurmountable alterity.  As a toddler, Lulu does not have the language to 
put her pain into words—to make her experience in the world sharable.  Even did she have 
access to his language, Lulu could not have known the information about her future 
Nanapush wanted her to disclose.   This juxtaposition between intersubjective recognition of 
Lulu and an acknowledgement of the insurmountable distance between the Nanapush and the 
child speaks to the questions at the core of many novels—how can I know you?  How can we 
form attachments in the face of such a precarious future, or as the historical setting of the 
novel suggests, in the shadow of such a violent past?  Nanapush’s narration models a 
possible response to the call of the child.  He not only recounts the stories of how he cared 
for her and her mother, but the telling itself is an act of care.  Just as in The History of Love 
and The Plague of Doves, storytelling emerges as an essential mode to establish a connection 
across unassailable distance.    
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 Even as Nanapush’s chapters demonstrate the sort of response a child can elicit, 
Erdrich alternates his chapters with those narrated by Pauline in an early example of the 
braided narrative.  Like Fleur and Nanapush, Pauline loses her entire family to the 
consumption epidemic, but, unlike the others, she finds no companionship in her grief and no 
solace in proper burial.  Her suffering stems not only from the injury itself, but also, and 
perhaps more poignantly, from her refusal of an intersubjective community that can 
acknowledge her pain.  Even as a child Pauline rejects her parents, desiring “to be like my 
grandfather, pure Canadian” (14).  She develops an idea that to be Native “is to perish,” and 
she refuses to “speak our language,” to bead, to tan hides, and instead convinces her father to 
send her to the settler town of Argus (14).  So even when Fleur shows her kindness and 
affection, bathing the grown woman as one would a child, Pauline cannot accept her 
attention.  Instead, Pauline invents a fantasy world both to hold the pain of her childhood 
traumas and to make sense of the voices she hears later in the novel.  Pauline incorporates the 
other characters into her own fantasy world, endowing them with exaggerated attributes of 
good or evil.  Often this involves taking on their pain in a futile and frustrating form of 
empathy. In her version of the gang rape at the beginning of the novel, Pauline conflates 
herself with Fleur even as she aids the rapists in a perverse crossing that defines her 
character.  Pauline later acts as Death’s gatekeeper, cleaning the dead before burial, 
accompanying the sick in their final hours, and, on one occasion, imagines herself as cutting 
the string between life and death (68).  Because Erdrich writes Tracks as a braided narrative, 
she contrasts Pauline intrapsychic fantasies with Nanapush’s intersubjective style.  The gaps 
between their narratives challenge readers to maintain a sense of difference, so we can 
recognize Pauline’s suffering and that of Fleur, which it inadequately describes. 
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As we have seen in the case of The History of Love and The Plague of Doves, in what 
I am calling the braided narrative, different narrators tell distinct stories that twine together to 
form a single novel.  According to the classical understanding of narrative, a story 
represented in discourse, we can see that Erdrich’s novel is comprised of two distinct 
narratives.  Adopting the language of the novel, I’m thinking of discourse as tracks on the 
page—having “never learned to read,” Nanapush’s love interest is afraid of the “tracks [of 
newspaper type] rubbing off on her skin” (Erdrich 47). Nanapush and Pauline narrate their 
own distinct series of events in their own discursive styles that I represent here with 
footprints.   
 
Figure 6: Footprints representing events narrated by Pauline and Nanapush 
Through the comforting cadence of oral storytelling, Nanapush tells of the devastating winter 
of 1912, his courtship of Margaret Kashpaw, Lulu’s birth, his standoff with the Morriseys, 
and Fleur’s eventual departure from Matchimanito.  Pauline’s increasingly deranged style, on 
the other hand, details: failing to witness Fleur’s rape, conjuring Eli and Sophie’s affair, 
1912 1913 1914 1917 1918 1919 1920-1924 
Pauline 
Nanapush  
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bearing an unwanted child, joining the convent, and murdering the devil who takes the form 
of her child’s father.  Although both narrate in chronological order, many of their chapters 
overlap in time, focusing on different, often unrelated events, and in the few chapters where 
Nanapush picks up where Pauline leaves off, he denies her responsibility for causing those 
events.87  Further, to put it in Seymour Chatman’s language, what is a “kernel” event for one 
narrator registers barely as a “satellite” for the other (53).  Lulu’s birth, a key moment for 
Nanapush, gets as much air time in Pauline’s sections as Napoleon’s murder, her climax, gets 
in Nanapush’s.  As a braided narrative, Tracks invites us to query why an event of such 
importance for one narrator can be passed over by the other.     
 Both narrators do focalize Fleur’s “path” to use Peter Rabinowitz’s term for “a 
character’s order of experience [that] may conform to neither the story order nor the 
discourse order,” but I don’t read Tracks as a single narrative centering on her story (183). 
Some of what Fleur endured, such as the gang rape, has different conflicting representations 
in Pauline and Nanapush’s discourses.  Other events are focused on, almost exclusively, by 
one narrator—such as Lulu’s birth as told by Nanapush or Fleur’s miscarriage as told by 
Pauline.  As the gaps between prints indicate, many of Fleur’s experiences go unnarrated 
altogether.  Further, Pauline’s accounts of Fleur begin as potentially mimetic representations 
                                                
87 On one hand, this is a forgiving interpersonal gesture as it dismisses Pauline’s acts of 
malice and ignores her negligence: in chapter 5, he takes in Eli, when Fleur kicks him out 
after his affair with Sophie, and in chapter 7, he finds four-year-old Lulu freezing at his door 
because Pauline had let her run through the snow in patent leather shoes.  On the other hand, 
this undermines Pauline’s narrative authority as Nanapush refuses to acknowledge her role in 
the causal relationship between events.   
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of Fleur as a possible character in Erdrich’s storyworld but disintegrate into thematic 
representations of Fleur in Pauline’s mind.  Although more respectful of Fleur, Nanapush 
also conscripts her character for his purposes.  While Pauline projects her fantasies onto 
Fleur, Nanapush privileges her with a special connection to the past in order to obtain Lulu’s 
pardon.  Erdrich does not grant Fleur the same narratorial power that she does Nanapush and 
Pauline, and getting to tell your own story is what’s at stake, not only because of the critiques 
I’ve already raised, but because of the ethical challenges narrators can make.  In his 
delineation of the ethical positions that arise in narrative, Jim Phelan places narrators on a 
different level than characters because they raise questions about the events themselves and 
that narrator’s relationship “to the telling, to the told, and to the audience” (23).88  As in my 
discussion of The Plague of Doves, conflicting accounts of events and varying evaluations of 
characters require readers to temper our interpretation of one narrator’s story with the 
account of another.   
Given the primacy of ethics and the influence of the oral tradition, I turn to the 
rhetorical understanding of narrative that Phelan proposes as “somebody telling somebody 
else on some occasion and for some purpose(s) that something happened” (5).  In this 
formulation, Nanapush tells Lulu, on the occasion of her proposed marriage, for the purpose 
of preventing that union and reuniting the child with her mother, why Fleur allowed Lulu to 
                                                
88 As we saw in chapter five, James Phelan identifies four situations: first, “that of the 
characters within the story world,” second, “that of the narrator in relation to the telling, to 
the told, and to the audience,” third, “that of the implied author in relation to the telling, the 
told, and the authorial audience,” and fourth, “that of the flesh-and-blood reader in relation to 
the set of values, beliefs, and locations operating in situations 1-3” (Phelan 23).   
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go to boarding school. Nanapush frames the catastrophic changes that open the novel by 
stating his audience and purpose.  His use of the second person positions us in Lulu’s shoes 
and complicates us in the conflict that necessitates his story—even though it is Lulu who 
refuses to call Fleur mother readers might see some complicity in the history that facilitated 
that separation.  We know Nanapush, true to character, told the entire story to Lulu in one 
long sitting because he pauses to comment on the adult Lulu’s appearance and reactions.  At 
one point he chastises Lulu about the time he cured her of frostbite that I discussed in the 
second chapter,  
I’m sure you’ve forgotten what happened next, for if you remembered, you 
would not wear such shoes as you have on at this moment– those heels, like 
tiny knives, and your toes sticking through!  You’d wear footwrappings made 
of rabbit fur for protection, and no fine stockings either. (166)     
Because our world is still structured by patriarchy, it’s radical for Erdrich to situate her 
readers so explicitly in women’s shoes.  As Nanapush continually reminds Lulu, his exigency 
is not only sartorial, but also ethical: how she ought to behave towards her mother. As he did 
at the beginning of the novel, Nanapush implores Lulu to forgive her mother at the novel’s 
end: 
But you, heartless one, won’t even call Fleur mother or take off your pointy 
shoes, walk through the tough bush, and visit her.  Maybe once I tell you the 
reason she had to send you away, you will start acting like a daughter should.  
She saved you from worse, as you’ll see.  Perhaps when you finally 
understand, you’ll borrow my boots and go out there, forgive her, though it’s 
you that needs forgiveness… (210) 
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Nanapush’s exigency asserts a relational ethics—a need for interconnection, not only 
between grandfather and grandchild but also between mother and daughter.   
Erdrich’s repeated references to Nanapush’s moment of telling highlights, as Carl 
Gutiérrez-Jones writes, that “Erdrich leaves Pauline’s rhetorical situation undefined; a 
character seemingly obsessed with belonging, her chapters finally create no apparent 
connections to others” (107).  Although Pauline specifies neither narratee nor occasion for 
telling, her narrative does have a clear purpose: to reconcile her perceived past sins with her 
vocation as a nun.  While Nanapush tells his story in a single sitting, Pauline’s seems to keep 
pace with the years she narrates because her understanding of her guilt and how she thinks 
she should deal with it evolves drastically.  Taking her first murder as an example, we can 
see how she hesitates to claim responsibility.  At one moment, Russell alone shuts the men in 
the freezer, but at another it’s Pauline’s limbs, acting almost on their own, that pull the bar 
down.  As the novel progresses, Pauline’s confidence in her own agency increases.  While 
she maintains her characteristic voice through her long descriptive sentences, she loses her 
hesitancy, and as some claim, her ties to reality.  She replaces her uncertainty with elaborate 
descriptions of a religious battle for souls.  My students find Pauline confusing and hard to 
read as indicated by this word cloud of their impressions.   
 321 
 
Figure 7: Word cloud of my students’ reactions to Pauline collected via an IRB approved classroom study in 2016. 
Pauline not only inflicts pain on Erdrich’s flesh and blood readers, but also on her own body 
through self-assigned penances: she wears hair shirts, underwear made out of potato sacks, 
and shoes on the wrong feet.  The literature on Tracks matches this discomfort with critical 
attention that treats Pauline with literary diagnoses ranging from unresolved trauma to a 
borderline personality disorder.89  Although these scholars don’t foreground ethics, their 
work acknowledges the ethical challenge Erdrich raises: Pauline does horrible things that 
these critics, like Pauline herself, try to explain, excuse, or at least understand.  Regardless of 
                                                
89 Connie Jacobs and Lawrence Gross understand her as a victim of unresolved trauma.  
Allan Chavkin and Nancy Feyl Chavkin trace her “psychological deterioration” to a 
borderline personality disorder that causes her to distance herself emotionally from her 
various families (19).  More sympathetically, Gutiérrez-Jones posits that her fantasies result 
from the “sublimation of the injuries that shape her stories” (107).   
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how we make sense out of Pauline,90 the question remains: why pair her with Nanapush?  
How does the position the nun puts us in relate to the grandfather’s appeal?  
 This is the heart of the braided narrative: by pairing two distinct narrators who tell 
two different, and conflicting stories, Erdrich not only forces us to see the multifaceted 
damage of settler colonialism, but also asks us to dwell with the complicated characters who 
are surviving it.  Erdrich attunes her to contemporary debates about how to live in a world 
already harmed by history she narrates;91 Gutiérrez-Jones points to the historical moment 
when Erdrich published the novel: the legal battles that led to the passage of the Native 
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, which helps tribes reclaim their ancestors’ 
bones.  This context unites Nanapaush and Pauline.  Early on, Nanapush acknowledges, but 
rejects, the rumors that blame his delay in burying the Pillagers for “the unrest and curse of 
trouble that struck our people” (4).  Likewise, as we have seen, Pauline’s first guilt is failing 
to bury her own family.  The presence of past generations informs many of the novels 
discussed in this project.  As we saw, in The Round House, places remember the crimes 
committed there, and the very architecture of The Plague of Doves includes the history of the 
place where it was built.  Morrison links her child-narrators to slavery through the stories 
Cholly hears from Blue, and even Scout acknowledges the people who built Finch Landing.   
                                                
90 Erdrich makes sure this descent into madness is also an ascent into sainthood: The Last 
Report of the Miracles At Little No Horse (2001) charts Sister Leopolda’s canonization.     
91 Erdrich alerts her readers to the Allotment policies that allowed the U.S. to seize almost 
two thirds of Native lands, the devastating effects of boarding schools on families, and the 
creepy ever-present role of the church in colonization.   
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Although Tracks lingers on this liminal relationship between the living and the dead, 
just as it attends to the damaging policies of conquest, Erdrich ultimately asks her readers to 
turn towards the living.  In the novel’s penultimate scene, Nanapush sees all his deceased 
relatives whispering among the trees.  Nanapush recalls, 
I stopped, stood among these trees whose flesh was so much older than ours, 
and it was then that my relatives and friends took final leave, abandoned me to 
the living. 
…. She took my arm, showed me how simple it was to follow, how 
comforting to take the step. 
Which I would have done happily, had only the living called from the 
shade. (220) 
Nanapush’s relatives mark their final departure with a tempting invitation for him to join 
them, but because Fleur chose to stay with the living, so does Nanapush.  He stays because 
he feels called to care for Lulu and in turn tells this story to call her to forgive her mother.  
This plea for forgiveness, or at least understanding, resonates with Pauline’s exigency to 
explain the hurt she experiences and causes.  Although it’s clear who bears responsibility for 
and continues to benefit from conquest, Erdrich doesn’t let her characters off the hook 
either—both Pauline and Fleur abandon their daughters and Nanapush admits to axing the 
last birch before he saved the last Pillager.  By following these narrators’ tracks, we find 
ourselves caught among competing claims, some posed in second person: how can we 
balance forgiveness with accountability?  How can we acknowledge a loss we cannot fully 
understand?  When the waters are this muddy, so clouded with wrongs, perhaps we should 
like Nanapush “give them another stir” and make radical claims of attachment as he did for 
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Lulu— an act that is, because he named her after his own deceased daughter, as much an 
honoring of the past as a commitment to the future (61).   
 Like Louise Erdrich, Harper Lee, Toni Morrison, and Nicole Krauss innovate specific 
narrative strategies such as the child-narrator and the braided narrative to help readers 
negotiate these pressing questions of how to negotiate a world where racial and sexual 
violence persist.  Child-narrators activate a sort of attention and concern that their adult 
counterparts do not.  Their naïve perspectives not only assert the ethical claim that the 
content of their stories is wrong for children to hear and experience but also require readers 
to fill in the awful knowledge that the child cannot know.  In The Round House, readers can 
answer the question the child asks “[w]hy did she smell like gas” and understand why Aunt 
Clemence cannot respond (15).  In The Bluest Eye, we know that the fact that “Pecola was 
having her father’s baby” means incestual rape, and we recognize the lynch mob Scout 
cannot (5).  At the same time the authors equip these young raconteurs with subtle lessons—
on Southern pride, case history, or power dynamics— that shift readers thinking.   
While child-narrators help authors to engage specific social issues, the braided 
narrative offers a structure that requires readers to balance multiple, often conflicting 
experiences in our mind simultaneously.  This layering of different versions of events 
proposes a type of empathy that requires difference.  In The History of Love, Alma and Leo 
can recognize each other even though they each remain somewhat trapped in their own 
experiences.  In The Plague of Doves, we can pity Cordelia for her loneliness even as we 
judge her for her racism.  In Tracks, we can recognize that both Nanapush and Pauline suffer 
in different ways from the “Anishinaabe apocalypse,” and, like the characters we can 
question our own complicity in the history the text engages.  In the language of Claudia’s 
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preface to The Bluest Eye: since the “why” of racial and sexual violence “is difficult to 
handle,” “A Child’s Call” “takes refuge in how”—the narrative strategies authors use to push 
readers to engage these issues that still plague our society.  Now, it is left to us to take these 
authors cue and imagine and struggle for a community comprised of radical attachment and 
care.   
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